Post-Crisis Financialization Through Product Innovation: Assessing Complexity, Growth & Design In Exchange Traded Funds by Clements, Ryan
 
Post-Crisis Financialization Through Product Innovation: 
Assessing Complexity, Growth & Design In Exchange Traded Funds 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation 
 
 
 
Submitted to:  
 
 
 
Professor Lawrence G. Baxter, David T. Zhang Professor of the Practice of Law, 
Faculty Director, Global Financial Markets Center, Duke University School of 
Law 
 
Professor James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University 
School of Law 
 
Professor Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Professor of Law, Duke University School 
of Law 
 
Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, The George Washington 
University School of Law 
 
(collectively the “SJD Committee”) 
 
 
 
In partial satisfaction of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) at Duke 
University School of Law, August 30, 2020 
 
 
 
By: 
 
Ryan Clements, BA (Honors, Alberta), LLB (Distinction, Alberta), LLM 
(Magna Cum Laude, Duke), SJD Candidate (Duke), Assistant Professor, Chair 
Business Law & Regulation, University of Calgary Faculty of Law 
 
  
 
 
 
2 
Acknowledgements 
 
 I am tremendously grateful for the support, extensive knowledge, 
insights, analysis, mentorship, and guidance that my entire SJD Committee has 
provided to me throughout this dissertation.  Thank you for sharing your 
substantial knowledge and insights with me. Also, thank you for your advice on 
publishing and academic career matters. I hold each of you in extremely high 
regard, and I hope to grow into the calibre of scholar that each of you are.  
 
 Thank you to the international office at Duke University Law School, 
Dean Jennifer Maher, Suzanne Brown, Rima Idzelis, Dean Oleg Kobelev, and 
the rest of the international office staff.  I am so grateful for your support, 
flexibility (particularly in facilitating my ability to write a substantial portion of 
this dissertation from Canada) and friendship.  Also, to the many students and 
professors at Duke Law, and other faculties, that I’ve had the privilege of 
associating with during my LLM and SJD studies including the Fuqua School of 
Business, the Sanford School of Public Policy, and the Department of 
Economics.  I’m extremely grateful to be able to study at, and be affiliated with, 
Duke University, and I cherish my association with this great institution. 
 
 I’d like to thank Lee Reiners, Executive Director, and other affiliated 
faculty, advisors, board members and fellows of the Duke Global Financial 
Markets Center including Joe Smith, Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin, Tyler 
Gellasch, Professor Nakita Cuttino, and Professor Steven L. Schwarcz for your 
scholarship, insights, opportunities to blog, podcast and participate in many 
engaging and educational events.  I strongly value my affiliation as a non-
resident fellow and hope to contribute much more to the center in the future.  
 
 Thank you to Dean Ian Holloway, Associate Deans Lyndsay Campbell 
and Nickie Nikolaou, Professor Bryce Tingle and other faculty and staff at the 
University of Calgary Faculty of Law for guidance and support as an Assistant 
Professor concurrent with the completion of my dissertation. Also, thank you to 
the many individuals who have aided in the development of the ideas and 
arguments in this dissertation including staff and executives at the Alberta 
Securities Commission, staff at the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
external faculty, regulators and industry stakeholders who provided valuable 
email and in-person discussions, including interactions at events in the U.S., 
Canada and the U.K., the Public Banking Institute, Americans for Financial 
Reform, the Houston Business & Tax Law Journal, the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, the Virginia Law & Business Review, the 
Duke Global Financial Markets Center FinReg Blog and Pod, and the Columbia 
Law School Blue Sky Blog. 
 
Most of all thank you to my family – you’ve supported me in so many 
ways while I pursued my dream at Duke.  Love you all!  
  
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines emerging risks and regulatory concerns in 
exchange traded funds (ETFs).  It makes four core arguments through four 
published or accepted (and forthcoming) law review articles, alongside two 
published blog posts, all of which were written and previously submitted to the 
SJD Committee during the author’s dissertation research period.  These articles 
are organized herein as dissertation chapters together with a contextual 
introduction and a summary conclusion which frames the dissertation within the 
scholarly literature on economic “financialization,” and emerging challenges 
associated with the growth of large interconnected asset managers.   
 
The four core arguments in this dissertation are as follows. First, ETFs 
are operationally reliant on the discretionary behaviors of independent financial 
market intermediaries with instabilities that resemble prior financial products 
including auction rate securities, portfolio insurance and money market mutual 
funds. Second, there is growing support that index products (including ETFs, 
other exchange traded products, and index mutual funds) are contributing to 
market inefficiency and the formation of collective investor behaviors. Third, 
ETFs, and their sponsors, are creating deep and complex interconnections 
between numerous market participants and service providers, down to retail and 
institutional investors, affecting corporate behaviors and decision making. These 
connections generate new direct and indirect systemic risk transmission 
pathways, with unique factors not found in other managed asset products. 
Fourth, ETFs are incredibly difficult, and in some cases impossible, to accurately 
compare side-by-side. Product and performance comparisons would be 
materially improved with standardized website formats and layouts, uniform 
calculation methodologies, the imposition of an ETF naming convention, 
standards for sustainable investment products, and a systematized and structured 
electronic reporting system of key variables to a centrally-hosted data repository.   
 
The dissertation provides extensive support, and a diverse variety of 
applied case studies, in favor of each of the four core arguments.  It also includes 
a unique (and timely) contextual analysis of the events of March 2020 and the 
resulting impact on ETFs due to the coronavirus pandemic - including the 
historically unprecedented intervention in the credit ETF market by the Federal 
Reserve. Given these four core emerging risks and regulatory concerns, the 
dissertation provides three recommendations. First, greater regulatory scrutiny 
and safeguards for giant interconnected asset managers. Second, enhanced 
controls over credit ETF origination, liquidity transformation, and “cash-like” 
tradeable investment products. Third, additional investor-focused disclosure 
reforms to ease ETF product comparisons.  
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Introduction 
 
The diversity, depth, and complexity of tradeable investment products 
has grown tremendously in the U.S. over the last fifty years.1 As a result, a 
tradable financial instrument represents nearly every real economic interest,2 and 
the number of assets under professional management, the amount of money in 
the “market”, the variety and supply of available financial products, the depth of 
“credit intermediation” for both businesses and households, and the breadth of 
“shadow banking”3 continues to expand.4  Financial product innovation did not 
disappear as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis (“GFC”).  Rather, nascent 
financial product innovation has flourished post-GFC in the exchange traded 
product (ETP) market - led by the most successful ETP of all, the exchange 
traded fund (ETF).5   
 
This dissertation assesses emerging risks and regulatory concerns in ETP 
innovation, with a specific focus on ETFs - materially the largest product 
segment.  As a cumulative submission it is perhaps the most comprehensive 
single product on emerging ETF instabilities to date in the academic literature. 
It answers four broad, but related, investigative questions. First, do ETFs have 
design similarities that resemble financial product instabilities from the past? 
Second, are ETPs, ETFs, and other index products contributing to less efficient 
 
1 See generally Michael Collins, Wall Street and The Financialization Of The Economy, 
FORBES (February 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-
and-the-financialization-of-the-economy/#4f6e026d5783; see INVESTOPEDIA, Financialization, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialization.asp. 
2 See Servaas Storm, Financial Markets Have Taken Over The Economy.  To Prevent Another 
Crisis, They Must Be Brought To Heel, INSTITUTE FOR NEW ECONOMIC THINKING (February 
13, 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/financial-markets-have-taken-
over-the-economy-to-stop-the-next-crisis-they-must-be-brought-to-heel.  
3 See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft & Haley Boesky, Shadow Banking, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT 458, 458 (2010) (defining shadow 
banking as “financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation 
without explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees.”); see Mark 
Vandevelde & Sujeet Indap, Apollo: how a private equity giant is navigating the crisis, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (April 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6fce9808-84ab-11ea-b555-
37a289098206 (discussing the rise of shadow banking in the private equity industry). 
4 See generally Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27(2) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3 (2013). 
5 See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, BLOOMBERG 
(September 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-
market/?srnd=etfs; M. Lettau & A. Madhavan, Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for Economists, 
32(1) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 135, 135-138 (2018). 
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markets?  Third, do ETFs create new systemic risks, and (relatedly) could the 
largest asset managers that sponsor ETFs become systemically important to the 
financial system? Fourth, what challenges do investors face when they attempt 
to compare ETFs and their performance side by side? 
 
These four questions are answered in the dissertation as follows. First, 
ETFs are operationally reliant on the discretionary behaviors of independent 
financial market intermediaries, and thus resemble instabilities in prior financial 
products including auction rate securities, portfolio insurance and money market 
mutual funds. These product instabilities were revealed during the coronavirus 
pandemic. Second, index products (including ETFs, ETPs, and index mutual 
funds) are contributing to market inefficiency and the formation of collective 
investor behaviors. Third, ETFs, and their sponsors, are creating deep and 
complex interconnections between numerous market participants and service 
providers, retail and institutional investors, and corporations, with new direct 
and indirect systemic risk transmission pathways and unique factors not found 
in other managed asset products. Fourth, ETFs are incredibly difficult (in some 
cases impossible) to accurately compare side-by-side. Product and performance 
comparisons would be materially improved with standardized website formats 
and layouts, uniform calculation methodologies, the imposition of ETF naming 
conventions, and a systematized and structured electronic reporting system of 
key variables to a centrally hosted data repository. 
 
The dissertation is formatted and presented with this introduction, five 
substantive chapters, a concluding section, and a full bibliography.  Each chapter 
is an article (and in the case of Chapter Two, two separate media articles) that 
have either been independently published as a full law review article during the 
course of the dissertation writing period, or have been accepted as forthcoming 
to be published. Links to independent publication sources are provided in the 
respective Chapter headings.  The cumulative product of this dissertation 
includes four separate and independent full law review articles and two media 
articles.  Also, the author has discussed his work in various media, conference 
presentations, webinars, and podcasts, all of which the SJD Committee has been 
previously advised.  
 
Further, the dissertation provides three core recommendations for the 
ETF sector (also applicable to other ETPs).  First, a call for greater scrutiny and 
safeguards for giant interconnected asset managers (who are also the world’s 
largest ETF sponsors). Second, enhanced regulatory controls over credit ETF 
origination, liquidity transformation, and the proliferation of “cash-like” 
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tradeable investment products. Third, additional investor-focused disclosure 
reforms to ease ETF product comparisons.  
 
ETPs – with a concentrated focus on ETFs – were chosen as the subject 
matter of this doctoral dissertation for several reasons.  First, they have 
experienced remarkable post-GFC growth.  Recent estimates suggest that the 
number of available ETFs have more than quadrupled since 2008, with almost 
nine times market capitalization growth. 6  Further, there are a myriad of 
additional reasons, which will become evident throughout this dissertation, that 
support academic interest in ETFs. This includes, among others: the way these 
products experience viral replication, create new systemic risks and economic 
concentration, contribute to market inefficiency, utilize synthetics, leverage and 
derivatives, exhibit similarities to instabilities in prior financial products, 
obscure investor comparisons, align with emerging studies on economic 
“financialization,” and give rise to a host of regulatory considerations. 
 
The four investigative questions allow for both a micro-level analysis on 
the unique risks of the products themselves, and the challenges investors face in 
understanding these risks and conducting product comparisons; and a macro-
level analysis on how these products, and the firms that sponsor them, are 
contributing to systemic risk and general market instabilities. Each investigative 
channel navigates applicable regulations, presents numerous specific case 
studies to illustrate concerns, advocates for areas of needed regulatory reform, 
and points to additional investigation worthy of future study. The four specific 
investigative questions, and how they are answered in the dissertation, are as 
follows.  
 
The first investigative question asks whether ETFs have design 
similarities that resemble financial product instabilities from the past? 
Particularly, it investigates the extent that ETFs rely on financial intermediaries 
(who operate with discretionary incentives) for their smooth operation; and 
whether they offer the promise of perpetual liquidity which could prove illusive 
in a crisis.  This question is answered in Chapter One (a reproduction of an article 
published in Volume 20 (January 2020) of the Houston Business and Tax Law 
 
6 ETFGI Global reports that from 2008 to 2019 the number of ETFs worldwide grew from 
1617 to 6940, while the value of assets held in ETF products, during the same period also grew 
from $716 billion to over $6 trillion.  See ETGFI, ETFGI report assets in the global ETFs and 
ETPs industry which will turn 30 years old in March started the new decade with a record 6.35 
trillion US dollars (January 16, 2020), https://etfgi.com/news/press-releases/2020/01/etfgi-
reports-assets-global-etfs-and-etps-industry-which-will-turn-30. 
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Journal7), Chapter Two (a reproduction of two articles, one published in April 
2020 on the Duke Global Financial Markets Center FinReg blog,8 and the other 
published in April 2020 on the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Corporate and 
Securities Blog9), and Chapter Five (an article which is forthcoming in the 
Virginia Law and Business Review). 10  These articles show that ETFs are 
operationally reliant on the discretionary behaviors of independent financial 
market intermediaries, and as a result are vulnerable in a crisis. 
 
ETFs exhibit similarities to portfolio insurance in the lead up to the 
October 19, 1987 “Black Monday” stock market crash, and auction rate 
securities (ARS) which failed during the GFC. Both products contributed to 
market instabilities during periods of financial panic.  The events of March 2020 
and the coronavirus pandemic (which are noted in the introduction below, and 
prominently discussed in Chapters Two, Four and Five) provide additional 
support to an affirmative answer to this first investigative question. The 
coronavirus pandemic, and the Federal Reserve’s historically unprecedented 
support for ETFs in an effort to stabilize credit markets (an event which is 
discussed extensively below and in Chapters Two, Four and Five), also provide 
support that cash-like ETFs resemble fragilities in Money Market Mutual Funds 
(MMMFs).11  
 
The operational reliance on independent discretionary actors in ETFs 
creates a unique risk that intermediaries can stop providing liquidity, or 
performing arbitrage, if it suits them to do so, during periods of market 
instability. This risk doesn’t exist, to the same extent, in other index products 
(like index mutual funds), but it was exhibited in both ARS and portfolio 
insurance. Chapters Two and Five highlight how this risk manifested during the 
March 2020 market sell-off associated with the coronavirus pandemic, resulting 
in unprecedented instability and ETF trading price dislocations from their net 
 
7 See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make Markets 
Less Stable? Part I, Liquidity Illusions, 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J. 15 (2020). 
8 See Ryan Clements, What Have We Learned So Far About ETFs In The COVID-19 Crisis, 
DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS CENTER FINREG BLOG 
(April 3, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/04/03/what-have-we-learned-so-
far-about-etfs-in-the-covid-19-crisis/#comment-668. 
9 See Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL BLUE SKY BLOG (April 7, 2020), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/04/07/are-etfs-making-some-asset-managers-too-
interconnected-to-fail/. 
10
 Ryan Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine Product 
Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds, VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming, Fall 2020) 
11
 See infra, Chapters Two, Four & Five. 
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asset value (NAV), and intervention by the Federal Reserve. Given this 
instability, and the growing importance of ETFs in financial markets these 
various Chapters advocate for heightened regulatory safeguards and academic 
attention in the ETF market.  
 
The second investigative question asks whether ETPs, ETFs and other 
index products are contributing to less efficient markets? Here two sub-channels 
are investigated. First, what role do index products play in coordinating 
destructive and volatile collective behaviors like information cascades, investor 
herds, and financial contagion?  Second, to what extent are ETFs, along with 
other index-tracking products, distorting the informational value of underlying 
asset and securities prices, and disincentivizing active price discovery, in a way 
that masks market risk?  This second investigative question is largely answered 
in Chapter Three, an article that is accepted to be published in the Spring 2021 
edition of the Houston Business and Tax Law Journal,12 with related discussions 
in Chapters Two, Four and Five (in relation to the events associated with the 
coronavirus pandemic and the Fed’s unprecedented intervention to ward off 
further systemic impacts). These Chapters build on the theoretical underpinnings 
of Chapter One by showing that despite their popularity, index products 
(including ETPs and ETFs) may also be making the financial system less stable 
and decreasing market efficiency.   
 
In answering (in the affirmative) this second investigative question, 
Chapter Three also posits that ETPs and ETFs may be introducing two 
“interaction risks” into financial markets due to their complex (and opaque) 
operational and trading ecosystem.  First, ETFs could be contributing to 
information cascades, facilitating investor herding, and increasing the potential 
for financial contagion and feedback selling between ETF and underlying asset 
markets.  Second, ETFs, ETPs and other index-based products (including index 
mutual funds), could be distorting the informational responsiveness and 
efficiency of underlying asset and securities prices, and disincentivizing active 
price discovery, in a way that masks market risk.   
 
The third investigative question asks whether ETFs create any new 
systemic risks, and (relatedly) could the largest asset managers that sponsor these 
products become systemically important to the financial system? This question 
is answered in Chapter Four - a reproduction of an article published in Volume 
22, Issue 4 (August 2020) of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business 
 
12 See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Are Exchange Traded Funds Making 
Markets Less Stable? Part II Interaction Risks (forthcoming) HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J. 15 (2021). 
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Law.13  It argues that ETF’s success could be making some asset managers “too 
interconnected to fail.”  It illustrates how ETFs, and their sponsors, are creating 
deep and complex interconnections between numerous market participants and 
service providers, down to retail and institutional investors, and affecting 
corporate behaviors and decision making.  
 
Chapter Four also shows how these connections generate new direct and 
indirect systemic risk transmission pathways, with unique factors not found in 
other managed asset products.  It then shows how the effective monitoring of 
ETF systemic risk requires a cross-market analysis to assess the collective 
behaviors of numerous participants in a complex and interconnected operating 
ecosystem, and how both activity and entity-level oversight is prudent.  It 
suggests that despite ETF firms being distinct from banks and insurance 
companies, there’s merit in imposing heightened regulatory parameters given 
their centrality in a highly interconnected ecosystem, the way they disseminate 
“cash like” ETFs, and the way the government intervened in, and supported the 
ETF market during the COVID-19 crisis.14  Details of the Fed’s intervention, 
and how ETFs add to the transmission of systemic risk and instability during a 
crisis is also illustrated in Chapters Two and Five.15 
 
The fourth investigative question asks what challenges investors face 
when they attempt to compare ETFs and their performance side by side? This 
question is answered in Chapter Five (an article that is accepted and forthcoming 
to be published in the Virginia Law & Business Review).16  This Chapter reveals 
that, despite their central use in modern capital markets, ETFs are incredibly 
difficult to accurately compare side-by-side.  Investors face concurrent 
challenges of product choice overload, opaque index construction methodology, 
and a wide array of discretionary operational, management, marketing, and 
financial practices of ETF sponsors that undermine simple product and 
performance comparisons.17 The challenge in comparing ETFs is compounded 
by disclosure effectiveness limitations given investor cognitive tendencies and 
behavioral inclinations.18  
 
 
13 Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 22(4) 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 722 (2020). 
14
 See infra, Chapter Two, Four & Five. 
15
 See infra, Chapter Two & Five. 
16 See Clements, supra note 10. 
17
 See infra, Chapter Five. 
18
 Id. 
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Chapter Five also advocates for continued investor-focused reform in 
ETFs, building off encouraging actions recently taken by the U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission in its 2019 “Rule 6c-11” under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.19 This chapter makes several recommendations to improve ETF 
product comparisons including standardizing website formats and layouts for 
information presentation, uniform calculation methodologies of key ETF 
variables, an ETF naming convention, and standard terms for sustainable 
investment products.  ETF investors would also greatly benefit from a 
systematized and structured electronic reporting mechanism where standardized 
data could be provided by ETF sponsors to a centrally controlled public 
repository.20 
 
In answering these four questions the dissertation extensively illuminates 
the history, demand factors, institutional and cultural back-story of ETPs and 
ETFs. It provides descriptive statistics of the market size, product variety, and 
uses by both retail and institutional investors. It identifies the various parties (and 
incentives) that exist in a complex and opaque operational ecosystem, reliant on 
a novel but discretionary “arbitrage” mechanism. It also establishes parallels 
between ETP and ETF innovation, intermediary incentives, product structure 
and design, and the use of leverage and derivatives, with financial products from 
the past. It shows how ETFs, and the increasingly centralized firms who control 
their dissemination, are generating new systemic risks through interconnectivity; 
and how current regulatory structures in the U.S. are insufficient to adequately 
curtail such risks. Finally, it reveals how industry discretion and disclosure 
inefficiencies are undermining investor efforts to perform simple “side-by-side” 
ETF product comparisons.  
 
The cumulative product of this work fits squarely within a growing body 
of scholarship on the externalities associated with economic “financialization” 
and financial product innovation – topics which will be discussed in the 
dissertation’s conclusion.21 It also relates to the work of Hyman Minsky and his 
“Money Manager Capitalism Hypothesis” (MMCH). 22   Minsky’s “financial 
 
19
 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Exchange Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 33,646 (September 25, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 57,162, 57,166 (Oct. 24, 2019) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 232, 239, 270, 274), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf. 
20
 See infra, Chapter Five. 
21
 See infra, Conclusion. 
22 See L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis, 
Working Paper 661, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE (1996); Hyman Minsky, 
Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies, Working Paper 155, LEVY 
 
 
 
15 
instability hypothesis” (which has grown in prominence since the GFC) 
theorized a cyclical pattern whereby banks and other financial intermediaries 
endogenously destabilize the financial system by introducing increasingly risky 
credit and financial products while searching for profits during periods of 
economic tranquility.23 
 
Yet in lesser known, but equally prescient scholarship, Minsky cautioned 
against the disruptive impact that large asset managers might have on the 
financial and economic system.24  The MMCH posits that financial markets 
evolve due to the profit seeking activities of financial firms themselves, not just 
those businesses undertaking traditional or “productive” enterprises, and that this 
makes the financial system more fragile, while increasing the size and power of 
the largest financial intermediaries. 25  This dissertation, including its intra-
chapter discussions of the ETF market during the coronavirus pandemic, 
compliments the MMCH as it shows how the financial system is becoming more 
interconnected, more volatile, and less stable because of the proliferation of 
ETFs, while the firms that propagate these products are becoming increasingly 
powerful and influential, not just within the economic system but also to 
governments themselves.26  
 
An unprecedented market event (the coronavirus pandemic), that 
occurred during the writing of this dissertation, facilitated a live observational 
environment to test the author’s investigations relating to ETF product 
instability, and the systemic influence of the largest ETF issuers. As such, 
extensive commentary relating to ETF behavior and fallout during the 
coronavirus pandemic is featured prominently in Chapters Two, Four and Five.27  
A brief overview of these events, and the resulting regulatory and scholarly 
ramifications is provided here as follows.  
 
 
ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE (1996); Hyman P. Minsky, Money Manager 
Capitalism, HYMAN P. MINSKY ARCHIVE. Paper 13 (1989), 
http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/13; C.J. Whalen, (2002), Money manager 
capitalism: Still here, but not quite as expected, 36(2) J. OF ECON. ISSUES (2002). 
23 See Hyman P. Minsky The Financial Instability Hypothesis, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF 
BARD COLLEGE WORKING PAPER NO. 74 (May 1992); Minsky, H.P. Financial instability 
revisited: The economics of disaster. 3 REAPPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT 
MECHANISM 97 (1972). 
24 See Wray supra note 22. 
25 See H.P Minsky, Schumpeter and finance, in Salvatore Biasco, Alessandro Roncaglia, and 
Michele Salvati (eds), MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF PAULO SYLOS LABINI (1993). 
26 See infra, Chapters One, Two, Three & Five. 
27
 See infra, Chapter Two, Four, Five. 
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In March 2020, as the market grasped the potential impact of the 
pandemic, historic price discounts from net asset value (NAV) emerged in the 
secondary market trading prices of a wide variety of ETFs.28  Corporate credit 
(particularly high-yield and “junk bond” varieties) and emerging market ETFs 
were the most severely impacted, and these products exhibited unprecedented 
trading price discounts from NAV.29 Trading discounts from NAV were also 
witnessed, however, in normally “ultra-stable” short-maturity bond ETFs.30  
 
The trading price discounts from NAV in bond ETFs occurred because 
critical financial market intermediaries in the ETF ecosystem (authorized 
participants or “APs” – prominent market players who will be featured 
throughout this dissertation31) and other market makers stopped performing 
arbitrage in credit ETFs as liquidity and trading volume in underlying bond 
markets disappeared.32 Bond markets became opaque, volatile and expensive 
(manifest through increasingly widened bid-ask spreads),33 and APs, who were 
also managing their own risks during this period of increasing uncertainty, 
backed away from performing the critical arbitrage function that’s necessary to 
align ETF trading prices with their underlying NAV.34  
 
Chapter One of this dissertation contends that ETFs rely on financial 
intermediaries (these APs who create and redeem ETFs directly with ETF 
 
28
 See Gillian Tett, ETFs are the canary in the bond coal mine, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 29, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6bdc7747-3ab9-4410-a4b2-ba9acbe204e8; Lewis Braham, 
Emerging Market ETF Pricing Another Victim of the Coronavirus Outbreak, BARRON’S 
(March 26, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/emerging-market-etf-pricing-another-
victim-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak-51585217700; Clements, supra note 8; Andrea Riquier, 
ETFS behaving badly: ‘exactly what they are supposed to do’ or ‘just what we feared’? 
MARKETWATCH (March 28, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-to-think-
about-the-turbulence-in-etf-pricing-and-heres-what-to-do-about-it-2020-03-27. 
29
 See Sirio Aramonte & Fernando Avalos, The recent distress in corporate bond markets: 
cues from ETFs, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BULLETIN NO. 6 (April 14, 2020), 
1-4, available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull06.pdf; See Dawn Lim, Bond ETFs Flash 
Warning Signs of Growing Mismatch, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 23, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bond-etfs-flash-warning-signs-of-growing-mismatch-
11584964801. 
30
 See Brian Chappatta, Bond ETFs Will Never Be The Same After Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (March 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-
23/coronavirus-bond-etfs-will-never-be-the-same-after-this-crisis; see Lim, supra note 13.  
31
 See infra, Chapter One, Four & Five.  
32
 See Katherine Greifeld & Luke Kawa, Fed’s Historic Step Into Credit Markets May Cure 
ETF Dislocations, BLOOMBERG (March 23, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-23/fed-credit-backstop-fuels-surge-in-
investment-grade-bond-etfs; see Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 13 at 4. 
33
 See id. 
34
 See Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 29 at 1-4. 
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sponsors, as well as market makers who assist in arbitrage and price to NAV 
coupling through secondary market selling operations).35 These intermediaries 
operate with discretionary incentives, not legal obligations, and ETFs rely on 
them for their smooth operation and stability.36  Chapter One analogizes ETFs 
to both auction rate securities (ARS) in 2008, and portfolio insurance in 1987 
given a similar reliance on intermediaries with discretionary incentives.37 The 
events that materialized in the ETF market during the initial coronavirus 
pandemic sell-off strengthens the comparison to both products.  
 
The ARS market needed financial intermediaries to provide liquidity 
support to ARS product auctions (despite being under no legal obligation to do 
so), and the ARS market failed when dealers withdrew from the market as their 
internal risk profile changed due to losses from the 2008 crisis.38   In the ETF 
market during the March 2020 sell-off bond dealers stopped supporting fixed 
income markets, and this uncertainty materially impaired the arbitrage function 
leading to historic price discounts from NAV.39 Also, the breakdown of arbitrage 
performance in ETFs by APs and market makers during the worst of the March 
2020 sell-off strengthens the comparisons to the events of October 19, 1987 
(“Black Monday”) when index futures and cash prices decoupled because 
arbitrageurs couldn’t accurately assess prices in the midst of the panic, and thus 
retreated undermining market stability and exacerbating the sell-off.40 
 
Dramatic price dislocations persisted in credit ETFs until the Federal 
Reserve intervened (for the first time ever in the ETF market) with its Secondary 
Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF),41 and only after that point did ETF 
prices realign with their underlying NAV.42 Prior to the SMCCF the Federal 
 
35
 See infra, Chapter One. 
36
 See Clements, supra note 7 at 25-26. 
37
 Id. at 45-51.  
38
 Id. 
39
 See Greifeld & Luke Kawa supra note 32. 
40
 See Clements, supra note 7 at 45-49; see Floyd Norris, A Computer Lesson Still Unlearned, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2012),https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/business/a-computer-lesson-
from-1987-stillunlearned-by-wall-street.html; Mark Carlson, Fed. Red. Bd., 2007-13, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
RESPONSE IN FINANCE AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, DIV. OF RES. STAT. & MONETARY 
AFFAIRS (Nov. 2006), at 11-12. 
41
 FEDERAL RESERVE, POLICY TOOLS, SECONDARY MARKET CORPORATE CREDIT FACILITY, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm (last visited June 28, 2020). 
42
 See Katherine Greifeld, One Month of Fed ETF Buying Redraws $4 Trillion Market 
Contours, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-
16/a-month-of-fed-bond-etf-buying-and-what-it-did-to-markets. 
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Reserve had never purchased credit ETFs;43 yet they felt such an unprecedented 
move was necessary to stabilize markets, bank exposure to risk, and prevent 
further runs on underlying bonds and other fixed income products (like fixed 
income mutual funds).44   
 
The Fed’s move to purchase ETFs is controversial since BlackRock (the 
world’s largest ETF sponsor – another entity which will be prominently featured 
throughout this dissertation) was given a no-bid contract to oversee ETF 
purchases, and a mandate to even purchase its own funds.45 As this dissertation 
will show, conflict fears have materialized as a significant number of the Fed 
financed ETFs have been BlackRock products.46 Such fears, and the growing 
influence of BlackRock’s “Aladdin” risk management and modelling technology 
will be discussed in Chapter Four in support of heightened prudential regulation 
for the world’s largest asset managers and ETF sponsors.47  
 
The coronavirus pandemic crisis is also significant because it lends 
support to contentions in Chapters Four and Five that ETFs are being used as 
cash substitutes, and thus should be subject to enhanced prudential regulation.48 
It also provides comparative support that certain types of ETFs (short-duration 
credit products) are analogous to money market mutual funds (MMMFs), which 
were also used as cash substitutes in the lead up to the 2008 crisis and also needed 
government support after investing in risky asset-backed commercial paper.49  
 
43
 See Andrea Riquier, The Fed is Going to Buy ETFs. What Does It Mean? MARKETWATCH 
(March 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fed-is-going-to-buy-etfs-what-
does-it-mean-2020-03-23. 
44
 See Katherine Greifeld, Fed Lifeline Saves Bond Funds Teetering on Brink of ETF Hell, 
BLOOMBERG (March 28, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-28/fed-
lifeline-shields-bond-funds-teetering-on-brink-of-etf-hell; See Greifeld & Luke Kawa supra 
note 16. 
45
 See Richard Henderson & Robin Wigglesworth, Fed’s big boost for BlackRock raises 
eyebrows on Wall Street, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 27, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/08b897a5-aadb-40d7-922c-431154ed968a. 
46
 See Matthew Boesler, Katherine Greifeld & Catarina Saraiva, Fed Reveals ETFs It 
Purchased in Emergency Lending Program, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-29/fed-reveals-which-etfs-it-purchased-in-
emergency-lending-program. 
47
 See infra, Chapter Four. 
48
 See infra, Chapter Four & Five; see Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef 
Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC 
COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (June 2019), 3-4, 28-29, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf; see Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 13 at 1-4. 
49
 See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS, (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2014); 195-96, (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely 
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The Fed’s support of short-duration credit ETFs in the coronavirus 
pandemic, and these product’s act of “liquidity transformation” in turning 
illiquid bonds into cash substitutes (a concept that will be discussed extensively 
throughout the dissertation, particularly in Chapters Four and Five 50 ), has 
similarities to the MMMF market in 2008.51  Given these similarities Chapters 
Four and Five advocate for additional investigation into whether MMMF 
safeguards, such as prophylactic mechanisms, stress tests, additional disclosures, 
and primary market creation and redemption safeguards could also be applicable 
to ETFs.52   
 
 In conclusion, there are three core recommendations that emerge from 
the cumulative product of this dissertation. First, there is a need for greater 
regulatory scrutiny and enhanced safeguards for the largest interconnected asset 
managers (the “mega” ETF sponsors).  As this dissertation (particularly Chapter 
Four, but also Chapters Two and Five) will reveal, some ETF sponsors may 
becoming “too interconnected to fail” resulting in growing levels of economic 
(and market) concentration, complex layers of operational interconnectivity, the 
introduction of new systemic risks, model risks (such as Aladdin), and 
government influence (primarily BlackRock). 53   Enhanced safeguards are 
warranted given their central interconnection in a complex financial ecosystem, 
as well as the unprecedented Federal Reserve support for ETF markets during 
the coronavirus pandemic, their interconnection and relationship to credit 
markets, and the way BlackRock and other major ETF sponsors have benefited 
from governmental intervention.54 
 
 The second recommendation is for enhanced controls over credit ETF 
origination, liquidity transformation, and the origination and trading of “cash-
 
viewed as virtually indistinguishable from bank deposits as similarly safe vehicles for storing 
cash with slightly better interest rates”); Martin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe 
Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24(1) J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES. 29, 34-7 (2010). 
50
 See infra, Chapters Four & Five. 
51
 See Clements, supra note 13 at 70; see infra, Chapters Four & Five. 
52
 See infra Chapter Five; See Eva Su, Money Market Mutual Funds: A Financial Stability 
Case Study, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IN Focus (March 24, 2020), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11320; see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 
Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules, (July 23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2014-
143#:~:text=Website%20Disclosure%20%E2%80%93%20Money%20market%20funds,use%2
0of%20affiliate%20sponsor%20support. 
53
 See infra, Chapter Four & Five. 
54
 See id.  
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like” investment products from asset managers. These are the fastest growing 
ETF market segments. As noted in Chapters Two and Five, credit and “cash like” 
ETFs exhibited historic secondary market price dislocations from net asset value 
during the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic while performing “liquidity 
transformation” on underlying bonds. 55  These products revealed arbitrage 
fragility and financial intermediary “step-away” risk (as identified in Chapter 
One)56 and investor herd risk (as identified in Chapter Three)57, strengthening 
comparisons throughout this dissertation to ARS, portfolio insurance, and 
MMMFs.  Further, this new “implicit backstop” of the Federal Reserve to the 
ETF market reveals the extent of credit ETF “interconnection” to the real 
economy, and the potential for contagion and feedback selling to underlying 
bond market and mutual funds, while industry trends also flag new credit moral 
hazard and “originate to distribute” risks.58  
 
 The third recommendation from this dissertation is that the ETF industry 
would greatly benefit from additional “investor-focused” reforms to ease the 
plight of investors who attempt to assess products side-by-side. As will become 
evident from Chapter Five, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible in some 
cases) to accurately compare ETFs against each other.59 Given the variety of 
ETF specific risks, the opacity of the ETF operational ecosystem, and the 
documented performance instabilities in this sector, further investor-focused 
reforms are a worthwhile regulatory undertaking. As detailed in Chapter Five, 
there is a strong impetus for standardized website formats, uniform calculation 
methodologies, the imposition of ETF naming conventions, and a systematized 
and structured electronic reporting of key variables to central repository.60  
  
 
55
 See infra, Chapter Two & Five. 
56
 See infra, Chapter One. 
57
 See infra, Chapter Three. 
58
 See infra, Chapter Four & Five. 
59
 See infra, Chapter Five. 
60
 Id.  
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Chapter I: Exchange Traded Funds & “Liquidity Illusions” 
 
The following chapter was published in January 2020 at 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J. 15 (2020) 
as “New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make Markets Less Stable? Part 
I, Liquidity Illusions” and is available online here: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3343976  
 
i. Abstract 
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
have exploded in popularity. An ETF is an investment product that tracks an 
underlying index or basket of assets, such as securities, bonds, or commodities. 
However, unlike other types of popular investment products—like mutual 
funds—ETFs trade like stocks. Thus, many view ETFs as superior to mutual 
funds because they give average investors instant, low-cost diversification in a 
product that can be bought or sold throughout the trading day on a national 
exchange. 
 
ETFs will likely house a sizeable share of American retirement savings 
in the future as they become the preferred investment vehicle for institutions, 
high frequency traders, and wealth managers. This shift, however, could also 
present a worrisome risk. While ETFs appear to offer the benefits of lower 
transaction costs and the ability to buy or sell quickly, this near-perfect liquidity 
could prove illusory when it matters most: during a market crash or a full-blown 
financial crisis. This two-part study investigates interaction risks in the ETF 
market. This Article shows how ETFs can create liquidity risk by operating in a 
complex ecosystem that is dependent on the discretionary behaviors of financial 
institutions. Case studies on portfolio insurance in the 1980’s and the auction 
rate securities market failure in 2008 also illustrate how reliance on discretionary 
actors to provide liquidity and perform arbitrage in a crisis can be illusory and 
fragile. 
 
It is impossible to predict exactly how or when a new crisis will arrive. 
Yet, the popularity of ETFs as an asset class, the increased connection between 
Main Street and Wall Street, the potential liquidity risks, and the long-term 
uncertainty about the effects of passive investment practices on the economy 
make ETFs a prime candidate for heightened consumer financial protection, 
regulatory action, and academic attention 
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ii. Introduction 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) made Americans “deeply 
distrustful” of Wall Street.61  Most citizens have very little in common with a 
Wall Street firm.62  Yet since the GFC, a relatively new financial product– the 
Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) – has created a common bond between main 
street, institutional investors and major Wall Street firms.63  ETFs are investment 
products that trade on exchanges (like stocks) but “track an underlying index” or 
basket of assets (like securities, bonds or commodities).64 They give average 
investors low-cost instant diversification, in a single click of a mouse, with a 
product that can be bought or sold throughout the day on a national stock 
exchange like the NYSE.65 While mutual funds - perhaps the most important 
investment vehicle in the history of U.S. markets - also provide passive index 
and diversified asset exposure, ETFs are seen by many as superior since they 
offer secondary market, intra-day, trading at lower fees and tax advantages.66 
 
Given their numerous benefits, 67  the post-GFC ETF market has 
experienced remarkable growth.68 Recent estimates peg the U.S. market at $3.4 
trillion, up from pre-GFC levels of just over $500 billion.69   The menu of 
available ETFs have surged worldwide from 1622 in 2008 to 6478 in 2018,70 
 
61 See Quentin Fottrell, 10 Years After Lehman Brothers Collapse, People Are ‘Deeply 
Distrustful’ of Wall Street, MARKETWATCH (September 23, 2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-years-after-lehman-brothers-collapse-are-people-
smarter-with-their-money-2018-09-17. 
62 See Heesun Wee, The Problem With Wall Street Greed 5 Years After The Crash, CNBC 
(September 13, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/id/101022751.  
63 See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, BLOOMBERG 
(September 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-
market/?srnd=etfs. 
64 See James Chen, Exchange Traded Fund (ETF), INVESTOPEDIA (January 16, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/etf.asp.  
65 Id.  
66 See ETF GUIDE, Why ETFs Are Beating Mutual Funds, SEEKING ALPHA (July 13, 2018), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4187043-etfs-beating-mutual-funds.  
67 See infra Section II(iii). 
68 For an analysis of the growth in the global ETF market from 2003 to 2018 see STATISTA, 
Development of Assets of Global Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) From 2003 to 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/224579/worldwide-etf-assets-under-management-since-
1997/ (last visited May 31, 2019).  
69 See Eva Su, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs): Issues For Congress, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT R45318, 1 (September 24, 2018), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45318.pdf. 
70 See STATISTA, Number of Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) Worldwide From 2003 to 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/278249/global-number-of-etfs/ (last visited May 31, 2019). 
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and these products are expected to house a sizeable share of American retirement 
savings in the foreseeable future. 71  Also, ETFs are a preferred habitat for 
institutional investors, high-frequency trading programs (HF trading) and 
algorithmic wealth managers (robo-advisers). 72  And yet, ETFs present a 
potentially worrisome73 paradox, and have polarized market participants.74  On 
the one hand, they create the appearance of nearly perfect liquidity – the ability 
to buy or sell instantly with very low transaction costs. Yet, as this article will 
show, this liquidity could prove both illusory and fragile when it matters most, 
like during a stock market crash or a full-blown financial crisis, because it relies 
on the discretionary behaviors of intermediating financial institutions in a 
complex operational ecosystem.75  
 
In the U.S., ETFs lack a unified regulatory framework and naming 
convention (they’re often conflated with more complex 76  Exchange Traded 
Products (ETP)).77 They’ve also stimulated a host of concerns about complexity, 
 
71 See Su, supra note 69. 
72 See Dominic Litz, Risk, Reward, Robo-Advisers: Are Automated Investment Platforms 
Acting In Your Best Interest? 18 J. HIGH TECH. L. 367 (2018). 
73 See Noah Smith, It’s Smart To Worry About ETFs, BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-05/it-s-smart-to-worry-about-etfs.  
74 See Rachel Evans, The Debate Over Bond ETFs Rages on The Sidelines at Milken, 
BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-01/-hero-or-
villain-bond-etf-debate-rages-on-the-milken-sidelines. 
75 The reliance on discretionary actors to maintain the integrity and stability of the ETF 
ecosystem has been cited recently by several researchers, and will be discussed in detail in this 
article, see Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded 
Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018); see Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, The SEC and 
Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Commendable Start and a Welcome Invitation., 92 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2019); CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Exchange Traded Fund Discussion 
Paper (2017), 41-51, available at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/publications/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-6/discussion-paper-6---exchange-
traded-funds.pdf (hereinafter “CBI Discussion Paper”); DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING 
CORPORATION, The Next Crisis Will Be Different: Opportunities To Continue Enhancing 
Financial Stability 10 Years After Lehman’s Insolvency, INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER (September 
2018) at 13-14 (hereinafter “DTCC”); Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and 
Systemic Risks of Exchange Traded Funds, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 
WORKING PAPER NO. 343 (April 2011), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/work343.pdf 
(hereinafter “BIS ETF study”). 
76 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 916; see also Martin Small, 
Don’t Confuse ETFs with ETPs, BUSINESS INSIDER (February 11, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/dont-confuse-etfs-with-etps-2018-2. 
77 The discretionary, exemption-based, regulatory framework for ETFs has recently been 
described by Professors Henry T.C. Hu and John D. Morley as exhibiting a “cubbyhole 
problem.” See Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 889 
(the authors propose the first “unified” ETF regulatory framework for products that exhibit an 
“arbitrage mechanism” between a secondary and primary market). ; See also Hu & Morley, A 
Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 1159.  The U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission has 
also recently provided for a simplified approval process for certain classifications of new ETFs.  
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opacity and contagion risk, 78  counterparty and collateral risk for synthetic 
ETFs,79 and price and information inefficiency for underlying assets.80  They 
may also increase systemic risk since they extend the “financial intermediation 
chain”81 and behaved peculiarly during periods of market volatility in 2010, 
2015, and 2018.82   
 
Another concern is “concentration risk” since three ETF sponsors - 
Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street - account for over 83% of the U.S. ETF 
market and these firms could become systemically important in the future.83 
Equally concerning is the “shift to passive investing from active management” 
which has reduced a market “stabilizer”- active arbitragers who will mitigate a 
crisis by buying under-valued assets during a selloff.84  Evidencing this trend, 
passive investment vehicle ownership of U.S. equities will soon cross the 50 
percent threshold85 and ETFs, as a growing significant portion of the passive 
index universe, could be facilitating more speculative market trading activity.86 
 
See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Proposes New Approval Process For 
Certain Exchange-Traded Funds (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2018-118. 
78 See DTCC supra note 75 at 13-14. 
79 See CBI Discussion Paper, supra note 75 at 41-51. 
80 See Doron Israeli, Charles M.C. Lee & Suhas A. Sridharan, Is There A Dark Side To 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) An Information Perspective, 22 REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING 
STUDIES 1048, 1048-1050 (2017). 
81 See BIS ETF study, supra note 75; see also Stefano Battiston, Guido Caldarelli, Robert M. 
May, Tarik Roukny, & Joseph Stiglitz, The Price Of Complexity In Financial Markets, 113(36) 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
PNAS 10031, 10031-10036 (September 2016), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1521573113; see also Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A 
Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012). 
82 See Su, supra note 69 at 17-20; see also Hu & Morley, A Commendable Start, supra note 75 
at 1174. 
83 See Su, supra note 69 at 16; see also Owen Walker, Funds ‘snowball’ means big firms can 
only get bigger, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1611bea8-68d3-
11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11. 
84 See Joanna Ossinger, JPMorgan Sees ‘Violent’ Markets on Volatility-Liquidity Loop, 
BLOOMBERG (April 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
08/jpmorgan-blames-violent-markets-on-volatility-liquidity-loop; see also John Gittelsohn, The 
$1.9 Trillion Fund Giant With a Crazy Idea About Investing, BLOOMBERG (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-14/the-1-9-trillion-fund-giant-with-a-
crazy-idea-about-investing. 
85 See Erin Arvedlund, John Bogle pens WSJ op-ed warning index funds becoming too big, THE 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (November 29, 2018), http://www2.philly.com/philly/business/john-
bogle-vanguard-wsj-index-funds-blackrock-state-street-fidelity-20181129.html. 
86 See William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange Traded Funds: A Positive 
Market Response To The Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 94-95 (2008); see 
also Ricardo Crisostomo & Jorge Medina, ETFs and Financial Stability; A Compendium of 
Possible Risk Sources, CNMV BULLETIN QUARTER IV, 71, 75 (2018) (“Empirical studies 
suggest that investors who acquire shares in ETFs hold them for a shorter period than they 
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Concerns have also been cited about potential conflicts of interest in ETF’s use 
of collateral,87 and leverage.88  An in-depth analysis of every ETF concern is 
beyond the scope of this article; however, they are worthy of individual academic 
consideration.  
 
Ironically, one of the more important people in the creation of the ETF 
also became a strong critic -Vanguard’s late founder John Bogle.89 Prior to his 
death, Bogle worried about ETFs (and passive investing at large) creating a 
“tragedy of the commons” problem since what’s rational for individual investors 
(diversification, low fee investing) could weaken the market as a whole.90  Bogle 
also saw increased volatility and impaired price discovery through the decline of 
active investing (with less people wanting to “beat” the market, and more 
wanting to just “own” it)91  and noted the “momentum” effects of a market 
dominated by “trend traders” such as “algorithmic or programmatic trading 
systems” who could move in coordinated herds within the ETF ecosystem.92 
 
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (America’s largest post-
trade infrastructure provider) 93  recently described growth, and liquidity 
uncertainties, in the ETF market as “two of the most significant post-crisis 
evolutions that could be potential sources of systemic market-related risks.”94  
Yet the ETF market is understudied, and in a recent article proposing the U.S.’s 
first “unified” regulation framework for ETFs, Professors Henry T.C. Hu and 
 
would have if they had invested directly in the underlying assets. Low transaction costs and 
their continuous trading may make ETFs (i) more liquid than the reference securities and (ii) 
more attractive than other types of CIS. ETFs can therefore attract short-term investors and 
high-frequency traders (HFTs) to a greater extent.”) 
87 See Crisostomo & Medina, supra note 86 at 77-78. 
88 Id. at 79. 
89 See John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds A Warning on Index Funds, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(November 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-
1543504551?mod=trending_now_4. 
90 David Thomas, A Warning From The Late John Bogle, FORBES (February 12, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-
bogle/?fbclid=IwAR2nJ2IRa12gI7zP5xLX3oALr5CwcctcoR21ccSk7tgAMczd46mRy5m9P-
Q#53dbcf022b99. (“As with any tragedy of the commons, indexing is the sensible thing for 
each individual to do, but each individual should remember that many sensible ideas, 
especially in investing, make less sense as more people put them into practice. When the stock 
market turns down again, index fund owners will have to become their own active manager and 
make sure they’re well diversified, with limited exposure to risk, chaos, and catastrophe.”) 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 See DEPOSITARY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, http://www.dtcc.com (last visited 
November 29, 2018).  
94 See DTCC supra note 75 at 13-14. 
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John D. Morley called the market a “regulatory and academic backwater”95 and 
noted “ETF regulation has also suffered from academic neglect.”96 As such there 
is very little legal writing directly in this area, 97  and only a few articles 
tangentially address ETFs as part of larger concerns.98  
 
This two-part study investigates “interaction risks” in the ETF market.  
The first article (Part I) evaluates the potential for ETF “liquidity illusions” in a 
crisis. Part II will investigate other “interaction risks” as they manifest in investor 
herding and information inefficiencies.  ETF liquidity in a sustained crisis is 
uncertain; however, the ETF industry maintains that these products (and their 
operating ecosystem) are stable; 99  yet many commentators offer a contrary 
opinion.100  Liquidity in ETFs is dependent on the behavior of discretionary 
actors, which, in a crisis, can prove fragile, unpredictable and illusory.101  This 
 
95 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 844. 
96 Id. at 847-848. 
97 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 847; see also William M. 
Humphries, Leveraged ETFs: The Trojan Horse Has Passed The Margin Rule Gates, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299 (2010); Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 8 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291 (2018); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking The Regulation of Securities 
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2010); Garrett M. Fischer, New Twists on an Old 
Plot: Investors Look To Avoid The Wash Sale Rule By Harvesting Tax Losses With Exchange 
Traded Funds, 88 WASH U. L. REV. 229 (2010); John Yoder & Bo J. Howell, Actively 
Managed ETFs: The Past, Present, and Future, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 231 (2013). 
98 See Bret E. Strzelczyk, Rise Of The Machines: The Legal Implications For Investor 
Protection With The Rise of Robo-Advisors, 16 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 55 (2017); Benjamin 
P. Edwards, The Rise Of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue The Retail 
Market? 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (2018); Litz, supra note 12 (ETFs are discussed as used by 
algorithmic wealth management platforms); see also Scot Hirst, The Case For Investor 
Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 255 (2018) (ETFs are discussed in relation to “investor 
ordering” proposals as an alternative to mandatory rules); see also Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. 
Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting In An Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014), Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 
43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018), Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? 
Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803 (2018) 
(ETFs are discussed in relation to trends and issues in corporate governance and shareholder 
voting given the rise of passive investment); See also John Morley, The Separation of Funds 
and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 
(2014) (ETFs are discussed in conjunction with other funds in contrast to organization business 
structures); see also Michael C. Macchiarola & Daniel Prezioso, Expanding Alternatives: From 
Structured Notes To Structured Funds, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 405 (2017) (ETFs are discussed in 
contrast to Unit Investment Trusts); see also Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index 
Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 (2013) 
(ETFs are discussed briefly in a critique on financial indexes). 
99 See infra Section IV(f). 
100 See infra Section IV(a) – (e). 
101 One of the most famous pronouncements of the fickle promise of liquidity was made by 
economist John Maynard Keynes when he remarked “of the maxims of orthodox finance, none, 
surely is more antisocial than the fetish of liquidity….It forgets that there is no such thing as 
liquidity of investment for the community as a whole.” (original source JOHN M. KEYNES, THE 
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article will illuminate both sides of this debate and will illustrate the complexities 
in the ETF operational structure which drive the conflict. 
 
The article will also use case studies on portfolio insurance in the 1980s, 
and the auction rate securities market in 2008, to show that in a crisis, 
arbitrageurs can be absent when they’re needed most, and that discretionary 
liquidity can also fail. The case studies highlight how Wall Street has a habit of 
creating investment products that, like ETFs, either promise perpetual liquidity, 
or combine leverage, complexity, and structural opacity to decrease financial 
stability.102  The question that lingers is whether ETFs are another iteration of 
this trend?  It is impossible to predict how (or when) a new crisis will materialize, 
yet the popularity of ETFs as an asset class, how they increase the connection 
between main street and Wall Street, their potential risks, and the long-term 
economic uncertainty that passive investing is creating make ETFs a segment of 
consumer finance and financial regulation worthy of heightened attention. 
 
The article will proceed by recounting the industry’s history; identifying 
ETF market growth figures and demand drivers; and explaining the ETF 
ecosystem’s operational mechanics and key participants. It introduces the 
concept of “liquidity illusions” and builds on prior analysis (like that of Professor 
Hu and Morley) that ETF liquidity is contingent on the discretionary actions of 
intermediaries,103 that that such liquidity could prove fragile in a crisis.  The 
liquidity illusion debate is polarizing - each side relying on assumptions about 
the behaviors of intermediaries under stress.  Yet how these “ETF ecosystem” 
participants will act in a true sustained crisis is unknown.104  
 
The article provides a robust summary of the incentives and fragilities of 
participants in the ETF ecosystem, and a curated menu of contemporary 
empirical research and theoretical viewpoints on the liquidity illusion debate.  It 
also documents the by-products of market complexity including the possibility 
 
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1st ed. 1936), re-quoted in Jacobs 
infra note 102 at 93.  
102 For an in-depth study on the propensity of Wall Street to create such products see BRUCE I. 
JACOBS, TOO SMART FOR OUR OWN GOOD: INGENIOUS INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, ILLUSIONS 
OF SAFETY, AND MARKET CRASHES (1st ed. 2018). 
103 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75; Hu & Morley, A Welcome 
Invitation, supra note 55. 
104 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, The Growing Importance of Exchange Traded Funds in the 
Financial Markets, MONTHLY REPORT (October 2018), 79, available at 
https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/766600/2fd3ae4f0593fb2ce465c092ce40888b/mL/2
018-10-exchange-traded-funds-data.pdf (hereinafter “Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report”). 
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of financial intermediary “rent-seeking”105 and other non-productive economic 
behaviors by market participants. 106  This compliments previous work 
investigating the risks and impacts of economic “financialization.”107 Finally, it 
evaluates “supply-side” 108  financial product innovation (new products that 
originate from financial intermediaries) against the idea that financial product 
innovation is driven by investor demand for more “complete markets,” and the 
allocation of financial risk to those most capable of bearing it.109  
 
105 For a definition of rent-seeking see Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent 
Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). 
106 For a discussion of the externalities in the modern financial system including non-
productive intermediation see JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF 
FINANCE (1st ed. 2015); see also Robert C. Hockett & Saule Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 
102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017).  
107 For critiques of the modern “financialization” of the real economy see Bruce Bartlett, 
‘Financialization” as a Cause of Economic Malaise, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 11, 2013), 
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/financialization-as-a-cause-of-economic-
malaise/; Michael Collins, Wall Street and The Financialization Of The Economy, FORBES 
(February 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-and-the-
financialization-of-the-economy/#4f6e026d5783; Christine Emba, Has Our Economy Become 
Too ‘Financialized’, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/18/has-our-economy-become-
too-financialized/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.58e2b4e180b8; Apostolos Fasianos, Diego 
Guevara, & Christos Pierros, Have We Been Here Before? Phases of Financialization within 
the 20th Century in the United States, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
869 (June 27, 2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801088; RANA FOROOHAR, 
MAKERS AND TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE FALL OF AMERICAN BUSINESSES (1st ed. 
2016); Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein. The Growth of Finance, 27(2) JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3 (2013); Jeremy Greenwood, Juan Sanchez & Chen Wang, 
Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs, 100(4) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
1875 (2010); Eckhard Hein, Finance-Dominated Capitalism and Redistribution of Income: A 
Kaleckian Perspective, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, WORKING PAPER NO. 746 (January 10, 
2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198919; Mike Konczal & Neil Abernathy, 
Defining Financialization, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (July 27, 2015), 
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/defining-financialization/; Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization 
of the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW 173 (2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
Financialism A (Very) Brief History, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323 (2010); Ratna Sahay et al. 
Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets, IMF STAFF 
DISCUSSION NOTE (May 2015); Lord Adair Turner, What Do Banks Do, What Should They Do 
And What Public Policies Are Needed To Ensure Best Results For The Real Economy? SPEECH 
TO CASS BUSINESS SCHOOL (March 17, 2010); Lord Adair Turner, et al. The Future of 
Finance: The LSE Report, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (2010); 
Charles J. Whalen, Understanding Financialization: Standing on the Shoulders of Minsky, 
LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, WORKING PAPERS SERIES NO. 892 (June 22, 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991096. 
108 See Dan Awrey. Toward a Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation, OXFORD LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 44/2012 (June 27, 2012), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2094254. 
109 To highlight the debate of “supply” and “demand” side financial innovation compare and 
contrast Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech As A Systemic Phenomenon, 36(2) 
YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION (2019, forthcoming) at 27, available 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224393 (for a discussion of supply side innovation) against Judge, 
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iii. The Exchange Traded Fund Ecosystem and the Value of Liquidity 
  
This section introduces the liquidity illusion debate by describing how 
an ETF works; the intermediaries, their roles and incentives in the ETF 
ecosystem; and the history, and post-GFC demand drivers of ETF market 
growth.  It also briefly introduces the concept of “liquidity” and describes why 
it’s so important in financial products.  
 
a. Exchange Traded Funds: A Brief History 
 
 Although closed-end funds, and pooled investing, have their origins as 
far back as Dutch merchants in the late eighteenth century,110 the modern ETF 
first began trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1990.111  The original 
American counterpart was launched by State Street Global Investors in 1993 
under the ticker “SPDR” (popularly called the “spider”) and it tracked the S&P 
500.112  The idea of index investing (the foundation of ETFs) emerged two 
decades earlier when index mutual funds were launched by Wells Fargo and the 
American National Bank and Vanguard founder John Bogle created the First 
Index Investment Trust (which like the SPDR also traded the S&P 500).113 Also, 
in 1989, the American Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
began trading Index Participation Shares (IPS) which were synthetic investment 
products (similar to futures contracts) that replicated the S&P 500 
performance.114  
 
Investor-Driven, supra note 81 (for a discussion of demand factors in financial innovation 
including the influence of regulation on financial product innovation); see also Anastasia 
Nesvetailova, The Crisis of Invented Money: Liquidity Illusion and the Global Credit 
Meltdown, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 125, 132-133 (2010). 
110 See VANGUARD, What is the history of ETFs? 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/etfcenter/article/ETF_HistoryOfETFs 
(last visited June 1, 2019).  
111 The fund was called “TIPs 35” and it tracked the Toronto Stock Exchange 35 Index.  See 
Stephen D. Simpson, A Brief History of Exchange Traded Funds, INVESTOPEDIA (October 11, 
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/exchangetradedfunds/12/brief-history-exchange-
traded-funds.asp. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 See Laurent Deville, Exchange Traded Funds: History, Trading and Research, in C. 
ZOPOUNIDIS, M. DOUMPOS, P. PARDALOS ED. HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, 
SPRINGER, 1-37, 4 (2008). (“These synthetic instruments were aimed at replicating the 
performance of the S&P 500 index, among others, but they had characteristics similar to those 
of futures contracts. Despite significant interest from investors, IPS had to stop trading after the 
lawsuit by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) was won. As futures contracts, IPS had to be traded on a futures exchange regulated by 
the CFTC.”) 
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b. ETF Operational Ecosystem, Participant Incentives and Market 
Concentration 
 
ETFs generally take one of two forms: a replication of a “physical” 
benchmark, or a “synthetic replication” using a derivative. 115  Physical 
replication is the most common structure in the U.S.116  A physical replication 
can both “fully” represent an index or benchmark (by holding the exact same 
underlying securities), or provide a “sampling” (common for more illiquid 
underlying holdings).117 A simple ETF (a “plain vanilla” physical replication 
structure) is created when an “authorized participant” (AP) 118  - a financial 
institution or market specialist - transfers, in kind, a basket of securities to an 
ETF plan sponsor (like BlackRock or Vanguard).119    In exchange, the AP 
receives new ETF shares (called “creation units” - usually in blocks of 50,000 or 
more).120 The ETF share basket is published daily by the ETF sponsor.121 This 
is the “primary market”, where the total number of ETF shares is flexible, and 
retail investors do not transact.122   
 
Once in possession of new ETF shares, APs sell them to market makers 
(MM) and into exchanges (the “secondary market”) where they are traded by 
retail and institutional investors throughout the day.123 It’s been estimated that 
90 percent of daily trading activity in ETFs takes places in the secondary 
market.124  Because ETFs trade on secondary markets (like stocks) they can be 
 
115 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 83. 
116 Id. at 84 
117 Id. at 83. 
118 See BLACKROCK, A Primer on ETF Primary Trading and the Role of Authorized 
Participants (March 2017), 3, available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-etf-primary-trading-
role-of-authorized-participants-march-2017.pdf (BlackRock lists the following examples of 
“Common U.S. APs” as “Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jeffries, JP Morgan, KCG, Morgan Stanley, UBS Securities, 
Virtu.”) 
119 See Rochelle Antoniewicz & Jane Heinrichs, The Role and Activities of Authorized 
Participants of Exchange Traded Funds, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE REPORT (March 
2015), 1, available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_15_aps_etfs.pdf (“In addition, APs are U.S. 
registered self-clearing broker-dealers that can process all required trade submission, clearance, 
and settlement transactions on their own account, as well as full participating members of the 
National Securities Clearing Corporation and Depository Trust Company.”)   
120 See Su, supra note 69 at 4-5. 
121 Id. at. 5. 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Blackrock, A Primer, supra note 118 at 7. 
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purchased through commissioned brokers, and also traded long or short, 
purchased with margin, and executed using a variety of order methods including 
limit, stop and market.125 Institutional clients can also trade them in alternative 
trading systems and dark pools, and they have become a preferred vehicle of HF 
trading and algorithmic trading programs.126 
 
Supply and demand for new ETF creations (or redemptions) originates 
in the secondary market, based on buy/sell order “imbalances.” 127  APs are 
incentivized to transact with fund sponsors through arbitrage opportunities 
(explained below).128 APs may create ETF shares directly for institutional clients 
(for example in large ETF share blocks for an investor, like a pension fund, who 
delivers cash or securities, or a combination, directly to the AP to facilitate the 
creation).129  
 
ETF redemptions occur in a reverse process. ETF shares are purchased 
by APs from investors or MMs and then transferred to ETF plan sponsors in 
exchange for the basket of securities, or cash, if the ETF is cash redeemable.130 
APs exclusively interact with the fund (the only participants in the ETF 
ecosystem to do so). 131   This right is granted when an AP enters into an 
authorized participant agreement (APA) with a fund sponsor, which endows a 
right (but not an obligation) for the AP to create or redeem shares in the primary 
market.132  The APA will either be “overarching” (allowing for primary market 
activity for any fund the sponsor offers) or limited to a particular fund series or 
trust.133  In this regard, APs have been described as a “provider of technology” 
in the ETF share creation and redemption process.134  
 
ETFs are different from mutual funds because of the “arbitrage 
mechanism” that exists between the primary and secondary market. 135 
Professors Henry T. C. Hu and John D. Morley (who have described the 
 
125 See BIS ETF Study, supra note 75 at 2. 
126 See Drew Voros, High-Frequency Trading Key to ETFs, ETF.COM (September 25, 2013), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/features/19955-high-frequency-trading-key-to-etfs.html. 
127 Blackrock, A Primer, supra note 118 at 2; see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, 
supra note 75 at 852. 
128 Blackrock, A Primer, supra note 118 at 2 
129 Id. at 3. 
130 Id.; see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 852. 
131 See Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 119 at 1. 
132 Id.; see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 1196-1197. 
133 Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 119 at 2. 
134 See Blackrock, A Primer, supra note 118 at 2. 
135 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 843; see also Su, supra, note 
69 at 6; 
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“arbitrage mechanism” in detail, and also recently proposed the first 
“comprehensive” regulatory framework for the U.S. ETF market) have called 
this dynamic a “novel, theory driven device” and also the “defining 
characteristic” of the ETF since “it is absent from the market microstructure of 
all other traded securities and from the ETF’s closest cousins, the mutual fund 
and the closed end fund.”136  The “arbitrage mechanism” is a way to ensure that 
ETF prices in the secondary market align with the net asset value (NAV) of the 
underlying basket of securities held by the fund sponsor.137 For example, if an 
ETF’s shares are trading in the secondary market, at a discount to its NAV then 
APs have an incentive to redeem the ETF shares for the more valuable basket of 
securities.138 Effective arbitrage (which relies on the voluntary actions of APs) 
is a fundamental regulatory consideration in the SEC’s ETF approval process.139  
c. Post-Crisis Growth in the ETF Market Size and Expanding Product 
Variety 
 
Demand for ETFs, and the variety and complexity of available products, 
has grown dramatically over the past decade. 140  An expanding number of 
institutional investors now hold ETFs.141 The limits of ETF product variety seem 
unbounded,142 and new products cover nearly every sector, with firms looking 
to replicate profit opportunities frequently copying new ideas.143  Recently ETFs 
have been created that follow (and track) newly financialized sectors, ideas, or 
strategies - for example there are ETFs on “women in leadership.”144 Product 
variety seems limited only by one’s imagination and extends beyond indices to 
 
136 Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 843-845. 
137 See id. at 851. The NAV of an ETF is “generated at the end of the trading day.” See also 
Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 82; see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome 
Invitation, supra note 75 at 1158-1159 
138 Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 852. 
139 See Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 1159-1160, 1194-1195; see also 
U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Proposed Rule 6c-11, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/33-10515.pdf. 
140 See Vanguard, supra note 110. 
141 See Max Chen, Institutional ETF Ownership Steadily On The Rise, ETF TRENDS (August 2, 
2018), https://www.etftrends.com/smart-beta-channel/institutional-etf-ownership-steadily-on-
rise/. 
142 See Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 1157-1158. 
143 See THE ECONOMIST, Special Report: Exchange Traded Funds, From Vanilla To Rocky 
Road The Darwinian Evolution of Exchange Traded Funds (February 25th, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2012/02/25/from-vanilla-to-rocky-road.  
144 See ETF DATABASE, Barclays Women In Leadership Total Return Index, 
http://etfdb.com/index/barclays-women-in-leadership-total-return-index/ (last visited June 1, 
2019). 
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novel concepts like video-gaming and e-sports, 145  consumer discretionary 
products,146 and commodity factoring.147 It also includes trading or operational 
strategies like leveraged products,148 synthetics,149 directional (inverse funds).150 
As such, the number of available products have grown exponentially.151 
 
Some believe that “all new fund launches in 15 years” will be ETFs, thus 
effectively eliminating the mutual fund structure.152  A recent estimate suggests 
61-times worldwide growth in ETPs (of which ETFs comprise the vast majority) 
since 2000.153 Bloomberg recently reported that the worldwide ETF market is 
worth over $5.3 trillion (up from $700 billion pre-GFC) with the U.S. accounting 
for nearly 70 percent of its size.154  The German Central Bank notes that as of 
mid-2018, the total capitalization of all worldwide investment funds was over 
$37 trillion (including mutual and other “open-end” fund structures, which 
 
145 See Emily Zulz, VanEck Launches ETF Focused on Video Gaming, Esports: Portfolio 
Products, THINKADVISOR (October 22, 2018), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/10/22/vaneck-launches-etf-focused-on-video-gaming-
esport/. 
146 See NASDAQ, Should You Invest In The First Trust Consumer Discretionary AlphaDEX 
Fund (FXD) (November 8, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/should-you-invest-in-the-
first-trust-consumer-discretionary-alphadex-fund-fxd-cm1052437. 
147 See BUSINESS WIRE, Blackrock Intends To Launch Factor-Based Commodities Exchange 
Traded Products (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181102005352/en/BlackRock-Intends-Launch-
Factor-based-Commodities-Exchange-Traded-Products. 
148 See Kate Stalter, Why That Leveraged ETF Is A Bad Idea, FORBES (January 23, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katestalter/2017/01/23/why-that-leveraged-etf-is-a-bad-
idea/#452495e66ed2. 
149 See Sirio Aramonte, Cecilia Caglio & Tugkan Tuzun, Synthetic ETFs, FEDS NOTES, 
WASHINGTON: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (August 10, 2017), 
available at https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2028. 
150 See Rachel Evans, & Carolina Wilson, Is This The Markets Latest Problem Child? 
BLOOMBERG (February 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
08/spotlight-turns-to-etf-problem-children-after-volatility-blow-up. 
151 Id.; see also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON 
EXCHANGE-TRADED PRODUCTS, RELEASE NO.34-75165, FILE NO. 27-11-15 (November 27, 
2015), 3 (“From 2006 to 2013, the total number of ETPs listed and traded as of year-end rose 
by an average of 160 per year, with a net increase of more than 200 in both 2007 and 2011. By 
comparison, from 1993 to 2005, the total number of ETPs listed and traded as of year end rose 
by an average of just 17 per year, with a net increase of 60 in 2000.”) 
152 Yoosof Farah, Just How Dominant Will ETFs Be In 15 Years, CITYWIRE (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://citywire.co.uk/wealth-manager/news/just-how-dominant-will-etfs-be-in-15-
years/a1158758. 
153 Su supra note 69 at 1. 
154 See Evans & Wilson, supra note 63. 
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comprise the largest share). 155  Given their popularity, and post-GFC rapid 
growth,156 ETFs are an important market segment for closer scrutiny.  
 
The fuel for ETF growth is diverse. They have lower fees, secondary 
market intra-day trading, the potential for short and margin trades 157  (with 
enhanced liquidity over mutual funds)158, instant diversification,159 “operational 
simplicity”160 and tax advantages.161  Thus they are largely an upgrade from 
mutual funds.162 Perhaps most compelling is that net of fees, and over a ten-year 
time period, passive funds routinely outperform actively managed funds.163 It’s 
been suggested that post-GFC regulatory requirements for banks to “shed large 
inventories to bolster their balance sheets” has contributed to market growth, as 
well as the ability to execute (with low costs) hedge or speculative trades - 
including exposure to illiquid underlying assets.164  Also contributing to growth 
is the “viral” replication potential for profitable structures.165  ETFs can also act 
as an “alternative to futures” while generating similar benefits,166 and provide 
low-cost access to otherwise thin, or illiquid, markets such as commodities, 
 
155 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 80. 
156 See id (“However, its growth momentum has been particularly pronounced in recent years. 
For instance, ETFs accounted for a mere US$0.7 trillion (5.4%) of the assets managed by all 
types of investment funds back in early 2009. Since then, its share of all fund products has 
increased significantly, which is attributable to considerably higher growth rates for ETFs 
compared to those for open-end investment funds (and other investment funds) over the past 
few years.”) 
157 See INVESTOPEDIA, Advantages and Disadvantages of ETFs, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/exchangetradedfunds/11/advantages-disadvantages-
etfs.asp (last visited January 12, 2019). 
158 See Judge, Investor-Driven, supra note 37 at 328. 
159 The benefits of portfolio diversification in ETFs can be derived from the establishment of 
“Modern Portfolio Theory” by Harry Markowitz, Merton Miller and William Sharpe.  See 
BlackRock, Index Investing and Common Ownership Theories, VIEWPOINT (March 2017), 4, 
available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-index-
investing-and-common-ownership-theories-eng-march.pdf. 
160 Id. at 5. 
161 See BARRON’S, “What Makes ETFs Tax Efficient?” (April 27, 2017), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sponsored/what-makes-etfs-tax-efficient-1493223526; see 
also ETF.com, Why Are ETFs So Tax Efficient? https://www.etf.com/etf-education-
center/21017-why-are-etfs-transparent-and-tax-efficient.html (last visited January 12, 2019). 
162 See Ryan Vlastelica, ETFs shattered their growth records in 2017, MARKETWATCH 
(January 3, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/etfs-shattered-their-growth-records-in-
2017-2017-12-11. 
163 See Tom Anderson, Investors Say ‘Forget It’ to Active Funds, CNBC (August 29, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/29/investors-say-forget-it-to-active-funds.html. 
164 See Evans & Wilson, supra note 63.  
165 See THE ECONOMIST, Exchange-Traded Funds Become Too Specialized (April 27, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/04/27/exchange-traded-funds-
become-too-specialised. 
166 See Nancy B. Nichols, William M Vandenburgh & Luis Betancourt, Taxing Implications of 
Exchange Traded Funds, 85 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 109,110 (2010). 
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precious metals and higher-yield fixed income products, as well as inverse and 
leveraged exposure.167  
 
d. Why Liquidity Matters in Investment Products 
 
Liquidity costs are often both “underestimated” 168  and “under-
appreciated.” 169  Liquidity captures the “ease” at which an asset can be 
“converted” into cash and thereby facilitate a “consumption” activity. 170 
Importantly, liquidity measures the extent that a security can be traded without 
affecting its price.171  
 
Liquidity in ETFs is relevant at the secondary market level (often called 
“displayed liquidity”), MM inventory level (non-displayed secondary market 
liquidity), the ETF primary market (APs transacting with ETF sponsors through 
redemptions and creations) and liquidity in the actual underlying assets.172 The 
“bid-ask spread” has been described as a “simple measure of market 
liquidity.” 173  Recent empirical studies undertaken by the Central Bank of 
Germany have noted tighter bid-asks for ETFs (over their underlying securities) 
for certain market segments (like widely held equities) – suggesting that ETFs 
are “more liquid” than their underlying holdings.174  This was not the case, 
however, for ETFs holding certain fixed income products and bonds.175  
 
As witnessed in the GFC, liquidity shortages can be devastating.176  The 
“riskiness” of an ETF is not just the economic risk associated with the underlying 
assets, but also liquidity risk from the interactions of intermediaries within the 
 
167 See id. at 112-114. 
168 See Dean Stewart, The value of liquidity, implications for global debt instruments, 
MACQUARIE INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES (August 2014) 2, see also at 5 (“Because liquidity is 
highly skewed, liquidity costs at any point in time other than during a crisis are likely to be 
lower than long term averages. This will bias investors to underestimate liquidity costs.”) 
169 Id. at 6 (“Investors usually carefully analyze the credit quality of their portfolio, but usually 
pay less attention to the liquidity of their portfolio, or the liquidity management credentials of 
their managers. If anything, it should be the other way around.”) 
170 Aleksander Berentsen, Samuel Huber & Alessandro Marchesiani, Free-riding on Liquidity, 
UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH WORKING PAPER NO. 32 (September 2011), 2. 
171 See INVESTOPEDIA, Liquidity, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp (last June 
14, 2019).  
172 See Su, supra note 69 at 4-5. 
173 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 89-91. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 90. 
176 See Su, supra note 69 at 4-5.  
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ETF trading ecosystem.177 It is impossible to predict the next crisis, but liquidity 
shortages in the ETF market could magnify a crisis fallout.178  Liquidity is also 
important for investors who don’t have the resources to otherwise “absorb 
sudden shocks” in the context of flash crashes or investor herds.179   
 
iv. Do ETFs Create Liquidity Illusions? 
  
This section will introduce the notion of ETF “liquidity illusions.” It will 
illustrate how a breakdown in ETF arbitrage could create a scenario where 
liquidity in the ETF market proves to be illusory (or at least very costly) when 
it’s needed most during a crisis.  It will also show how fears of liquidity illusions 
are primarily, but not exclusively, in fixed-income ETFs. The section also 
identifies the industry-advocated pro-liquidity counter arguments to round out 
the debate. Finally, it canvasses the impact of algorithmic trading programs and 
HF trading on liquidity illusions.  
a. Liquidity Illusions and the ETF Arbitrage Function  
  
The foundational fear behind the liquidity “illusion” concern is that ETF 
shares aren’t as liquid as they are purported to be.  In a crisis scenario, a lack of 
liquidity in ETFs could foster “pro-cyclical” developments like investor herding, 
cascades and contagion selling in ETF’s underlying securities and across other 
asset classes.180 These concerns have been identified recently in a variety of 
reports including by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),181 the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), 182  and the Central Bank of Germany (Deutsche 
Bundesbank).183   
 
 
177 Id. 
178 See Satyajit Das, Scarce Liquidity is a Growing Risk, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-12/scarce-liquidity-is-a-growing-risk. 
179 See Riza Demirer, Karyl Leggio & Donald Lien, Herding and Flash Events: Evidence From 
the 2010 Flash Crash, FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS (December 26, 2018), 3, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3263881. 
180 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 93-97. 
181 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2019, 50, 
available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/03/27/Global-Financial-
Stability-Report-April-2019. 
182 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, Policy Recommendations To Address Structural 
Vulnerabilities From Asset Management Activities (January 12, 2017), 11-24, available at 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Policy-Recommendations-on-Asset-
Management-Structural-Vulnerabilities.pdf. 
183 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104.  
 
 
 
37 
Liquidity illusion concerns emanate from uncertainties about how ETF 
ecosystem participants – particularly APs and MMs – will act in a crisis.184  
There is also a “spill over” worry that liquidity shortages in ETFs could lead to 
panicked selling in other asset classes, as investors who can’t sell their ETF 
shares (or can only sell them at steep discounts) will spread the “liquidity 
pressure” in a cascading selloff of other investments.185 This could generate 
what’s been described as a “feedback loop” as coordinated selling drives prices 
downward in both the ETF secondary and underlying asset markets.186  
 
These concerns are based on a belief that the ETF arbitrage function 
wasn’t “designed for a large market sell-off.”187  It’s been reported that some 
hedge funds have been “borrowing shares and stockpiling bearish options” under 
a theory that ETFs (especially fixed income) are a “ticking time bomb.”188 The 
theory is that APs in an underlying asset sell-off won’t want to redeem ETF 
shares and receive, in-kind, illiquid (and quickly devaluating) securities, so they 
will simply withdraw from the primary market redemption process altogether – 
thus creating an ETF “death spiral” since healthy portions of the fund will be 
liquidated and only “distressed and illiquid notes” remain.189  Such a scenario 
could also lead to a liquidity shortage and a corresponding ETF share fire sale in 
the secondary market.190  
 
Some fear that this could also generate a “self-fulfilling prophesy” if 
enough investors believed an AP withdraw was inevitable and collectively 
shorted the ETFs.191 Also MMs and APs may widen their bid-ask spreads as 
 
184 See Vesna Poljak, Fund Managers Believe Exchange Traded Funds Will Have A Role In 
The Next Crisis, FINANCIAL REVIEW (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.afr.com/markets/fund-
managers-believe-etfs-will-have-a-role-in-the-next-crisis-20171021-gz5oay. 
185 Id.  
186 See Ian Foucher & Kyle Gray, Exchange-Traded Funds: Evolution of Benefits, 
Vulnerabilities and Risks, BANK OF CANADA FINANCIAL SYSTEM REVIEW (December 2014), 42 
(“APs can also transmit liquidity shocks from the ETF to the underlying assets (and vice 
versa). As ETFs and the underlying market become more interconnected, a small liquidity 
shock originating in either the ETF or the underlying securities could be amplified through a 
feedback loop (via APs). This could result in a large liquidity shock and a reduction in price 
informativeness for both the ETF and the underlying market.”) 
187 See Natasha Doff, Hedge Fund Manager Stakes Own Cash on a Bet Against Credit ETFs, 
BLOOMBERG (November 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
05/hedge-fund-manager-stakes-own-cash-betting-credit-etfs-crumble. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
191 Joanna Ossinger, JPMorgan Says ETFs Won’t Be The Biggest Victims If Credit Blows Up, 
BLOOMBERG (November 9, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
09/jpmorgan-says-etfs-won-t-be-biggest-victims-if-credit-blows-up. 
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compensation for the enhanced volatility “pricing error.”192  In anticipation of 
liquidity shortages other fund managers have started devising option strategies 
to profit from flash crashes.193   
 
 If APs completely withdraw from the market, ETFs would trade like 
closed-end funds, and the spread between ETF share prices and their NAV would 
widen.194 Secondary market liquidity providers (like high frequency traders (HF 
traders)) could back out of the market, leaving ETF investors with illiquid 
securities.195 HF Traders and other short-term ETF sellers would likely be the 
largest (and fastest) participants to liquidate their initial positions, leaving less 
sophisticated investors exposed to significant losses.196   
 
This is the essence of the “illusion” of liquidity when ETFs are comprised 
of illiquid underlying securities.197 Liquidity in a ETF that holds illiquid assets 
is contingent on an “intervening mechanism that allows participants to arb away 
disconnects.”198 The problem is that the arbitrage function for ETFs could be 
fragile since it is discretionary, driven by market incentives, and as Part V will 
show discretionary liquidity, and reliance on arbitrageurs, can prove fragile in a 
crisis.199 
b. Fixed Income ETFs: The Center of The Liquidity Illusion Controversy 
 
 
192 See FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, Update on Review of Asset Management 
Products and Activities (November 16, 2016) available at, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Revie
w%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf. 
193 See Cecile Gutscher & Yakob Peterseil, The Liquidity ‘Illusion’ Has These Funds Making 
Plans for a Stock Doomsday, BLOOMBERG (April 10, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/liquidity-illusion-has-these-funds-
making-stock-doomsday-plans. 
194 See Mike Bird, Could ETFs Fall Into A Liquidity Jam? THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 
21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/return-of-volatility-raises-liquidity-question-for-etfs-
1521627574?mod=ITP_businessandfinance_0&tesla=y. 
195 See Joseph N. DiStefano, Will ETFs, their prices dependent on hedge fund billions, stay 
aligned in the next market panic? MINNESOTA POST BULLETIN (November 28, 2018), 
https://www.postbulletin.com/news/business/will-etfs-their-prices-dependent-on-hedge-fund-
billions-stay/article_af7bd54e-0ede-57c9-a3df-6a2308bcb93b.html. 
196 See David Thorpe, ETF Investors ‘Must Accept’ Liquidity Risk, FT ADVISOR (November 8, 
2018), https://www.ftadviser.com/investments/2018/11/08/etf-investors-must-accept-liquidity-
risk/. 
197 See David Tuckwell, Junk Bond ETFs are Being Sold Short En Masse, ETF STREAM 
(Feburary 18, 2018), http://www.etfstream.com/data-snapshot/2955_junk-bond-etfs-are-being-
short-sold-en-masse. 
198 SEEKING ALPHA, Presenting: The ‘New’ Doom Loop (February 20, 2018), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4148271-presenting-new-doom-loop. 
199 See Infra, Section IV. 
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These warning calls resound most loudly in the fixed income and loan 
ETF markets (although the issue of liquidity “mismatch” has also been cited as 
a concern by the Bank for International Settlements in “emerging market 
equities” as well).200  Fixed income ETFs have experienced significant post-
crisis growth driven by yield-seeking investors wanting exposure to otherwise 
illiquid, and over-the-counter traded, loans and fixed income products, and 
institutions who use these products as cash substitutes.201  The market could 
grow even larger as BlackRock has signaled that mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) are “ripe for transformation” into an ETF structure.202  Recent reports 
estimate that the value of the bond ETF market is “on track” to surpass $1 trillion 
by the end of 2019.203  
 
The main ETFs of concern for liquidity illusions are corporate and high 
yield bond funds 204  given the increasing size, institutional exposure, the 
“challenges in trading, liquidity and security sourcing” of individual bonds, and 
the fact that fixed income ETFs are seen as a “frictionless” substitute for 
otherwise illiquid fixed income products. 205  A sustained low interest rate 
environment has facilitated a “surge” in post-GFC corporate debt with recent 
reports estimating the market at over $9 trillion (64 percent higher than 2009).206 
Correspondingly, the fixed income ETF market has exploded with over $97 
 
200 See BIS ETF Study, supra note 75 at 1. 
201 See Stephen Gandel, The Market Time Bomb That’s Bigger Than The Vix, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (February 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
07/there-s-a-time-bomb-bigger-than-the-vix-in-the-market. 
202 Matt Levine, CEOs Still Don’t Like Short-Termism, BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-07/ceos-still-don-t-like-short-termism. 
203 See Bailey McCann, Bond ETFs are On Track To Reach $1 Trillion Mark By End of the 
Year, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bond-etfs-are-
on-track-to-reach-1-trillion-mark-by-the-end-of-the-year-11556726577/. 
204 See Wolf Richter, Treacherous Times For Bond Funds Ahead, WOLF STREET (November 
29, 2018), https://wolfstreet.com/2018/11/29/potentially-treacherous-times-for-bond-funds-
ahead/. 
205 See Lee Barney, Fixed-Income ETFs Used To Address Bond Market Issues, PLAN SPONSOR 
(September 19, 2018), https://www.plansponsor.com/fixed-income-etfs-used-address-bond-
market-issues/; see also Hu & Morley, A Commendable Start, supra note 15 at 1158; Henry 
T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 843. 
206 See Jeff Cox, Gundlach’s warning on ‘ocean of debt’ adds to worries over corporate bonds, 
CNBC (January 14, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/14/gundlachs-warning-on-ocean-
of-debt-adds-to-worries-over-corporate-bonds.html. 
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billion in new assets in 2018.207 This concern has also been recently noted for 
ETFs that invest in leveraged loans and mortgages.208  
 
Fixed income ETFs allow for instant access to a market that is otherwise 
difficult to obtain exposure.209 They are “attractive to retail investors” because 
of the secondary market liquidity for a generally illiquid underlying asset 
class.210  It also triggers a risk of a “negative feedback loop” as previously 
described. 211   The idea of transforming something that’s fundamentally 
“illiquid” (like a mortgage) into something “liquid” (an ETF that holds mortgage 
securities) evokes a liquidity “mismatch” and “illusion” concern (reminiscent of 
mortgage backed securities in the GFC).212 Said one market participant in a 
recent Barron’s interview, “[i]n 2007, the lie was that you could take a 
cornucopia of crap, package it together, and somehow make it AAA. This time, 
the lie is that you can take a bunch of bonds that trade by appointment, lump 
them together in an ETF, and magically make them liquid.”213 
 
ETF liquidity is reliant on MMs and APs who have market-based 
incentives and are not contractually obligated to provide liquidity.  The APAs214 
that APs enter into with ETF sponsors don’t provide compensation to the AP 
 
207 See MARKETWATCH, Fixed Income ETF Volume Surged In 2018 (January 15, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fixed-income-etf-volume-surged-in-2018-2019-01-15-
12461728. 
208 See Colby Smith, Who’s Buying Leveraged Loans Anyways? FINANCIAL TIMES (November 
20, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/11/20/1542706123000/Who-s-buying-leveraged-
loans-anyways-/. 
209 See Chris Flood, ‘Big Ticket’ Trades Made Possible By Bond ETF Liquidity, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b5e0bb88-5865-11e8-806a-808d194ffb75. 
210 See Daniel Zwirn, Jim Kyung Soo Liew & Ajakh Ahmad, This Time Is Different, but It Will 
End the Same Way: Unrecognized Secular Changes in the Bond Market since the 2008 Crisis 
That May Precipitate the Next Crisis, unpublished manuscript (April 29, 2019), available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379979. 
211 Id. See also Levine, supra note 202 (“ETFs, like stocks, can be bought and sold in 
milliseconds. But bank loans cannot.  Loans trade in over-the-counter markets with much less 
volume and settlement times that can stretch out a month.  The worry is that investors will 
stampede out of loan ETFs, which account for about $10 billion of the $156 billion in loan 
fund investments, faster than the ETF managers can sell the underlying loans in their portfolio.  
This would cause a gap in the value of the ETF and the value of the loans in it, or worse, the 
possibility the funds may not be able to immediately come up with money for investors looking 
to cash out.”) 
212 Id.  
213 Randall W. Forsyth, Corporate Credit Could Be The Next Bubble To Burst, BARRON’S 
(February 15, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/debt-be-not-proud-danger-in-the-
complacency-about-corporate-credit-51550248974. 
214 For an example of an APA see FORM OF PROSHARES TRUST II AUTHORIZED PARTICIPANT 
AGREEMENT, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1415311/000119312508213746/dex43.htm.  
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directly.215  APs profit by either acting as dealers or MMs in the secondary 
market (earning the bid-ask spread and also profiting off arbitrage opportunities), 
or taking fees as “clearing brokers” where they are paid for “processing creations 
and redemptions as agents for various market participants” like investment 
advisers and liquidity providers such as MMs, hedge funds, and “proprietary 
trading firms.”216 Most importantly, an AP does not have a legal (or fiduciary) 
obligation to create or redeem ETF shares 217, and an individual ETF sponsor 
will enter into many APAs with various APs with large funds having the most 
agreements in place.218  
c. Liquidity Wrappers and Market Completion Theory 
 
Liquidity in the ETF secondary market is considered “additive” or an 
“enhancement” 219  since it doesn’t require trading in the underlying 
securities. 220 It is essentially a “liquidity wrapper” for otherwise illiquid 
underlying. 221   This paints ETFs as a favorable by-product of financial 
innovation, driven in response to “market imperfections.”222 Another view of 
financial innovation is that it originates from financial intermediaries seeking to 
capture profits by converting risky claims into “safe assets.” 223  This is 
commonly called the “supply-side” financial innovation. 224  Concerning the 
latter, Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” whereby financial 
 
215 See Mara Shreck & Shelly Antoniewicz, ETF Basics: The Creation and Redemption 
Process And Why It Matters, ICI VIEWPOINT (January 19, 2012), 
https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_12_etfbasics_creation. 
216 See Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 119 at 1.  
217 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 853; see also Hu & Morley, A 
Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 1196. 
218 See Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 119 at 2-4. 
219 See Garth Friesen, ETFs Won’t Cause The Next Wave of Panic Selling In The Bond Market, 
FORBES (August 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/garthfriesen/2018/08/14/etfs-wont-
cause-the-next-wave-of-panic-selling-in-the-bond-market/#5ef918c75ce6. 
220 See Su, supra note 69 at 6. 
221 Id. at 10.  
222 For a discussion of investor demand factors in financial product innovation see Dan Awrey, 
Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 235, 260-267 (2012). 
223 See Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 363. 
(2016). The concept of “safe assets” has been reviewed in depth by Professors Anna Gelpern 
and Erik F. Gerding and is a “catch-all term to describe financial contracts that market 
participants treat as if they were risk free. These may include government debt, bank deposits, 
and asset-backed securities, among others.” The Professors argue that despite these asset’s 
perception as “safe” there are “embedded” sources of “instability” and “distortion” because of 
the “legal architecture” and “political commitments” inherent in these assets (see discussion at 
406-411). As a result, they argue there is “no such thing as a risk-free financial contract” and it 
is only the intervention of the state that allows people to act as if these assets are truly “safe” 
(see discussion at 365, 420).  
224 See Awrey, Toward A Supply Side, supra note 108. 
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firms use innovation to pursue profit opportunities225 has gained prominence 
post-GFC.226 In Minsky’s model, financial innovation is a product of “profit 
seeking activity” by financial institutions, and over extended periods of 
economic tranquility markets endogenously de-stabilize. 227   
 
Liquidity enhancement as a justification for financial innovation is 
derived from the “market completion theory” (MCT) 228  Under this theory, 
economic risk is managed through the creation of financial products that are 
optimally distributed to capable risk bearers. 229   Professor Anastasia 
Nesvetailova has argued that the GFC fostered MCT-based “liquidity illusions” 
and these drove investor behavior and contributed to the crisis beyond the 
“structural” and “cyclical” economic causes commonly cited. 230  Relying on 
Minsky she posits that liquidity is contingent on the characteristics of tradeable 
assets, not MCT from financial innovation.231 Her assertions rely on Minsky’s 
idea that economic tranquility facilitates instability by fostering a “complex 
hierarchy of financial commitments”232 and that periods of prosperity create an 
“underestimation of risks” 233  when creating and trading financial products 
including liquidity that is “assumed but never guaranteed” like during the GFC 
in mortgage-backed securities.234  
 
The seemingly endless possibilities of ETF innovation cause one to 
wonder whether markets will ever be fully “complete.”235 A recent study by 
Professors Kevin Pan and Yao Zeng casts additional doubt on ETFs as a demand-
 
225 See Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE 
OF BARD COLLEGE WORKING PAPER NO. 74 (May 1992). 
226 See Eugenio Caverzasi, Minsky and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Financial 
Instability Hypothesis in the Era of Financialization, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, WORKING 
PAPER NO. 796 (April 28, 2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430259. 
227 See Minsky, supra note 225 at 6. See also Nesvetailova, supra note 109 at 127. 
228 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Riskbearing, 31 
REV. ECON. STUD. 91, 91-96 (1964); and Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an 
Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265-66 (1954); Robert C. 
Merton, Financial Innovation and Economic Performance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. (1992); See 
Nesvetailova, supra note 109. 
229 See Nesvetailova, supra note 109 at 132-133. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 136. 
233 Id.  
234 Id. at 138 
235 See generally Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Corporate Governance (May 8, 
2003) (speech delivered at the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2003 (“financial innovation will 
slow as we approach the world in which financial markets are complete in the sense that all 
financial risks can be effectively transferred to those most willing to bear them.”) 
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side “market completion” proposition, since the “liquidity mismatch” dynamic 
can lead to “persistent relative mispricing and potential market fragility” 
between ETFs and underlying bonds when financial intermediaries act in “dual 
roles” as both bond dealers and ETF arbitrageurs. 236  The study notes, “AP 
arbitrage indeed becomes less effective or even fragile when liquidity mismatch 
becomes more significant.” 237  Further, when acting in dual roles, ETF 
arbitragers can use primary market redemptions and creations to “unwind their 
bond inventory imbalances.”238  
 
The intermediation layers in the ETF ecosystem (specifically the ETF 
arbitrage process) may be adding new inefficiencies (relative mispricing, 
reduced liquidity, market fragility) and also generating conflicts of interest for 
ecosystem participants to potentially withdraw from arbitrage activities.239  The 
exercise of strategic discretion, and resulting inefficiencies, by APs (who also 
hold and trade the underlying asset) in a conflict scenario is very important to 
consider when critically assessing the value-add of liquidity wrappers under a 
market completion theory.240 Further, when an AP is also acting as both a dealer 
/ market maker and an arbitrageur, during a time of crisis, there is an inherent 
conflict which could lead to MMs “front running” their own trades.241  
 
236 See Kevin Pan and Yao Zeng, ETF Arbitrage Under Liquidity Mismatch, FOURTH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION (June 28, 2017) at 2, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895478 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2895478; see also Hu & 
Morley, A Commendable Start, supra note 75 at 1196-1197. 
237 Pan & Zeng, supra note 236 at 50. 
238 Id.  
239 See id. discussion at 2. 
240 See id. discussion at 3 (“ETF arbitrage may go in the opposite direction than what would be 
implied by the initial relative mispricing. Specifically, APs may choose to create (redeem) 
more ETF shares where they have extremely positive (negative) bond inventory imbalances, 
regardless of the initial price discrepancy. Surprisingly, the model suggests that APs do even 
more ETF creations and redemptions when bond volatility increases or as the market becomes 
more illiquid. Intuitively, APs strategically use ETF creations and redemptions not to correct 
relative mispricings but to unwind bond imbalances, reduce existing inventory risks and 
facilitate future market-making in their role as bond dealers. In this sense the ETF arbitrage 
mechanism becomes distorted - creations and redemptions are disconnected from fundamentals 
(and/or arbitrage opportunities) and gives rise to the possibility of larger relative mispricings. 
More precisely, the ETF arbitrage is distorted not because APs fail to fully optimize. Instead, 
APs do optimize, choosing to use creations and redemptions strategically on account of their 
existing illiquid bond inventory imbalances, thereby potentially violating the designed 
intention of the ETF arbitrage mechanism.”); see also Hu & Morley, A Commendable Start, 
supra note 75 at 1196. 
241 See Su, supra note 69 at 22; see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 75 at 
1195-1196 (“Some APs also act as registered market makers, who assume a two-sided 
obligation to buy and sell ETF shares on a particular exchange.  The effectiveness of the 
arbitrage mechanism in narrowing deviations from NAV depends on such purely voluntary 
decisions of APs, as well as the activities of market makers and others in the secondary 
market.”). 
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 A May 2019 research report by Moody’s Investor Service stressed how 
important MMs were to ETF investors in providing liquidity in the ETF 
ecosystem.242 The report notes, “tech-enabled trading firms dominate the ETF 
market making space” and that if these firms “stepped away” from the market 
making environment it could “amplify” systemic risk.243 This will also have a 
particularly perilous effect on investors who embrace the liquidity wrapper 
theory that “believe an ETF is more liquid than its holdings.”244   
 
Given the potential conflicts of interest and systemic risks, emanating 
from their role as intermediary in the ETF ecosystem, is it natural to wonder 
whether some type of duty of “redemption” or positive obligation to provide 
liquidity support should be imposed on APs and other large MMs? The subject 
of MM fiduciary duty will be explored in the next subsection; however, this 
inquiry is one for regulators to be mindful of as the market grows, and alarm 
bells continue to sound (like the Moody’s report) about just how important the 
APs and MMs are to secondary market ETF investors. 
  
Investors in ordinary mutual funds can redeem their shares directly with 
the fund at “net asset value” (NAV)245 pursuant to sections 2(a)(32) and 5(a)(1) 
the Investment Company Act governing “open-end management investment 
companies.” 246  Money-money mutual funds (MMMF) historically were 
redeemable at a “stable” NAV ($1.00 per share); however, post-GFC rules 
designed to mitigate MMMF runs have introduced new “floating NAV” rules 
that reflect underlying securities daily prices (rather than a $1.00 “stable price”) 
on MMMFs that invest in corporate debt.247  
 
ETF shareholders in the secondary market can’t transact directly with the 
ETF fund sponsor to redeem their shares at the underlying NAV. This is only 
 
242 See Faid Abdel Massih, Ana Arsov, Financial Institutions – Global: ETFs Track Liquidity 
Risk on Top of Asset Performance, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE RESEARCH REPORT (May 9, 
2019), available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-ETFs-ability-to-weather-
liquidity-risk-governed-by-its--PBC_1174986. 
243 Id. See also Rachel Evans, ETFs Threaten to ‘Amplify’ Systemic Risk When Liquidity Dries 
Up, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-09/etfs-
threaten-to-amplify-systemic-risk-when-liquidity-dries-up. 
244 Evans, supra note 243. 
245 See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund 
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2013). 
246 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 5(a)(1) (2012). 
247 See Kuhu Parasrampuria, SEC’s New Money Market Rules, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 2, 
2-3 (2016) (in addition to the “floating NAV” the reforms “also impose fees and redemption 
gates, which temporarily prohibit investors from withdrawing their investments in MMFs.”) 
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done by a small number of “designated APs” who redeem ETF shares in “large 
blocks” and are incentivized through the arbitrage function to eliminate price 
differences in the ETF secondary market and the underlying NAV. 248  It is 
uncertain whether imposing a duty on these designated APs to provide liquidity 
support (akin to a redemption right in ordinary mutual funds or MMMFs) in the 
secondary market, under certain circumstances, is warranted.249  Also, as noted 
by Hu and Morley, it is a “complex question” to consider whether APs should 
have a duty to perform the arbitrage function.250 
 
d. Discretionary Market Makers or Noise Traders? Algorithmic & High 
Frequency Trading 
  
The case for ETF liquidity illusions being overblown (or even non-
existent) rests on the assumption that MMs and APs will step up in a crisis and 
provide liquidity support.  The incentives for MMs and APs to provide liquidity 
support are market-based, and they come primarily in the form of capturing bid-
ask spreads and receiving “liquidity rebates” from exchanges.251  MMs in the 
ETF market primarily use a “maker-taker” compensation model (where liquidity 
providers are compensated and liquidity “takers” (often hedge funds or other 
large block sellers) are charged for reducing it.252 Maker rebates are “enhanced” 
for lead market makers (LMM) who take on additional quoting obligations.253  
 
MMs provide secondary market liquidity to ETF investors through 
conventional trades like “limit orders” or for larger, more sophisticated, 
investors through “step away” trading off-exchange.254  The NYSE ARCA is the 
 
248 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 75 at 873.  
249 See CBI Discussion Paper, supra note 75.  
250 See Hu & Morley, supra note 75 at 1194-1195. 
251 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty? Exploring The Boundaries of Fiduciary 
Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31,32 (2011) (hereinafter “Dolgopolov 
Two-Sided”); see also Hu & Morley, supra note 75 at 1195. 
252 See Andrew Bloomenthal, What Maker-Taker Fees Mean To You, INVESTOPEDIA (March 1, 
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/042414/what-makertaker-fees-
mean-you.asp. 
253 See Phil Bak, The Big Systemic Market Structure ETF Risk That No One Is Talking About, 
THINKADVISOR (March 30, 2018), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/03/30/the-big-
systemic-market-structure-etf-risk-that-no-one-is-talking-about/?slreturn=20190106213320; 
see also NYSE ARCA, Market Making, 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/liquidity-programs/arca_mm_orientation.pdf 
(last visited February 7, 2019). 
254 See ETF.COM, Who are Market Makers and What is Step-Away Trading? 
https://www.etf.com/etf-education-center/21020-who-are-market-makers-and-what-is-step-
away-trading.html (last visited February 6, 2019).  
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top U.S. exchange for ETF trading with over 22% market share in U.S. trading 
volume.255  ETFs also trade on Alternative Trading Systems (ATS), although at 
a reduced volume.256   
 
The MM industry has experienced some strain in recent years,257 and a 
digital-reiteration driven by the emergence of HF trading algorithms (often 
called “informal liquidity providers.”) 258  HF trading is a major player in 
providing liquidity in ETFs.259 The rise of HF trading as a primary market maker, 
and the death of the human exchange “specialist” has been lamented as 
facilitating “duty free liquidity” where HF trading incurs benefits but not 
obligations since they “only provide liquidity when the algorithms that they 
employ determine that the risk reward ratio is tipped in their favor.”260   
 
The robustness of ETF liquidity provision by HFT in a crisis is 
uncertain.261 We don’t know exactly how HF traders will interact with other 
MMs in a prolonged ETF liquidity crisis, and the associated costs (particularly 
imposed on traditional liquidity providers who may be trading on “long-term 
information”).262 HF trading has been criticized as disrupting the price discovery 
function263 and reducing the incentives of informed traders because of their 
 
255 See BUSINESS WIRE, NYSE Arca Remains Leading Exchange for ETFs in 2017 (January 10, 
2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180110005309/en/. 
256 See Laura Tuttle, Alternative Trading Systems: Description of ATS Trading in National 
Market System Stocks, SEC DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS MEMORANDUM 
(October 2013) 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/alternative-
trading-systems-march-2014.pdf  
257 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making From 
Crowded Floors to High Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 658 (2016).  
258 Id. at 659. 
259 See Larry Swedroe, High Frequency Trading’s Impact, ETF.com (February 24, 2016), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/swedroe-high-frequency-tradings-
impact?nopaging=1. 
260 See Jennifer Victoria Christine Dean, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences: The 
Death of the Specialists, The Rise of High Frequency Trading & the Problem of Duty-Free 
Liquidity in Equity Markets, 8 FIU L. REV. 217, 261 (2012). 
261 See Dolgopolov, Regulating, supra note 257 at 693; see also Vikas Raman et al., Electronic 
Market Makers, Trader Anonymity and Market Fragility (Dec 1, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445223. 
262 See Dolgopolov, Regulating, supra note 257 at 699. 
263 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tapping the Brakes: Are Less Active Markets Safer and Better for the 
Economy? 7 (Apr. 2014)(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/14fmc/Stiglitz.pdf; see also Andrew 
Haldane, Patience and Finance: SPEECH AT THE OXFORD CHINA BUSINESS FORUM (Sept. 9, 
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r100909e.pdf; Robert A. Jarrow & Philip Protter, 
A Dysfunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in Electronic Markets, No. 08-201, JOHNSON 
SCH. RES. PAPER SERIES 4 (2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1781124; Markus Baldauf & Joshua 
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ability to co-locate, subscribe to market data-feeds, and obtain “early access to 
inside information and trading data.”264  The primary concern of HF trading as a 
liquidity provider (particularly in the ETF market) is whether, as the SEC has 
inquired, they provide “phantom liquidity that disappears when it is most needed 
by long term investors and other market participants.”265 
 
Professor Stanislav Dolgopolov has noted that Federal courts have not 
historically imposed broad fiduciary requirements on MMs to provide liquidity 
to individual investors.266  MMs could also play “multiple roles” - in addition to 
acting as principal on their own account, they may also act as underwriter, agent 
or broker-dealer.267  Dolgopolov states that in some cases dealing with multiple 
roles, as well as “personalized relationships and relatively illiquid / custom-made 
securities traded in an informal market,” an increased duty on MMs has been 
found by federal courts.268 MM’s are not immune to private rights of action – a 
factor that supports their stepping up to provide liquidity to the ETF market in a 
time of crisis.269   
 
Yet MMs are also continually exposed to the risk of “pick off” – in other 
words the risk of “entering into an unfavorable transaction with a counterparty 
with superior information”270 - although this risk is mitigated by the micro-time 
horizons associated with HF trading.271 An MM will only provide liquidity if it’s 
in their economic best interest to do so, and a potential concern is that, even if 
MMs stay in a crisis scenario they may trade at “inflated” or “grossly 
 
Mollner, High-Frequency Trade and Market Performance 3-4 STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. 
POL'Y RES.,WORKING PAPER NO. 15-017 (2017), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/15-017_0.pdf; Jasmin Gider et al., 
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PAPER, 2016, 7-8, 26-27  http://firn.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/High-frequency-
trading-adn-fundamentalprice-efficiency-Gider-Schmickler-Westeide.pdf. 
264 See Gaia Balp & Giovanni Strampelli, Preserving Capital Markets Efficiency In The High 
Frequency Trading Era, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 349, 403. 
265See U.S SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CONCEPT RELEASE ON EQUITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3608 (Jan. 21, 2010); 
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and Evaluation, 39 VA. LAW & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2017-07 (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955112. 
266 Dolgopolov Two-Sided, supra note 251 at 35-36. 
267 Id. at 33-34. 
268 Id. at 63. 
269 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity In A High-Frequency World: Trading 
Obligations And Privileges of Market Makers And A Private Right of Action, 7 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303 (2013).  
270 See Dolgopolov, Regulating, supra note 257 at 677. 
271 Id. at 679. 
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exaggerated prices” – similar to what happened in equity index options on 
“Black Monday” (October 19, 1987).272  
 
A recent study showed, using a “rational expectations equilibrium 
model”273 that discretionary liquidity traders – like HF traders –increase the 
amount of “noise trading” (trading with no valuable informational content in 
valuing the asset).274 This causes price inefficiency and a loss of “information 
aggregation.”275  These distortions are exacerbated by “public information” (like 
enhanced disclosures), that while initially increasing liquidity, attracts more 
uninformed (noise) traders into the market and acts to “crowd out” valuable 
private information. 276   Price or “market” efficiency is the notion that all 
“information that is relevant to the asset’s fundamental value” (including its 
liquidity risk) is transmitted through its price.277 Thus as HF trading grows to 
dominate ETF liquidity provision one must naturally question the efficacy of 
ETF prices as a conveyor of full information including risk.278 Further, there is 
evidence that HF traders and other “algorithmic traders” use trading strategies 
that are “highly correlated.” 279  Therefore, HF trading MMs in ETFs could 
generate herding risk, an “interaction risk” fully explored in Part II of this article.  
e. Liquidity Shortages and Market Maker Ecosystem Participant 
Concentration  
 
 
272 Dolgopolov Two-Sided, supra note 251 at 35-36. 
273 Bing Han, Ya Tang, & Liyan Yang, Public Information and Uninformed Trading: 
Implications for Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency, 163 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
604, 605 (2016) (“Rational expectations equilibrium (REE) models have been the workbench 
for analyzing financial markets by providing a machinery of Hayek’s (1945) idea that prices 
aggregate information dispersed among market participants. These models typically introduce 
“noise trading” or “liquidity trading” to prevent the market price from fully revealing private 
information and to circumvent the “no trade” problem.”) 
274 Id. at 605. 
275 See id. 
276 Id. at 606. 
277 Id. 
278 See id. (“More public information reduces information asymmetry and adverse selection; 
thus, for a given amount of noise trading, it improves market liquidity. In turn, better liquidity 
lowers the expected loss of discretionary noise traders thereby attracting more such traders to 
the market, leading to more non-informational trading in the market. Hence, the information 
asymmetry problem weakens, which further improves market liquidity. As a result, both the 
equilibrium amount of aggregate noise trading and market liquidity increase with the precision 
of the public signal. Since noise traders are uninformed, increased noise trading negatively 
impacts the effectiveness of asset price in aggregating speculators’ private information, which 
implies that disclosure negatively affects price efficiency.”) 
279 See A.P. Chaboud, B. Chiquoine, E. Hjalmarsson & C. Vega, Rise of the Machines: 
Algorithmic Trading In The Foreign Exchange Market, 69 J. FINANCE 2045 (2014). 
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Another identified problem in the modern ETF MM ecosystem is market 
concentration. It’s been recently estimated that “[e]ighty seven percent of all 
allocated ETFs on the New York Stock Exchange are spread out among only 
five different market making firms.”280 Therefore a “strategic exit” or rogue 
behavior by a dominant MM in the ETF market could cause significant 
disruption.281   
 
Another concern is that APs perform a “dual role” of both primary 
market redemption / creation of ETF shares and secondary market MM, and an 
AP withdrawal in a crisis eliminates both functions.282 APs frequently trade in 
the primary market with many different funds, and their active participation is 
of “critical significance” to the market at large.283 It’s been estimated by the 
Bank of France that the number of APs for a given fund is often five or less and 
this reinforces just how important their intermediating role is, and the concerns 
relating to market concentration.284   
 
Liquidity shortages via “concentration risk” is relevant to consider for 
APs, MMs who aren’t APs (providing addition secondary market liquidity) and 
ETF fund sponsors and the concern is that an “idiosyncratic event” at a 
prominent ETF ecosystem intermediary could trigger a contagion across the 
market.285  Related is the liquidity concern of “true float” (the actual shares 
available to be traded) of underlying assets as passive ETF funds (and ecosystem 
participants who both trade and manage them) continue to grow in size.286  
f. The ETF “Pro-Liquidity” Industry Counter-Arguments 
  
ETF liquidity illusions are hotly contested, and far from a settled 
proposition.287 Industry participants say they trust the market, and also that other 
 
280 Bak, supra note 253. 
281 Id.  
282 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 93; see also Hu & Morley, A 
Commendable Start, supra note 75 at 1196. 
283 Id. at 94. 
284 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 93. see also G. Turner & V. 
Sushko, What risks do exchange- traded funds pose, BANQUE DE FRANCE, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REVIEW, No 22 (April 2018). 
285 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104; see also 13D Research, The ETF 
Liquidity Question: Can The Passive Universe Hold Up In The Event of a Market Crisis? 
MEDIUM (December 13, 2018), https://latest.13d.com/etf-market-crisis-qe-liquidity-passive-
investing-6af295f4e667. 
286 13D Research, id.  
287 See Trevor Hunnicutt, Fund Industry Defends Bond ETFs to U.S. Regulators, REUTERS 
(April 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-bonds/fund-industry-defends-bond-
etfs-to-u-s-regulators-idUSKBN1HG2YZ. 
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APs will replace those who withdraw during a crisis.288 BlackRock (who clearly 
benefits from a stable market perception), is adamant that these purported risks 
are overblown – even non-existent. 289  Liquidity illusions have also been 
identified as potentially forming in equity ETFs290 and Societe Generale SA 
recently disclosed results from a liquidity fragility stress test of 16,000 stocks, 
suggesting several ETFs were exposed to secondary market liquidity risks given 
their large holdings of particularly vulnerable equities.291  
 
BlackRock refutes these studies, stating that they use assumptions not 
indicative of “historic behavior of investors or ETFs.”292 They also suggest that 
widespread AP pullout is highly unlikely because other APs would scoop up the 
arbitrage opportunity for profit.293 This trust in APs to step in and mitigate a 
liquidity crisis has been cited by other industry participants. 294  APs have 
previously withdrawn momentarily from providing liquidity (the case of Knight 
Trading Group in 2012, and Citigroup in 2013) and alternative APs and MMs 
responded. 295  BlackRock has noted that secondary trading volume is much 
greater than primary market trading volume in a given fund’s underlying 
securities (in line with the liquidity enhancement argument previously noted).296 
Further, the underlying bond portfolios of fixed income ETFs are becoming 
increasingly “standardized” which serves as an additional safeguard.297 
 
288 See CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Feedback Statement on DP6 – Exchange Traded Funds 
(2018), 11, available at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/publications/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-6/feedback-statement-on-exchange-
traded-funds---discussion-paper-6.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
289 See BLACKROCK VIEWPOINT, February 2018 Case Study: ETF Trading In A High Velocity 
Market, March 2018, at 3 (hereinafter “BlackRock ETF Case Study”).; see also BlackRock, 
Index Investing, supra note 159. 
290 See Tautvydas Marciulaitis, ETF Liquidity Trap Will Get You, SEEKING ALPHA (July 26, 
2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4090736-etf-liquidity-trap-will-get?page=2; see also 
Sonali Basak & Lananh Nguyen, Guggenheim’s Anne Walsh Sees Liquidity Mismatch in 
Passive Bond Funds, BLOOMBERG (January 30, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-30/guggenheim-s-walsh-sees-liquidity-
mismatch-in-passive-bond-funds. 
291 See Yakob Peterseil, BlackRock Hits Back at SocGen’s Warning About the ETF Market, 
BLOOMBERG (September 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
11/blackrock-hits-back-at-socgen-alarm-over-etf-market-fragility. 
292 Id.  
293 See BLACKROCK ETF Case Study, supra note 289 at 5-6. 
294 See Scott Longley, Addressing ETF Liquidity Concerns, ETF STREAM (April 4, 2019), 
https://www.etfstream.com/feature/7093_addressing-etf-liquidity-concerns/. 
295 See Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 119 at 8, 11; see also See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL 
RESEARCH, Asset Management and Financial Stability (September 2013), 11-12, 
https://www.financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.
pdf. 
296 See BLACKROCK ETF Case Study, supra note 289 at 1, 6. 
297 See Friesen, supra note 219.  
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 The Financial Stability Board has noted that, in a crisis, ETF sponsors 
could rely on credit lines and use cash to cover redemptions until the panic had 
subsided.298Most ETFs, however, are not cash redeemable, but rather transfer 
the underlying securities “in-kind” to the AP299, and using leverage to subside a 
panic is a risky proposition.300 It is also possible (but easy to doubt) that investors 
can self-manage risk exposures by closely scrutinizing the liquidity of the 
underlying securities prior to investing in an ETF.301  A recent survey undertaken 
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) 
suggests that industry participants generally consider ETFs to be safer than 
mutual funds because of secondary market trading and the in-kind redemption 
mechanism,302 and that “the best line of defense against a liquidity mismatch” is 
with the ETF itself to establish prudent liquidity management tools and 
practices.303 
 
 Another point of view in support of ETFs providing an “additional layer 
of liquidity” is that in some cases the “underlying assets” are only lightly traded, 
or don’t trade at all.304  In this case “price” is not the trading signal but rather the 
“value” of the underlying assets, and the additional layer of liquidity, provided 
through ETF secondary market trading, performs a price discovery function 
 
298 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, Policy Recommendations To Address Structural 
Vulnerabilities From Asset Management Activities (January 12, 2017), available at 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Policy- Recommendations-on-Asset-
Management-Structural-Vulnerabilities.pdf.; see also Ashley Lau & Michael Flaherty, ETF 
Companies Boost Bank Credit Lines Amid Liquidity Concern, REUTERS (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-etfs-credit-expansion-insight/etf-companies-boost-bank-
credit-lines-amid-liquidity-concern-idUSKBN0NY0A720150513. 
299 See Jennifer Ryan Woods, Experts Say Bond ETF Liquidity Concerns Are Overblow, 
FORBES (May 18, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferwoods/2015/05/18/experts-say-
bond-etf-liquidity-concerns-are-overblown/#38a2baa26091. 
300 See Bird, supra note 194. 
301 See RISK.NET, Institutional ETF Trading, Liquidity Improving, Trade Sizes Growing (Q4 
2018), available at 
https://www.janestreet.com/static/pdfs/JaneStreet_Inst_ETF_Trading_Survey_2018.pdf?utm_s
ource=website&utm_medium=download_button&utm_campaign=trading-survey-2018; see 
also John Manganaro, ETF Costs, Liquidity in Focus For Institutional Investors, PLAN 
SPONSOR (October 12, 2018), https://www.plansponsor.com/etf-costs-liquidity-focus-
institutional-investors/. 
302 See THE BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
Recommendations For Liquidity Risk Management For Collective Investment Schemes Final 
Report (February 2018) at 23-24, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD590.pdf. 
303 Id. at 23.  
304 See Corey Hoffstein, Making The Case For Using ETFs to Track Illiquid Markets, FORBES 
(October 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/10/06/making-the-
case-for-using-etfs-to-track-illiquid-markets/#1fa3bbce7f85. 
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(making an ETF a superior investment vehicle for illiquid underlying).305 For 
example, in 2015 the stock market in Greece closed for 5 weeks due to political 
and regional uncertainty, and when it re-opened the market fell 23 percent.306 
During this time, however, an ETF (Global X’s GREK ETF) tracked the market 
and stock prices when the market re-opened were in line with the ETF prices.307   
 
 Also, in regards to the fixed income market, one portfolio manager has 
argued that bond ETFs are safer than bond mutual funds because “[i]f liquidity 
of the underlying asset class was a concern and you wished to exit a traditional 
bond fund, your redemption would be at the discretion of the fund provider and 
in extremis, you may find yourself gated.”308 With an ETF you can at least sell 
on the secondary market and you aren’t stuck to only dealing with the fund 
issuer.309  Further, the “gradual electronification of fixed-income trading” has 
been cited as a factor that will improve the liquidity in both bonds and fixed 
income ETFs reducing the liquidity illusion risks.310 
 
v. Case Studies: Absent Arbitrageurs and Discretionary Liquidity Failure 
  
History has a habit of repeating itself, and as philosopher George 
Santayana famously remarked, “those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.”311  Two financial market episodes from the relatively 
recent past are worthy of investigation when assessing interaction effects, 
liquidity illusions, and reliance on discretionary actors in ETFs.  These are the 
impact of “portfolio insurance” products during the “Black Monday” crash of 
October 1987, and the “auction rate securities” market failure in the GFC.  
Several parallels can be drawn between these two episodes and growing 
concerns in the ETF market, of which two are most relevant: arbitrageurs aren’t 
always there when you need them; and discretionary liquidity is fragile in a crisis 
because intermediaries can simply back away and stop providing it. 
 
 
305 Id.  
306 Id.  
307 Id.  
308 Henry Cobbe, Concerned About Liquidity? Stick to Bond ETFs, SEEKING ALPHA (May 5, 
2019), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4260276-concerned-liquidity-stick-bond-etfs. 
309 Id. 
310 Evans, supra note 183. 
311 See INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, George Santayana (1863-1952), 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/santayan/ (last visited May 15, 2019).  
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a. Black Monday and The Failure of Portfolio Insurance 
  
Monday, October 19, 1987 - known to market historians as the infamous 
“Black Monday” crash -312 saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average (“DJIA”) lose 
over 20 percent of its value (the largest single day decline in U.S. history).313  
Various theories have attempted to explain what caused Black Monday including 
the impact of “globalization.”314 The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago stated 
that “international investors had become increasingly active in US markets, 
accounting for some of the rapid pre-crisis appreciation in stock prices.”315 Other 
theories include a record number of “margin calls”316 as well as “problems in 
trading systems” and “difficulty in gathering information in the rapidly changing 
and chaotic environment.”317 In the seven months preceding the crash, global 
investment in U.S. markets caused the DJIA to appreciate 44 percent and evoke 
“concerns of an asset bubble.” 318  Exacerbating the fallout were certain 
“structural flaws” including “trade clearing protocols” in both securities and 
derivatives markets that were later subject to regulatory “overhaul.”319 
 
 Another factor that likely “amplified” the Black Monday crisis was an 
innovative product called “portfolio insurance” - ironically designed to insulate 
 
312 See Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy 
Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1988). 
313 See Troy Segal, What Causes Black Monday: The Stock Market Crash of 1987? 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042115/what-caused-black-
monday-stock-market-crash-1987.asp (accessed April 26, 2019) 
314 Id. 
315 Donald Bernhardt & Marshall Eckblad, Stock Market Crash of 1987, FEDERAL RESERVE 
HISTORY, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/stock_market_crash_of_1987#what 
(accessed April 26, 2019). 
316 Mark Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash With A Discussion of The 
Federal Reserve Response, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVISIONS OF 
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007-13, 
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf, at 12-14. 
317 See id at 3-4. 
318 Bernhardt & Eckblad, supra note 315.  
319 Id. (“At the time of the crisis, stock, options, and futures markets used different timelines 
for the clearing and settlements of trades, creating the potential for negative trading account 
balances and, by extension, forced liquidations. Additionally, securities exchanges had been 
powerless to intervene in the face of large-volume selling and rapid market declines.  After 
Black Monday, regulators overhauled trade-clearing protocols to bring uniformity to all 
prominent market products. They also developed new rules, known as circuit breakers, 
allowing exchanges to halt trading temporarily in instances of exceptionally large price 
declines.”); see also Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 
1987 – The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993; Lawrence 
Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 927 (1989). 
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investors from a market crash. 320  The Presidential Task Force on Market 
Mechanisms 1988 (the “Brady Commission”) suggested portfolio insurance 
“ignited” the crisis by facilitating “mechanical price-insensitive selling.” 321 
Those who purchased portfolio insurance (primarily mutual and pension funds 
and insurance companies) agreed to “short S&P 500 futures if the stock market 
fell by a certain amount” and by doing so they would reap an offset against the 
decline in the value of their portfolio.322 Ironically, a financial innovation that 
was designed to mitigate risk actually exacerbated a crisis. Those fearing ETF 
liquidity “death spirals”, see an analogous application: a financial instrument that 
is designed to provide liquidity could in fact amplify a run on liquidity and create 
a pro-cyclical sell-off in both the fund and the underlying assets (which could 
also cascade to other asset classes).  
 
 Portfolio insurance was designed to mirror a “put option”, thereby 
allowing investors to “preserve upside gains but limit downside risk.”323 It was 
strategically enacted through computer modelling programs that calculated 
“optimal stock-to-cash ratios at various market prices.” 324  Most portfolio 
insurers adjusted ratios through a process called “dynamic hedging” where, as 
stock prices fell, an increasing number of futures-contracts were sold to offset 
portfolio losses.325  Model re-calculation and portfolio adjustment was costly, so 
models were updated periodically and then trading took place in “batches.”326 
Futures were traded because they were both cheaper than stock trading, and 
because the institutions that provided the portfolio insurance didn’t have the 
ability (or authority) to trade their client’s portfolios.327 However, during Black 
Monday, the “simultaneous” use of portfolio insurance by investors (who were 
 
320 See Anora M. Gaudiano, Here’s One Factor That Amplified The 1987 Stock-Market Crash, 
MARKETWATCH (October 19, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-one-key-
factor-that-amplified-the-1987-stock-market-crash-2017-10-16. 
321 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988): REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS. NICHOLAS BRADY (CHAIRMAN), U.S. 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE at 7 (hereinafter “Brady Commission”). 
322 See Matt Maley, The Real Reason For The 1987 Crash, As Told By A Salomon Brothers 
Veteran, CNBC (October 16, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/16/cause-of-black-
monday-in-1987-as-told-by-a-trader-who-lived-through-it.html. 
323 Carlson, supra note 316 at 4. 
324 Id.  
325 See Floyd Norris, A Computer Lesson Still Unlearned, THE NEW YORK TIMES (October 18, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/business/a-computer-lesson-from-1987-still-
unlearned-by-wall-street.html. 
326 See B Garcia, An Appraisal: Portfolio Insurance Could Fuel Stocks’ Fall, Critics Say, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (October 12, 2987), p. 43. 
327 Carlson, supra note 316 at 4. 
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among the day’s largest sellers) interacted with other market participants to 
accelerate the price decline and increase downward selling pressure.328  
 
Another problem with portfolio insurance was that futures contract 
buyers reacted by demanding deep discounts and, concurrently, “hedging their 
position by selling the underlying stocks” all of which contributed to pro-cyclical 
downward pressure on the market.329  Adding to the interaction fall-out were 
large institutions, who anticipated both a portfolio insurance sell off, and a surge 
in mutual fund redemptions and acted quickly to try and “pre-empt” the market 
selloff.330  
 
This created a “cascade effect”331 and also a downward “feedback loop” 
(similar to the feedback loop noted in the first section on ETF liquidity illusions): 
selling by portfolio insurers motivated selling by other participants which 
thereby prompted more selling by portfolio insurers.332  Another concern, cited 
by the SEC in its investigative report on Black Monday, was that non-portfolio 
insured investors had difficulty ascertaining how much selling was related to 
portfolio insurance and how much was from other market participants, and this 
opacity made corrective arbitrage difficult to execute.333  
 
 Another parallel between ETFs and portfolio insurance is that in the 
latter, there was a generally accepted belief that if futures selling drove too steep 
a discount arbitrageurs would step in and purchase the clearly undervalued 
stocks, and this proved to be a fallacy.334  Index arbitrageurs were not active 
when they were needed.335 Also, opacity “abetted” the portfolio insurance crisis 
as many investors did not appreciate the “large number of assets” that were 
 
328 Id. at 15-16. 
329 Norris, supra note 325. 
330 See Brady Commission, supra note 321 at 29 
331 See Robert Shiller, Portfolio Insurance and Other Investor Fashions as Factors in the 1987 
Stock Market Crash, in Stanley Fischer, ed. NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1988, 
VOLUME 3, 287-297 (MIT Press, 1988) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10958 
(“The mechanism they referred to has been called a "cascade effect." An initial price decline 
starts a vicious circle by causing portfolio insurers to sell, causing further price declines, 
causing portfolio insurers to sell again, and so on.”) 
332 Carlson, supra note 316 at 15.  
333 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1988): THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET 
BREAK. WASHINGTON: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. AT 3-14 – 3-16. 
334 Norris, supra note 325. 
335 See Carlson supra note 316 at11 (“Usually, index arbitragers would use this as an 
opportunity to buy in the futures market and sell in the cash market, which would mitigate 
pressure in the futures market. However, index arbitrage traders were not active, due, in part, to 
the NYSE’s restrictions regarding use of the DOT system. This unusual pattern served to partly 
decouple prices in the futures and cash market.”) 
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potentially affected.336 Financial market opacity emanates from many sources 
including a “lack of knowledge” on the part of participants, complex products 
and strategies, and “complexity in the network of actors involved in the 
strategy.” 337  Just like portfolio insurance, ETFs could be also affected by 
information opacity regarding the complexity of the product, the participant 
network that sustains it, HF Trading generated noise, and difficulty ascertaining 
signal in a pro-cyclical crisis. 
 
As discussed above in the “pro-liquidity” section, many industry 
participants believe that AP withdrawal in an ETF liquidity crunch will be met 
with new AP entrants who will profit off the arbitrage opportunity.  If history, 
and portfolio insurance, is a guide this is not a certain proposition.  Another 
parallel between portfolio insurance and the ETF market is a potential over-
reliance on “program trading” which, in the case of portfolio insurance proved 
fallible in a crisis.338 Uncertainties linger about the extent that we can truly rely 
on risk modelling during a crisis.339 Quant-trading strategies and algorithmic 
trading reliance, especially when coupled with volatile ETF varieties like those 
using leverage, continue to be a cited concern of many.340  
 
A 2013 report from the Federal Reserve Board identified additional 
parallels between portfolio insurance and leveraged and inverse ETF trading. 341 
Both portfolio insurance and trading in inverse and leveraged ETFs leads to 
“destabilizing” effects (and cascade pressure) during periods of market volatility 
because daily rebalancing of “stock-to-cash ratios” is procyclical and these 
products generate directional “selling in a declining market and buying in a 
rising market.”342 Further, like portfolio insurance, the rebalancing of portfolios 
in ETFs is “mechanical” and attract other traders who look to pre-empt orders 
(also known as “anticipatory trading).343  
 
336 See Jacobs, supra note 102 at 270-271. 
337 Id. at 270. 
338 Norris, supra note 325; see also Carlson, supra note 316 at 15-16. 
339 See Erik F. Gerding, The Dangers of Delegating Financial Regulation To Risk Models, 29 
No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2010).  
340 Doug Kass, Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Increasing, REAL MONEY 
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of-mass-destruction-are-increasing-14875209. 
341 See Tugkan Tuzun, Are Leveraged and Inverse ETFs the New Portfolio Insurers? FINANCE 
AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVISIONS OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY 
AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2013-48 (June 13, 2013) 23-24, available at, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340616. 
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b. Auction Rate Securities & The Global Financial Crisis 
  
The GFC highlights how relying on intermediated discretionary liquidity 
providers can be fragile in a crisis.344 Also, “market discipline” can fail when it 
is most needed.345  This occurred in the Auction Rate Security (ARS) failure.346  
The comparison between ETF liquidity illusions and the failure of the ARS 
market was first noted in 2015347 by investment manager Howard Marks.348  
ARSs were variable or adjustable rate bonds, often issued by a municipality, 
student loan finance authority or corporation, with a rate set, and periodically 
adjusted, through a Dutch Auction.349 They offered issuers long-term borrowing 
at short-term floating rates,350 and they were attractive to investors since they 
were considered “liquid, short-term, cash-equivalent” investments (like 
commercial paper) despite being in actuality floating rate, longer-term, fixed 
income securities.351  
 
Sellers brought their ARS to auction, where prospective purchasers 
(looking to ARS as money market substitutes352) supplied competitive bids, 
indicating their desired purchase amount and the lowest acceptable interest rate 
they would pay.353 At the close of the auction the “clearing rate” (the rate all 
investors would receive until the next auction354) was set with investor bids 
 
344 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Opening Remarks, Governor Daniel K. Tarullo At The Center For 
American Progress and Americans For Financial Reform Conference, Washington, D.C., BK. 
COMPL. GD. 3755909 (C.C.H.) 2018.  
345 See David Min, Understanding The Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1421 (2015). 
346 See Joe Prendergast, Craig McCann & Eddie O’Neal, Auction Rate Securities, 16 No. 4 
PIABA B.J. 383 (2009). 
347 See Howard Marks, Memo To Oaktree Clients Re: Liquidity (March 25, 2015), available at 
https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-source/memos/2015-03-25-
liquidity.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
348 See Stephen Foley, The Alchemy of ETF Liquidity is an Illusory Promise, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(April 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/cc44cd76-d918-11e4-b907-00144feab7de. 
349 INVESTOPEDIA, Auction Rate Security – ARS, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/auction-rate-security.asp (last visited November 30, 
2018).  
350 Marc L. Ross, The ARS Debacle: The Forgotten Crisis of 2008, CFA INSTITUTE, 
ENTERPRISING INVESTOR (January 31, 2017), 
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351 See Prendergast et al., supra note 346 at 383. 
352 See Jacqueline Doherty, Auction-Rate Securities: Still Frozen In Time, BARRON’S (March 
28, 2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/auction-rate-securities-still-frozen-in-time-
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353 See Adrian D’Silva, Haley Gregg & David Marshall, Explaining The Decline In The 
Auction Rate Securities Market, 236 CHICAGO FED LETTER 1, 2 (2008). 
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placed above this rate not filled.355 If the interest rate that cleared the auction 
(based on issuer default perception) was higher than the maximum issuer 
contractual rate then the auction “failed”, the coupon rate defaulted to the 
maximum rate in the issuer’s prospectus, and investors held on to their 
securities.356  
 
During the GFC, ARS auctions failed as major financial institutions – 
who ran the auctions and were relied on to provide liquidity support – 
withdrew,357 leaving a wide supply of nearly worthless ARS.358 ARS auction 
failure meant there were “insufficient bidders to cover the number of securities 
offered for sale.”359 ARS liquidity was “entirely dependent on the presence of 
sufficient orders to buy outstanding ARS” all of which was contingent on a 
“contractual ceiling” that the issuer was required to pay.360 Thus investors had 
no “put option” to sell their securities and the short-term nature of the investment 
required the “continual success of the period auction.”361  
 
 It was believed that auction sponsors (broker-dealers) would step in and 
a provide a backstop for auctions, in the event of failure - placing bids just below 
the contractual maximum, and allowing auctions to clear.362 This is exactly the 
opposite of what happened as auction sponsors instead withdrew from the market 
during the crisis363 – failing to make good on their “implicit” guarantee that they 
would intervene to ensure auction success - leaving issuers unable to reset rates 
(and also subject to penalties 364 ), and investors holding now illiquid (and 
devalued) securities they once thought were like cash.365  Banks withdrew from 
the ARS market because they were exposed to significant credit losses and 
mortgage write-downs at the time and thus “less willing to commit their money 
to supporting auctions in danger of failing.” 366  The ARS failure resulted in 
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settlements of over $50 billion to aggrieved investors who alleged the products, 
and liquidity risks, were not adequately described (or were misleading).367  
 
As identified by Marks and others, the ETF market echoes some of the 
follies of the ARS failure.368  First, there was a perception that ARS would be 
liquid, which later proved illusory when intermediaries who were relied on to 
support the auction withdrew. This turned out to be a case of “discretionary” 
liquidity – in other words, intermediaries only supported the auction when it was 
in their best interest to do so.  This is similar to some of the expressed fears in 
ETFs – that the APs and other MMs (particularly those run by computer 
algorithms) will back out when it is in their best economic interest to do so, and 
stop providing liquidity support to retail investors in the secondary market.  
vi. Conclusion  
 
This article has shown that ETFs, despite their benefits, could destabilize 
markets.  As the case studies of portfolio insurance in the 1980s, and the auction 
rate securities market during the GFC show, Wall Street will, at times, create 
new financial products that, like ETFs, promise perpetual liquidity through 
intermediated structures that rely on discretionary actors.  These products may 
also combine leverage, complexity, and structural opacity to further decrease 
financial stability.369  Despite the calming voices from the ETF industry, history 
illustrates that discretionary liquidity and arbitrage reliance isn’t always there 
when you need it. Also, financial product innovation can generate pro-cyclical 
market accelerations because of the complex interactions of market participants 
in a crisis.  
 
Hyman Minsky and others have prominently argued that financial 
innovation, in and of itself, can facilitate future crises. 370  From portfolio 
insurance and dynamic hedging in 1987, to securitizations and collateralized 
debt obligations in the GFC, financial product innovation seems to consistently 
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show up as a central factor in a crisis - driving market instability while fostering 
more complex intermediary connection points. 371   When assessing financial 
innovation (including financial technology) it is worthwhile to consider the 
impact of deepening complexity in regulatory oversight structures.  
 
Now Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane, in his well-
known “dog and the frisbee” speech, makes a strong case, citing numerous 
studies in behavioral economics and complex decision making under 
uncertainty, that the most appropriate regulatory response to financial 
complexity isn’t more complexity, but rather to “simplify and streamline the 
control framework.”372 When it comes to ETF risk disclosure perhaps “more 
isn’t more” and instead we should heed Haldane’s advice (which was at the time 
being made to the bank capital frameworks under the Basel regime) and look to 
“cutting back the thicket, re-sizing the haystack.”373  One of the ways to simplify 
the ETF regulatory frameworks, and focus on the unique risks, is to heed 
Professor Hu and Morley’s proposal of a “comprehensive” approach to ETF 
regulation that focused on the “arbitrage mechanism.”374 
 
Similarly, regulatory regimes can facilitate what Professor Richard 
Epstein describes as uncertain “cumulative and interactive effects.” 375  Any 
attempt at regulatory simplicity begs an inquiry into the purpose of governing 
legislation for a given domain – and to this end financial regulation has been 
advocated as increasingly requiring “systemic” considerations. 376  This 
necessitates a “public goods” analysis since, as ETFs clearly show - actions 
rationally undertaken by individuals can facilitate collective instability.377  
 
There are good reasons to avoid a response to market complexity with 
heightened regulatory complexity – particularly when we don’t know how 
regulation itself could exacerbate a future crisis, induce iatrogenic or “nonlinear” 
 
371 See Satyajit Das, WMD Old and New Primed For Next Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (May 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-09/wmd-old-
and-new-primed-for-a-market-meltdown. 
372 See Andrew G Haldane &Vasileios Madouros, SPEECH AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
KANSAS CITY’S 366TH ECONOMIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM, “THE CHANGING POLICY LANDSCAPE”, 
JACKSON HOLE, WYOMING (31 August 2012), available at 
https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf. 
373 Id.  
374 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework; supra note 75; see also Hu & Morley, A 
Welcome Invitation, supra note 75. 
375 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1st ed. 1995), 3.  
376 See Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Financial Regulation in a System Context, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 229 (2008).  
377 Id. at 232.  
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effects,378 or facilitate economic rent seeking.379  As Epstein has documented 
“there has been a massive increase in the frequency and complexity of the legal 
rules that govern society” and this is “neither inevitable nor desirable.” 380 
Unfortunately increased regulatory complexity has certainly been the case in 
financial markets, and with increased regulatory complexity comes a greater 
potential for unintended consequences.381  Of note, the SEC’s recent transaction 
fee pilot program382 for national market system (NMS) stocks (including ETFs) 
which imposes temporary pricing restrictions on exchanges and ATS (including 
“maker-taker” liquidity models) with a goal of “improving pricing, liquidity, and 
trade execution quality”383 has attracted recent criticism (and litigation) from 
several exchanges.384  
 
Another idea, previously canvassed in the literature, is whether a 
government “market liquidity provider of last resort” (MLLR) could be 
established as proposed by Professor Steven Schwarcz.385 Such a mechanism 
might reduce the “consequences of failure” associated with temporary market 
panics - like a sustained period of ETF arbitrage breakdown and resulting 
 
378 See Cheng-Yun Tsang, The Seven Deadly Sins of the Contemporary Financial System, 37 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 359, 360-361 (2017). (“Modern financial markets operate like a 
complex adaptive ecosystem. Moreover, like an ecosystem, policy or regulatory change is 
often influenced by complexity science elements, such as nonlinearity or emergence. This 
means that regulatory efforts intended to affect market actors' behaviors may lead to an 
unexpected outcome, or steer them in an unintended direction.”) 
379 See Turbeville, supra note 359 at 1203. (“Modern capital and derivatives markets are 
exceedingly complex and involve multiple methods for extraction of value by the financial 
sector that must be paid for by the productive economy. The amount extracted is demonstrably 
far higher than historic data or reasoned analysis suggests could possibly be reasonable. The 
rents extracted by the financial sector for intermediating capital investment are inefficiently 
high.”) 
380 Epstein, supra note 375 at 21.  
381 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 
211, 265 (2009). 
382 SEE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TRANSACTION FEE PILOT FOR NMS 
STOCKS, Release No. 34-82873; File No. S7-05-18, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-82873.pdf. 
383 See Bibb Strench, SEC’s NMS Pilot Program of Vital Interest to ETFs, THOMPSON HINE 
ETF UPDATE (May 10, 2018), https://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/secs-nms-pilot-
program-of-vital-interest-to-etfs. (“Data from the Pilot will be used to inform the SEC, market 
participants and the industry about the effects of transaction-based fees and rebates under the 
three models. *…*….*…* The Pilot also will require the national securities exchanges to 
prepare and post on their websites public and downloadable data including aggregated and 
anonymized order routing data (updated monthly), and an XML dataset of standardized 
information on their transaction fees and rebates.”) 
384 See Alexander Osipovich & Dave Michaels, Big-Three Stock Exchanges Sue SEC Over 
Trading-Fee Plan, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (February 15, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-joins-new-york-stock-exchange-in-suing-to-block-sec-
rule-11550259637?mod=hp_major_pos19. 
385 See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 381 at 247-250. 
 
 
 
62 
illiquidity – by providing “functional modularity” to the crisis episode, and 
preventing spillover effects to other financial system. 386   There are many 
considerations before resorting to such a measure – like whether APs and MMs 
should be required to provide liquidity support, and the extent ETF ecosystem 
participants (including APs, MMs, and ETF sponsors) should pay fees to the 
entity.387  
 
Professor Schwarcz maintains that the cost of this liquidity provider 
would be “minimal” when compared to the “lender of last resort” function of the 
Federal Reserve in the GFC, and had such an entity been in existence in the GFC, 
much of the damage of the subprime crisis could “restricted in scope and 
lessened in impact.”388 An MLLR would theoretically provide modularity by 
“investing in securities of panicked markets” in contexts where the value of these 
securities deviates drastically from the “intrinsic value” of the underlying assets 
(as a result of irrational investor panic or herding behaviors).389 This would 
provide a “floor” to the short-term panicked market.390  
 
Schwarcz also suggests that concerns of taxpayer burden and moral 
hazard are effectively mitigated because a MLLR will only intervene when it 
sees a profit opportunity (based on the underlying asset value deviation).391 One 
naturally wonders why private entities wouldn’t undertake the same arbitrage 
activity, given the obvious profit potential?  But as this article has shown, the 
behavior of private intermediaries in a crisis is unpredictable. Black Monday 
showed that arbitrageurs are sometimes nowhere to be found when a perfect 
storm crystalizes around panicked selling, interaction risks, contagion, 
information cascades and asymmetry.  Also, the costs, if you’re wrong, of acting 
 
386 See Id. at 215-216; see also discussion at 247-248 (“One such possible approach is to 
establish a governmental entity to act, if needed, as a market liquidity provider of last resort 
(hereinafter, “market liquidity provider”) in order to more loosely couple the feedback effects.  
This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which recognizes that failures are almost 
inevitable in complex systems, and that successful systems are those in which the 
consequences of a failure are limited. *…*….*…*. A market liquidity provider would work in 
much this same way, providing functional “modularity” to limit the consequences of financial-
market failure by directly investing in securities of panicked markets. Financial markets rely 
critically on the supply of liquidity in the form of credit. If a failure deprives a particular 
market of liquidity, a market liquidity provider can restore liquidity before that market 
collapses and endangers other financial markets.”) 
387 See id. at 216. 
388 Id at 251. 
389 Id. at 248-249. 
390 Id. at 252. 
391 Id.  
 
 
 
63 
during a panic are both financial and reputational.392  There is no certainty, 
however, that the government will be “right” in its interventional timing either.  
 
New financial products can be beneficial, but they can also destabilize 
markets.  The benefits of ETFs have facilitated a massive post-GFC surge in 
market capitalization. Given this trend, ETFs could likely house a sizeable share 
of American retirement savings in the future, and continue as a preferred vehicle 
for institutional investors, HF traders and robo-advisors.  How ETF liquidity will 
play out in a full-blown future crisis is unknown.  The arguments advocated by 
BlackRock and other industry participants may prove prescient, but this will only 
be known over time.   
 
It’s impossible to predict how (or when) a new crisis will happen. The 
growth in size and importance of ETFs as an asset class; how they connect retail 
investors, pension funds and Wall Street; the potential instabilities they could 
create; and the long-term uncertainty that passive investing will have on the 
economy, make ETFs a critical, yet significantly understudied, segment of 
consumer finance that deserves closer academic and regulatory scrutiny. ETFs 
have not undergone a true liquidity test.393 Part II of this study will continue an 
investigation into ETF market instabilities by introducing other “interaction 
risks” manifest through the potential for investor herding, and the transmission 
of informational inefficiencies throughout the ETF operational ecosystem.   
 
 
  
 
392 Id. at 255. 
393 See Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 104 at 79, see also 13D RESEARCH, 
supra note 285. 
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Chapter II: Exchange Traded Funds & the COVID-19 Crisis 
i. What Have We Learned So Far About ETFs in the COVID-19 Crisis? 
 
The following subchapter was published on April 3, 2020 on the Duke Law School’s, Global 
Financial Markets Center, FinReg Blog and is available at  
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/04/03/what-have-we-learned-so-far-about-etfs-
in-the-covid-19-crisis/  
 
ETFs are at the heart of the COVID-19 financial crisis.394   Over 40 
percent of the trading volume during the mid-March selloff was in ETFs 
(multiple times the percentage in January), making them the “tool of choice” for 
many crisis traders.395 Using ETFs to trade through a crisis makes sense – they 
offer high intraday liquidity and instant exposure to entire asset classes, industry 
sectors, and even global markets.396 They’ve also shown recent value as futures 
substitutes when liquidity thinned in derivatives markets.397 
 
Besides their popularity as a preferred crisis trading tool, what have we 
learned about ETFs so far in the COVID-19 crisis? 
 
First, the pandemic has revealed fragilities – most noticeably deep 
discounts in the trading price of many ETFs relative to their underlying net asset 
value.398 It’s also confirmed pre-COVID-19 fears that intermediaries could back 
away from arbitraging away price discounts in a crisis;399 validated prior reports 
 
394 Dawn Lim & Mischa Frankl-Duval, In Market Rout, ETFs Are Where The Action Is, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-market-rout-etfs-
are-where-the-action-is-11584270000. 
395 Id.  
396 See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make 
Markets Less Stable? Part I, Liquidity Illusions, 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J. 15 (2020), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3343976. 
397 Lim & Frankl-Duval, supra note 394.  
398 See Marc Gerstein, Why Your Supposedly Stable Fixed-Income ETF Fell Off A Cliff, 
FORBES (March 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcgerstein/2020/03/23/why-your-
supposedly-stable-fixed-income-etf-fell-off-a-cliff/#7a1c08bf7ba5. 
399 See Clements, supra note 396 at 34.  
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that ETFs are the new cash substitute;400 and shuttered a variety of ETFs that 
maybe shouldn’t have ever existed in the first place.401   
 
Most importantly, given the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented de facto 
bail-out of investment grade corporate credit ETFs,402 it’s sparked an unsettled 
debate on the systemic importance of certain asset managers that are the largest 
ETF sponsors.403  
 
a. Liquidity mismatch and arbitrage instability concerns in ETFs are real  
 
Much of the early selling in ETFs were in equity indexes in a flight to 
quality towards bond funds.404  The safety of bond ETFs proved precarious, 
however, when pre-COVID-19 fears of “liquidity mismatch” 405  – a topic I 
discussed with Lee Reiners in January on the Duke FinReg Pod - materialized 
with discounts emerging between bond ETF trading prices and their underlying 
net asset values (NAV).406  Unprecedented discounts also emerged in ETFs with 
illiquid underlying equities, like BlackRock’s iShares MSCI Philippines ETF 
(EPHE) which reported a 15 percent discount to NAV on March 16th.407 One 
report estimated that, thus far in the COVID-19 crisis, there have been around 
700 ETFs trading “at least 1% or more higher or lower than that fund’s NAV.”408 
 
 
400 See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To 
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (June 2019), 3-4, 28-29, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf.   
401 Katherine Greifeld & Brandon Kochkodin, ETFs Liquidate at Quickest Pace Since 2017 
Amid Market Turmoil, BLOOMBERG (April 1, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/etfs-liquidate-at-quickest-pace-since-
2017-amid-market-turmoil. 
402 Alexandra Scaggs, The Fed Has Never Bought ETFs Before. Here’s Why That’s Changing, 
BARRON’S (March 24, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-the-federal-reserve-is-
now-buying-etfs-51585076254. 
403 See Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 
22(4) U. PA. J. BUS. L. 722 (2020). available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516936. 
404 Lim & Frankl-Duval, supra note 394.  
405 See Clements, supra note 396 at 36. 
406 Lim & Frankl-Duval, supra note 394.  
407 Lewis Braham, Emerging Market ETF Pricing Another Victim of the Coronavirus 
Outbreak, BARRON’S (March 26, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/emerging-market-
etf-pricing-another-victim-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak-51585217700.  
408 Andrea Riquier, ETFS behaving badly: ‘exactly what they are supposed to do’ or ‘just what 
we feared’? MARKETWATCH (March 28, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-
how-to-think-about-the-turbulence-in-etf-pricing-and-heres-what-to-do-about-it-2020-03-27. 
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Pricing discounts were widely manifest in credit ETFs, even for those 
with “negligible credit or term risk” like ultra short duration funds,409 while 
investment grade corporate credit funds were most heavily impacted.410 Even the 
corporate bond funds of the largest ETF issuers - BlackRock and Vanguard - 
started “trading out of sync with their underlying assets.”411  For example, the 
week through March 20th, BlackRock’s iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade 
Corporate Bond ETF (LQD) closed at a 5 percent discount to its NAV, later 
rebounding to a premium of 3.2 percent NAV after the Fed’s measures were 
announced.412  
 
NAV discounts are common in closed-end funds;413 however, unlike a 
closed-end fund, an ETF uses a unique “arbitrage mechanism” to continuously 
align its trading price with its NAV.414   The problem is that this arbitrage 
function, which involves the continual creation and redemption of ETF shares 
by large financial institutions called “authorized participants” (APs), 415  is 
performed discretionarily and is motivated by market incentives, not legal 
obligations.416 AP’s failure to “arb away” the discounts in the ETF market during 
this crisis has validated many pre-COVID-19 concerns about AP “step away” 
risk during spikes of volatility and market uncertainty.417   
 
The Fed’s move to buy up corporate bonds and ETFs helped to stabilize 
the “massive dislocations” between prices and value, and restore at least some 
short-term stability in the credit fund sector.418  It also staved off a run on fixed-
income mutual funds which may have had to unload corporate bonds onto the 
market at fire sale prices to meet investor cash redemption demands.419 This 
 
409 See Gerstein, supra note 398.  
410 See Tom Eckett, ETF discount concerns bubble to the surface, ETF STREAM (March 23, 
2020), https://www.etfstream.com/feature/10826_etf-discount-concerns-bubble-to-the-surface/. 
411 See Dawn Lim, Bond ETFs Flash Warning Signs of Growing Mismatch, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (March 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bond-etfs-flash-warning-signs-of-
growing-mismatch-11584964801. 
412 Id.  
413 Eckett, supra note 410.  
414 See Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A 
Commendable Start and a Welcome Invitation, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2019); see also see 
Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded Funds, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018). 
415 Gerstein, supra note 398. 
416 See Clements, supra note 396 at 25-28, 34-36. 
417 Id. 
418 Katherine Greifeld, Fed Lifeline Saves Bond Funds Teetering on Brink of ETF Hell, 
BLOOMBERG (March 28, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-28/fed-
lifeline-shields-bond-funds-teetering-on-brink-of-etf-hell. 
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could have easily triggered a selling cascade across other credit ETFs, to 
underlying bonds, and in turn driven more mutual fund redemption runs.420  
 
b. ETFs as cash substitutes, while others maybe shouldn’t exist at all 
 
Crisis trading also revealed that ETFs are being used as cash 
substitutes.421 This confirms pre-crisis studies by the European Systemic Risk 
Board. 422  Market reports show ultra-short duration treasury ETFs like 
BlackRock’s iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF (SHY) benefiting from 
massive funding flows in early March (in an early flight to quality) only to 
experience a whipsaw outflow after the Federal Reserve unleashed its stimulus 
package and investor funds quickly herded to high-grade corporate credit ETFs 
in an “all clear sign for risk assets.”423  
 
Also, in an episode somewhat reminiscent of the failure of certain 
volatility-linked inverse exchanged traded products (ETPs) in 2018,424 several 
three-times leveraged, oil-linked ETPs issued by WisdomTree were forced to 
close after crude oil prices plummeted amidst oil-price war fears.425 Similar 
products issued by USB, Société Générale and Janus Henderson experienced 
significant losses, raising (again) the question of why some of these products 
exist in the first place, especially in light of regulatory warnings regarding their 
unsuitability for most investors.426  
 
As coronavirus fears pounded the markets, many ETFs were forced to 
shutter.  Bloomberg recently reported that 72 ETFs have closed in the first 
quarter of the year (representing $1.4 Billion) with “niche” indexes, and 
leveraged funds that use derivatives hit particularly hard.427 Other ETFs, like 
 
420 See Ryan Clements, supra note 403.  
421 Katherine Greifeld, Cash-Like ETFs See $3 Billion Exit After Fed Steps Into Market, 
BLOOMBERG (March 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-30/fading-
funding-squeeze-spurs-3-billion-exit-from-cash-like-etfs. 
422 See Pagano, Serrano & Zechner, supra note 400 at 3-4, 28-29.  
423 Greifeld, supra note 421. 
424 See Ryan Clements, If We Can, Does It Mean That We Should? Volatility Linked ETPs and 
the Recent Crash, DUKE FINREG BLOG (February 10, 2018), 
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2018/02/10/if-we-can-does-it-mean-that-we-should-
volatility-linked-etps-and-the-recent-crash/. 
425 Chris Flood and Attracta Mooney, Crude Price Crash Hits Oil-Linked Exchange Traded 
Products, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 15, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ce8a2b61-8f71-
4bea-a391-3564b4409e28. 
426 Id.  
427 Greifeld & Kochkodin, supra note 401.  
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gold-linked funds have, however, seen a surge in investor inflows;428  while 
several new “non-transparent” actively-managed ETFs are coming to market for 
the first time, despite the precarious timing.429 
 
c. ETFs and the Federal Reserve’s “Infinite QE” policy  
 
In the week through March 25th the Federal Reserve expanded its balance 
sheet by $586 billion to $5.25 trillion – topping the $5 trillion mark for the first 
time in history - as it stabilized bond and money markets, and extended credit to 
primary dealers (and dollar swap lines to other central banks) in a fast move to 
mitigate the coronavirus economic fallout.430 In the wake of the Fed’s quick 
response were a host of concerns about the implications of it being a “buyer of 
last resort,” with one commentator suggesting we’re now “past the point of QE 
infinity” and in the process the Fed has fostered a “post-Lehman crisis legacy of 
distorted risk premia in markets.”431  
 
The newest member of the “infinite” QE club are ETFs that track the 
investment grade corporate debt sector. 432  The Fed’s expansive stimulus 
package (one commentator called it an “alphabet soup of new asset buying 
programs” 433 ) includes a Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
(SMCCF),434 which can purchase “up to 20% of the assets of any exchange 
traded fund that provides broad exposure to the investment grade bond 
 
428 Katherine Greifeld & John Gittelsohn, Gundlach Sounds Alarm on ‘Paper Gold’ ETFs 
Raking in Billions, BLOOMBERG (April 1, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/gundlach-sounds-alarm-on-paper-gold-
etfs-raking-in-billions. 
429 Claire Ballentine, Hidden-asset ETFs test appetite for active managers amid rout, BNN 
BLOOMBERG (April 2, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/hidden-asset-etfs-test-appetite-for-
active-managers-amid-rout-1.1416386. 
430 Dan Burns, Fed balance sheet tops $5 trillion for first time as it enters coronavirus war 
mode, REUTERS (March 26, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-fed-
balancesheet/fed-balance-sheet-tops-5-trillion-for-first-time-as-it-enters-coronavirus-war-
mode-idUSKBN21D3K9. 
431 Michael Mackenzie, The Federal Reserve has gone well past the point of ‘QE Infinity’, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/11b338a2-6d0c-11ea-89df-
41bea055720b. 
432 Id.  
433 Jim Bianco, The Fed’s Cure Risks Being Worse Than The Disease, BLOOMBERG OPINION 
(March 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-27/federal-reserve-s-
financial-cure-risks-being-worse-than-disease. 
434 FEDERAL RESERVE, Policy Tools, Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm (last visited March 30, 2020). 
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market.”435 ETFs won’t, however, be eligible as pledged collateral in the Fed’s 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility.436  
 
A variety of justifications have been advanced for the Fed’s 
unprecedented bailout of corporate bond ETFs including indirect support for the 
banking sector (since large credit ETFs also hold bank debt), allowing the Fed 
to hold longer duration corporate bonds, 437  and preventing the bust of an 
economy currently in “suspended animation.” 438  Also, purchasing high 
investment grade corporate credit ETFs are more efficient than individual bonds 
(since the Fed can provide support to many bond issuers at the same time).439 
Accurate pricing of ETFs and underlying bonds will, however, be difficult in the 
days to come as the market continues to oscillate.440  
 
The Fed’s move is unprecedented, but it’s very possible that it prevented 
(hopefully not just delayed) a complete financial market meltdown.441 Yet it may 
have also preserved Wall Street’s propensity for making “outlandish promises” 
about the performance (and liquidity) of their financial products.442   
 
d. With government support, could ETF sponsors be systemically 
important? 
 
Shortly after the Fed signalled its intention to purchase corporate bonds 
and credit ETFs. BlackRock’s LQD jumped 7.4% with investor inflows of $1.06 
billion.443  Notably, LQD isn’t the only BlackRock sponsored ETF that stands to 
benefit from the Fed’s de facto bailout. Its iShares Broad USD Investment Grade 
Corporate Bond Fund (USIG) could also potentially benefit, as could other 
 
435 Scaggs, supra note 402.  
436 Joy Wiltermuth & Sunny Oh, How the Fed’s latest crisis-era credit facility aims to finally 
calm rattled markets, MARKETWATCH (March 18, 2020), 
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does-it-mean-2020-03-23. 
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mega-ETF issuer’s funds including Vanguard’s Total Corporate Bond Market 
ETF (VTC) and Pimco’s Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF (CORP).444 
 
In executing its stimulus measures, the Fed tapped BlackRock, the 
world’s largest asset manager (and largest ETF sponsor), to manage the purchase 
of new, and previously issued, U.S. corporate investment grade bonds and ETFs, 
and agency guaranteed445 commercial mortgage-backed securities secured by 
multi-family home mortgages.446  
 
The Fed’s investment grade bond ETF purchases will take place in the 
“previously issued” component of the SMCCF.  This presents, a prima facie 
conflict since BlackRock is also the world largest bond ETF issuer (and sponsor 
of eligible ETFs), and safeguards have been announced including a 20 percent 
investment limit on a given ETF.447 The extent that BlackRock’s corporate credit 
funds will find their way onto the Fed’s balance sheet is a contested topic 
amongst analysts.448  
 
ETF sponsors, like BlackRock, are clearly distinct from banks and 
insurance companies since they act as agents, use less leverage, a smaller balance 
sheet, and can’t access government-insured deposits as a source of funding.449 
Also, up until the Fed’s COVID-19 stimulus, they lacked access to central bank 
support.  The crisis has revealed, however, that not only are ETFs a widely-used 
trading tool and a large store of investor wealth, but that the government views 
them as crucially “interconnected” to the corporate credit sector, and worthy of 
stimulus intervention to curb a larger economic fallout.  
 
The systemic importance of the largest ETF sponsors is worthy of 
assessment. These firms sit interconnected in the financial system through a 
complex operational structure, that creates numerous contractual, institutional 
and sectoral interdependencies, and in the process interlinks credit exposures 
 
444 Scaggs, supra note 402. 
445 See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FAQs: Agency MBS Purchase (March 24, 
2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ambs-treasury-faq?mod=article_inline. 
446 Dawn Lim, Federal Reserve Taps BlackRock to Purchase Bonds for the Government, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-reserve-taps-
blackrock-to-purchase-bonds-for-the-government-11585085843. 
447 Id. 
448 See Yakob Peterseil, A Big Fed-Driven Bet on BlackRock ETF Gets a Contrarian Warning, 
BLOOMBERG (March 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-30/a-big-
fed-driven-bet-on-blackrock-etf-gets-a-contrarian-warning. 
449 See Clements, supra note 403. 
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while performing liquidity transformation through their products.450 Further, an 
operational event, or failure, at one of the mega ETF firms could easily drive a 
fire sale in ETFs that could cascade across other firm’s products to underlying 
assets, impact the operations of APs and market markers (which are critical to 
an ETF’s operational ecosystem), and harm investors and corporations in the 
process.451  
 
There’s an unsettling form of market alchemy that takes place when 
illiquid, over-the-counter bonds are transformed into instantly liquid ETFs.452 
ETF “liquidity transformation” is now being supported by the government, just 
like liquidity transformation in mortgage backed securities and shadow banking 
was supported in 2008.453 Given the “social costs”454 (in the form of government 
support) of ETF liquidity transformation, perhaps subjecting their centrally 
interconnected mega-sponsors to enhanced safeguards may be necessary. 
 
e. Concerns regarding BlackRock’s interconnective influence?  
 
This isn’t the first time that the government has tasked BlackRock with 
overseeing asset management activities during a crisis (it also procured its 
services to manage the assets of Bear Stearns and AIG). 455  BlackRock’s 
influence far transcends the Fed’s current asset management task, and its 
operations (along with other large ETF sponsors) are creating complex economic 
interconnections between retail and institutional investors, banks, financial 
institutions, and market service providers, as well as influencing the behaviors 
of corporations through proxy voting.456 
 
450 Id. 
451 Id.  
452 Randall W. Forsyth, Corporate Credit Could Be the Next Bubble to Burst, BARRON’S (Feb. 
15, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/debt-be-not-proud-danger-in-the-
complacency-about-corporate-credit-51550248974 (“In 2007, the lie was that you could take a 
cornucopia of crap, package it together, and somehow make it AAA.  This time, the lie is that 
you can take a bunch of bonds that trade by appointment, lump them together in an ETF, and 
magically make them liquid.”) 
453 See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (July 2010), 61-64, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2016), 96-101; William 
A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1163, 1190. 
454 See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After The Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. REV. 75, 78, 
119-120 (2011). 
455 Liz Rappaport & Susanne Craig, BlackRock Wears Multiple Hats, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (May 19, 2009),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124269131342732625. 
456 See Lucian A. Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 BOSTON U. L. 
REV. 721, 723 (2019); John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The 
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At a minimum, one wonders just how influential BlackRock and its risk 
management and financial modelling system Aladdin (which will be heavily 
utilized in the current bond and ETF purchasing program) has become to global 
financial markets and governments. 457  A recent European Banking Institute 
working paper on “financial operating systems” (FOS) includes a significant 
profile on BlackRock’s Aladdin, and describes it among “the most consequential 
and unexamined developments in global finance.”458  
 
The authors note that it is the FOS with “by far the greatest impact” on 
global and U.S. asset management, with over 25,000 clients, and influence on 
more than $20 trillion in assets (an amount equal to “four times the value of all 
cash in the world, the annual GDP of the U.S., or the total U.S. stock market 
capitalization.”)459  The shear scope of Aladdin’s risk modelling influence and 
data control, when coupled with BlackRock’s assets under management, its 
ability to steer current economic stimulus measures, and its central 
interconnection as the world’s largest ETF issuer make its systemic importance 
of a matter of live concern.  
 
f. Did ETFs achieve an important stress testing milestone?   
 
The “abnormal gap” between market prices and underlying asset values, 
evidenced across ETFs in the COVID-19 crisis, has evoked fears that these 
products aren’t as resilient as Wall Street would have us think, and investors 
aren’t able to obtain fair pricing when they look to sell (a concept referred to in 
the literature as a “liquidity illusion”).460 It also invigorates concerns of arbitrage 
fragility in the ETF operational structure given the fact that, before the Fed’s 
bailout, APs and other discretionary market makers couldn’t (or wouldn’t) 
actively arbitrage away the price discounts in ETFs.461  
 
 
Problem of Twelve, HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1011 (April 2019), 16, 
available at http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Coates_1001.pdf. 
457 Id.  
458 Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, William A Birdthistle, Douglas W Arner, & Ross P. Buckley, 
Financial Operating Systems EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE (EBI) WORKING PAPER SERIES 
NO. 58/2020 ((March 1, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532975. 
459 Id. at 14-16.  
460 See Clements, supra note 396 at 32-37. 
461 See Eckett, supra note 410.  
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Yet others counter that ETFs have actually passed an important “stress 
test” in the COVID-19 crisis.462  Despite the discounts, a market did exist for 
investor exits during the worst segments of the early sell-off.463 Some say that 
ETFs have also acted as a price discovery vehicle (reflecting the “true” fair 
market value of the underlying bonds) and as a “liquidity wrapper,” - a valuable 
modern technology to absorb news faster than the underlying assets ever 
possibly could.464 Further still, others posit that even if liquidity in credit ETFs 
came with a discount to NAV (an exit “premium” if you will), there was at least 
a market, which isn’t necessarily the case for the underlying bonds.465 
 
The problem with liquidity wrapper and price discovery justifications is 
that they neglect to consider what might have happened had the Fed not stepped 
in. The primary concern is that a “doom loop”466 could have materialized where 
continued selling pressure in the ETF market exacerbated a fire-sale in the 
underlying, and again vice-versa, in a procyclical pile-on with devasting 
consequences.467  
 
Perhaps the key question underscoring the COVID-19 scorecard for 
ETFs is what, exactly, are investors using them for? As Bloomberg analyst Brian 
Chappatta aptly noted, “[i]f investors are simply turning to them for instant price 
discovery and liquidity, then the funds have certainty held up their end of the 
bargain,” but if investors are seeking an accurate real time tracking of the 
underlying index then “they’ve been let down amid this market turmoil.”468 
Above all, we are also now left wondering whether the Fed’s intervention has 
set a precedent that it will act as the “guarantor of last resort” against future 
instability in the ETF market.  
  
 
462 Jon Sindreau, ETFs Have Passed Their COVID-19 Stress Test, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(March 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-have-passed-their-covid-19-stress-test-
11585303519. 
463 Id. 
464 See Lim, supra note 411. 
465 See Eckett, supra note 410. 
466 See Peter Chatwell, The liquidity ‘doom loop’ in bond funds is a threat to the system, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/b7c15426-6e1b-11ea-89df-
41bea055720b. 
467 See Ian Foucher & Kyle Gray, Exchange-Traded Funds: Evolution of Benefits, 
Vulnerabilities and Risks, BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYS. REV., Dec. 2014, 42; Katherine Greifeld, 
‘Illiquidity Doom Loop’ Threatens Bond ETFs Caught Up In Turmoil, BLOOMBERG (March 20, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-20/mizuho-charts-roadmap-for-an-
illiquidity-doom-loop-in-etfs. 
468 Brian Chappatta, Bond ETFs Will Never Be The Same After Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (March 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-
23/coronavirus-bond-etfs-will-never-be-the-same-after-this-crisis.  
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ii. Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 
 
The following sub-chapter was published on April 7, 2020 on the Columbia Law School’s Blue 
Sky Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets and is available at 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/04/07/are-etfs-making-some-asset-managers-too-
interconnected-to-fail/  
 
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) sit at the center of the COVID-19 crisis 
selloff.469  This isn’t surprising, since ETFs are a low-cost highly liquid vehicle 
for trading entire sectors, asset classes, and even global economies.  Yet the use 
of ETFs as a preferred crisis trading tool, and the Federal Reserve’s 
unprecedented mid-crisis purchasing of bond ETFs, 470  reinvigorates a long-
standing debate on the systemic importance of ETF sponsors.  
 
Yet the largest ETF sponsors are becoming systemically important due 
to interconnectedness - a material factor in the 2008 global financial crisis 
(GFC).  Although large ETF sponsors are distinct from banks and insurance 
companies, there’s merit in safeguarding their economic resilience given their 
central interconnectedness, government bail-out potential, and ability to ignite 
numerous risk transmission channels, in a highly complex financial ecosystem.  
 
a. Moving Beyond Size: When Financial Firms Become “Too 
Interconnected To Fail” 
 
Today’s financial markets exhibit both “complex links” and deeply 
interconnected firms.471 The GFC clearly illustrated that size is an incomplete 
measure of a firm’s systemic importance, and smaller, yet widely interconnected 
firms can also destabilize the financial system.472  Because modern financial 
markets operate as a “system,” if a firm sits at the center of this system, there’s 
 
469 See Dawn Lim & Mischa Frankl-Duval, In Market Rout, ETFs Are Where The Action Is, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-market-rout-
etfs-are-where-the-action-is-11584270000. 
470 See Alexandra Scaggs, The Fed Has Never Bought ETFs Before.  Here’s Why That’s 
Changing, BARRON’S (March 24, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-the-federal-
reserve-is-now-buying-etfs-51585076254. 
471 See Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons From The Financial 
Crisis and Policy Implications, REMARKS AT AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION / AMERICAN 
FINANCE ASSOCIATION JOINT LUNCHEON, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA (January 4, 2013), 
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/Yellen20130104a.pdf. 
472 See ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, 
AND THE WORK AHEAD, at 112-113 (2013). 
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merit in safeguarding its economic viability and ensuring that it won’t exacerbate 
shock transmissions.  
 
My article describes numerous interconnected shock transmission 
channels that could emerge from the operations, or disruption of ETF sponsors 
including interlinked credit exposures, operational complexity, liquidity 
transformation, and contractual, sectoral and institutional interdependencies. 
 
b. How do ETFs Create Complex Economic Interconnections? 
 
My article identifies a myriad of demand factors behind ETF growth 
including passive investment outperformance, active management 
disillusionment, instant diversification, high liquidity, tax benefits, low costs, 
instant exposure to opaque sectors, asset classes and novel index strategies, use 
by robo-advisors and fintech platforms, and cash substitutability for institutional 
investors in the growing fixed-income ETF market.  
 
I show that ETF’s are, however, fostering deep and complex 
interconnections between numerous financial institutions, banks, market 
participants and service providers, extending to retail and institutional investors, 
and affecting corporate behavior and decision making. They function globally in 
a complex operational ecosystem with many participants, highly reliant on the 
discretionary incentives of large financial intermediaries who perform a critical 
“arbitrage function,” 473  and dependent on secondary liquidity, and market 
service providers.  
 
Even with the current crisis, mega ETFs sponsors (who are also the 
world’s largest asset managers) wield significant proxy voting power over 
publicly traded companies, including competitors in systemically important 
sectors like banking. 474  I argue that they connect financial firms through 
securities lending, link institutional investors with corporate debtors when the 
former use fixed-income ETFs as cash substitutes, and influence herding as 
investor portfolios and risk models become increasingly correlated, and 
technology systems like BlackRock’s Aladdin, gain institutional prominence.  
 
473 See Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A 
Commendable Start and a Welcome Invitation, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2019); see also see 
Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded Funds, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018). 
474 See Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 592-593, 633-
636 (2018). 
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c. How Could ETF-Driven Interconnectivity Contribute To Financial 
Market Systemic Risk? 
 
My article outlines how ETFs create both direct and indirect systemic 
risk transmission pathways that aren’t present in other managed asset products.  
The coupling of ETF share prices with underlying net asset value relies on 
effective arbitrage by authorized intermediaries or discretionary market makers; 
and the current crisis is revealing arbitrage instability in bond ETFs.475 ETF 
operational complexity fuels informational opacity in a crisis, and ETF fire sales 
can drive procyclical liquidations in underlying assets – particularly concerning 
for bond ETFs characterized by “liquidity mismatch” with moral hazard for 
underwriters to originate riskier debt to satisfy demand.476   
 
As the current crisis has revealed (and my article highlights), ETFs are a 
haven for short-term traders, a hot-bed for new derivatives, and there’s evidence 
they increase market volatility.477  I suggest that ETF securities lending creates 
multiple risk transmission channels, and if an operational disruption occurred at 
a large ETF sponsor investors could herd to quality, triggering contagion selloffs 
in competitor ETF products and underlying assets, uncertainty in the operations 
of authorized intermediaries, with significant losses accruing to retail investors, 
pensions and corporations.  
 
d. The Challenge of Regulating Highly Interconnected ETF Sponsors 
 
Regulating highly interconnected ETF sponsors is difficult since they 
have distinguishing characteristics from banks and insurance companies.  ETF 
sponsors do perform an agency function, with smaller balance sheets, less 
leverage, substitutable products, and an inability to access central bank liquidity 
or benefit from government insured deposits for low-cost funding.  Thus, the 
largest ETF sponsors were also strongest advocates in favor of the Financial 
 
475 See Peter Chatwell, The liquidity ‘doom loop’ in bond funds is a threat to the system, 
Financial Times (March 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/b7c15426-6e1b-11ea-89df-
41bea055720b. 
476 See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To 
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (June 2019), 3-4, 28-29, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf.   
477 See I. Ben-David, F. Franzoni, F. & R. Moussawi, Do ETFs increase volatility? 73(6) 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE. 2471 (2018). 
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Stability Oversight Council’s embrace of an activities-based framework (away 
from entity-specific) for non-bank systemically important financial 
institutions.478  
 
I counter-submit in my article, however, that activities-based regulation, 
utilizing cost-benefit analysis, is problematic for unpredictable fast-moving 
crises and complex, highly interconnected firms with opaque and global 
operations (like large ETF sponsors). It also doesn’t curb the interconnection-
generated risk transmission channels unique to ETFs. Thus, I lend support to 
prior studies that consider both activities and entity-based regulation as 
“complimentary” when addressing financial market systemic risk emanating 
from non-bank financial firms.479  
 
e. What Are The True Costs of Liquidity Transformation?  
 
When assessing the interconnective influence of large ETF sponsors one 
must consider the costs of liquidity transformation.  Turning opaque, over-the-
counter traded, bonds or loans into instantly liquid, cash-substitutable financial 
products evokes concerns of the mortgage-backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations market in the GFC.480 The Fed providing relief to bond ETFs is 
reminiscent of bail-outs of the shadow banking and money-market mutual fund 
industries that also performed liquidity transformation.481 If government support 
is a “social cost” of liquidity transformation, 482  then perhaps, now that the 
 
478 See BLACKROCK, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: COMMENTS 
ON PROPOSED INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA00 (May 13, 2019), 
at 47, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/fsoc-
interpretive-guidance-supervision-regulation-certain-nonbank-financial-companies-
051319.pdf; VANGUARD, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: 
AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES; RIN 4030-AA00 (May 13, 2019), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0013. 
479 See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia-Ann McCoy, and Daniel B. Schwarcz, Regulating Entities 
and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1455 (2019). 
480 See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (July 2010), 61-64, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2016), 96-101. 
481 Id at 61-64; see William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. 
L. REV. 1155, 1163, 1190. 
482 See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After The Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. REV. 75, 78, 
119-120 (2011). 
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government has entered the ETF arena, firms providing these services should be 
subject to higher safeguards.  
 
Despite the current crisis, ETFs retain compelling utility for retail and 
institutional investors as low-cost diversified investment products. Post-crisis, 
ETF sponsors will continue to sit centrally and globally interconnected in a 
complex financial market, and their products will be used in future crises as 
hedging and speculation instruments,483  while simultaneously housing many 
citizen’s savings and retirement assets.  ETF sponsors may become “too 
interconnected to fail” and the most effective regulatory framework may require 
a “system-wide” toolkit with implications for both firms, participants and 
activities.484  
 
  
 
483 See Lim & Frankl-Duval, supra note 469.  
484 See Andrew G. Haldane, Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech Given to Financial 
Student Association, Amsterdam (April 28, 2009), available at 
https://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf. 
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Chapter III: Exchange Traded Funds & “Interaction Risks” 
 
The following chapter is forthcoming to be published in the Spring 2021 edition of the HOU. 
BUS. & TAX L. J. as “New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make Markets 
Less Stable? Part II, Interaction Risks” and is available online here: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3486027 
 
i. Abstract 
 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) – tradeable investments that provide a 
return linked to an underlying index or basket of assets – are likely the most 
successful financial product since the 2008 crisis.  Over the last decade they’ve 
experienced remarkable growth. Yet these products may also be making the 
financial system less stable and, like Wall Street innovations of the past, 
connecting banks and main street with dangerous implications.  This final article 
- of a two-part study on ETF risks - posits that these products may be introducing 
two “interaction risks” into financial markets due to a complex operating and 
trading ecosystem.  First, ETFs could contribute to information cascades, 
facilitate investor herding, and financial contagion.  Second, ETFs, along with 
other index-based products, could be distorting the informational efficiency of 
underlying asset and securities prices, and disincentivizing active price 
discovery, in a way that masks market risk.   
 
This article builds on its predecessor, which showed how ETFs could 
create a fragile “illusion” of liquidity, since financial intermediaries, in a crisis, 
often act unpredictably and pursue discretionary incentives.  The combined study 
compliments prior work on financial market systemic risk by analogizing ETF 
interaction risks to prior crises – particularly 2008. Given the comparisons, the 
ETF market’s continuing growth and interest by retail investors, institutions, and 
pensions, regulatory and academic attention should be increased to ensure risks 
are both understood and appropriately mitigated. This article introduces several 
areas where heightened focus is warranted.  
 
ii. Introduction 
 
A strong case can be made that Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) – 
tradeable investments that provide a return linked to an underlying index or 
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basket of assets– are the most successful financial products since the 2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC). 485    ETFs have experienced a tremendous post-GFC 
surge,486 while connecting retail investors with pensions and major banks.487 
They are also believed by many to be a lower-cost, tax advantaged,488 easily 
tradeable, instant diversification, upgrade over mutual funds.489  Yet they may 
also be making the financial system less stable.490  Signs point to continued 
market growth,491  especially in fixed income products;492  an ever-expanding 
 
485 See Eva Su, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs): Issues For Congress, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, 7-5700 (September 24, 2018), 16, available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45318; see also Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory 
Framework For Exchange Traded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018); Henry T.C. Hu & 
John Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Commendable Start and 
a Welcome Invitation., 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2019). 
486 See Mark Kolakowski, ETF Assets Cross $4 Trillion Milestone, INVESTOPEDIA (July 10, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/etf-assets-cross-usd4-trillion-milestone-4692488. 
487 See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, BLOOMBERG 
(September 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-
market/?srnd=etfs. 
488 Zachary R. Mider, Rachel Evans, Carolina Wilson & Christopher Cannon, The ETF Tax 
Dodge is Wall Street’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’, BLOOMBERG (March 29, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-etf-tax-dodge-lets-investors-save-big/. 
489 See BLACKROCK, What is an ETF? https://www.blackrock.com/ca/individual/en/learning-
centre/etf-education/what-is-an-etf (last visited December 10, 2019). 
490 See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To 
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (June 2019), 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf (hereinafter “ESRB Report”). 
491 See BLACKROCK, The ETF Network Effect, https://www.blackrock.com/americas-
offshore/insights/etf-growth (last visited November 4, 2019) (“Four trends will fuel future ETF 
growth, especially in the U.S. and Europe: Portfolio construction preferences are shifting with 
the recognition that management fees have significant impact on long-term returns. Use of low-
cost, index-based ETFs as core positions is likely to grow with ETFs increasingly used as 
building blocks in asset allocation and as vehicles to deliver factor-based investment strategies. 
A transformation in the business model for financial advice is under way in the U.S. and will 
soon begin in Europe. ETFs are positioned to be prime beneficiaries of this secular transition, 
since financial advisors and wealth managers will have incentives to place low-cost ETFs at the 
heart of portfolios. Bond trading is evolving. The liquidity that many institutions once took for 
granted is evaporating. To facilitate large transactions, investors are increasingly likely to use 
bond ETFs alongside single securities. ETF market scale and product standardization will 
reinforce adoption. As more investors participate, and the market expands, ETFs become more 
efficient to trade and cheaper to own. The network effect will accelerate future ETF adoption 
by investors big and small.”) 
492 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 4, footnote 2 (“The passive nature of ETFs in that they 
constitute investments in fixed-income products may in principle create a moral hazard 
problem in the issuance of such products: anticipating that they will be bought by ETFs, bond 
underwriters may forgo due diligence on such instruments, as was the case in the originate-to-
distribute business model before the global financial crisis.”); see also  A. Purnanandam, 
Originate-to-distribute model and the subprime mortgage crisis, 24(6) REVIEW OF FINANCIAL 
STUDIES, 1881-1915 (2011). 
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choice of products including “thematic” styles;493 and a growing dominance of 
mega-ETF issuer firms like BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.494  
 
The ETF ecosystem provides a powerful case study of the financial 
market’s continual evolution in technology and speed. These products are 
commonly promoted by algorithmic wealth management platforms (robo-
advisors)495 and also embraced by high frequency traders (HFT) who profit by 
providing daily liquidity and market making (MM) activity.496  Yet an in-depth 
investigation of the complex ETF operating ecosystem reveals layers of inter-
connected relationships amongst product creators, intermediating participants 
(including MMs and HFT), as well as retail and institutional investors.497  
 
Given this operational complexity, the risks in ETFs aren’t well 
understood, and they emanate from how intermediaries interact in this 
ecosystem.498  This study’s first article described how intermediary interaction 
in ETFs has the potential to create liquidity “illusions” that could prove fragile 
in a crisis if participants pursue discretionary incentives.499  It also highlighted, 
using examples from 1987’s “Black Monday” crash,500 and the GFC,501 that 
 
493 The ever-expanding menu of ETF choices also includes “virtue signals” and “trends” 
including religion, veganism and marijuana. See Jennifer Thompson, Virtue Signaling ETFs: 
Religion, Veganism and Marijuana Used To Tap Trends, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 28, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7d4147e2-9e2e-11e9-b8ce-8b459ed04726; see also Hu & Morley, 
A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 843. 
494 See Su, supra note 485 at 16. (“The top three ETF sponsors (also known as asset managers 
or issuers)—BlackRock (40%), Vanguard (25%), and State Street (18%)—account for around 
83% of U.S. ETF market share.”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, The Specter of 
the Giant Three, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 25914 
(June 2019), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25914. 
495 See Hugh Son, JP Morgan Is Rolling Out a Robo-Adviser With Free ETFs to Lure New 
Investors, CNBC (July 10, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/jpmorgan-creates-robo-
adviser-you-invest-portfolios-with-free-etfs.html. 
496 See Ivan Martchev, This Is How Some ETFs Are Run Like A Shell Game Scam, 
MARKETWATCH (June 27, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-how-some-etfs-
are-run-like-a-shell-game-scam-2018-06-27. 
497 See Su, supra note 1 at 2-7; see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 
at 851-856; Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 1 at 1157-1162. 
498 See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Are Exchange Traded Funds Making 
Markets Less Stable?Part I – Liquidity Illusions, 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J 14 (2020); also Hu 
& Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 847 (“The arbitrage mechanism and its 
effectiveness vary among ETFs, depending on, among other things, the assets an ETF holds.  
Irrespective of particulars, every arbitrary mechanism embodies a theoretical model 
hypothesizing the voluntary behavior of APs and other market participants in a variety of 
circumstances. Like all models, this model depends on assumptions and suffers from “model 
risk” – the risk that the model may be faulty.”) 
499 Id. at 15-19. 
500 Id. at 29-33. 
501 Id. at 33-35. 
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relying on financial intermediaries to provide discretionary liquidity to investors, 
and price stabilizing arbitrage intervention, mid-crisis is not certain.502   
 
This article compliments its predecessor and argues that two “interaction 
risks” originate from the ETF ecosystem.  First, ETFs have the potential to 
contribute to collective investor behaviors including the formation of 
information cascades, investor herds, and contagion.503  Second, ETFs, together 
with other exchange traded products (ETPs) and the ever-expanding menu of 
available index based mutual and closed-end funds, given the increasing demand 
for such products by both retail and institutional investors alike, may be 
distorting the prices of underlying assets, making markets less informationally 
efficient, and disincentivizing price discovery.504  Given these risks - and the 
strong interest by retail investors, pensions and institutions – heightened 
regulatory, investor, and academic attention should be directed to indexing (and 
ETFs in particular) to better understand the budding consequences of this post-
crisis growth, and ensure mitigating safeguards are established against emerging 
instabilities.505 
 
The first section of this article outlines how ETF’s could contribute to 
information cascades, investor herds, and contagion. It defines the concept of 
“concentration risk” as applied to ETF ecosystem intermediaries like authorized 
 
502 Not only is reliance on arbitrage potentially fragile in a crisis, but there are inherent “costs” 
and “limits” to undertaking any form of arbitrage activity, especially during a crisis. See Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52(1) THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 35, 38 
(1997) (“We show that performance-based arbitrage is particularly ineffective in extreme 
circumstances, where prices are significantly out of line and arbitrageurs are fully invested. In 
these circumstances, arbitrageurs might bail out of the market when their participation is most 
needed.”); see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 485 at 1196. 
503 See infra, Section III. 
504 See infra, Section IV. 
505 See infra, Section V.  
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participants (AP),506 MMs,507 and fund sponsors;508 and shows how the failure 
of a prominent intermediary could trigger an investor run.509  This section also 
shows how cascade selling could arise from independent profit-seeking actions 
of APs (for example when using “operational shorting” strategies),510 and also 
occur as a result of interactions between ETF secondary market trading, and sales 
of underlying assets.511 This section also notes the impact of robo-advisors and 
HTF on information cascades and investor herding in ETFs.512 
 
The article’s second section argues that complex interactions in the ETF 
ecosystem could be contributing to financial markets becoming less 
informationally efficient, and disincentivizing active price discovery.513  This 
section outlines how prices of underlying ETF assets and securities might be 
artificially inflated by demand from index investors who aren’t engaging in 
active price discovery (a contention supported by several prominent investors); 
and that the true value of index securities might also be distorted by noise 
transmission coming from intermediating participants (primarily HFT) in the 
ETF operational ecosystem. 514  To support this contention it reviews and 
summarizes empirical evidence from several recent studies showing price and 
liquidity co-movement in securities that comprise ETF indices. 515  It also 
highlights how ETFs could be contributing to more volatile markets.516 
 
506 See Clements, supra note 498 at 38-42; See also Rochelle Antoniewicz & Jane Heinrichs, 
The Role and Activities of Authorized Participants of Exchange Traded Funds, INVESTMENT 
COMPANY INSTITUTE REPORT (March 2015), 1, available at 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_15_aps_etfs.pdf (“In addition, APs are U.S. registered self-
clearing broker-dealers that can process all required trade submission, clearance, and 
settlement transactions on their own account, as well as full participating members of the 
National Securities Clearing Corporation and Depository Trust Company.”); see also 
BLACKROCK, A Primer on ETF Primary Trading and the Role of Authorized Participants 
(March 2017), 3, available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-etf-primary-trading-
role-of-authorized-participants-march-2017.pdf (BlackRock lists the following examples of 
“Common U.S. APs” as “Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jeffries, JP Morgan, KCG, Morgan Stanley, UBS Securities, 
Virtu.”); see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 851-856; Hu & 
Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 485 at 1157-1162. 
507 See Clements, supra note 498 at 38-42. 
508 See Su, supra note 485 at 16. 
509 See infra, Section III(c). 
510 See infra, Section III(g); see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 1 at 
1195-1196. 
511 See infra, Section III(e) & (g). 
512 See infra, Section II(f). 
513 See infra, Section IV. 
514 See infra, Section IV (a) - (c). 
515 Id. 
516 See infra, Section IV(d). 
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The article provides a unique contribution to the literature on systemic 
risk and financial crises by illustrating how information cascades, investor herds, 
and informational and price inefficiencies were also present in the lead up to, 
and during, the GFC, as well as in post-GFC “flash crashes.”517 Specifically, 
information cascades and investor herds were evidenced in the demand for 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 518  the run on Lehman Brothers in the 
wholesale funding market,519 and the herding behavior which was prominent in 
the auction rate securities (ARS) market failure in the GFC.520  
 
The GFC provides a tragic lesson on how complexity in financial product 
innovation, and non-linear responses due to intermediary interconnectedness, 
can decrease the efficiency of information in financial markets. When this 
happens material, and catastrophic risks, build up and go unnoticed until the 
market crashes. This was evidenced by the “informationally insensitive” market 
in the lead up to Lehman’s failure,521 and in the overlooked risks in the MBS 
market during the subprime lending boom.522  A growing body of empirical 
evidence, as this article will present, supports the proposition that ETFs are also 
contributing to a less efficient market.  This is a development that should be 
taken very seriously by regulators, academics, and investors of all stripes and the 
concluding section will identify specific areas where heightened research 
attention is warranted.  
 
iii. Could ETFs Facilitate Investor Herding? 
 
a. Herding, Information Cascades and Crowd-Panic in Financial Markets 
 
Best-selling author, and former bond trader, Michael Lewis has widely 
documented investor herding and crowd mania in his book Panic! The Story Of 
 
517 See infra, Section III(b), Section IV(e); see also Dave Nadig, Understanding ETF ‘Flash 
Crashes’, ETF.COM (August 26, 2015), https://www.etf.com/sections/blog/understanding-etf-
flash-crashes?nopaging=1. 
518 See infra, Section IV(e); see also Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the 
Financial Crisis, 21(2) CRITICAL REVIEW: A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND SOCIETY 195 (2009). 
519 See infra, Section IV(v); see also William O. Fisher, Predicting a Heart Attack: The 
Fundamental Opacity of Extreme Liquidity Risk, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 465 (2014). 
520 See infra, Section IV(e). 
521 See Fisher, supra note 518. 
522 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 
211, 218-220 (2009) 
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Modern Financial Insanity,523 including the “Black Monday” stock market crash 
of 1987,524 the East-Asian financial crisis in the 1990s,525 the dot.com boom,526 
and the GFC. 527   Professors Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts posit that herding 
increases systemic risk and negatively impacts the “production of 
information” 528  and that “mimicry” in the marketplace (especially during a 
financial panic) can generate “disabling information cascades.” 529  These 
cascades cause investors to follow other’s behaviors over more effective 
information “signals” (which Ayers and Mitts define as the “subjective 
probability regarding the payoff of a particular action, transaction, or contractual 
term.”)530 
 
 An information cascade can occur “when people form beliefs based upon 
the belief or opinion of others” even if the latter isn’t true.531  Professor Jonathan 
R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft Jr. describe it as “when a market participant can 
easily observe the behavior of those around him and follows the behavior of the 
other market participants without regard to his or her own information, beliefs, 
or the views of the market.”532 In other words, as articulated by Professor Seth 
Oranburg, information cascades are market “group think” where “even rational 
individuals will choose to abandon their private information (or not make efforts 
to gather information in the first place) and instead follow the crowd.”533  
 
Professor Steven Schwarcz suggests such events create a “sequential 
ordering” and investor actions (like selling a particular asset class) are observed 
as being made with “better information.”534  This can set off a “chain reaction” 
of group behavior – also described by Professors Bryan Druzin and Jessica Li as 
 
523 MICHAEL LEWIS, PANIC! THE STORY OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY (1st ed. 2009).  
524 Id. at 20-78. 
525 Id. at 79-161. 
526 Id. at 162-263. 
527 Id. at 283-366. 
528 See Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1,1 (2015). 
529 Id. at 4. 
530 Id. at 18; see also Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, 
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 
(1992); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of 
Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998). 
531 Bryan Druzin & Jessica Li, Censorship’s Fragile Grip on The Internet: Can Online Speech 
Be Controlled, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 369, 387-88 (2016).  
532 Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is An Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach To Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1383-4 (2011). 
533 Seth C. Oranburg, A Place Of Their Own: Crowds In The New Market For Equity 
Crowdfunding, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 147, 152 (2016). 
534 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1077-78 (2018). 
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“the fragility of mass behaviors” which can also produce a “procyclical” 
effect. 535  Professor Robert Hockett calls this a “recursive collective action 
problem,”536 and notes that many “familiar regulatory and policy challenges” in 
financial markets “constitute instances of this general phenomenon.”537 
b. Herding and Information Cascades During and After the Global 
Financial Crisis 
  
Early in the GFC, Professor Cass Sunstein warned about herding and 
information cascades (which he called a “lemmings” problem), and suggested 
that psychology was just as important as economics in calculating a regulatory 
response.538 Sunstein identified numerous cascades where individual’s actions 
seemed to be largely influenced by the judgments of others, not just by their own 
“private information” and analysis.539  The net result was a great number of 
people making bad decisions (a “social contagion”) including the pre-GFC 
axiom that real estate prices always increased over time, and the pessimism that 
stocks were inherently risky, leading to wide selling and price destabilization.540 
Professor Steven Schwarcz has argued that another example of herding behavior 
and information cascades in the GFC was the “frenzied worldwide demand” for 
MBS,541 which was driven by “a misleading information cascade about the value 
of such MBS.”542  
 
Evidence of herding in sophisticated commercial and investment banks 
during the GFC has also been recently documented.543 The GFC also showed 
how quickly (onset by information cascades) panicked selling led to a financial 
contagion across global markets.544  Investor runs on liquidity created “self-
 
535 Druzin & Li, supra note 531 at 387. A “procyclical” effect is where the behaviors of the 
crowd cause the initial fallout from the crisis to become worse.  
536 See Robert C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of 
Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies and Formally Similar 
Contexts, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES (2015).  
537 Id. at 1.  
538 See Cass R. Sunstein, Wall Street’s Lemmings, THE NEW REPUBLIC (October 10, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/63023/wall-streets-lemmings. 
539 Id. 
540 Id.  
541 See Schwarcz, Complacency supra note 534 at 1078. 
542 Id; see also Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and 
After A Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2011).  
543 See M. Humayun Kabir, Did Investors Herd During The Financial Crisis? Evidence From 
The US Financial Industry, 18(1) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE 59 (2018). 
544 See Steven B. Kamin & Laurie Pounder DeMarco, How Did A Domestic Housing Slump 
Turn Into A Global Financial Crisis, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DISCUSSION PAPERS 994 (January 2010); also OXFORD 
ANALYTICA, U.S. Financial Crisis Goes Global, FORBES (September 22, 2008), 
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fulfilling panics” which caused a nearly simultaneous intermediary 
“coordination failure” in the ARS market.545 A Federal Reserve Board working 
study on the ARS market noted that “coordination failures triggered by an 
unexpected first mover caused all major broker-dealers to simultaneously 
withdraw their liquidity support.”546  
 
World Bank researchers have also noted that wholesale funding markets 
were another area affected by the cascade because banks, which relied on “non-
deposit” funding sources were adversely exposed to “liquidity crunches” when 
wholesale funding markets simultaneously froze after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. 547  Wholesale funding, including commercial paper, repos and 
interbank loans, provide banks with a “non-depositary” source of short-term 
financing;548 and liquidity in the wholesale funding market experienced a “sharp 
and widespread collapse” in September 2008 following Lehman’s bankruptcy 
filing.549 Observers reported that “access to wholesale funding evaporated in a 
matter of days, if not hours.”550 
 
Another instructive aspect of the GFC, for the purposes of evaluating 
risks in ETFs, is that interaction effects between financial intermediaries likely 
exacerbated the crisis fallout.551 Professor Markus Brunnermeier has argued that 
securitization in the GFC “led to an opaque web of interconnected obligations” 
and drove “several amplification mechanisms”552 and “network effects” when 
financial institutions acted in dual roles as lenders and borrowers.553 Although 
ETF intermediaries don’t act as lenders and borrowers, some have dual roles as 
ETF arbitrageurs and underlying asset managers or dealers.554  Herding didn’t 
 
https://www.forbes.com/2008/09/19/banks-contagion-globalization-
cx_0919oxford.html#72e8c6d43ed9. 
545 See Song Han & Dan Li, Liquidity Crisis, Runs, and Security Design - Lessons from the 
Collapse of the Auction Rate Securities Market, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD WORKING PAPER 
(February 15, 2009), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1327429. 
546 Id. at 25. 
547 See Claudio Raddatz, When The Rivers Run Dry: Liquidity and the Use of Wholesale Funds 
in the Transmission of the U.S. Subprime Crisis. WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING 
PAPER 5203 (February 2010). 
548 See id. at 7. 
549 Id. at 2.  
550 Id. at 3. 
551 See Markus Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23(1) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 77, (2009).  
552 Id.  
553 Id. at 96-97. 
554 See Kevin Pan and Yao Zeng, ETF Arbitrage Under Liquidity Mismatch, FOURTH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION, 3 (June 28, 2017) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895478 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2895478; see also Hu & 
Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 485 at 1195-1196. 
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end with the GFC. Recent empirical evidence has also identified herding in the 
“flash crash” of May 2010.555  In this study, intraday S&P 500 price data was 
used to show that “market herding” started right before the crash and remained 
during, and into its aftermath, and that there was a “clear link” between herding, 
flash events and “sudden price fluctuations.”556   
c. How Could ETFs Contribute to Investor Herd Formation? 
 
An ETF is a collective investment vehicle that gains “market exposure at 
lower fees.”557 ETFs, like index mutual funds, are a “momentum strategy” and 
underlying assets are purchased when ETF investor money “flows in” and 
underlying assets are sold when investor money “flows out.”558 Investor demand 
for ETFs, and other “passive investing” products may be creating “artificial 
popularity” for assets comprising an index, or representative basket, during in-
flow periods (and a potential bottleneck of future risk that could be unleashed 
during a market sell-off).559  
 
Given the nascent surge in passive investing, a bear market sell-off in 
ETFs could facilitate an investor “stampede” in the underlying market, with too 
few active arbitrageurs (who may be unreliable during a crisis) to stabilize the 
market by purchasing undervalued underlying assets. 560  This potential was 
ominously identified by the late John Bogle (founder of Vanguard, and perhaps 
one of the most important people in the history of ETFs and passive investing) 
who noted before his death that “[if] everyone indexed, the only word you could 
use is chaos, catastrophe. The markets would fail.”561 
 
 
555 See Riza Demirer, Karyl Leggio & Donald Lien, Herding and Flash Events: Evidence From 
the 2010 Flash Crash, FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS (December 26, 2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3263881. 
556 Id. at 6. 
557 David Thomas, A Warning From The Late John Bogle, FORBES (February 12, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-
bogle/#6c00a7d62b99. 
558 Id; To further understanding the relationships between demand for ETFs and the purchasing 
of underlying assets, see Clements, supra note 498 at 38-41. 
559 See Michael Cannivet, The Passive Investing Boom Poses A New Risk: Artificial Popularity, 
FORBES (June 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcannivet/2018/06/27/the-
passive-investing-boom-poses-a-new-risk-artificial-popularity/#4ef54d843e93. 
560 Thomas, supra note 557; see also Clements, supra note 498 at 29-35; see also Hu & 
Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 851-856; Hu & Morley, A Welcome 
Invitation, supra note 485 at 1157-1162. 
561 Thomas, supra note 557. 
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Another potential ETF information cascade, with investor herding 
potential, in ETFs is related to the “concentration” of ETF issuers,562 financial 
intermediaries (like APs and MMs) and swap counterparties (for synthetic 
ETFs).563 The ETF market has a small number of large fund issuers.564 The 
European Systemic Risk Board, in a June 2019 report (the “ESRB Report”), 
posited that if a large ETF fund issuer had an “operational” disruption or a 
serious case of fraud or “financial misconduct” then trust in the market could 
quickly evaporate leading to an ETF contagion sell-off in a herding pattern.565 
Also, as noted recently by Ireland’s Central Bank, a “stress event” affecting a 
large AP could have a material ripple effect throughout the ETF market.566 If 
consolidation occurs in MM or AP firms,567 it could exacerbate the potential for 
herding, and first-mover influence, while reducing the number of available APs 
who could step in to correct mispricing and liquidity shortages, since liquidity is 
inherently “fragile” during a crisis.568  
 
The Central Bank of Ireland has also posited that dealers and MMs will 
stop providing liquidity once they start incurring losses, or their balance sheets 
are negatively impacted from other exposures, and they can no longer bear the 
additional risk from providing the liquidity support.569 ETFs are administratively 
cheap and they may not have a “great tolerance for liquidity risk.”570  Also, 
active funds that hold ETFs in their portfolio might sell with the herd, since as 
Professor Steven Schwarcz identifies, active managers often won’t contest the 
crowd because of the costs of being “wrong.”571   
 
562 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 3. 
563 Id. at 16, 30. 
564 See Su supra note 485 at 1; see also Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 494. 
565 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 31.  
566 See CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Feedback Statement on DP6 – Exchange Traded Funds 
(2018), at 11, available at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/publications/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-6/feedback-statement-on-exchange-
traded-funds---discussion-paper-6.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (hereinafter “CBI Feedback Statement”). 
567 There is some evidence that the market for AP ETF arbitrage is, however, growing more 
robust with additional competition; see Siobhan Riding, Watchdogs Probe Systemic Risks of 
Passive Fund Growth, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 31, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a1deabc2-3eab-11e9-9499-290979c9807a. 
568 For an analogous application from the GFC that shows how liquidity is “fragile” during a 
crisis, see Song Han & Dan Li, The Fragility of Discretionary Liquidity Provision: Lessons 
From The Collapse Of The Auction Rate Securities Market, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 
DISCUSSION SERIES DIVISIONS OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD (May 2010), available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201050/201050pap.pdf. 
569 See CBI Feedback Statement, supra note 566. 
570 See id. at 47-48. 
571 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5.  
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Professors Ayan Bhattacharya and Maureen O’Hara have posited, in a 
recent working paper, based on a “tractable model of ETF trading” the potential 
for “fragility via herding” in ETFs through “inter-market information 
linkages.”572 Specifically, the authors identify a potential “tail wagging the dog” 
phenomenon since ETF market volatility impacts the price volatility of the 
underlying assets “even when such information is irrelevant for a particular 
underlying asset.”573 The authors further identify that MMs in an underlying 
asset, when interpreting price data in ETFs “cannot perfectly distinguish between 
price changes caused by factors pertinent to his asset, and other factors irrelevant 
to him.”574 This creates market instability.575 The potential for herding noted by 
these authors emerges when MMs cannot “synchronize” the ETF and underlying 
asset prices (through arbitrage and speculators start trading in unison (based on 
the “systematic factor signal” 576 ) which is “unhinged” from asset price 
information.577  
 
As identified by Professors Henry Hu and John Morley, in their study 
advocating for the first “single regulatory framework” for ETFs in the U.S., the 
ETF “arbitrage mechanism” temporarily failed in February 2018, resulting in 
coordinated MM movements, decreased liquidity, and deviations between ETF 
prices and their net asset value (NAV) when Inverse VIX products traded at 18 
times their NAV.578 Also, during the May 2010 flash crash, and again in August 
2015, ETFs which held long exposure to U.S. domestic equities suffered an 
arbitrage breakdown with similar mischief.579   
 
If the ETF market continues to grow (a highly probable outcome580) it 
could fail again and thus regulatory developments like the unified regime 
proposed by Professors Hu and Morley, requiring enhanced “qualitative” and 
“quantitative”  assessments for the ETF “arbitrage mechanism,” are necessary to 
 
572 See Ayan Bhattacharya and Maureen O'Hara, Can ETFs Increase Market Fragility? Effect 
of Information Linkages in ETF Markets (April 17, 2018), Working Paper, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740699. 
573 Id. at 37. 
574 Id. at 5.  
575 Id. at 3. 
576 The authors define “systematic factor signal” as a situation where a “short-horizon 
equilibrium involves all speculators trading on the same signal.” See id. at 27. 
577 Id. at 7. 
578 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 846, 861-863; see also Hu 
& Morley, A Welcome Invitation., supra note 485. 
579 Hu and Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 846, 855-863; see also Hu & 
Morley, A Commendable Start, supra note 485  at 1175. 
580 See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 494. 
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consider (the author’s suggest disclosures analogous to a “management 
discussion & analysis” (MD&A) for a specific fund’s “arbitrage 
mechanism”).581 Another regulatory reform that has been canvassed, if the AP 
ETF arbitrage breaks down, would be to open primary market access to holders 
of ETF shares who obtain them in the secondary market (like retail investors) - 
a proposition beset, however, with practical complexities.582 
 
The ESRB Report also identified the possibility for “procyclical” market 
movements influenced by complex ETFs, like those utilizing leverage and “rule-
based trading strategies.”583  The ESRB Report notes how a “decoupling” of the 
ETF arbitrage function (the focus of the first article in this study584) could lead 
to a coordinated “fire sale” as investors en-mass “lose faith” in the ETF 
operational ecosystem and look to liquidate positions.585 Further, the popularity 
of certain ETF structures leads to investors having much greater “correlated 
exposures” than ever before and this could lead to a “chain reaction” in financial 
markets.586 
 
d. The Rise of the Passive Investor 
  
It’s been estimated that since 2009, passive equity investments (not 
including fixed-income baskets) have increased by more than $2.5 trillion, and 
during this time period, over $2.0 trillion has been withdrawn from actively 
managed funds. 587  It appears that “passive investing” has eclipsed active 
management (one reporter recently called it the “passive singularity.”)588 The 
 
581 Hu and Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 849; see also Hu & Morley, A 
Commendable Start, supra note 485 at 1159-1161. 
582 See CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Exchange Traded Fund Discussion Paper (2017), 26, 
available at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/discussion-
papers/discussion-paper-6/discussion-paper-6---exchange-traded-funds.pdf (hereinafter “CBI 
Discussion Paper”).  
583 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 2. 
584 See Clements, supra note 498 
585 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 2, 22-23, 28; see also Q. Bai, S.A. Bond, & B.C. 
Hatch, The Impact of leveraged and inverse ETFs on underlying stock returns, 43(1) REAL 
ESTATE ECONOMICS, 37, 37-66 (2015); P. Shum, W. Hejazi, E. Haryanto, & A. Rodier, 
Intraday share price volatility and leveraged ETF rebalancing, 20(6) REVIEW OF FINANCE 
2379 (2016). 
586 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 3, 18. 
587 See James Rickards, Free-Riding Investors Set up Markets For A Major Collapse, DAILY 
RECKONING (September 24, 2018), https://dailyreckoning.com/free-riding-investors-set-up-
markets-for-a-major-collapse/. 
588 Dani Burger, Passive Becomes The New Active As Indexing Rules Everything, THE GLOBE 
AND MAIL (March 1, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/funds-and-
etfs/etfs/passive-becomes-the-new-active-as-indexing-rules-everything/article38161099/. 
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growth of passive investments, like ETFs but also including index mutual funds 
and closed-end structures, has not been universally embraced, and Warren 
Buffett’s famous quote of “weapons of financial mass destruction” (describing 
the destabilizing impact of derivatives in financial markets) has also been 
recently levied at ETFs because of how investors can “blindly purchase” these 
products “without any regard to valuation” thus leading to a more inefficient 
market.589  
 
Economists (and Nobel prize laureates) George Akerloff and Robert 
Shiller in their book, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why It Matters For Global Capitalism, have detailed the 
variability (and “arbitrariness”) of individual investment decisions because of 
what they call “animal spirits” – or a human tendency towards irrationality.590 
Even through savings are a necessary condition for long-term individual 
welfare,591 and national prosperity,592 the authors contend (citing research from 
Richard Thaler, Hersh Shefrin, and Martin Feldstein, among others) that 
“[p]eople have a hard time knowing what to save” and that a “deer-in-the-
headlights” phenomenon can often be seen in investment decisions.593  An ETF 
appears to relieve this perplexity by facilitating a simple “buy the market” 
dynamic thus reducing decision-making friction.  
 
Some industry participants believe, however, that passive investing isn’t 
“benign” at all, but should be equated with a form of inefficient centrally planned 
“Marxist economy” and that active investment performs an important “social 
function” in terms of asset allocation, environmental and “social governance.”594 
Also, it’s been suggested that the number of indexes and passive products have 
grown so large that it requires an “active decision” (and the reliance on “model 
portfolios and robo-advisers”) to know which one to invest in.595 The rise of 
passive investment has also been attributed to a post-GFC period of “liquidity 
 
589 BARRON’S, A Dire Warning About ETFs (April 27, 2017), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/advisors-cash-is-king-amid-uncertainty-51546881439. 
590 See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 116-
130 (2nd ed. 2010). 
591 See id. at 123-124. 
592 See id. at 125-127. 
593 Id. at 119-120. 
594 Teresa Rivas, ‘Passive Investing Is Worse Than Marxism’: Bernstein, BARRON’S (August 
23, 2016), https://www.barrons.com/articles/advisors-cash-is-king-amid-uncertainty-
51546881439. 
595 Burger, supra note 588. 
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and loose monetary policy” that has arguably driven asset value inflation.596 
Related to this is the contentious (and unsettled) debate on the social utility, and 
deleterious impact of “common ownership”597 by index-based funds like ETFs 
on consumer prices, competition, shareholder engagement and executive 
compensation.598 
e. Collective Ownership, Firm Incentives and Herd Formation 
  
One particularly concerning by-product of passive investing is the effect 
that it may be having on firm incentives.599 Recent economic research suggests, 
ironically, that firms that have “overlapping sets of investors” have a perverse 
incentive to “distort competitive behavior, affecting pricing, entry, contracting 
 
596 Lance Roberts, The Risk Of An ETF-Driven Liquidity Crash, SEEKING ALPHA (October 2, 
2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4209301-risk-etf-driven-liquidity-crash. 
597 See BLACKROCK, Index Investing and Common Ownership Theories, VIEWPOINT (March 
2017), 1, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-
index-investing-and-common-ownership-theories-eng-march.pdf. (Common ownership is 
defined by BlackRock as “owners that hold shares of several companies in an industry, 
including asset managers acting on their behalf.”)  
598 A full review of the “common ownership” impact debate is beyond the scope of this article 
but for a sampling of the issues involved compare and contrast: BLACKROCK, Index Investing, 
supra note 597; Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the 
Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 669 (2017); 
Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2016), available at 
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/1267-1317-Online.pdf; Einer 
Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, Working Paper (August 2, 
2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370675; Vito J. 
Racaneli, Do Institutional Investors Suppress Competition? BARRON’S (September 17, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/do-big-investors-push-the-antitrust-envelope-1537220418; 
José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 
73(4) JOURNAL OF Finance (2018); José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate 
Ownership and Bank Competition Working Paper (July 23, 2016), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252; Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, 
Mireia Giné, and Martin C. Schmalz, Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management 
Incentives, CESIFO WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 6178 (2016), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885826; Daniel P. O'Brien and Keith 
Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less than We Think, 
Working Paper (Feb. 23, 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2922677; Edward B. Rock and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate 
Governance, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 17-05 (Mar. 1, 2017), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2925855; Jacob Gramlich & 
Serafin Grundl, Testing for Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, FINANCE AND 
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2017-029. WASHINGTON: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.029. 
599 See Luke Kawa, Index-Crazed Investors Turning S&P 500 Into One Gigantic Company, 
BLOOMBERG (January 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/index-
crazed-investors-turning-s-p-500-into-one-gigantic-company. 
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and virtually all strategic interactions among firms.”600 In other words, firms 
with the same owners may have less incentive to compete, and while they may 
not be engaging in anti-competitive behavior directly (as legally defined), their 
“reward-systems” are being re-aligned for collusion, not strong competition.601 
This could also influence herds as “investors in firms become more similar to 
each other over time.”602 Surprisingly, the referenced study also notes that this 
trend pre-dates the success of BlackRock and Vanguard.603 The result has been 
described as transforming the entire S&P 500 into “one gigantic company.”604 
 
 Other passive investment critics have noted how these investments can 
“impede” good corporate governance and the efficiency of markets. 605  As 
suggested recently by one financial markets commentator, “[i]ndex funds are 
disincentivized from expending resources on improving the performance and 
corporate governance of the companies in which they invest” because this would 
increase fund management costs, and thus ETFs lead to “large blocks of stock 
held by disinterested holders” which can “determine the outcome of corporate 
elections, and create a voting dead weight.”606 One potential solution suggested 
by this commentator would be a system of “pro rata voting.”607   
 
In response to the growing problem of block shares held by passive index 
funds, disincentivized from expending resources to enhance corporate 
governance,608  the SEC recently announced an initiative to study the proxy 
voting process including the role that fund ownership plays in shareholder voting 
and corporate governance.609 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, in recent remarks to 
 
600 Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon, & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in 
America: 1980-2017, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 
25454 (January 2019), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25454. 
601 See Kawa supra note 599. 
602 Id.  
603 See Backus et al., supra note 600. 
604 Kawa, supra note 599. 
605 See Maurice M. Lefkort, The Problem With Index Investing, WHARTON MAGAZINE (May 
14, 2018), http://whartonmagazine.com/blogs/the-problem-with-index-
investing/#sthash.iZtyeTxN.5V7LDKX5.dpbs. 
606 Id. 
607 Maurice M. Leftkort, A Proposed Solution To The Index Fund Free Rider Problem, 
WHARTON MAGAZINE (June 8, 2018), http://whartonmagazine.com/blogs/a-proposed-solution-
to-the-index-fund-free-rider-problem/#sthash.mluoON6A.JYuxvwmz.dpbs.  
608 See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting In 
An Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014). 
609 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Statement Announcing SEC Staff 
Roundtable on the Proxy Process (July 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-announcing-sec-staff-roundtable-proxy-process; see also Edward Rock & 
Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 
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the SEC Advisory Committee, noted the importance of reviewing passive 
investment growth including concentration risk, proxy considerations and 
“questions about how passive funds should approach engagement with 
companies on the one hand and engagement with their investors on the other 
hand.”610 
 
 The interaction of market intermediaries, and an expanding investor base 
for ETFs including institutional, retail, algorithmic, and HFT, with diverse 
investment goals and preferences, may also facilitate an “interaction risk” which 
can undermine market efficiency and information synthesis.611  Professor Benoit 
Mandelbrot (father of fractal geometry), together with Richard L. Hudson, has 
argued against the orthodox view of efficient markets, noting historical evidence 
of investor irrationality and non-continuous price changes.612 They note that 
“non-homogenous” investor interactions yield unexpected price movements, 
price bubbles and crashes.613 Also, citing research from economists Paul De 
Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi,614 they suggest that with multiple investor class 
interactions “[t]he market switches from a well-behaved ‘linear’ system in which 
one factor adds predictably to the next, to a chaotic ‘non-linear’ system in which 
factors interact and yield the unanticipated.”615 
 
f. The Impact of High Frequency Trading and Robo-Advisors on ETF 
Herd Formation 
  
Because of high secondary market liquidity, ETFs have attracted a 
variety of short-term, directional, and algorithmic traders, and become a 
preferred vehicle for HFT.616 HFT undoubtedly provides liquidity for ETFs; 
 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 18-39 (December 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098. 
610 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Public Statement, Remarks To The SEC 
Investor Advisory Committee (September 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-clayton-iac-091318. 
611 See BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS, A 
FRACTAL VIEW OF FINANCIAL TURBULENCE, 85 (1st ed. 2004)  
612 See id. at 89-107.  
613 See id. at 85.  
614 See Paul De Grauwe & Marianna Grimaldi, Bubbling and Crashing Exchange Rates, 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER 1045 (2003).  
615 See Mandelbrot & Hudson, supra note 611 at 85. 
616 See ESRB Report. supra note 490 at 7; see also M. Broman, M. & Shum, Relative liquidity, 
fund flows and short-term demand: evidence from Exchange-Traded Funds, 53(1) FINANCIAL 
REVIEW 87 (2018); M. Broman, Liquidity, style investing, and excess co-movement of 
exchange-traded fund returns, 30 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS, 27 (2016); L. Deville, A. 
Calamia, & F. Riva, Liquidity in European equity ETFs: What really matters?, BANKERS 
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however, the nature of their contribution to the ETF market ecosystem is 
debatable.617  The algorithms that power HFT have “similar assumptions” and 
as a result they may react in a crisis as Professor Hillary Allen notes, “in a herd-
like fashion.”618 HFT has been criticized as being “active and aggressive traders, 
committing fratricide when it suits them, or withdrawing altogether from volatile 
markets.”619 So ETFs create an environment where “micro-efficient behavior” 
(the actions of individual algorithmic trading platforms reacting to market 
conditions) could “exacerbate pro-cyclical action” when similarly programmed 
entities act in unison.620   
 
HFT legitimate market making can also tread dangerously close to 
“market manipulation” and “scalping.” 621  Market participants have also 
expressed recent concerns that HFT sourced liquidity could vanish in a crisis.622 
A theory cited as circulating Goldman Sachs’ trading desks is that HFT provides 
liquidity “without taking into account fundamental information” and as such 
they could withdraw this liquidity in periods of market stress “to avoid being 
adversely selected.”623 
 
One of the few test cases for ETF herding in a crisis, and the interaction 
effects of HFT, occurred in a mini-flash crash in February 2018 during a sell-off 
of volatility tracking exchange traded products (ETP).624  On February 5, 2018 
 
MARKETS & INVESTORS: AN ACADEMIC & PROFESSIONAL REVIEW, 60 (2013); Sophia Hamm, 
The Effect of ETFs on Stock Liquidity (April 23, 2014), working paper available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1687914. 
617 See Ted Knutson, HFT Mixed Bag for Retail Investors Say Experts, FORBES (September 24, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/09/24/retail-investors-helpedhurt-by-
high-frequency-traders-experts-say/#15ad69765e5b; see also Larry Swedroe, Swedroe: High 
Frequency Trading’s Impact, ETF.COM (February 24, 2016), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/swedroe-high-frequency-tradings-
impact?nopaging=1. 
618 See Hilary J. Allen, The SEC As Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715, 743-744 
(2018). 
619 See Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.) on File No. S7-02-10 (Oct. 31, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-300.htm.  
620 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, 
Intermediation and Markets – Policy Implications For Financial Regulations, 21 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 55, 103-104 (2016); see also Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, 
Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. 
STUD. 23 (2009). 
621 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making From 
Crowded Floors to High Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 697 (2016). 
622 See Tae Kim, Goldman Sachs Says Computerized Trading May Make Next “Flash Crash” 
Worse, CNBC (May 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/23/goldman-sachs-rise-of-
trading-machines-could-make-next-market-crash-much-worse.html. 
623 Id. 
624 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 485 at 846, 862-863. 
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the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) experienced its largest single day jump (115%) 
followed by a dramatic sell-off of inverse VIX exposure ETPs (products that 
gave investors a return opposite to the movement of the VIX by shorting VIX 
futures).625  The losses on inverse VIX products were massive (estimated at over 
$3 billion626) and the media reaction was quick and negative. 627  Influential 
investors suggested the products were increasing financial instability (Carl Icahn 
called them a “casino on steroids”628 and Devesh Shah, the inventor of the VIX 
noted “in my wildest imagination I don’t know why these products exist.”629) 
 
The episode was, however, an interesting “stress test,” on ETF arbitrage 
functionality in the context of potential intermediary herding. 630  Further, it 
distinguishes ETFs from their more complex ETP relatives (like VIX products), 
since ETFs on the S&P 500 exhibited “relatively tight tracking and bid-ask 
spreads”, a “minimal impact” on underlying U.S. stocks,631 and orderly trading 
in fixed income ETFs.632 BlackRock has cited this experience as indicative of 
the ETF ecosystem’s dependability in a crisis scenario.633 
 
Numerous digital wealth management platforms (called “robo-
advisers”)634 have emerged, post-GFC, providing investment recommendations, 
and other portfolio management services to clients using data-synthesizing 
algorithms that interpret factors like age, risk tolerance, and financial goals.635 
Robo-advisers are growing in popularity since they serve clients who, because 
 
625 See BLACKROCK VIEWPOINT, February 2018 Case Study: ETF Trading In A High Velocity 
Market, March 2018, at 2 (hereinafter “BlackRock ETF Case Study”); see also Hu & Morley, 
A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 846, 862-863. 
626 BlackRock ETF Case Study, supra note 625. 
627 Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Cramer: A little-known security tied to a calm market became a 
‘toxic cigarette’ for this sell off, CNBC (February 6, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/cramer-xiv-note-proved-to-be-a-toxic-cigarette-for-the-
market.html.  
628 Matthew J. Belvedere, Icahn: The Market Will One Day ‘Implode” Because Of These 
Wacky Funds Using So Much Leverage, CNBC (February 6, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/billionaire-investor-carl-icahn-there-are-too-many-
derivatives-and-the-current-market-is-a-rumbling-warning.html.  
629 Max Abelson & Joe Weisenthal, An Inventor of the VIX: ‘I Don’t Know Why These 
Products Exist’, BLOOMBERG (February 6, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-06/an-inventor-of-the-vix-i-don-t-know-
why-these-products-exist.  
630 BlackRock ETF Case Study, supra note 625 at 1. 
631 Id at 4. 
632 Id. at 5. 
633 See id. 
634 See, for example, BETTERMENT, https://www.betterment.com/ (last visited September 9, 
2019); see also NUTMEG, https://www.nutmeg.com/ (last visited September 9, 2019).  
635 See Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant: Digital Investment Advice and the 
Fiduciary Standard, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 141 (2018). 
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of factors such as geographic location or income, are unable to obtain 
sophisticated investment management services.636  These artificial intelligence 
driven innovations can also help remedy traditional investor shortcomings like 
irrational investor tendencies and biases.637  
 
ETFs form the foundation of many portfolios constructed by robo-
advisers.638 There are concerns that correlated advice from robo-advisors may 
exacerbate herding as AI-driven investment recommendations facilitate a “pile 
into” hot ETFs, and create a coordinated exit “stampede” in a crisis.639 This 
particular risk has attracted the attention of high profile regulators - like Mark 
Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, who has warned publicly that the rise 
of robo-advisers has a potential for “excess volatility or increase pro-cyclicality 
as a result of herding.”640 The Organization For Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has also cited robo-advisers’ use of ETFs as a potential 
systemic, 641  and “pro-cyclical,” stability risk. 642  Further, hedge fund CEO 
Jeffrey Gundlach has publicly decried what he calls a passive investing “mania”, 
and iterated the herding dangers with broad equity ETFs and their inclusion by 
robo-advisors.643   
g. Contagion and Spillover Effects from ETF Investor Herd Behavior 
  
Investor herding, in an ETF selloff, could also lead to panicked selling of 
other asset classes - a phenomenon in financial markets called “contagion.”644 If 
investors of certain ETF fund strategies (like fixed income) experience collective 
 
636 See id.  
637 See Stephen Lynch, Man v. Machine: AI’s Growing Role in Investment Management, 
SEEKING ALPHA (July 23, 2019), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4276777-man-vs-machine-
ais-growing-role-investment-management. 
638 See Ben Judge, The Rise of the Robo-Advisers, MONEYWEEK (October 2, 2017), 
https://moneyweek.com/461092/the-rise-of-the-robo-advisers/. 
639 See James Rickards, Robot Trading Will End in Disaster, DAILY RECKONING (July 19, 
2019), https://dailyreckoning.com/robot-trading-will-end-in-disaster/. 
640 Judge, supra note 638. 
641 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Robo-
Advice For Pensions (2017) at 15-16; see also William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1202 (2018).  
642 See OECD, supra note 641 at 15-16. 
643 See Michael Sheetz, Jeffrey Gundlach Says Passive Investing Has Reached A ‘Mania’ – 
Investors Should Avoid Index Funds, CNBC (December 17, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/17/gundlach-says-passive-investing-has-reached-mania-
status.html. 
644 See Will Martin, ‘A Huge Risk of Contagion’: Everything You Need To Know About ETFs – 
The Hot Investment Area That Some Think Will Cause The Next Financial Crisis, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (October 17, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-an-etf-risk-global-
financial-crisis-2017-10. 
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liquidity shortages, during a crisis or market sell-off, there is an additional risk 
of contagion or “spillover” to different ETF types;645 and even underlying asset 
classes, as investors, who are holding illiquid ETFs will be “forced into selling 
other assets, spreading the pricing and liquidity pressure across the financial 
system.”646  
 
This is also known as a “feedback loop” and has generated a significant 
amount of recent debate between the asset management industry, academics and 
regulators.647 The ESRB Report notes that ETFs are often utilized by financial 
institutions as cash substitutes in their liquidity management systems, and a 
shock to the ETF market could transmit shocks throughout the greater financial 
system if large financial institutions doubt this cash substitutability, and look to 
simultaneously liquidate their ETF holdings. 648  The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has also recently identified contagion risk as potentially stemming 
from ETF market activity.649  
 
 Empirical research has also linked the ETF arbitrage process with 
contagion risk, identifying it as “an unintended consequence of arbitrage and a 
 
645 See S. Malamud, S., A dynamic equilibrium model of ETFs, CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER 
SERIES, NO DP11469 (2016); see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 
915. 
646 See Su, supra note 485 at 11; see also Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 
485 at 915. 
647 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 21; see also Su supra note 485; INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, A bumpy road ahead, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, CHAPTER 1 
(April 2018), available from 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2018/04/02/Global-Financial-Stability-
Report-April-2018; Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, The Next Crisis Will Be 
Different: Opportunities to Continue Enhancing Financial Stability 10 Years After Lehman’s 
Insolvency, DTCC WORKING PAPER (September 2018), available from 
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2018/september/12/new-paper-identifies-post-crisis-opportunities. 
648 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 29; see also EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Counterparty and 
liquidity risks in exchange-traded funds, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, SPECIAL FEATURE C 
(November 2018), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-
stability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201811_3.en.html. 
649 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OUTLOOK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY, 19-20 (April 
2018), available at http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2018/04/02/Global-
Financial-Stability-Report-April-2018. The IMF notes risks in bond ETFs with reduced 
underlying liquidity based on several parameters including: “frequent trading” with often 
higher turnover and more volatility in ETF shares than the shares of underlying assets; ETF 
“sensitivity to changes in risky asset prices” which can lead to contagion risk and “possibly 
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greater “cross-asset correlation” due to the rise of passive investing as a dominant investment 
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yet-unexplored outcome of financial innovation.”650 In a study by Professors 
Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni and Rabih Moussawi, ETF arbitrage was 
evidenced as weakening (leading to “ETF mispricing” or “decoupling” between 
the fund NAV and the ETF trading price) when providing liquidity became less 
profitable for intermediaries, and also during periods of “poor stock market 
returns and poor returns for the financial sector.”651  ETF arbitrage was shown 
in this study to “facilitate the propagation of liquidity shocks from the ETFs to 
the underlying securities.”652 However, the propagated shocks are not due to an 
“information-based change in prices” (in other words they are “non-fundamental 
shocks”) and the authors suggest they “increase the risk of contagion across 
access classes.” 653 
 
 Another discovered source of contagion risk in ETFs is in “operational 
shorting” (OS) by MMs (including APs). 654 In a recent University of Virginia, 
Darden Business School, working paper, researchers defined OS as a scenario 
where, “the AP sells ETF shares but postpones their creation and delivery, which 
delay is effectively a form of short-selling. The AP owes or is short the ETF 
shares until they ultimately deliver those shares to the investor who purchased 
them in the secondary market.”655 The ability for APs to “sell new ETF shares 
that are not yet created” derives from an SEC delivery requirement exemption 
for market making activities (Rule 204), and the “flexibility of the multi-day 
settlement window.”656 Further, the study notes that OS activity is “driven by” 
ETF liquidity mismatch in the underlying assets and the “presence of efficient 
hedges.”657 While OS may serve as a “contrarian form of liquidity provision,”658 
and may also enhance price discovery, it can generate higher “failures to 
deliver”659 (FTD) which “spillover from one ETF to another within the same AP, 
 
650 See Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni & Rabih Moussawi, ETFs, Arbitrage and 
Contagion, NATIONAL CENTER OF COMPETENCE IN RESEARCH FINANCIAL VALUATION AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT WORKING PAPER NO. 793 (July 2012) at 3.  
651 Id.  
652 Id. at 4. 
653 Id. at 4-5; see also discussion at 30.  
654 See Richard B. Evans, Rabih Moussawi, Michael S. Pagano, & John Sedunov, ETF Short 
Interest and Failures-to-Deliver: Naked Short-Selling or Operational Shorting? DARDEN 
BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER NO. 2961954 (November 20, 2018), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961954. 
655 Id. at 2. 
656 See id discussion at 22; see also A. Jain, and Jain C., Fails-to-Deliver before and after the 
implementation of Rule 203 and Rule 204, 50 FINANCIAL REVIEW 611, 611-636 (2015). 
657 Evans et al. supra note 170 at 2. 
658 Id. at 35. 
659 A “failure to deliver” in a short-position occurs when the party with the short position “does 
not own the underlying assets and so cannot make the delivery” see INVESTOPEDIA, Failure to 
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and from one AP to another, because these firms make markets for ETFs with 
similar underlying securities.”660  
 
Related research from George Mason University has shown that FTDs in 
the ETF market are correlated with increased volatility and are also not random, 
but rather motivated by MMs attempting to by-pass the “borrowing costs” 
affiliated with their shorts.661 The contagion dynamic in OS is exhibited through 
the “commonality” in MMs engaging in similar strategies and the existence of 
“positively correlated trading strategies” amongst MMs following the behavior 
of “lead” MMs (usually large APs) to engage in OS.662 The authors conclude 
that any liquidity enhancements of OP by ETF MMs “does so at the cost of 
greater inter-connection within and between APs, an effect magnified by 
financial leverage.”663 
 
iv. Could ETFs Be Contributing To Markets Becoming Less Efficient? 
 
a. The Growing Complexity of the ETF Ecosystem 
 
Financial market complexity has been described by Professor Steven 
Schwarcz as the “greatest financial market challenge of the future.”664  The more 
complex markets are, “the greater the chance of the unexpected interaction of 
components.” 665  Over the last fifty years, financial markets, and available 
products (including ETFs) in the U.S., have grown tremendously in size, 
diversity and complexity.666  The complexification of ETFs continues nearly 
unabated, and “active” ETFs will shortly be launched in the U.S. with even less 
transparency (providing quarterly as opposed to daily positional disclosure), an 
 
Delivery, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/failuretodeliver.asp (last visited January 28, 
2019).  
660 Evans et al. supra note 654 at 36. 
661 See Thomas Stratmann & John W. Welborn, Exchange-Traded Funds, Fails To Deliver, 
and Market Volatility, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WORKING 
PAPER NO. 12-59 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183251. 
662 Id.; see also discussion at 6.  
663 Id. at 6.  
664 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 522 at 213. 
665 See Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 643, 643 (2012).  
666 See generally Michael Collins, Wall Street and The Financialization Of The Economy, 
FORBES (February 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-
and-the-financialization-of-the-economy/#4f6e026d5783; See also INVESTOPEDIA, 
Financialization, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialization.asp; see also Hu & 
Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 843. 
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idea that at first glance seem antithetical to the underlying ethos of securities 
regulation.667 
 
Professor Saule Omarova has described financial product growth as 
characterized by two unifying factors, both of which are exhibited prominently 
in the ETF market: the “synthesizing” of economic interests and the “scaling up” 
of transaction volume and speed.668  She notes that these unifying factors are 
driven by four increasingly common financial market “mechanisms”: pooling,669 
layering, 670  acceleration, 671  and compression. 672  The application of these 
mechanisms are evident in ETF innovation.  Consider the wide slate of funds 
currently offered by Vanguard673 – securities of many varieties are pooled into 
tradeable ETFs, layered by risk classification, accelerated through algorithmic 
trading mechanisms, and compressed through modern trade settlement 
dynamics.674 
 
As a result of this evolution, a tradable financial instrument represents 
nearly every real economic interest.675 The number of assets under professional 
management, the amount of money in the “market”, and the variety and supply 
of available financial products continues to expand. 676   Nascent product 
innovation has flourished post-GFC, as evidenced by an increasingly wide 
variety of new and exotic ETFs.677  The universe of available ETF products can 
be overwhelming678 (especially to retail investors) and has grown to include 
 
667 See Justin Baer, The Next Big Thing in ETFs: Less Transparency, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (July 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-next-big-thing-in-etfs-less-
transparency-11563010201; see also Hu & Morley, A Welcome Invitation, supra note 1 at 
1184-1186. 
668 See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech As A Systemic Phenomenon, 36 
YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 735, 741 (2019). 
669 See id at 762  
670 See id. at 763. 
671 See id. at 764. 
672 See id. at 765. 
673 See VANGUARD ETFS, https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/list#/etf/asset-class/month-end-
returns (last visited September 9, 2019). 
674 See Omarova New Tech, supra note 668 at 765-767.  
675 See generally Servaas Storm, Financial Markets Have Taken Over The Economy.  To 
Prevent Another Crisis, They Must Be Brought To Heel, INSTITUTE FOR NEW ECONOMIC 
THINKING (February 13, 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/financial-
markets-have-taken-over-the-economy-to-stop-the-next-crisis-they-must-be-brought-to-heel.  
676 See generally Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27(2) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3 (2013). 
677 See generally Robin Wigglesworth, Worries Over Exotic Exchange Traded Funds Deepen, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (February 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6c4f40dc-1113-11e8-940e-
08320fc2a277. 
678 See Vildana Hajric & Annie Massa, ETFs Use Anything For Attention To Crack Tough 
Market, BLOOMBERG (December 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
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artificial intelligence and robotics ETFs,679 and managed futures.680 A recent 
report on the ETF market by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) called the product selection in ETFs “the Baskin Robbins 
of choices” including index-based, activity managed, asset-criteria, region-
criteria, sector-specific, investment-style specific and even “fund of fund” 
structures.681   
 
The Bank for International Settlements in a 2011 report (“BIS Report”) 
identified several complexity-driven systemic risks and market vulnerabilities as 
a result of the growing ETF sector.682 The primary concern in the report was the 
way that ETFs act to “lengthen the financial intermediation chain” and thereby 
make risks less transparent and more difficult to detect.683 When strategies are 
replicated through new fund structures, these opaque risks “build-up” in the 
financial system.684 The BIS Report identifies the risks being particularly acute 
for ETFs that create synthetic exposures using derivatives.685 
 
 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, in his best-selling critique on modern financial 
institutions Antifragile, noted that the “problem of the commercial world is that 
it only works by addition (via positiva), not subtraction (via negative)”686 – and 
the same might be true of the secondary market for ETFs.  Product supply (and 
complexity) is unidirectional, and one questions what effect this “additive” 
growth is having on financial stability and whether ETF intermediaries represent 
what Taleb characterizes as “fragilizers,” since they gain at the “expense of 
others by getting the upside (or gains) from volatility, variations, and disorder 
and exposing others to the downside risks of losses or harm”.687  
 
 
12-20/etfs-use-pets-ai-anything-for-attention-to-crack-tough-market; see also Hu & Morley, A 
Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 843. 
679 See Ben Hernandez, Get Disruptive in 2019 With These 10 ETFs, ETF TRENDS (January 2, 
2019), https://www.etftrends.com/robotics-ai-channel/get-disruptive-in-2019-with-these-10-
etfs/. 
680 See Todd Shriber, Eyeing Alternatives With A Managed Futures ETF, ETF TRENDS 
(January 5, 2019), https://www.etftrends.com/eyeing-alternatives-with-a-managed-futures-etf/. 
681 See SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, SIFMA INSIGHTS: US 
ETF MARKET STRUCTURE PRIMER, 5 (September 2018). 
682 See Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange Traded 
Funds, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORK PAPER NO. 343 (April 2011), 
available at https://www.bis.org/publ/work343.pdf; 
683 Id. at 1-2 
684 Id.  
685 Id. at 11. 
686 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER, 400 (1st ed. 
2014) 
687 Id. at 5.  
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One market commentator identified that complexity of modern capital 
and derivatives markets “involve multiple methods for extraction of value by the 
financial sector that must be paid for by the productive economy.”688 He further 
suggests that such extractions are facilitated by information technology fueled 
information asymmetries that exist between trading counterparties (like between 
HFT and retail investors).689  Similar critiques have been levied squarely at the 
ETF industry and some believe that the demand for new product structures is 
“supply” based and driven by fund providers not investor interest.690 
 
Critics of modern financial complexity have argued that “financial 
markets exist primarily to serve themselves” 691  and that complexity has 
facilitated “rent-seeking” which gets conflated with “creating value.”692  Others 
suggest that financial market growth is “a function of the financial economy 
detaching from the real economy” and money flowing to finance (where it earns 
higher returns through “misallocation” and price “distortions.”)693  Professor, 
and Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman has suggested that modern financial markets 
create “money for nothing.”694 Others, such as Rana Foroohar, go as far as to 
call it “unproductive finance” and a cause of societal income inequality. 695  
Professor Jeremy Kidd has identified rent seeking in the financial sector as 
indicative of “market distortions” and a loss in net social welfare if new 
innovations only yield wealth transfers. 696   Further, it allows powerful 
 
688 Wallace Turbeville, A New Perspective On The Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation: 
Inefficiency Of Capital Intermediation In A Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1203 
(2013).  
689 Id. at 1177. 
690 See Carolina Wilson, As ETF Issuers Crowd Into ESG, Some Investors Say Enough 
Already, BLOOMBERG (January 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-
24/as-etf-issuers-crowd-into-esg-some-investors-say-enough-already. 
691 Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Financialism A (Very) Brief History, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
323, 323 (2010); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary 
Essay For Our Time, 20 STAN. J. LAW & POL. 171 (2009). 
692 See William Lazonick & Mariana Mazzucato, The Risk-Reward Nexus in the Innovation-
Inequality Relationship: Who Takes the Risks? Who Gets the Rewards? 22(4) INDUSTRIAL AND 
CORPORATE CHANGE 1093 (2013). 
693 Paul Kedrosky & Dane Stangler. Financialization and Its Entrepreneurial Consequences, 
KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION RESEARCH SERIES: FIRM FOUNDATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 8 
(March 2011). 
694 See Paul Krugman, Money For Nothing, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 29, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27krugman.html. 
695 Rana Foroohar, The Economy’s Greatest Illness: The Rise of Unproductive Finance, 
EVONOMICS (15 November 2016), http://evonomics.com/financialization-hidden-illness-rana-
foorohar/. 
696 Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote To Rent-Seeking? 93 CHI. KENT L. REV. 165, 170 (2018). 
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incumbents to limit market competition, leading to higher costs and reduced 
value in financial services.697   
 
When analyzing the mechanics of the ETF ecosystem one can easily see 
the salience of such modern financial market critiques. The central operation of 
an ETF, which revolves around arbitrage to equalize discrepancies between a 
fund’s NAV and the ETF’s secondary market trading prices has been criticized 
as a “shell-game scam” designed to extract profits (via bid-ask spreads) from 
inexperienced investors, and criticized by one trader as designed “not to help 
investors but to hoover up their nickels and dimes at very fast speeds.”698  The 
issue with bid ask spreads is even more pronounced in leveraged products, and 
ETFs that have low trading volume.699  
 
b. Complexity, Opacity and ETF Interaction Risks 
 
As institutions experiment with new ETFs, informational complexities 
are introduced into the financial system.  Economist Hyman Minsky, whose 
work has grown posthumously significant since the GFC, identifies the 
possibility of “several layers of intermediation” as a by-product of the financial 
system’s “institutional complexity.”700 Such layers are clearly visible in the ETF 
operating ecosystem.  A group of economic researchers including Nobel prize 
winner Joseph Stiglitz has also documented how financial institutions form 
“multilayer networks”701 and the “default probability” of one institution in a 
network is affected by the default probability of the entire network (which is 
increasingly difficult to compute as the network grows in complexity).702   
 
As markets grow more complex through intermediation lawyers, there is 
a potential “amplification of errors” and an increase in systemic risk. 703 
However, this systemic risk is difficult to accurately compute because systemic 
risk probabilities are “very sensitive to errors on information about contracts as 
 
697 Id. at 167. 
698 See Martchev, supra note 496. 
699 Id. 
700 See Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE 
OF BARD COLLEGE WORKING PAPER NO. 74, 4 (May 1992). 
701 See Stefano Battiston, Guido Caldarelli, Robert M. May, Tarik Roukny, & Joseph Stiglitz, 
The Price Of Complexity In Financial Markets, 113(36) PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PNAS 10031, 10031-10036 
(September 2016), available at https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1521573113. 
702 See id. at 10033. 
703 See id. at 10031. 
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well as on information about the complexity of the network structure.” 704  
Professor Kathryn Judge has also outlined how increased market complexity 
from financial innovation has enhanced systemic risk705 based on the concept of 
“fragmentation nodes” (financial innovations that “provide close substitutes for 
goods and services historically provided by banks.”) 706  She argues that 
complexity in these structures “impedes transparency and flexibility in ways that 
increase systemic risk.” 707  This is relevant given the aforementioned ESRB 
Report that notes some banks view ETFs are a liquid substitute for cash. 
 
The migration of PhDs to Wall Street, and an enhanced focus in business 
school curricula on quantitative market and trading models has encouraged 
“financial engineering” in investment products.708 At the heart of the academic 
takeover of conventional trading is algorithmic trading and HFT. Professor 
Yesha Yadav has argued that algorithmic trading has “undermined efficient 
capital allocation” (resulting in an information loss) by introducing systemic 
“model risk” 709  and disincentivizing informed traders from correcting 
“information deficits” because of the costs of competing with HF traders.710 This 
could lead to a “skewing” in favor of HF traders which favors “short-term and 
more cheaply researched information.”711  
 
Another way that Yadav notes HFT may be leading to less efficient 
markets is that information that “falls outside of the scope of their programming” 
is not incorporated into the algorithms;712 therefore, when “exceptional events” 
occur (like a liquidity freeze in fixed income ETFs) a short-term market 
withdrawal becomes less costly than a re-programming.713 Yadav’s research is 
supported by other empirical studies in finance finding short-term “directional” 
efficiency in HFT but pro-cyclicality in a crisis,714 and the imposition of costs 
 
704 Id.  
705See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and 
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012). 
706 Id. at 659. 
707 Id. at 660.  
708 See Knowledge at Wharton, infra note 785.  
709 Model risk has been described by Yadav as “models generate overly stylized, simplified 
representations of otherwise messy economic relationships. Put more simply, models can be 
unreliable and generate bad outcomes. The sources of such error can be numerous.” See Yesha 
Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1607, 1647-1648 (2015). 
710 See id. at 1615  
711 Id. at 1670. 
712 Id. at 1613. 
713 Id. at 1614. 
714 See Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading 
and Price Discovery, EUR. CENT. BANK WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 1602 (2013), 
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on “informed traders” both of which lend support against the orthodox view of 
security pricing as efficiently incorporating all information. 715 
 
ETFs, which are heavily traded by HF traders, 716  find themselves 
squarely in the middle of a debate on the distortive effects of financial product 
innovation on information and price discovery. ETF are heavily traded, and often 
held for only very short periods of time – or “heartbeat” trades for strategic tax 
reasons – a strategy called Wall Street’s “dirty little secret.”717 Strategies like 
this highlight a modern day phenomenon facilitated by today’s lightning fast 
trading infrastructure: financial instruments like ETFs aren’t just purchased for 
their intrinsic value, or because of a long-term desire for exposure to an 
underlying asset class, but for a variety of short term motivations.718 
 
The takeover of financial market trading by short-term-gain focused 
algorithms interplays with the broad investment trend which favors passive and 
index investing over active stock selection and fundamental analysis of 
underlying asset value.719 J.P Morgan Chase analysts recently estimated that 
nearly 90% of all equity trading is “trend” based from “quant, index, ETFs, 
futures and options-related strategies. 720  Some economists believe that 
disregarding fundamental information in favor of mimicking popular index 
structures is creating a store of systemic risk due to “stocks that were 
disproportionately bought because of ETFs and index funds being 
disproportionately sold.” 721  Further, information becomes more difficult to 
ascertain in “complex, noisy and opaque” markets which can lead to a 
“misallocation of capital.”722  
 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928510; see also STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, FINDINGS 
REGARDING THE EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, 45 (2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf 
715 See Yadav, supra note 709 at 1615. 
716 See Drew Voros, High-Frequency Trading Key to ETFs, ETF.COM (September 25, 2013), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/features/19955-high-frequency-trading-key-to-etfs.html. 
717 See Mider et al., supra note 488. 
718 Id.  
719 See Megan Greene, Passive Investing Is Storing Up Trouble, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 2, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cdbdd01a-95b4-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7. 
720 See David Thomas, A Warning From The Late John Bogle, FORBES (February 12, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-
bogle/#6c00a7d62b99. 
721 Greene, supra note 719. 
722 Id. (“One would be hard pressed to find a customer willing to hand their money to an 
investor who genuinely does not care about fundamentals or price. Yet this is the strategy 
pursued by passive and quant funds.”) 
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Further, not only do risks arise in the “operation” of the ETF structure 
(like liquidity illusions illustrated in the series’ first article);723 but they also arise 
by “how” the ETFs themselves are used.  For example, it’s been recently 
reported that mutual fund managers, and other institutions, are increasingly using 
bond and other fixed-income ETFs as cash surrogates. 724  If these funds 
experience a large redemption demand (driven from a different external factor), 
they will have to sell these ETFs to obtain cash to satisfy client withdrawal 
requests, and this ETF sell off could both induce a liquidity crunch in the bond 
ETFs and a cash shortfall (if they can’t easily sell the ETFs) while also induce a 
contagion sell off in the underlying bonds.725  
 
c. ETF’s Impacts on Asset Prices as a Source of Fundamental Information 
 
Neoclassical economic theory looks to price as a signal of all available 
information and corresponding risk (including liquidity) of an asset.726  The 
extent that prices are an efficient727 signal of “all” available information (and 
risks) is a live and rigorous debate; 728  however, some researchers believe 
markets (and asset prices) are not completely efficient,729 do not reflect “all” 
available information, 730  and are susceptible to human biases, unpredictable 
 
723 See Clements, supra note 498 at 15-27. 
724 See Rachel Evans & Emily Barrett, Fund Blowups Rekindle Doubts About ETF Liquidity in 
Crisis Times, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
07-12/panic-sales-rekindle-debate-over-etf-liquidity-in-next-crisis; see also ESRB Report, 
supra note 6 at 29. 
725 Evans & Barrett, supra note 724. 
726 See WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 77-78 (1970); 
Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25(2) THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 383 (1970); Sanjay Basu, Investment Performance of Common Stocks in 
Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios, 32 J. FIN. 663, 663 (1977); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient 
Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104(4) THE 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 655 (1989). 
727 To trace the origins of the “efficient market hypothesis” see LOUIS BACHELIER, THE 
THEORY OF SPECULATION (1ST ed. 1900); PAUL COOTNER, THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK 
MARKET PRICES (1ST ed. 1964); BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1st 
ed. 1973); and Eugene Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21(5) FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS JOURNAL 55 (1965). 
728 See George Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, 92(3) 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 411 (2002); ROBERTS SHILLER & GEORGE AKERLOF, PHISHING 
FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (1st ed. 2015); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 541 (2003). 
729 See Razeen Sappideen, The Paradox of Securities Markets Efficiency: Where To Next? 2009 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 80 (2009).  
730 See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction To The New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003). 
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decisions and behavioral “irrationalities”731 – a divide that Professor Andrew Lo 
seeks to bridge through his “adaptive markets hypothesis.”732  
 
A central critique of passive investing, and particularly ETFs, is that it 
disincentives price discovery for assets that comprise an index or benchmark.733  
The interaction between “markets, market participants, and information” is what 
drives the price of a security to an “efficient” level.734 It is believed by some that 
ETFs, and other passive fund structures, are disrupting the price discovery 
mechanism since ETF investors don’t act to discover the true asset value of a 
fund’s underlying holdings, so stocks held within funds can be “mispriced.”735 
The ESRB Report notes that, in most cases, ETF investors use the investment 
vehicle for exposure to the market itself - or the “systematic risk component of 
assets” - rather than the “idiosyncratic component” of individual securities.736 
Thus, there is an incentive for price discovery activity for the market (or 
particularly an ETF sector index, as the case may be), but not the individual 
security.737 
 
Similar to the belief by some prominent investors that ETFs are creating 
“illusions” of liquidity,738 a belief is also gaining traction amongst well-known 
market participants that ETFs (among other types of index products such as 
index mutual funds) are impeding price discovery and thus masking market risk 
and distorting information. 739  Billionaire investor Carl Icahn has called the 
passive investing market a “bubble,” with Jeffrey Gundlach and Jack Bogle 
 
731 See Robert Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance 17(1) JOURNAL 
OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 90 (2003); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: 
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (1ST ed. 2000); 
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS (1ST ed. 2000); JOSE A. SCHEINKMAN, SPECULATION, 
TRADING AND BUBBLES (1ST ed. 2014); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47(2) ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  
732 See ANDREW LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED OF THOUGHT 
(1st ed. 2017). 
733 See Roberts, supra note 596. 
734 Simon Constable, What is ‘Price Discovery’ and Why Does It Matter? THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (January 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-price-discovery-and-why-
does-it-matter-1483930860. 
735 Id.  
736 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 19. 
737 See L.R, Glosten, S. Nallareddy, & Y. Zou, ETF trading and informational efficiency of 
underlying securities, COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL RESEARCH PAPER, NO 16-71 (2016). 
738 See Clements, supra note 14 at 27-29. 
739 Carmen Reinicke, ‘Big Short’ Investor Michael Burry is Calling Passive Investment a 
‘Bubble.” He’s Not The Only Finance Luminary Sounding The Alarm, MARKET INSIDER 
(August 29, 2019), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/investors-that-have-
spoken-out-against-passive-investing-2019-8-
1028485512?utm_source=markets&utm_medium=ingest#carl-icahn1. 
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warning about the “herding” potential in ETFs (the focus of this article’s first 
section), and Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller, as well as hedge fund manager 
Howard Marks, expressing concern about a indexer’s “free-riding” on those who 
perform active price discovery.740 
 
Michael Burry, the antihero of Michael Lewis’ best-selling book The Big 
Short, and who was portrayed by Christian Bale in the Academy Award winning 
movie of the same title, has been particularly vocal against index funds and 
ETFs, calling them a bubble.741 He has also compared them to controversial 
financial products in the GFC like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).742 
Burry rose to great wealth, and notoriety, with contrarian bets against CDOs in 
the lead up to the GFC.743 Burry’s central critique is that, just as demand for 
CDOs and other mortgage backed-securities “distorted” prices for subprime 
mortgages in the GFC, demand for ETFs and passive investment structures is 
distorting prices for large capital equities (particular U.S. companies) which 
comprise the popular indexes.744 He suggests that demand for large-cap index 
funds has impeded price discovery and inflated those stocks, while pushing 
down prices of smaller companies (who are “under-represented” in passive 
funds), and that the longer the flows move in this direction, the greater the fallout 
will be when it “reverses.”745 
 
Burry, who is known for his steely resolve, and an aversion to pulling 
punches when criticizing Wall Street behavior, suggests that “[t]his structured 
asset play is the same story again and again,” driven by the marketing savvy of 
asset managers who know they can make up for low fees with “scale.”746  Yet in 
reality, according to Burry, this trend is fueling another “bubble”, and causing 
 
740 Id.  
741 See Ben Winck, ‘Big Short’ Investor Michael Burry Predicted The Housing Crisis. Now 
He’s Calling Passive Investment A ‘Bubble,’ MARKET INSIDER (August 28, 2019), 
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742 See Carmen Reinicke, ‘Big Short’ Investor Michael Burry Explains Why a Wildly Popular 
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MARKET INSIDER (September 4, 2019), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/big-
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744 See Reed Stevenson, The Big Short’s Michael Burry Explains Why Index Funds Are Like 
Subprime CDOs, BLOOMBERG (September 4, 2019), 
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funds-are-like-subprime-cdos. 
745 Id.  
746 Id.  
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smaller companies to be “orphaned” for the herd-driven demand of large-equity 
indexes.747  
 
Burry’s contention is not without some empirical support, ETF’s share 
of “passive fund assets” grew from around 30% in 2007 to over 40% in 2017.748  
A 2019 estimate noted that passive management now controls almost half of the 
current U.S. stock market. 749  Other estimates note that a surge in passive 
investors over the last two years has pushed the control of equities in the U.S. by 
passive vehicles to around 60%, with a further 20% of market share controlled 
by non-fundamental algorithmic quant-funds.750 This means that markets are 
now more “sensitive to headlines and more prone to sharp price swings” since 
they are less reliant on asset fundamentals.751  
 
Also supportive of Burry’s thesis is evidence of a valuation differential 
between large-capitalization stocks and smaller companies. 752   A recent 
investigation on this subject noted that large companies, which frequently 
comprise popular indexes, currently trade at a “premium”753 to smaller ones.754 
This is not necessarily a complete picture, however, as it is possible that the 
differential is reflective of smaller companies being riskier propositions. 755 
Nevertheless, it highlights an important area of needed additional research: to 
what extent are passive investment flows into large-cap heavy index funds 
inducing an artificial premium in the price of these large companies?  
 
The Bank For International Settlements (BIS), in a recent study on “the 
implications of passive investing for securities markets” has suggested that it 
“seems plausible that the portfolio-wide investing and trading of passive funds 
could bring about greater correlation of index securities and reduce the security 
specific information contained in prices” and has advocated for more studies on 
 
747 See Winck, supra note 741. 
748 See Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive Investing For Securities 
Markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, 114 (March 2018). 
749 See Jeff Cox, Passive Investing Automatically Tracking Indexes Now Controls Nearly Half 
The US Stock Market, CNBC (March 19, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/19/passive-
investing-now-controls-nearly-half-the-us-stock-market.html. 
750 Yun Li, 80% of the Stock Market Is Now On Autopilot, CNBC (June 29, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/28/80percent-of-the-stock-market-is-now-on-autopilot.html. 
751 Id. 
752 See NAIRU CAPITAL, Michael Burry Is Correct About Passive Investing: Here Is The Proof, 
SEEKING ALPHA (August 29, 2019), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4288578-michael-burry-
correct-passive-investing-proof. 
753 See id. The premium in the study is noted by the evidence that “large companies have much 
lower earnings yields (inverse of “P/E”) than smaller companies.” 
754 Id.  
755 Id.  
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the impact of ETF trading and the prices of underlying securities.756 The BIS 
report notes the ability of passive fund managers to “free-ride” on the valuation 
efforts of active fund managers for individual securities in an index, thus “an 
increase in the share of passive portfolios might reduce the amount of 
information embedded in prices, and contribute to pricing inefficiency and the 
misallocation of capital.”757  
 
There is also a growing body of evidence showing that ETFs are 
associated with “co-movement of asset prices” for the securities included in the 
index itself (both with each other and with the index price)758 and between ETFs 
with similar benchmarks.759  Recent studies further reveal that arbitrage of ETFs, 
which tracked the S&P 500, led to co-movement of S&P 500 stocks. 760 
Underlying asset price co-movement makes markets less efficient by distorting 
the informational value of the stock itself (making it sensitive to index-based 
“news” trades rather than security specific fundamental information).761 It also 
introduces system-level risk through the possibility of investor simultaneous 
loss, “synchronized” sell-offs, and company insolvencies.762  
 
Also, price co-movement is driven by the activities of APs acting under 
the arbitrage function who purchase, or sell, underlying securities based on the 
“portfolio weights in the creation baskets” and, as identified in the ESRB Report, 
companies that are over-weighted in an index have “arbitrage sensitivity” and 
“higher co-movement with ETF returns” (and these securities tend to “overreact 
to a repricing of an ETF”).763  
 
Israeli et al. (2017) has also linked increased ETF ownership with a 
decline in “price efficiency of the underlying security” since ETFs attract 
uninformed (“noise”) traders (since ETFs are cheaper to trade), and they increase 
the costs in obtaining valid information about the underlying assets (to reward 
informed traders), and simultaneously disrupt the supply of available underlying 
 
756 See Sushko & Turner, supra note 748 at 129. 
757 Id. at 119. 
758 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 2, 19. 
759 See id. at 19. 
760 See S. Da & S. Shive, Exchange traded funds and asset return correlations, 24(1) 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 136 (2018); see also Markus Leippold, Lujing Su & 
Alexandre Ziegler, How Index Futures and ETFs Affect Stock Return Correlations (April 24, 
2016), unpublished working paper, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2620955. 
761 Z. Da & S. Shive, S., ETFs and asset return correlations, 24(1) EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT, 136, 136-168 (2018). 
762 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 2, 19. 
763 Id. at 19. 
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tradeable securities due to their being held by a fund sponsor.764  Similarly, 
Goldstein & Yang (2017) have suggested that “trades not only bring fundamental 
information, through their speculative trading, but also unrelated noise, through 
their hedging-motivated trading, into futures price.” 765  As a result, the 
“information effect” can either reduce or exacerbate “futures price bias.”766   
 
At the heart of these studies is the observation that while passive 
investment strategies like ETFs provide low-cost benefits, they also come with 
“indirect costs” to financial markets including a potentially distortive impact on 
the value (and clarity) of securities prices as information signals. 767  Recent 
research also suggests “ETF ownership may be detrimental to firm performance” 
as it impacts “the relationship between prices and corporate policies.”768 Other 
price distortive impacts in ETFs, recently cited, include increased price 
correlation of securities that comprise a given index (thus reducing the benefits 
of diversification all together); an increase in the valuation of the underlying 
securities (since they are purchased more often); and the observation of 
“excessive movements in the underlying securities and a subsequent reversal in 
prices.”769  
 
In the context of a crisis, some believe that active market participants will 
provide stability by purchasing undervalued assets when passive investors (who 
don’t know the true value of the underlying asset) withdraw from the market.770  
Therefore, as the argument goes, passive investors free-ride on the upside of a 
fund’s value (the performance of the market) but contribute to economic 
instability in volatile markets and during a crisis.771 
 
 
764 See Doron Israeli, Charles M.C. Lee & Suhas A. Sridharan, Is There A Dark Side To 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) An Information Perspective, 22 REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING 
STUDIES 1048, 1048-1050 (2017). 
765 See Itay Goldstein & Liyan Yang, Commodity Financialization and Information 
Transmission, AFA 2016 ANNUAL MEETING; ROTMAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT WORKING 
PAPER NO. 2555996, 2; (June 1, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2555996. 
766 Id. at 26.  
767 See Constantinos Antoniou, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, & Onur Kemal Tosun, ETF 
Ownership and Corporate Investment, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (June 28, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/28/etf-ownership-and-corporate-investment/. 
768 Id.  
769 See Ricardo Crisostomo & Jorge Medina, ETFs and Financial Stability; A Compendium of 
Possible Risk Sources, CNMV BULLETIN QUARTER IV, 71, 73 (2018). 
770 See Rickards, supra note 587. 
771 Id.  
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The distortive impact of ETFs on underlying asset price formation is not 
settled.772 The Central Bank of Germany recently called the relationship between 
ETF activity and underlying asset prices “inconclusive.” 773  There are also 
additional recent empirical studies that downplay the extent that ETF trading 
leads to “spillover effects” in underlying assets.774 Also “passivity in purchase 
decisions” doesn’t necessarily imply a “passivity on the part of ETF companies 
as regards management control” as ETF sponsors can influence corporate 
decisions making “by exercising voting rights in shareholders’ meetings.”775  
 
ETFs may also positively contribute to price formation by providing 
“additive liquidity” in the secondary market.776 However, the significant growth 
of ETFs as an asset class make price-driven information signals, and their 
relationship to passive investing, a worthwhile development to continually 
investigate.777 Further, there are a growing number of professional investment 
managers that are concerned about the effect these popular products are having 
on the market’s informational efficiency.778  
 
d. ETF’s Impact on Volatility and Price Movement in Underlying Assets 
 
Secondary market financial product growth (of which ETFs represent a 
large proportion) may also be facilitating asset price bubbles and increased 
market volatility.779 The ESRB Report identifies that ETFs are “associated with 
increased price volatility of the constituent securities” and that ETFs also attract 
more short term, directional, and noise traders that increase both the volatility of 
 
772 See Asjylyn Loder, Do Passive Investors Move Markets? They Can, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (July 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-unlikely-to-cause-widespread-
market-disruptions-research-shows-1531906200. 
773 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, The Growing Importance of Exchange Traded Funds in the 
Financial Markets, Monthly Report (October 2018) at 96, available at 
https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/766600/2fd3ae4f0593fb2ce465c092ce40888b/mL/2
018-10-exchange-traded-funds-data.pdf (hereinafter “Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report”). 
774 See Travis Box, Ryan Davis, Richard B. Evans & Andrew A Lynch, Intraday Arbitrage 
Between ETFs and their Underlying Portfolios, (January 25, 2019), unpublished Working 
Paper, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3322400. 
775 Deutsche Bundesbank ETF Report, supra note 773 at 96. 
776 Id. at 99. 
777 Id. at 96. 
778 See SEEKING ALPHA, What To Do When ETFs Become Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
(June 10, 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4180604-etfs-become-weapons-mass-
destruction (Some fund managers have even gone as far as calling them “weapons of mass 
destruction” given their distortive impact on stock prices.) 
779 See generally Ehsan Ahmed et al., Financialization and Speculative Bubbles - International 
Evidence, CAMA WORKING PAPER NO. 6/2017, 6 (December 12, 2016), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899960;  
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ETF index, and its individual constituent securities.780 It also notes that certain 
type of ETFs (like those that use leverage) can “amplify the volatility of security 
prices through their rule-based trading strategies.”781 
 
In a related study, Ahmed et al. (2017)782 presented evidence, using daily 
stock market data from January 1993 to March 2005, of the presence of 
“nonlinear speculative bubbles” increasing in incidence over time in 23 
international markets.783  Other studies suggest that certain types of financial 
product innovations may be decreasing market liquidity 784  while increasing 
volatility (through “interaction” effects and “flash crashes”).785  The cumulative 
effect of heightened volatility, as noted by the ESRB Report, is that “large short-
term directional bets in the ETF market can eventually result in market crashes, 
and thus exacerbate the volatility of the index itself, as well as the sensitivity of 
security prices to market crashes.”786 
 
A recent paper by Professors Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni and 
Rabih Moussawi has linked ETFs with an increase in volatility in underlying 
securities,787 confirming results from previously investigations.788 This research 
shows empirically that “stocks with more ownership by ETFs display higher 
volatility than otherwise similar securities” – a result the authors attribute to 
ETFs being the “preferred habitat” of investors like HFT or other “short-horizon 
liquidity traders” with “higher turnover.”789 Thus HFT driven ETF “demand 
shocks” from enhanced secondary market trading can spill over to the prices of 
the underlying securities leading to their higher volatility.790  Also, this study 
found that increased volatility in the underlying stocks, brought on by ETF 
 
780 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 2, 20-24.  
781 Id.  
782 See Ahmed et al, supra note 779. 
783 Id. at 9.  
784 See Sunny Oh, Short interest on junk bond ETFs hits record as investors warn of "liquidity 
mismatch", MARKETWATCH (March 1, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/short-
interest-on-junk-bond-etfs-hits-record-as-investors-warn-of-liquidity-mismatch-2018-03-01. 
785 See KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, The Impact of High 
Frequency Trading: Manipulation, Distortion or a Better-Functioning Market? (September 30, 
2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-impact-of-high-frequency-trading-
manipulation-distortion-or-a-better-functioning-market/. 
786 ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 20. 
787 See Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni & Rabih Moussawi, Do ETFs Increase 
Volatility? 73(6) JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2471 (2018). 
788 See Timothy Krause, Sina Ehsani & Donald Lien, Exchange Traded Funds, Liquidity and 
Volatility, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 1617 (2014). 
789 See Ben-David et al. supra note 787 at 2471 & 2531. 
790 Id. at 2473.  
 
 
 
116 
trading, didn’t enhance price discovery,791 but was distortive “noise”.792 This 
suggests ETFs may be making markets less efficient, and potentially increasing 
systemic risk since the enhanced volatility is “non-diversifiable.”793 The ESRB 
Report supports the information distortive impact of ETFs including the view 
that “non-fundamental shocks” are integrated into underlying asset prices as a 
result of ETF trading.794 
 
ETF product variations have been an independent source of heighted 
volatility, like the linked products that generate returns based on the movement 
of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX).795  Some of these products appreciate when 
volatility spikes (for example the Barclay’s iPath VIX Short Term Futures Note 
(VXX)) while others decrease in value when volatility subsides (for example the 
Proshares Short VIX ETF (SVXY)) –independent of the movement of equity or 
bond markets. In February 2018, a spike in volatility drove a dramatic sell off of 
inverse, VIX-linked, exchange traded notes.796  Of particular concern, Credit 
Suisse’s VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short-Term ETN (XIV), during the 
crash traded “at a more than 92 percent discount to [its] closing value the prior 
day” and resulted in Credit Suisse terminating the product.797  These products 
also create counterparty risk, since they are redeemed in large blocks and depend 
on the creditworthiness of the issuer.798  Also, there is empirical evidence of 
trading volume similarities between volatility related ETPs and volatility futures 
 
791 See id. at 2531. 
792 Id.  
793 Id.  
794 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 22. 
795 See CBOE VIX, http://www.cboe.com/vix (last visited November 4, 2019). 
796 See Joanna Ossinger, VIX-Related ETPs Go Wild In After-Hours Trading Route, 
BLOOMBERG MARKETS (February 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
02-05/vix-related-etps-go-wild-in-after-hours-trading-in-wake-of-rout; see also Hu & Morley, 
A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1 at 862-863. 
797 Michael Shields & Trevor Hunnicutt, Credit Suisse ‘volatility’ fund liquidated after market 
selloff, REUTERS (February 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-credit-suisse-gp-
notes/credit-suisse-volatility-fund-liquidated-after-market-selloff-idUSKBN1FQ256; An ETN 
or “exchange traded note” is legally distinct from an ETF, see Hu & Morley, A Commendable 
Start, supra note 485 at 1178 (“Moreover, the use of such a moniker would help curb the 
mistaken belief on the part of some investors that exchange traded notes (“ETNs”) are little 
different economically from ETFs. Among other things, ETNs are debt instruments and thus 
entail credit risk exposure to the issuers of the ETNs. ETF shares, in in contrast, offer stakes in 
pooled investments and only entail credit risk exposures to the issuers of the debt instruments 
in the ETF’s portfolio.”) 
798 See John Waggoner, Exchange-traded notes add another lawyer of risk, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(February 7, 2018), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180207/FREE/180209934/exchange-traded-notes-
add-another-layer-of-risk.  
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which supports the argument that these products aren’t solely a hedge instrument 
but rather an independent contributor of market volatility.799 
 
e. How Complexity and Informational Opacity Impacted the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
The complexity and opacity of the over-the-counter derivatives 
market,800 and the wholesale and repo markets,801 undoubtedly influenced the 
GFC. Complexity risk has also been cited as a contributing factor in the Enron 
scandal and the Long-Term Capital Management failure.802  There is evidence 
that complexity and a “glut” of financial intermediation facilitated an 
“information loss” in the GFC.803 As Professor Manuel Utset has noted, markets 
are multi-actor “complex institutions” that facilitate price discovery through the 
aggregation of information;804 however, the proliferation of “many markets and 
meta-markets” (i.e. market complexity), through an extended chain of financial 
intermediation, increases informational opacity in regards to risk, despite 
rational behavior by individual actors.805  
 
This occurs because complexity (produced by difficult to value 
securities, and interconnectedness between intermediaries) will “increase the 
immediate costs of investing in information” and thereby drive an incentive to 
delay obtaining such information and instead transfer the information risk to 
another party.806 In an opaque information environment all parties end up acting 
in a similar manner (herding) because conducting the “due diligence” to 
ascertain the true risk of an underlying investment is too costly – and thus an 
individually rational decision leads to aggregate “informational deficits” at the 
group level.807  
 
 
799 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 24; see also N. P. B. Bollen, M.J. O’Neill & R. E. 
Whaley, Tail wags dog: intraday price discovery in VIX Markets, 37(5) JOURNAL OF FUTURES 
MARKETS 431 (2017). 
800 See Stout, supra note 730. 
801 See Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 
(2011).  
802 See Daniel Altman, Contracts So Complex They Imperil The System, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(February 24, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/24/business/contracts-so-complex-they-
imperil-the-system.html.  
803 See Manuel Utset, Rational Financial Meltdowns, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 407 (2014).  
804 Id. at 407. 
805 See id. at 408. 
806 Id. at 424. 
807 Id. at 428. 
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This dynamic was manifest in the GFC through the repo market runs on 
Lehman where lenders had an incentive to maintain their “equilibrium position” 
(roll-over the repo) until they “simultaneously” reversed their position.808  As 
Professor William Fisher has described, the repo lenders were “information 
insensitive until shock” meaning that they continued lending on new 
information, without adjusting terms, until they withdrew in seeming 
coordination (like “retail depositors during a bank run”).809  Fisher adds that the 
case of Lehman was one of “extreme” liquidity risk because the “fatal liquidity” 
context developed quickly (as he notes – with “frightening speed”810). The 
liquidity failure was driven by actors “outside” of Lehman (like the triparty repo 
lenders and clearing bank) with complex and “fast-moving” interactions; 
sophisticated parties acted in herds, and they didn’t adjust to new information 
gradually, but rather “simply stopped lending altogether.”811  Also there was 
asymmetrical information and the “concealing” of intentions between multiple 
parties.812 
 
Liquidity risk that is “extreme” has been described as “inherently 
opaque” by Professor Fisher since it is impossible to disclose in a timely way.813  
This means that heighted risk disclosure won’t necessarily work (Professor 
Fisher calls this “predicting a heart attack.”) 814 To make his case Fisher details 
the both the clearing bank “liquidity squeeze” that JP Morgan imposed on 
Lehman with its triparty repo collateral “haircuts,”815 and the repo lender run on 
Lehman that occurred when lenders almost simultaneously pulled funding 
support.816   
 
Research from the Financial Stability Board, and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston (FRB) has also found that opacity “exacerbated” the roll-over 
risks in the wholesale funding markets during the GFC and encouraged creditor 
runs; and that efforts to reduce risk-opacity would have had the additional 
benefits of “enhancing market discipline” and aid in the staving off of credit 
 
808 Id. at 441. 
809 See Fisher, supra note 518 at 485. 
810 Id. at 521. 
811 Id. at 523. 
812 See id. discussion at 521-523. 
813 See id. 
814 Id. at 524. 
815 See id at 471  
816 See id. at 485  
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runs. 817 It could also decrease contagion,818 and the spreading of runs to other 
institutions or  asset classes.819   
 
f. Do Investors Really Understand ETF Interaction Risks? 
  
As the investor base for ETFs grows, it is fair to wonder whether average 
investors understand “interaction risks” like liquidity illusions and mismatch, 
investor herds and information distortion cited by this article (and its 
predecessor) in their investment decisions, and can make a “realistic assessment 
of how ETFs will perform in stressed market conditions.” 820  Further, one 
wonders the extent that rationality even plays into the decision to invest in ETFs 
all together since there is empirical evidence that “investment flows tend to chase 
ETFs’ returns”821 rather than an assessment of the “managerial skill” or financial 
prospectus of the underlying company.822 
 
The fragilities within the ETF ecosystem highlight a separate (but 
relevant) uncertainty regarding the efficacy of regulatory disclosure 
requirements – including the extent that risks in certain types of ETFs have 
become what Professor Henry Hu has characterized as “too complex to 
depict.” 823  It also triggers an analysis of the informational effectiveness of 
 
817 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking 
Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (2013); see also Michal Kowalik, Opacity and 
Disclosure in Short-Term Wholesale Funding Markets, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 
WORKING PAPER RPA 16-02, 1 (September 15, 2016)  
818 Regarding contagion risk there is modelling evidence that small shocks in complex financial 
networks can lead to widespread fallout. See Richard J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in 
a Model of Complexity, 68(6) THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2549 (2013).  
819 Kowalik, supra note 817 at 2-7. 
820 See CBI Discussion Paper supra note 582 at 11. 
821 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 22; see also C.P. Clifford, J.A. Fulkerson & B.D. 
Jordan, B.D., What drives ETF Flows? 49(3) FINANCIAL REVIEW 619 (2014). 
822 See ESRB Report, supra note 490 at 22; see also M. Broman, Liquidity, style investing, and 
excess comovement of Exchange-Traded Fund returns, 30 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
27 (2016).  
823 See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” And The 
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2012). (“[m]odern financial 
innovation has resulted in objective realities that are far more complex than in the past, often 
beyond the capacity of the English language, accounting terminology, visual display, risk 
measurement, and other tools on which all depictions must primarily rely.”); additionally, see 
discussion at 1654 (“the process of financial innovation may be undermined by cognitive 
biases (e.g., ignoring low probability, catastrophic events in derivatives modeling); the 
peculiarities of financial ‘science’ (e.g., departures from traditional scientific norms such as 
‘universalism’), and the inability of banks to fully capture the benefits of their financial 
research and development (e.g., this ‘inappropriability’ resulting in the failure to invest enough 
to fully understand the characteristics of their complex products).”) 
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adding further disclosure to the already gargantuan requirements that financial 
product issuers face.824 Further studies are warranted on the interaction effects 
between these ETF ecosystem intermediaries and the possibilities for “feedback 
loops” or underlying asset price “distortions,” especially as ETFs evolve away 
from broad indices and head further down the path of sectoral or strategic 
focus.825  
 
Even if investors are able to fully appreciate the risks when investing in 
ETFs, recent research suggests that they may not be able to otherwise diversify 
it.826 A recent study determined that that “ETF ownership exacerbates the co-
movement in the liquidity of constituent stocks” and that this co-movement is 
driven by the arbitrage function.827 The authors conclude their study by noting 
“we show that as ETFs continue to grow and gain higher ownership of stocks, it 
can reduce the ability of investors to diversify liquidity shocks due to an increase 
in the commonality in liquidity of stocks included in ETF portfolios.”828 
 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider how to increase the 
informational, and operational, efficiency of the ETF ecosystem of which added 
disclosure may be necessary. Given the centrality of ETF arbitrage to the risks 
noted in both this paper and its predecessor, serious consideration should be 
given to regulatory simplification for ETFs, and specifically the proposal by 
Professors Hu and Morley, where they suggest a special emphasis on a clear 
naming convention to distinguish ETFs from other ETPs, more effective 
disclosure (they advocate for both “qualitative” and “quantitative” forms) 
around potential arbitrage breakdowns which could cause liquidity illusions, and 
what Morley and Hu further describe as “trading price frictions” including bid-
ask spreads and areas where the “arbitrage mechanism” could potentially 
become impaired or fail.829 
 
824 See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in 
Financial Disclosure Regulation, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO COASE SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR 
LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 680, (January 20, 2014), see discussion at 4; see 
also Robert P. Bartlett, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative 
Disclosures During The Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 57 (2010). 
825 See CBI Feedback Statement, supra note 566 at 47-48. 
826 See Vikas Agarwal, Paul E. Hanouna, Rabih Moussawi, & Christof W. Stahel., Do ETFs 
Increase the Commonality in Liquidity of Underlying Stocks? 28TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS AND ACCOUNTING; FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL 
MARKET REGULATION 2018 (November 20, 2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3001524. 
827 Id. at 20.  
828 Id. at 21.  
829 See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 490 at 842-851, 934-936; see also 
Hu & Morley, A Commendable Start, supra note 490 at 1157-1161, 1200-1201. 
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Further, in 2018, the SEC instituted rule 22e-4, and a new disclosure 
form (N-PORT), for liquidity risk management program disclosure for open-
ended funds including ETFs.830 These disclosures seek to protect investors by 
creating enhanced transparency and ensuring funds can meet shareholder 
redemptions.  There are regulatory restrictions on ETF illiquid holdings831 and 
ETFs must continually assess “liquidity cost to the authorized participant or 
other market participant, which could increase the cost of their participation and 
interfere with their role in the ETF arbitrage mechanism.”832 These rules require 
the ETF’s annual shareholder report to provide “on an annual or semi-annual 
basis a narrative discussion of the operation of the fund’s liquidity risk 
management program for the most recent fiscal year.”833  Further, they must 
include cash balance disclosure and eliminate potential gaming behavior when 
funds classify their holdings into liquidity baskets.834   
 
v. Conclusion  
  
The decline in active investing, and rise in dominance of the passive 
investing class, has many concerned observers.835 But what does it ultimately 
mean to the markets? A line has been drawn in the investment industry between 
those who support the long-term utility of ETFs, and those who maintain that 
they are distorting the prices of underlying assets.836 Those who lament the rise 
of ETFs, and other passive index structures, suggest that they impede price 
discovery and that supply and demand for many assets (including large-cap 
stocks) is now largely driven by “artificial” influences (like demand for the index 
 
830 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Adopts Rules To Modernize 
Information Reported By Funds, Require Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Permit 
Swing Programs (October 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-215.html.  
831 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, SEC Proposes ETF Rule, Amends Liquidity Risk 
Reporting Rule and Requires In Line XBRL Reporting By Funds (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-SEC-Proposes-ETF-Rule-Amends-
Liquidity-Risk-Reporting-Rule-and-Requires-Inline-XBRL-Reporting-by-Funds.pdf. 
832 See CBI Discussion Paper, supra note 582 at 23.  
833 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT COMPANY LIQUIDITY 
DISCLOSURE, RELEASE NO. IC-33142; FILE NO. 27-04-18); See also Sullivan & Cromwell, 
supra note 91 at 9 
834 See Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 831 at 9  
835 See GRANT’S INTEREST RATE OBSERVER, On the ETF Divide, Volume 34, NO. 19b 
(October 14, 2016), available at http://horizonkinetics.com/wp-content/uploads/Grants_On-
The-ETF-Divide.pdf. 
836 Id. 
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fund, independent of the actual companies that comprise it).837 Also, they note 
that a lack of price discovery can also distort a “rational allocation of capital.”838   
 
ETFs have positive utility for many investors.839 A market so fertile is 
driven by real demand, and genuine product benefits include lower costs,840 tax 
advantages841 and secondary market liquidity.842  The most effective counter-
argument, when contending against the decline of active investment 
management, is simply the fact that active managers routinely underperform 
passive funds at a higher cost - so it’s obvious why investors would be interested 
in indexing.843 The ETF ecosystem is a prime example, however, of a complex 
“layered” 844  financial product with resulting “interaction risks” as 
intermediaries, and investors, pursue individual goals in a collective ecosystem. 
The question that looms is, at what point (and if at all), as articulated by the late 
John Bogle, a true “tragedy of the commons” will occur in the ETF market where 
what’s good for the individual becomes problematic for the wider economy.845 
 
The growing size and future projections of ETFs as an asset class, the 
way they increase the connection between Main Street and Wall Street (like 
MBS in the past), their opaque “interaction risks” giving rise to potential 
instabilities and inefficiencies, and the long-term uncertainty that passive 
investing may have on the economy,846 make ETFs a market segment to closely 
monitor.  But how should regulators, academics, and interested stakeholders 
(particularly pensions) react?  No one wants to revisit the economic fallout of 
the GFC.  This article has identified, however, two echoes of the crisis in the 
nascent rise of ETFs and passive investing: they could influence the 
 
837 Id.  
838 Id.  
839 See generally Su, supra note 485. 
840 Id.  
841 See Mark Kennedy, ETF Tax Advantages Over Mutual Funds, THE BALANCE (July 15, 
2019), https://www.thebalance.com/etf-tax-advantages-over-mutual-funds-1215121. 
842 See Understanding ETF Liquidity, ETF.COM, https://www.etf.com/etf-education-
center/21034-understanding-etf-liquidity.html (last visited September 9, 2019). 
843 See Mohit Oberoi, A Market Crash Due To ETFs? Michael Burry Weighs In, MARKET 
REALIST (September 5, 2019), https://marketrealist.com/2019/09/market-crash-due-to-etfs-
burry-weighs-in/. 
844 See Omarova, supra note 668 at 763. 
845 See Conrad de Aenlle, Opinion: John Bogle Has A Warning For Index Fund Investors, 
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/john-bogle-has-a-
warning-for-index-fund-investors-2017-06-01. 
846 See Fred Imbert, Passive Investing Boom Could Be Causing A Market Bubble, But Not In 
The Stocks You Would Expect, CNBC (July 28, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/27/passive-investing-boom-could-be-causing-a-market-bubble-
but-not-in-the-stocks-you-would-expect.html. 
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materialization of investor herds which could result in panic selloffs and 
contagion in a crisis; and they might be decreasing the informational efficiency 
of asset prices, onset by less active price discovery and an artificial demand for 
certain stocks simply because of their inclusion in an index. The remainder of 
the article will identify areas of further research that are warranted, and ideas for 
regulatory adaptation to increase the price efficiency of the market and mitigate 
against the risk of information cascades and investor herding. 
 
First, much more empirical research is warranted on the precise nature of 
the relationship between ETF demand and underlying asset prices.   Not 
everyone agrees with Michael Burry, and other analysts’ content that price 
discovery in ETF underlying assets is “alive and well”, that the large indexes are 
comprises of the “most liquid stocks on the planet,” and that index investors are 
primarily long-run in their investment time horizons. 847  Relatedly, further 
studies should be undertaken on the impact of HFT on efficient price discovery, 
as well as HFT’s impact on the ETF operational ecosystem.848 
 
If the hypothesis of asset price distortion from index fund and ETF 
demand proves empirically sound, then one wonders whether measures to curb 
the proliferation of index and passive products is defensible?  Paternalism in new 
investment products is controversial, yet licensing regimes analogous to the 
regulation of new drugs, have been advanced by Professors Saule Omarova,849 
Eric Posner and Glenn Weyl,850 Robert Litan,851 and Heather Hughes.852 This is 
 
847 See Allan Roth, ‘The Big Short’ Whiffs on Indexing, ETF.COM (September 5, 2019), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/big-short-whiffs-indexing?nopaging=1. 
848 See Gaia Balp & Giovanni Strampelli, Preserving Capital Markets Efficiency In The High 
Frequency Trading Era, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 349, 404. 
849 See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. LAW. REV. 2 (2012). In this article Omarova suggests a financial 
product-licensing framework that would “place the burden of proving social and economic 
utility of complex financial instruments on the intermediaries that structure and market them”, 
see at 76. 
850 Eric A. Posner & Glen E. Weyl, A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on Derivatives: An 
FDA for Financial Innovation. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR LAW & ECONOMICS 
OLIN RESEARCH PAPER NO. 594 (January 29, 2012), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1995077. Posner & Weyl advocate for a financial market product ex 
ante licensing regime (like the U.S. Food & Drug Administration) and argue that new products 
should be subject to a “social utility” test focused on whether the product is to be used for 
speculation or hedging – effectively establishing a more complex “insurable interest rule.“ See 
at 13. 
851 See Robert E. Litan, In Defence of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE WHITE PAPER (Wednesday February 17, 2010), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/in-defense-of-much-but-not-all-financial-innovation/.   
852 See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, 
20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 179 (2015). 
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particularly relevant in light of the ongoing “fee-wars” in ETFs as issuers move 
to “zero-fee” structures to capture market share.853 
 
Continued investigation is also worthwhile on strategies to reduce 
herding potential in financial market products, like exploring “separating 
equilibria”, and “heterogeneous” rules (or regulatory relaxations) such as those 
suggested by Professors Ayres and Mitts.854  This is very relevant given the 
“crowding” in passive investments that could lead to a bottleneck in a selloff – 
or as Michael Burry recently noted “[t]he theater keeps getting more crowded, 
but the exit door is the same as it always was.”855 
 
Finally, the issue of “concentration risk” in the ETF market should be 
more closely analyzed, including the concentration of financial intermediaries 
(like APs and MMs) that sit at the heart of the ETF ecosystem, with an eye to 
discovering how regulation can be utilized to reduce the fallout of herding if a 
key ecosystem intermediary fails.  Relatedly, the extent that ETF fund sponsors 
(given the industry’s concentration) should be considered “systemically 
important financial institutions” (SIFI), and subject to more intensive regulatory 
oversight, should be evaluated.856  This is particularly timely in light of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s recent proposal,857 to change the rules 
associated with non-bank SIFIS to focus on “activities” over firm-specific 
designations.858   
  
 
853 Eric Platt, Zero Fee and Rebate Deals Throw Down Gauntlet on ETF Charges, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (July 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cc79a080-9117-11e9-8ff4-
699df1c62544?shareType=nongift 
854 See Ayres & Mitts, supra note 528. 
855 Yun Li, Michael Burry of ‘The Big Short’ says he has found the next market bubble, CNBC 
(September 4, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/the-big-shorts-michael-burry-says-he-
has-found-the-next-market-bubble.html. 
856 See Ashley Lau & Michael Flaherty, ETF Companies Boost Bank Credit Lines Amid 
Liquidity Concern, REUTERS (May 12, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-etfs-credit-
expansion-insight/etf-companies-boost-bank-credit-lines-amid-liquidity-concern-
idUSKBN0NY0A720150513. 
857 See FEDERAL REGISTER VOL. 84, NO. 49 (Wednesday March 13, 2019), FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 12 CFR Part 1310, available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Notice-of-Proposed-Interpretive-Guidance.pdf 
858 See Richard Berner, Kermit Schoenholtz, Lawrence J. White, Lowering The Bar on 
Financial Regulation is Fraught With Risk, AMERICAN BANKER (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/lowering-the-bar-on-financial-regulation-is-fraught-
with-risk. 
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Chapter IV: Are Exchange Traded Funds Making Some Asset Managers 
Too Interconnected To Fail? 
 
The following chapter is published at 22(4) U. PA. J. BUS. L. (2020) 772 as “Are Exchange 
Traded Funds Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail?” and is available 
online here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516936  
 
i. Abstract 
 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) are likely the most successful financial 
products since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC).   Despite numerous 
benefits, ETF’s success could be making some asset managers “too 
interconnected to fail.”  Interconnection is a core element of systemic risk, and 
it played a material role in the transmission of economic shocks in the GFC.  This 
article is the first, in a growing body of literature on ETFs, to provide a 
comprehensive inquiry into their systemic importance through the lens of 
interconnectivity.  The article provides three unique contributions.  First, it 
shows how ETFs are creating deep and complex interconnections between 
numerous market participants and service providers, extending to retail and 
institutional investors, and corporate behaviors and decisions.  Second, it 
illustrates how ETF interconnection creates direct and indirect systemic risk 
transmission pathways, with unique factors not present in other managed asset 
products, like the reliance on key market-incentivized intermediaries in a crisis, 
crowd behaviors from correlated investment exposures, information cascades, 
runs, fire sales, and non-linear impacts.  Finally, it shows how the effective 
monitoring of ETF systemic risk requires a cross-market analysis to assess the 
collective behaviors of numerous participants in a complex and interconnected 
operating ecosystem, and how both activity and entity-level oversight is prudent 
in this market.  While ETF firms are distinct from banks and insurance 
companies, there’s merit in safeguarding large firm’s economic resilience given 
their centrality in a highly interconnected ecosystem.  As such, ETFs illustrate 
the importance of considering financial markets as a “system” when designing 
supervisory frameworks. 
 
ii. Introduction 
 
The Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) is perhaps the most successful financial 
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product since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). 859   They have many 
benefits, and strong demand factors, including liquidity, cost and tax advantages 
over mutual funds, easy access to diversified exposures in opaque asset classes, 
and cash substitutability for institutions in their liquidity management 
activities.860  Evidence also supports passive investing providing superior long-
run returns.861  There are concerns, however, that certain ETF issuers may be 
growing too large.862  Recent reports suggest that three ETF firms (BlackRock 
(40 percent), Vanguard (25 percent) and State Street (18 percent)) make up 
around 83 percent of the ETF market share in the U.S.863   Another recent study 
noted that since the GFC, over 80 percent of all “assets flowing into investment 
funds” have been captured by these three firms.864  ETF critics argue that they 
“shut investors out of the high-growth companies that offer higher returns.”865  
John Bogle (founder of Vanguard) worried however, shortly before his death 
that “[i]f everybody indexed, the only word you could use is chaos, 
catastrophe . . . [t]he markets would fail.”866 
 
This article is the first, in a growing body of literature on ETFs, to provide 
a comprehensive inquiry into their systemic importance through the lens of 
interconnectivity – a material factor in the GFC. 867   Since 2008, highly 
interconnected ETF mega firms have increased their influence, and voting 
power, over nearly every publicly traded corporation in America.868  These firms 
are fostering deep and complex interconnections between market participants 
 
 859. See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-market/?srnd=etfs 
[https://perma.cc/544K-5PKC]. 
 860. See infra Section IV (c). 
 861. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of 
Mutual Fund Returns, 65(5) JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1915 (2010); Ben Johnson, Active vs. 
Passively Managed Funds: Takeaways From Our Midyear Report, MORNINGSTAR BIG PICTURE 
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/08/23/actively-managed.html 
[https://perma.cc/W3GC-XET3]. 
 862. See Elisabeth Dellinger, Too Big To Fail: Money Management Edition, FISHER 
INVESTMENTS MARKET ANALYSIS (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.fisherinvestments.com/en-
us/marketminder/too-big-to-fail-money-management-edition [https://perma.cc/CP8Y-N2FP]. 
 863. See Eva Su, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs): Issues For Congress, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT (7-5700), 16 (Sept. 24, 2018), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45318.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z68P-LCFY]. 
 864. See Lucian A. Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 
721, 723 (2019). 
 865. Keris Lahiff, Why zero-fee ETFs are not risk free, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/09/why-zero-fee-etfs-are-not-risk-free.html 
[https://perma.cc/35MS-TLGG]. 
 866. David Thomas, A Warning From The Late John Bogle, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-
bogle/#6c00a7d62b99 [https://perma.cc/J34P-SS45]. 
 867. See infra Section III (c). 
 868. See infra Section IV (d)(2). 
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and service providers that traces down to retail investors, main street, and 
corporate behaviors and decision making.869  ETFs are also giving rise to a new 
subset of systemic risks that have both direct and indirect transmission channels, 
and which don’t exist in other managed asset classes (like those associated with 
the ETF arbitrage function, and onset from short-term directional and noise 
traders attracted to the intraday liquidity of ETFs).870 
 
Optimal financial market interconnectivity is difficult to assess since 
interconnections can both absorb and amplify shocks.871  The ETF operating 
structure integrates into a “tangled web” of a “genuine” global interconnected 
financial system, and asset managers like ETF mega firms may require a 
heightened macro-prudential focus in the future.872  ETF systemic risk derives 
from the potential collective actions of numerous interconnected market 
participants, experienced through phenomena like the discretionary withdrawals 
of key market-incentivized intermediaries from the ETF operating substructure 
in a crisis, and crowd behaviors from correlated exposures creating information 
cascades, runs, fire sales, and non-linear impacts.873 
 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) activities, and entity-
based, regulatory frameworks, for non-bank systemically important financial 
institutions (non-bank SIFIs) when applied separately to ETF firms, both have 
limitations.  As other scholars have recently advocated, activity and entity 
oversight should not be considered mutually exclusive,874  and this article will 
show how a “complementary approach”875 is also prudent for the ETF market.  
The ETF ecosystem highlights the increasing importance of regulating financial 
markets as a system.876  While ETF firms are clearly distinct from banks and 
insurance companies, there’s merit in ensuring they are economically resilient 
and have adequate safeguards given their centrality in a highly interconnected 
 
 869. See infra Section IV (d). 
 870. See infra Section V. 
 871. See Andrew G. Haldane, Managing Global Finance As A System, MAXWELL FRY 
ANNUAL GLOBAL FINANCE LECTURE, BIRMINGHAM UNIVERSITY (Oct. 29, 2014) at 3, 9, 
available at https://www.bis.org/review/r141030f.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS3K-EPXB] 
(discussing the evolution of the financial market into a complex and interwoven system that is 
both “robust” and “fragile”). 
 872. See id. at 3-9. 
 873. See infra Section V. 
 874. See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia-Ann McCoy & Daniel B. Schwarcz, Regulating Entities 
and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455 
(2019). 
 875. Id. 
 876. See Haldane, supra note 871 at 3-5. 
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system.877 
 
The asset managers profiled in this article could be growing “too 
interconnected to fail” and the most effective regulatory frameworks going 
forward will need to ensure firm stability and look across the market to assess 
and monitor the collective behavior of all participants. This study raises post-
GFC systemic concerns.  It also complements other post-GFC scholarship which 
identifies a small number of highly interconnected mega-banks sitting in the 
center of the leading central clearinghouses for derivatives and dominating the 
derivatives dealer markets.878 
 
This article proceeds by first establishing interconnectivity as a core 
measure of financial market systemic risk on par (if not more important) than 
size, and how disruptions at widely interconnected firms facilitated the GFC.  It 
then establishes several indicators of high interconnectivity and applies them to 
the ETF market in Section IV.  This Section, after identifying demand factors 
for ETFs, shows how these products facilitate complex economic 
interconnections.  Section V illustrates how ETF interconnectivity could 
contribute to systemic risk.  Section VI then canvasses the challenge of 
regulating highly interconnected asset managers (like the ETF mega issuers), 
including the limitations of both activities and entity-based non-bank SIFI rules, 
and relevant alternative regulatory considerations.  The article concludes by 
considering the true costs of liquidity transformation in ETFs. 
iii. Does Interconnection Increase Financial Market Systemic Risk? 
a. Moving Beyond Size: When Firms Become “Too Interconnected To 
Fail” 
 
A “hallmark” of the modern financial system is its “complex links” and 
deeply interconnected firms, whose operations transcend national borders and 
encompass a wide range of activities, functions and transactions.879  Size is not a 
 
 877. See Mark Gilbert, Banks Get Stress Tested. So Should Asset Managers, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (July 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-04/banks-get-
stress-tested-so-should-asset-managers [https://perma.cc/TEL9-LRTN], see infra Section III. 
 878. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, 34(1) 
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW 183, 234 (2014); Felix B. Chang, Second-Generation 
Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in Derivatives Markets, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657, 695-
708 (2016); Nahiomy Alvarez & John McPartland, The concentration of cleared derivatives: 
Can access to direct CCP clearing for end-users address the challenge? FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF CHICAGO WORKING PAPER 2019-06, (Aug. 20, 2019), available at 
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2019/2019-06 
[https://perma.cc/EG22-GCWV]. 
 879. See Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons From The Financial 
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complete measure of a financial institution’s importance in the larger system.880  
Highly interconnected financial institutions played a material role in the fallout 
from the GFC, and the continued existence (and as this article will suggest, the 
growing prevalence in the ETF sector) of complex and highly interconnected 
firms creates ongoing concerns for financial stability.881  The importance of 
highly-interconnected financial firms to economic stability has given rise to the 
concept of “too connected to fail” as a factor potentially as germane as size when 
analyzing systemic risk.882 
 
A firm’s size is a “relevant” but “nondeterminative” factor when assessing 
its systemic importance.883  Post-crisis analysis by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has noted that “the network of the financial system” can become very 
“vulnerable” and subject to shocks when a “highly connected” network 
participant experiences material failure, and its interconnectedness can amplify 
shocks across the entire network rather than absorbing them.884  Professor Steven 
Schwarcz has documented how a firm’s “interconnectedness, size, and lack of 
substitutability” can magnify systemic risk.885  Professors Schwarcz and Iman 
 
Crisis and Policy Implications, REMARKS AT AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION / AMERICAN 
FINANCE ASSOCIATION JOINT LUNCHEON, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA (January 4, 2013), available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/Yellen20130104a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8RV-JCED]. 
 880. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is An Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach To Financial Regulation, 120 Yale L.J. 1368, 1386-91 (2011). 
 881. See SYSTEMIC RISK COUNCIL, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
RE: AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA00, (May 21, 2019) available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0029 [https://perma.cc/7FH5-
BRR7]; BETTER MARKETS, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: 
AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA00, 84 Fed. Reg. 9028 (May 24, 2019), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0030 [https://perma.cc/K2WQ-
AYCB]; CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL, RE: FSOC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANY 
DETERMINATIONS (May 13, 2019) available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0017 [https://perma.cc/C6DY-
8WSY]; Patricia McCoy, Jeremy C. Kress, & Daniel Schwarcz, COMMENT OF LEGAL SCHOLARS 
ON AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA40 (May 13, 2019), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0012 [https://perma.cc/33ZE-
TG6L ] (hereinafter “Letter from Legal Scholars”). 
 882. See Paul Maidment, Too Connected to Fail, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/2010/04/19/banks-regulation-risk-business-wall-street-notes-on-the-
news-connected.html#2c4946285fe7 [https://perma.cc/K2B5-F7NF]. 
 883. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1469. 
 884. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Recent Advanced in Modelling Systemic Risk Using Network 
Analysis, 6 (January 2010), available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/modellingsystemicrisk012010en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q43P-NKCV]. 
 885. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2019). 
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Anabtawi also note that inherent in all systems are interconnected elements,886 
and that the financial system (which is a “law-related system”)  has elements 
(like certain market participants and service providers) which exhibit high levels 
of interconnectivity.887 
 
b. The Relationship Between Interconnection And Financial Instability 
 
Some argue that the history of financial crises is also a history of highly 
interconnected firms, where system-wide risk, and market failure, is a “by-
product” of such interconnectedness.888  Others suggest that interconnectedness 
is a key to the complexity (and potential fragility) of today’s financial system.889  
Douglas Elliot has argued that “[t]he more connections a firm has with others, 
the more channels there are to transmit problems.”890   Several studies have 
documented how connectivity was present in prior crises. 891   Janet Yellen 
suggests that interconnectedness was a material factor in the banking panic of 
1907, when what first appeared to be a “contained” crisis (limited to a few firms), 
quickly spread to traditional banks, and the larger economy as a result of 
“extensive interconnections.”892  Researchers from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) have also described the role of interconnectedness in the Herstatt 
Bank crisis in 1974, and the failure of Long Term Capital Management in 
1998.893 
 
There are several economic benefits to interconnectedness, including 
 
 886. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address The 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 78-80 (2013). 
 887. Id. at 84. 
 888. Alexander Goodenough, Dodd-Frank: Regulating Systemic Risk in the Offshore Shadow 
Banking Industry, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 137, 144 (2011). 
 889. See Cheng-Yun Tsang, The Seven Deadly Sins of the Contemporary Financial System, 
37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 359, 368 (2017); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 1262, 1306-07 (2013). 
 890. Douglas Elliot, Systemic Risk and the Asset Management Industry, ECONOMIC STUDIES 
AT BROOKINGS (May 2014), 4, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/systemic_risk_asset_management_elliott.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4H5-
T7YA]. 
 891. See Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The 
Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 262 (2010) (identifying the 
“chain reaction problem” inherent in systemic risk); see also Daniel J. Hunt, Just Grin and Bear 
It: Why Consistent Use of Individual Bailouts Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act Is 
A Necessary Evil to Combat Economic ‘Mass Destruction’, 6 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 59, 
60 (2014). 
 892. See Yellen, supra note 879. 
 893. Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected to Fail Institutions 
3 (IMF, Working Paper WP/10/98), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1098.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6KGR-BHBW]. 
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liquidity, risk diffusion, maturity transformation, and efficient capital 
intermediation from savers to borrowers; 894  yet the operations of highly 
interconnected firms in a crisis can also contribute to panicked selling, and 
contagion to other asset classes.895  Yellen notes that complex interconnections 
can “serve to amplify existing market frictions, information asymmetries, or 
other externalities.”896  In support of this proposition, empirical research has 
shown that a high degree of interconnectedness can increase market fragility as 
instabilities, or panicked sell-offs, in one sector quickly spreads to others in a 
contagion.897 
c. Interconnectedness as a Material Factor in the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis 
 
The GFC proved that instabilities at widely “interconnected” financial 
institutions could rapidly transmit shocks throughout the entire economy,898 and 
impact the entire “financial system.”899  When Lehman Brothers failed a “shock 
was transmitted through money market mutual funds to the short-term funding 
and interbank markets.”900  It also froze the derivatives markets as Lehman was 
thought to be counterparty to $5 trillion in credit default swap (CDS) contracts, 
causing “gridlock” in money market and fixed income trading as banks “hoarded 
liquidity.”901   Similarly, the asset-backed commercial paper market (ABCP) 
experienced interconnected material distress when “investors reali[z]ed that 
money market mutual funds had invested in paper backed by sub-prime 
assets.”902  When ABCP failed, investors soon became “distrustful of all forms 
of private credit” leading to a near instantaneous withdrawal of liquidity in 
wholesale funding markets because of complex network linkages of financial 
institutions.903  Similarly, in money market funds, when the Reserve Primary 
Fund “broke the buck” a wave of redemptions “fueled instability in the credit 
markets.”904 
 
 894. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108(1) J. OF POL’Y ECON. 1,4 
(2000). 
 895. Yellen, supra note 879. 
 896. Id. 
 897. See Allen & Gale, supra note 894, at 4. 
 898. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 6. 
 899. See Schwarcz, supra note 885, at 35. 
 900. Yellen, supra note 879. 
 901. See Andrew G. Haldane, Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech at Financial Student 
Association, Amsterdam (April 28, 2009), available at https://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SKJ3-8WD3]. 
 902. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 5. 
 903. Id. 
 904. Id.; see Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation By Threat: Dodd Frank and The 
Nonbank Problem, 84 UNI. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 1813, 1828 (2017). 
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The GFC also showed the speed that healthy but highly interconnected 
institutions can fail.905  During the crisis “interconnected nonbank institutions” 
took many risks under lowered regulatory parameters. 906   Bear Sterns was 
deemed too great of a systemic risk, because of its interconnectedness, to let fail 
(leading to a bail-out).907  Yet Bear was smaller than Lehman Brothers (which 
was allowed to fail).908  Alan Blinder has suggested that “[t]he primary reason 
[the Fed saved Bear] was fear that Bear was too interconnected to fail.”909  The 
potential shock transmission from the failure of a highly interconnected AIG 
made its bail-out a necessity.910 
 
d. Establishing Indicators of High Interconnectivity 
 
 
One way to measure the interconnectedness of a financial institution is 
through “network analysis.”911  Using “network representations” has been noted 
by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC),912 as “particularly 
suitable” to assess the interconnection of financial institutions.913  The ECB 
describes this as a process that models “the interlinking exposures either between 
financial institutions, among the sectors of the economy or across entire financial 
systems.”914  The ECB adds that in determining the complexity of a network one 
 
 905. See Center For American Progress, supra note 881. 
 906. See Letter from Timothy Geithner, Former Sec’y of the Treasury, Jacob Lew, Former 
Sec’y of the Treasury, Ben Bernanke Former Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys. & Janet Yellen, Former Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to Steven 
T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury, & Jerome H. Powell, Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. (May 13, 2019), (on file at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/887-
bernanke-geithner-lew-yellen-letter/a22621b202dfcb0fe06e/optimized/full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DP6R-FYJZ].) 
 907. See HENRY M. PAULSON JR. ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, at 117 (2010); see also Hunt, supra note 891, at 72-3. 
 908. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 880, at 138. 
 909. ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, 
AND THE WORK AHEAD, at 112-3 (2013) 
 910. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 7. 
 911. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 4. 
 912. The DTCC is the U.S.’s largest post-trade services (clearing and settlement) provider, 
see About DTCC, DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, (Dec. 26, 2019), 
http://www.dtcc.com/about [https://perma.cc/2M3K-2WKT]. 
 913. See DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, UNDERSTANDING 
INTERCONNECTED RISKS TO BUILD A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 8 (2015), 
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/WhitePapers/InterconnectednessWP-
101815.pdf [https://perma.cc/69Y8-85QR] (hereinafter “DTCC Whitepaper”). 
 914. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 4. 
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must look at both “nodes” (participants on the network) and “links” (connections 
and relationships).915  In network analysis the concept of “centrality” is critical 
to determine which nodes on a given network are “of systemic importance.”916 
 
A key finding of the DTCC in relation to interconnection-based risk 
transmission is that financial networks “tend to be robust yet fragile” meaning 
that they absorb shocks to a “tipping point” where they then spread risks rather 
than “contain them.”917  Andrew Haldane has noted that this tension is also 
exhibited in other complex ecosystems, like tropical rainforests,918 and that after 
the tipping point the “systemic dislocation” can often be much larger than the 
“initial shock.” 919   Interlinked exposures are also evident in the Office of 
Financial Research’s (OFR) financial connectivity index for globally 
systemically important banks, which measures the liabilities of banks held by 
other financial institutions.920 
 
 
Another characteristic of a highly interconnected firm is that it engages in 
credit extension or leverage transactions with other firms.921  When firms engage 
in interlinked credit exposures (like borrowing from and lending to each other) 
they deepen the interconnection. 922   Credit exposures can also generate 
interconnectedness when firms holds debt securities that are “issued by other 
institutions.”923  Further, some studies indicate that the potential for contagion is 
enhanced for firms with interlinked credit and leverage exposures.924  This point 
is relevant to the analysis of the institutional uptake of fixed income ETFs as 
cash substitutes below.925  Relatedly, a high level of leverage can increase the 
 
 915. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 9. 
 916. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 10. 
 917. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913 at 2; for an application of this principle outside of 
financial markets, in other complex systems, D.J. Watts, S.H. Strogatz, Collective dynamics of 
‘small-world’ networks, 393(6684) NATURE 440-442 (1998); R. Kinney, P. Crucitti, R. Albert 
& V. Latora, Modeling Cascading Failures in the North American Power Grid, B 46 THE EUR. 
PHYSICS J. 101 (2005). 
 918. See Haldane, supra note 901, at 2. 
 919. Haldane, supra note 901, at 5. 
 920. See P. Glasserman & B. Loudis, A Comparison of U.S. and International Globally 
Systemically Important Banks, OFF. OF FIN. RES. BRIEF SERIES 15-07 (2015). 
 921. See Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi & Jean-Charles Rochet, Systemic Risk, Interbank 
Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 
611 (2000). 
 922. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 4. 
 923. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 5. 
 924. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 28. 
 925. Infra Section IV (d)(v). 
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instability of an interconnected firm.926  ETF issuers (even the mega-players), 
however, use much lower levels of leverage than traditional banks (a factor often 
cited against the proposition of heightened prudential oversight).927 
 
A firm with a complex operating structure will also be highly 
interconnected.928  This can lead to “coordination problems” amongst firms,929 
given an increase in “opacity” of the operations of highly interconnected and 
complex institutions. 930  As Janet Yellen has noted, as the number of 
intermediaries involved in a financial process rises, “it becomes increasingly 
difficult to understand how one member of the network fits into the overall 
system.”931  Also, the more complex a firm’s operations, the more difficult it is 
to resolve.932  Large and complex firms often operate with thousands of separate 
legal entities, each interconnected to other firms.933  Research has revealed that 
the informational opacity in complex financial operations can exacerbate 
systemic risks like asset “fire sales,”934 and contagion is more likely when there 
is a high level of connectivity.935  Complexity of operations is also linked to the 
maturity and liquidity transformation process which in turn links counterparties, 
creates expectations for market participants (which may be illusory) and can 
serve to “amplify” systemic risk.936 
 
A firm’s legal and contractual obligations can create interconnectedness, 
and foster direct and indirect systemic risk exposures. 937   Direct 
interconnectedness stems from the fact that a contractual default can have a 
 
 926. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 27. 
 927. See infra Section VI (c). 
 928. See Yellen, supra note 879. 
 929. See Freixas, Parigi & Rochet, supra note 921 at 620-21. 
 930. Yellen, supra note 879. 
 931. Yellen, supra note 879. 
 932. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 16. 
 933. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 16. 
 934. See Richard J Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity, (Mass. Inst. 
of Tech. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-28, 2011). 
 935. See Prasanna Gai, Andrew Haldane & Sujit Kapadia, Complexity, Concentration and 
Contagion, 58 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 453 (2010). 
 936. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS 
STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITIES FROM ASSET MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES, 12 (2017), 
https://www.fsb.org/2017/01/policy-recommendations-to-address-structural-vulnerabilities-
from-asset-management-activities/ [https://perma.cc/3A92-29YK] (hereinafter “FSB Structural 
Vulnerabilities”). 
 937. See DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 12. 
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material adverse effect on a counterparty.938  Direct interconnectedness can arise 
from contractual relationships (like service or “infrastructure” agreements), 
credit exposures or trading links.939  Indirect interconnectedness can originate 
through contractual relationships due to factors like “information spillovers,”940 
common asset exposure, fire sales and shadow banking941 - all of which will be 
assessed for ETFs in subsections below.  Also, because of “interconnecting 
contracts” firms, and the larger economy, can be disrupted when a party defaults 
on its obligations, and the default results in the contractual counterparty 
defaulting on collateral obligations in a “domino-effect.”942 
 
Another descriptor of a “too interconnected to fail” institution is that it 
generates “interdependencies” amongst “institutions, sectors and systems.”943  
The notion of financial market interdependencies as a source of interconnection-
based systemic risk has been documented in research by the DTCC.944  The 
“complex web of direct and indirect links” in the U.S. financial system was also 
a material factor in the GFC that linked numerous market participants.945  The 
spread of contagion in a market panic is dependent on a variety of links and 
interdependencies. 946   As subsequent sections in this article will highlight, 
numerous direct and indirect links are being fostered by large ETF sponsors.947  
A centrally connected financial institution will act as a “hub” with a large 
number of “links” (generally contractual) with counterparties comprising a large 
number of “interdependencies.”948 
iv. How do ETFs Facilitate Complex Economic Interconnections? 
a. Post-Crisis Passive Investing and The Rise of ETF “Mega” Firms 
 
The popularity of ETFs have surged post-GFC. 949   They are now an 
 
 938. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 5. 
 939. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 4-5. 
 940. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 6 (“The distress or failure of one entity may be 
interpreted by the market as a negative signal about other entities.”) 
 941. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 6. 
 942. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 886, at 88. 
 943. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 16. 
 944. See DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 14. 
 945. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 3. 
 946. See Allen & Gale, supra note 894. 
 947. See infra Section IV (d). 
 948. European Central Bank, supra note 884, at 16, 18. 
 949. See Bryan Borzykowski, The Trillion-Dollar ETF Boom Triggered By The Financial 
Crisis Just Keeps Getting Bigger, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2018), 
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increasingly important component of the modern investment ecosystem.950  The 
ETF market has “swelled” in excess of $4 trillion since the late nineties, and in 
the process led to ETF issuer consolidation and the emergence of a few ETF 
“mega” firms.951  Smaller sponsors have been “squeezed out” as the large players 
compete for valuable assets under management (AUM) 952  which are an 
independent source of revenue from securities lending.953  Recent Morningstar 
data reveals that BlackRock (who issues iShares ETFs) is the largest U.S. and 
global market issuer, followed closely by Vanguard (one of the pioneers of the 
industry).954  State Street is next in line, followed by Invesco, Schwab and First 
Trust.955  The lion’s share of the ETF market (studies suggest over 83%) are 
managed, however, by the top three of BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.956  
These ETF firms are a continuing focal point for systemic risk “watchdogs.”957 
Prominent market participants have also started to question the seemingly 
“endless creation” of ETF products.958 
b. Estimated Growth Projections of The Most Dominant ETF Firms 
 
The size of BlackRock is particularly striking, with AUM nearing $7 
trillion, and a footprint in over 100 countries.959 It’s effectively become the 
“biggest investment management company across the globe.”960 As the ETF 
market grows the ETF sponsor space is becoming increasingly concentrated, 
with new money disproportionately flowing into the largest fund structures.961  
 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etf-boom-triggered-by-the-financial-
crisis.html [https://perma.cc/78NG-Z7Z5]. 
 950. See Su, supra note 863. 
 951. Michael Wursthorn, The $4 Trillion ETF Industry is Creating More ‘Roadkill’ THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-4-trillion-etf-
industry-is-creating-more-roadkill-11572255004 [https://perma.cc/8NW9-ENS3]. 
 952. Id. 
 953. Infra Section IV (c)(vii). 
 954. See Wursthorn, supra note 951. 
 955. Wursthorn, supra note 951 
 956. See Su, supra note 863, at 16. 
 957. See Siobhan Riding, Watchdogs Probe Systemic Risks of Passive Fund Growth, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a1deabc2-3eab-11e9-9499-
290979c9807a [https://perma.cc/VFE2-S44U]. 
 958. See Jim Cramer, We Need To Bring Back Individual Investors, REAL MONEY (Apr. 23, 
2019), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/jim-cramer-we-need-to-bring-back-
individual-investors-14933853 [https://perma.cc/A584-H3NZ]. 
 959. Trevis Team, BlackRock’s Revenue Growth Will Slow Down Considerably Over Coming 
Years, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/09/18/blackrocks-revenue-growth-will-
slow-down-considerably-over-coming-years/#2303728d7d79 [https://perma.cc/SNN6-D6FH]. 
 960. Greg McFarlane, How BlackRock Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012616/how-blackrock-makes-money.asp 
[https://perma.cc/48Z2-72V6]. 
 961. See Wursthorn, supra note 951. 
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A recent study by Professors Lucian Bebchuck and Scott Hirst projects that 
within two decades, the three asset management firms with the largest ETF 
market share (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors) could 
collectively double market power, and in turn exert control over 40 percent of 
the voting shares of all the companies in the S&P 500.962 Bebchuk and Hirst add 
that the voting power of these firms is “even greater than would be suggested by 
the proportion of shares that they manage, because many other shareholders do 
not vote.”963 Given current trends, they suggest that these firms will “dominate” 
voting of public companies in the U.S. over time. 964  This is a staggering 
proposition, which one reporter recently called “one of the most consequential 
economic developments of the past 30 years.”965 
c. What’s Fueling The Growth of These ETF Mega Firms? 
 
This section will review the most important structural factors fueling the 
growth of ETF mega-firms.  No one factor is determinative, and all have 
contributed to both the rise of the product class and the corresponding 
concentration in fund sponsors.  The growth of ETFs as a post-crisis 
phenomenon has, however, been criticized by high profile “active” investors, 
and academics including Jeffrey Gundlach, 966  Michael Burry, Carl Icahn, 
Howard Marks and Robert Shiller who suggest passive investing makes markets 
less efficient and exhibits characteristics of a “bubble.”967 
 
Perhaps the most compelling factor influencing the rise of ETFs as an asset 
class is that net of fees, passive fund structures (which include the vast majority 
of ETFs) have outperformed their active counterparts.968  This is empirically 
 
 962. See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 741. 
 963. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 738. 
 964. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 723, 741. 
 965. See Andrea Riquier, Three fund managers may soon control nearly half of all corporate 
voting power, researchers warn, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/three-fund-managers-may-one-day-control-nearly-half-of-
all-company-voting-shares-researchers-warn-2019-07-17 [https://perma.cc/7NX7-25QZ]. 
 966. See Michael Sheetz, Jeffrey Gundlach Says Passive Investing Has Reached a “Mania” 
– Investors Should Avoid Index Funds, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/17/gundlach-says-passive-investing-has-reached-mania-
status.html [https://perma.cc/P6WM-4FZL]. 
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29, 2019), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/investors-that-have-spoken-out-
against-passive-investing-2019-8-1028485512 [https://perma.cc/XX4D-JXQ9]. 
 968. See Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The implications of passive investing for 
securities markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, at 116-17 (Mar. 2018), 
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justified by the “efficient market theory” that hold that all available information 
is incorporated into the price of securities and thereby “excess future returns are 
not predictable.”969  Also, many investors still feel stung from the failure of most 
active managers to foresee the GFC, and have redirected actively managed assets 
into index funds.970  In addition, recent scandals like the redemption freeze at 
U.K. based Woodford Equity Income Fund, support investor demand for ETFs971 
over actively managed, opened-ended, redeemable funds because of their 
secondary market liquidity.972 
 
Passive outperformance isn’t the only reason ETFs are popular, as many 
mutual funds also use passive indexing strategies.973  Another strong argument 
in support of ETF’s popularity is that they cost less than analogous index mutual 
or closed end fund structures.974  They also have tax advantages over mutual 
funds.975  Additionally (and perhaps most importantly), ETFs are easy to buy in 
the secondary market.976 Although ETFs have features similar to both closed-
end funds, and open-ended structures (like mutual funds),977 ETF investors don’t 
 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803j.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y64S-LCFF]. 
 969. Id. at 116-17; see J. Busse, A. Goyal & S. Wahal, Investing in a global world, 18(2) 
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Winner in the Woodford Troubles, BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/passive-investing-emerge-winner-woodford-
troubles/ [https://perma.cc/Y2ZG-WLKW]. 
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ETF STREAM (June 11, 2019), https://www.etfstream.com/feature/8073_woodford-shows-why-
etf-liquidity-is-worth-paying-for/ [https://perma.cc/3WQF-B2EV]; Matthew Vincent, 
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[https://perma.cc/G52P-7MZN] (last accessed Feb. 1, 2020). 
 975. See Mark Kennedy, ETF Tax Advantages Over Mutual Funds, THE BALANCE (July 15, 
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have the same redemption procedures as mutual fund investors.  ETFs can be 
purchased like stocks through a brokerage account.978  This secondary market 
ETF “liquidity” advantage is a tremendous selling point for investors who are 
nervous of a mutual fund “redemption freeze.”979 
 
 
Another factor contributing to the rise of ETFs (and the growth of mega 
issuers) are recent regulatory accommodations easing the path to launch for new 
funds.980  In September 2019 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
approved a new rule (Rule 6c-11) designed to “streamline the process for 
offering” ETFs.981  With Rule 6c-11,982 certain ETF issuers will no longer have 
to obtain exemptive relief from the SEC to launch prescribed funds.983  The rule 
also provides “flexibility” for “newer ETF issuers and their middlemen to swap 
stocks or bonds that aren’t an exact, proportional match for the fund’s 
holdings.”984 
 
 
Many corporate and emerging market bonds trade over-the-counter in 
difficult to access and opaque dealer markets, and fixed income ETFs allow retail 
investors an access point to these markets.985   Research suggests that fixed-
income and other ETF structures with illiquid underlying assets attract investors 
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who would not otherwise invest in these sectors.986  Institutional investors have 
flocked to ETFs as a new “tool of choice” in the construction of their 
portfolios, 987  and institutional investors are increasingly using fixed-income 
ETFs as “near substitutes for cash” because of their high liquidity.988  Other 
benefits of ETFs to institutional investors include “ease of use.”989  As a result, 
recent reports note that institutional ETF assets have “grown at an average 
annual rate of 17% since 2014 to reach more than $1 trillion, easily outpacing 
the growth rates of most other investment vehicles” with fixed income ETFs 
representing the fastest growing segment.990  Large ETF firms can also offer 
institutional investors “liquidity advantages” like more competitive bid-ask 
spreads.991 
 
 
The variety of underlying asset class exposure seems nearly limitless with 
ETFs.992  To avoid competing head to head with mega firms, new fund issuers 
will often devise novel indexes and benchmarks.993  This is a tenuous strategy, 
however, because the large firms can simply copy innovative structures and use 
their market power to capture the flow of funds into novel structures. 994  
Paradoxically, the fourth largest U.S. ETF issuer Invesco (with over $1.2 trillion 
total AUM and $206 billion in ETFs) recently sought SEC protection to keep 
ETF portfolio holdings confidential.995  As will be discussed below,996 the SEC’s 
 
 986. See M. Broman, Relative Liquidity, Style Investing, and Excess Comovement of Exchange 
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Construction, GREENWICH INSIGHTS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.greenwich.com/asset-
management/etfs-us-institutions-new-tool-choice-portfolio-construction 
[https://perma.cc/DQE6-CNY2]. 
 988. See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To 
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC 
RISK BOARD (June 2019), 28-29, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJQ-SNNQ ] (hereinafter “ESRB Report”). 
 989. BROADRIDGE, Institutional Usage of North America ETFs, Asset Management Report, 2 
(Nov. 2018), available at https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-institutional-
usage-of-north-america-etfs.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ZJ-D5EG]. 
 990. Id. at 2. 
 991. See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 729. 
 992. See Evans & Eley, supra note 970. 
 993. See Wursthorn, supra note 951. 
 994. See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 731. 
 995. Rachel Evans, Invesco Seeks SEC Nod for ETF Designed to Thwart Copycats, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-25/invesco-
seeks-sec-nod-for-new-etf-designed-to-thwart-copycats [https://perma.cc/DRS9-XM59]. 
 996. See infra Section VI(f)(vi). 
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recent approval of “non-transparent” ETFs helps to alleviate index strategy 
duplication concerns.997 
 
 
Another factor fueling ETF growth is the popularity of “fintech” algorithmic 
wealth management platforms (or “robo-advisors”) which use low-fee ETFs in 
model portfolios.998 Investor interest in robo-advisers transcend “the millennial 
set”, and now include much of the retail public.999  Some fear that robo-advisors 
create ETF herding risk;1000 nevertheless, they represent a paradigm shifting 
“democratization” of wealth management - allowing the masses access to 
“diversified, affordable investment products” with essentially no account 
minimums. 1001   This trend is widely facilitated by demographic changes, 
technological advancements, and “a shift in investor preferences” to passively 
managed structures like ETFs.1002 Alongside the emergence of low cost fintech 
wealth-management,1003 has been the brokerage commission and ETF fee war, 
both moving quickly to a zero fee environment.1004  The emergence of robo-
advisors may also be increasing ETF issuer concentration, since they often 
promote widely held ETFs (like Vanguard).1005 
 
 997. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Public Statement, Statement of 
Commissioners Jackson and Lee on Non-Transparent Exchange Traded Funds (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-lee-2019-11-15 
[https://perma.cc/873L-4FB4 ] (hereinafter “Jackson and Lee”). 
 998. See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 788 (2019); Bret E. Strzelczyk, Rise of the Machines: The Legal 
Implications For Investor Protection With The Rise of Robo-Advisors, 16 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 55 (2017). 
 999. See Bryan Yurcan, U.S. Bank Marketing Robo Adviser Beyond The Millennial Set, 
AMERICAN BANKER (June 19, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/us-bank-
marketing-robo-adviser-beyond-the-millennial-set [https://perma.cc/F22C-YCHV]. 
 1000. See Sheetz, supra note 966. 
 1001. See Evans & Eley, supra note 970. 
 1002. FINEXTRA, The Democratization of Wealth Management (June 6, 2016), 
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/12698/the-democratization-of-wealth-management 
[https://perma.cc/BKZ7-Y2HX]. 
 1003. Low cost fintech access to professional wealth management arguable started with 
Robinhood; see John Divine, How Robinhood Changed an Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Oct. 17, 2019), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/how-
robinhood-changed-an-industry [https://perma.cc/77LX-QNB6]. 
 1004. See Jim Wang, Free Stock Trades Are Not Always A Good Thing, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimwang/2019/10/03/free-stock-trades-are-not-always-a-good-
thing/#76a987a2687b [https://perma.cc/3VHZ-LE5U]; see also Kirsten Chang, Battle for client 
assets heats up as brokers cut fees to zero, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/13/battle-for-client-assets-heats-up-as-brokers-cut-fees-to-
zero.html [https://perma.cc/C3VX-KWSH]. 
 1005. Eric Jansen, When a robo-advisor is, or isn’t, the right choice, CNBC (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/when-a-robo-advisor-is-or-isnt-the-right-choice.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DSL-Y2A7]. 
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ETF issuers have strong growth incentives since “collective investment 
vehicles” (which includes ETFs) can be used for “shadow banking” activities.1006  
The term “shadow banking” (or non-bank lending) is widely associated with the 
GFC. 1007  Securities lending, along with CDS written on collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO), were two key elements of American International Group’s 
(AIG) failure in the GFC.1008  Since the GFC, it’s been estimated that global 
“shadow banks” (including ETF issuers) have increased their assets by over 75 
percent to $52 trillion.1009  Securities lending has been called a “hidden source of 
return” for ETF fund sponsors, 1010  even the “best-kept secret in the ETF 
business.”1011  Securities lending is not unique to ETFs – it’s been done for 
decades by other asset managers, like mutual funds and pensions.1012  The fee 
generating value of significant AUM from securities lending is so appealing that 
ETF issuers are willing to forgo fees (with “zero expense ratio” funds),1013 or 
even pay investors (the so-called “negative fee” funds).1014  Securities lending 
tends to be conducted by more profitable ETFs with underlying stocks which are 
in higher demand by short sellers.1015 
 
 
 1006. Jeff Cox, Shadow Banking is Now A $52 Trillion Industry, posing a big risk to the 
financial system, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/shadow-
banking-is-now-a-52-trillion-industry-and-posing-risks.html [https://perma.cc/74MU-YFS7]. 
 1007. Id. 
 1008. See Robert McDonald & Anna Paulson (2015).  AIG in Hindsight, 29(2) J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 81, 81-95 (2015). 
 1009. Cox, supra note 1006. 
 1010. Lewis Braham, ETFs’ Hidden Source of Return – Securities Lending, BARRON’S (Apr. 
7, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/etfs-hidden-source-of-returnsecurities-lending-
1523054918 [https://perma.cc/C8WD-UQSD]. 
 1011. Lara Crigger, Is Securities Lending Good For ETF Investors? ETF.COM (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/securities-lending-good-etf-
investors?nopaging=1 [https://perma.cc/BSE5-6LNE]. 
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 1013. Eric Rosenbaum, Millennial online lender SoFi to offer zero-fee ETFs, an unexpected 
rival for index fund giants Vanguard, iShares, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:44 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/25/zero-fee-etfs-coming-but-not-from-vanguard-or-ishares-its-
sofi.html [https://perma.cc/2MHV-L7UX]. 
 1014. See Robert C. Lawton, Investment Funds That Pay You To Invest Are Coming, FORBES 
(May 19, 2019, 6:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlawton/2019/05/19/investment-
funds-that-pay-you-to-invest-are-coming/#67ea1c555c1d [https://perma.cc/LUF5-KZZW] 
(describing the likelihood of ETFs with “negative expense ratios”); see also Jeff Sommer, A 
Price War Has Driven Fund Fees to Zero. They May Be Set To Drop Further, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/business/price-war-fund-fees-zero-
negative.html [https://perma.cc/57L4-MPAF ] (reporting that the fees associated with ETFs are 
“on the verge of falling below zero”). 
 1015. Crigger, supra note 1011. 
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Another “structural factor” that Professors Bebchuck and Hirst cite in their 
recent critique of the growth of the “giant three” (BlackRock, Vanguard and 
State Street) is that “economies of scale” allow ETF issuers to seize market share 
at the expense of smaller firms. 1016   This is effectively an operational cost 
advantage – or as they note, “[a]n ETF with assets of $10 billion would have one 
hundred times the assets under management of an ETF with assets of $100 
million tracking the same index, but the costs of operating the former would 
likely be much less than one hundred times the cost of operating the latter.”1017  
Given this cost saving advantage these firms can reduce the operational costs of 
individual funds.1018  Recent empirical evidence cited by these authors supports 
the argument of economies of scale in index funds, since certain fixed costs in 
running a fund (like administration, management, and commissions) can be 
spread over the entire fund issuer fund family.1019 
 
d. How Do ETFs Facilitate Complex Economic Interconnections? 
 
ETF firms facilitate complex interconnections with other financial 
institutions, banks, market participants, service companies, and retail and 
institutional investors.1020  Their operational structure also connects these entities 
with each other and with retail and institutional investors.  The scope of ETF-
generated interconnectedness, and the risks originating from these heightened 
connections, enhances their systemic importance. 1021   Because indexing is 
appealing for retail investors, 1022  and ETF liquidity attracts institutional 
 
 1016. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 729. 
 1017. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 729. 
 1018. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864, at 729. 
 1019. JOHN ADAMS, DARREN HAYUNGA & SATTAR MANSI, Returns to Scale in Active and 
Passive Management 27 (Dec. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 26-7, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295799 [https://perma.cc/6XDS-YY33]. 
 1020. See CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Exchange Traded Funds, Discussion Paper (2017), 
https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/discussion-papers/discussion-
paper-6/discussion-paper-6---exchange-traded-funds.pdf?sfvrsn=6 [https://perma.cc/R5GW-
JELR] (hereinafter “CBI Discussion Paper,” illustrating the operational complexity of an 
exchange traded fund in both its primary and secondary market structures, and identifying the 
various participants in the ETF’s operational ecosystem). 
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and systemic risk, see DTCC White Paper, supra note 913. 
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investors,1023 it’s likely that the market will grow.1024  As a result, three firms 
(BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) will continue to increase in size and 
influence.1025  This section will detail how ETFs, and the firms dominating their 
issuance, have created complex economic interconnections. 
 
 
ETFs rely on the interaction of numerous external market participants, many 
of whom act with discretionary, non-binding, market incentives.1026  A simple 
“physical replication” ETF is created when an “authorized participant” (AP) – 
which is normally a large broker dealer 1027  - transfers in kind a basket of 
securities (corresponding to the index structure published by the ETF issuer) to 
an ETF issuer in exchange for new ETF shares (and in a reverse process for the 
redemption of ETF shares).1028 This is the ETF “primary market,” and retail 
investors can’t transact here.1029  In the primary market the number of ETF shares 
are flexible (similar to a mutual fund) and are continually adjusted based on 
supply and demand. 1030   The ETF ecosystem also connects other voluntary 
market participants since APs will sell shares into the secondary market where 
 
 1023. Andrew McCollum, ETFs: U.S. Institutions’ New Tool of Choice for Portfolio 
Construction, GREENWICH ANALYTICS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.greenwich.com/asset-
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 1026. HENRY T.C. HU & JOHN MORLEY, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: 
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CAL. L. REV. 839, 845 (2018). 
 1027. See ROCHELLE ANTONIEWICZ & JANE HEINRICHS, The Role and Activities of Authorized 
Participants of Exchange Traded Funds, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE REPORT, 1 n.1 (Mar. 
2015), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_15_aps_etfs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T4V-CFZD] (“In 
addition, APs are U.S. registered self-clearing broker-dealers that can process all required trade 
submission, clearance, and settlement transactions on their own account, as well as full 
participating members of the National Securities Clearing Corporation and Depository Trust 
Company.”); see also  BLACKROCK, A Primer on ETF Primary Trading and the Role of 
Authorized Participants (Mar. 2017), 3, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-etf-primary-trading-
role-of-authorized-participants-march-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSC2-9F2Y] (BlackRock 
lists the following examples of “Common U.S. APs” as “Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jeffries, JP Morgan, KCG, 
Morgan Stanley, UBS Securities, Virtu.”). 
 1028. Su, supra note 863, at 3-5. 
 1029. Su, supra note 863, at 4-5. 
 1030. SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977, at 4. 
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the bulk of trading activity takes place,1031 and which is accessible by market 
makers, high frequency traders (HFT), and retail and institutional investors.  APs 
have an incentive to perform an “arbitrage mechanism” to keep the net asset 
value (NAV) of the underlying assets in alignment with the ETF secondary 
market price. 1032   The ETF ecosystem connects other participants, such as 
derivatives dealers, for “synthetic” or other more complex structures (such as 
inverse or leveraged ETFs).1033 
 
 
ETF issuers sit intermediated between companies and investors, with the 
largest firms (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) steadily increasing their 
proxy voting power over global businesses.1034  There’s emerging evidence that 
ETF issuers rarely use this power, but frequently side with management, even 
on controversial issues like executive pay increases.1035  A recent investigation 
noted that for the 300 worst performing companies in the Russell 3000 Index, 
BlackRock sided with management in 93 percent of its proxy votes, while 
Vanguard and State Street voted, respectively with management 91 and 84 
percent of the time.1036  This is problematic when you consider potential conflicts 
faced by these firms who “count on corporations to offer their funds to 
employees in retirement plans.”1037  Therefore, a by-product of the indexing 
phenomenon is a concentration of voting power over U.S. public companies.1038  
As John Bogle - shortly before his death – wrote: “[i]f historical trends continue, 
a handful of giant institutional investors will one day hold voting control of 
virtually every large U.S. corporation. Public policy cannot ignore this growing 
dominance, and consider its impact on the financial markets, corporate 
 
 1031. BLACKROCK, A PRIMER, supra note 1027, at 7. 
 1032. Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1026, at 851-4. 
 1033. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS IN 
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Report”). 
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governance, and regulation. These will be major issues in the coming era.”1039 
 
Professor Yesha Yadav has identified that several of the world’s largest ETF 
issuers (BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, Fidelity and T. Rowe Price) also 
happen to be the largest “block holders” of U.S. bank holding company 
shares.1040  Post-crisis banking reform requiring heightened capital, facilitated 
greater asset manager equity exposure to banks. 1041   Thus retail investors, 
holding these asset manager’s products, “have assumed the residual default risk 
of large parts of the U.S. banking system.”1042  Therefore, the need for ETF 
issuers to mitigate against excessive bank risk-taking is critical.1043  Also, as the 
AUM of ETF firms grows, some question bank’s “raison d’être” altogether, and 
suggest that “buy side” firms like ETF issuers are “poised to replace banks as 
the major source of funding for deals and underwriting.” 1044   Further, asset 
managers hold large positions in competing banks, and a failure contagion across 
the banking industry would multiply loss exposure for retail investors.1045 
 
ETF firms have immense influence through proxy voting, and written 
advocacy to management, but can’t sell the underlying shares unless an ETF 
index is adjusted. 1046   Yadav posits that asset managers “possess unique 
advantages, bringing a less risk-seeking model of equity investment to bank 
governance.”1047 Unfortunately, it seems they infrequently “use that clout” to 
“discipline” corporate managers.1048  Numerous scholars suggest that large asset 
managers are “afflicted by agency problems” and have “substantial incentives to 
be excessively deferential to the corporate managers of their portfolio 
companies.”1049  Also, since there is “no mission to outperform market indices” 
 
 1039. Id. 
 1040. YESHA YADAV, Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 592-93, 633-36 
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 1042. Id. at 621. 
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 1049. BEBCHUK & HIRST, supra note 864, at 19; see also LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, ALMA COHEN 
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they may lack incentives to ensure that companies comprising an index are 
“well-run.”1050  It’s also not clear how ETF issuers will exercise voting power 
when the interests of competing companies (that sit side-by-side in an index) are 
opposed, or when the interests of one company are unaligned with that of the 
larger economy.1051  Professor John Coates suggests that indexing firms can 
wield major influence, while achieving “scale” through the formation of 
“policies” that apply across companies, which are often discretionarily devised 
through consultations with interested stakeholders.1052 
 
 
ETF issuers connect financial institutions to each other through shadow 
banking and securities lending.1053  The Financial Stability Board (FSB)1054 has 
identified ten “non-bank financial entities involved in shadow banking” post 
GFC in the Americas, including ETF firms.1055  Nonbank lending played a key 
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role in the GFC,1056 particularly by AIG,1057 and the FSOC’s non-bank SIFI 
declaratory power (which will be discussed in detail below) safeguards against 
this risk.1058  Recent research shows that securities lending by ETF issuers in the 
U.S. has increased to levels unprecedented since the GFC.1059 
 
Many ETF issuers engage in securities lending.1060  An ETF sponsor can 
profit by lending a fund’s underlying securities to market participants like short-
sellers. 1061   Elon Musk, among others, has been vocal against ETF issuers 
stimulating short selling through securities lending, and that ETF investors don’t 
realize the extent of these practices.1062  BlackRock has defended against such 
allegations,1063 suggesting securities lending benefits investors (since income is 
passed on in the form of lower fees), only generates a small amount of revenue, 
and doesn’t expose investors to extra risk.1064  Short selling can also enhance 
liquidity and price discovery. 1065   The amount of lending profit returned to 
investors is contentious, and varies between issuers.  A recent report noted 
Vanguard distributes almost all lending profits to investors, while others (like 
BlackRock) keep a higher proportion.1066  Securities lending can also create new 
layers of complexity which may not be “offset” by the generated revenue.1067 
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 1065. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Market Declines: Is Banning Short Selling 
the Solution? STAFF REPORT NO. 518, (Sept. 2011) (discussing the market benefits of short 
selling). 
 1066. Siobhan Riding, Fund Groups Challenged Over Securities Lending Practices, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/62946b2e-1a36-3bd9-9515-
f48dfda43b2a [https://perma.cc/Y8B5-6W8M]. 
 1067. Crigger, supra note 1011; Attracta Mooney, Stock Lending By ETF Operators Worries 
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ETFs connect institutional investors (like mutual and hedge funds, pensions 
and other institutional investors) with debtors, since fixed-income ETFs are 
being used as cash substitutes (due to high liquidity).1068  In the case of a mutual 
fund holding a fixed income ETF it creates uncertainty if “funds can be sold off 
to pay fleeing clients in times of stress as seamlessly as the stewards of the $4 
trillion market would like” – leading to frozen client withdrawals in a crisis.1069  
Other institutions look to short duration bond ETFs as “handy alternatives” to 
cash or money market mutual funds (MMMFs) which have more significant 
regulation post-GFC.1070 
 
Prior to the GFC, MMMFs were viewed as cash substitutes that paid higher 
rates than bank deposits;1071 however, prime MMMFs created systemic risk by 
investing heavily in commercial paper (CP) backed by subprime mortgage loans 
and other illiquid and largely opaque asset classes.1072  On September 16, 2008 
the Reserve Primary Fund (RPF) (the oldest MMMF in the U.S.) announced that 
it was “breaking the buck” and reducing its net asset value to below $1 per share 
because of exposure to $785 million of Lehman Brother’s CP, a move that 
precipitated a run on both the RPF and other MMMFs.1073  The resulting market 
panic led to an immediate $85 billion loan to AIG (to prevent another major 
institution from failing),1074 and the Fed providing nonrecourse discount window 
 
Investors, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d4706b0e-e40a-11e7-
a685-5634466a6915 [https://perma.cc/JZE9-LW2P]. 
 1068. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 28; Rachel Evans & Emily Barrett, Fund Blowups 
Rekindle Doubts About ETF Liquidity In Crisis Times, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-12/panic-sales-rekindle-debate-over-etf-
liquidity-in-next-crisis [https://perma.cc/94T2-TSWL]. 
 1069. Evans & Barrett, supra note 1068. 
 1070. See Chris Dieterich, ETFs as a Solution For Cash, BARRON’S (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/etfs-as-a-solution-to-cash-1425697664 
[https://perma.cc/274H-YJFR] (explaining the apparent liquidity of ETFs that makes them 
attractive substitutes for cash and other short-term funds). 
 1071. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES, (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2014); 195-96, (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely viewed 
as virtually indistinguishable from bank deposits as similarly safe vehicles for storing cash with 
slightly better interest rates”). 
 1072. Id. at 127-28; Martin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: 
Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24(1) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
29, 34-7 (2010). 
 1073. Phillip Swagel, Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis 
Policy Response, 29(2) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 107, 112-13 (2015); See also Phillip Swagel, 
The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Spring 
2009), 40-41; HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 233-34  (New York: Business Plus, 2010) 
 1074. Paulson, supra note 1073, at 233-41; Geithner, supra note 1071, at 194-97; McDonald 
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bank loans to purchase the toxic-asset backed CP from the MMMFs (a program 
that peaked at $150 billion exposure).1075  In October 2008 the Fed and the 
Treasury provided additional support mechanisms for MMMFs, the CP market 
at large, and the “shadow banking” system.1076 
 
ETF mega firms issue cash and MMMF substitutes, like BlackRock’s 
iShares Short Term Treasury Bond ETF.1077  Also, the ETF market has evolved 
to list “actively managed, ultra-short duration bond ETFs” seeking market share 
from the MMMF segment.1078  Like MMMFs holding toxic-asset backed CP, 
these ETFs as cash substitutes could add to systemic risks depending on the 
composition of their fixed income baskets.  The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) has noted that “[l]arge swings in ETF prices may create systemic risk 
insofar as financial institutions hold large ETF positions on their balance sheets 
or rely heavily on ETF shares in their liquidity management operations.”1079 
 
The coronavirus-driven market crash of March 2020 provides further 
evidence of ETFs being used as “cash-like” instruments.1080 Flows from ETFs to 
MMMFs accelerated after the Federal Reserve launched its program to support 
MMMFs and commercial paper in the crisis, 1081  supporting the notion that 
 
& Paulson, supra note 1008, at 89. 
 1075. ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, 
AND THE WORK AHEAD, 147-48 (New York: Penguin Group (USA), LLC, 2013); Lorie Logan, 
William Nelson & Patrick Parkinson, Novel Lender of Last Resort Programs (Sept. 2018), 9-11, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/02-Novel-LOLR-Prelim-Disc-Draft-
2018.09.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ9N-339D]. 
 1076. Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (July 2010) at 61-64, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337 [https://perma.cc/8AB9-35K5]; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY 
PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 
2016), 96-101. 
 1077. ISHARES, iShares Short Term Treasury Bond ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239466/ishares-short-treasury-bond-etf 
[https://perma.cc/P7EY-FL72] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
 1078. Max Chen, Wary Investors Can Turn To Cash Alternative, Ultra-Short-Duration Bond 
ETFs, ETF TRENDS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.etftrends.com/fixed-income-channel/wary-
investors-can-turn-to-cash-alternative-ultra-short-duration-bond-
etfs/?utm_source=Yahoo&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=ReadMore 
[https://perma.cc/ZN78-SENM]. 
 1079. See ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 28 (noting that”[i]n such circumstances, this excess 
volatility of ETFs relative to their constituent securities will translate into a more volatile net 
worth of financial intermediaries, which may trigger additional selling pressure in the ETF 
positions, thereby exacerbating ETF price drops.”) 
 1080. See Katherine Greifeld, Cash-Like ETFs See $3 Billion Exit After Fed Steps Into Market, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-30/fading-
funding-squeeze-spurs-3-billion-exit-from-cash-like-etfs [https://perma.cc/RD5C-HETJ]. 
 1081. See Sirio Aramonte & Fernando Avalos, The recent distress in corporate bond markets: 
cues from ETFs, BIS Bulletin No. 6 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/55S5-ZLR7]. 
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investors were using ETFs as short-term, and higher yielding, alternatives to 
MMMFs. 
 
 
ETFs are also connecting investors and firms with a new form of “moral 
hazard.” 1082   Passive investing has been associated with moral hazard by 
promoting “laziness” and a “lack of sophistication” rather than a desire to 
outperform the market or “seeking alpha.”1083  Some feel that holding the entire 
market indefinitely is an inferior investment strategy to those who actively 
“rebalance,” adjust allocations, and seek outperformance.1084  Yet another (more 
subtle, but potentially destructive) form of ETF moral hazard may exist in the 
relationship between debt underwriters and ETF issuers.  For example, the ESRB 
Report notes: 
 
[t]he passive nature of ETFs in that they constitute investments in 
fixed-income products may in principle create a moral hazard problem 
in the issuance of such products: anticipating that they will be bought 
by ETFs, bond underwriters may forgo due diligence on such 
instruments, as was the case in the originate-to-distribute business 
model before the global financial crisis.1085 
 
The firms that “devise” the underlying index can also have conflicts1086 
including threats from China to include their companies in basket 
compositions. 1087   The indexes themselves are susceptible to manipulation, 
 
 1082. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 4 n.2. 
 1083. Ivan Illan, Passive Portfolios Are A Moral Hazard, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2018/11/15/passive-portfolios-are-a-moral-
hazard/#6dc717db4d74 [https://perma.cc/9ATE-NW9D]. 
 1084. Id. 
 1085. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 4 n.2; See also A. Purnanandam, Originate-to-distribute 
model and the subprime mortgage crisis, 24(6) REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1881-1915 
(2011) (discussing the originate to distribute model in the global financial crisis and the resulting 
moral hazard). 
 1086. See Robert J. Jackson & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What’s Really In Your Index Fund? 
N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/opinion/index-fund.html 
[https://perma.cc/W6ZH-ZQQ8]. 
 1087. See Mike Bird, How China Pressured MSCI to Add Its Market To Major Benchmark, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-
pressured-msci-to-add-its-market-to-major-benchmark-11549195201 [https://perma.cc/368N-
ZH9S] (detailing the interaction between index funds, the Chinese government, and the market 
in China). 
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which could hurt investors.1088  ETFs can also incentivize risky behavior in other 
financial institutions.  Some ETFs invest in leveraged loans,1089 and numerous 
ETF companies have recently signalled their intention to enter this market as 
well.1090  Knowing that there is a market for leveraged loans, driven by ETF 
investor demand, financial institutions are incentivized to originate such 
products, and transfer the risk to ETF investors.1091  There is a clear liquidity 
“mismatch” between the underlying leveraged loans (which are “traded 
infrequently” with long settlements) and the ETFs that hold them (which are 
considered highly liquid), further exacerbating the risk of a liquidity crunch in a 
crisis.1092 
 
Another way that ETF issuers are connecting financial institutions to each 
other is in their fund structures.  The ESRB Report reports that “[s]ynthetic ETFs 
are exposed to the risk that the swap counterparty is unable to fulfill its obligation 
to deliver the index return, while physical ETFs are exposed to counterparty risk 
through securities lending transactions, with the potential, in both cases, to 
generate fire sales in times of financial stress.”1093  Some funds invest in other 
funds, thereby deepening the interconnection complexity and making the 
unwinding of the overall structure even more unpredictable in a crisis.1094 
 
 1088. See Mark DeCambre, How trillion-dollar stock-market index funds are vulnerable to 
manipulation that ‘could harm American investors,’ MARKETWATCH (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-trillion-dollar-stock-market-index-funds-are-
vulnerable-to-manipulation-that-could-harm-american-investors-2019-02-19 
[https://perma.cc/PGA4-MXYC] (pointing out that the methods used to create index funds are 
not necessarily aligned with fund value maximization). 
 1089. See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, Big Banks Are Very Exposed To Leveraged Lending 
and CLO Markets, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/04/15/big-banks-are-very-
exposed-to-leveraged-lending-and-clo-markets/#38dd21987309 [https://perma.cc/DG3J-
LKY7] (demonstrating the growth of leveraged lending and pondering the implications for 
systemic risk). 
 1090. See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, The SEC Tells Senator Elizabeth Warren That It Is 
Monitoring CLO Markets, FORBES (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/05/06/the-sec-tells-senator-
elizabeth-warren-that-it-is-monitoring-clo-markets/#7a52a2be2124 [https://perma.cc/TGF9-
C33C] (identifying the growth in the leveraged loan market along with the concerns that CLO 
market growth presents for regulation). 
 1091. See Colby Smith Who’s Buying Leveraged Loans Anyways? FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/11/20/1542706123000/Who-s-buying-leveraged-loans-
anyways-/ [https://perma.cc/5KU8-ZZ3J] (displaying that the increased demand for leveraged 
loans is concomitant with a growing liquidity mismatch, exposing investors to increased risk). 
 1092. Id. 
 1093. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 3. 
 1094. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 3. 
 
 
 
153 
 
ETFs connect retail and institutional investors to each other.  The ESRB 
notes that “ETFs can contribute to systemic risk by inducing investors to take 
correlated exposures that may trigger a chain reaction with systemic risk 
implications.”1095  A 2013 report by the OFR (a division of the U.S. treasury)1096 
also assessed ETF’s impact on financial stability,1097 and potential contagion 
selling in underlying assets, especially for ETFs with illiquid assets (like 
bonds).1098  There is also a “herding” potential that gets exacerbated through ETF 
duplication as firms look to copy other’s index structures.1099  The quick creation 
of new products could generate buying pressures by consumers not well suited 
to hold such risk exposure (like ETFs that replicate complex trading strategies 
used by hedge funds).1100  In a crisis, once risks materialize, investors could 
quickly sell their ETFs.1101  Another potential scenario is a “run” on a big asset 
manager (like BlackRock) where all secondary market fund holders 
simultaneously liquidate their holdings. 1102   There is also an emerging, and 
unsettled, debate on the price distortive and volatility enhancing impact of ETFs 
on underlying securities.1103 
 
Mutual funds holders can interact directly with a mutual fund issuer and 
redeem their fund units at NAV, 1104  because of Investment Company Act 
 
 1095. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 3. 
 1096. See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, About the OFR, 
https://www.financialresearch.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/K8WJ-BGQ7] (last visited Oct. 10, 
2019). The Office of Financial Research was instituted pursuant to post crisis reform (the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010) to “promote financial stability 
by looking across the financial system to measure and analyze risks, perform essential research 
and collect and standardize financial data.” 
 1097. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Asset Management and Financial Stability (Sept. 
2013), 
https://www.financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4B7-7PST] (hereinafter “OFR Report”). 
 1098. Id. at 10-11. 
 1099. Id. at 9. 
 1100. Jeff Reeves, 7 ETFs That Act Like A Hedge Fund, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 
18, 2018), https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/slideshows/7-etfs-that-act-like-a-hedge-
fund [https://perma.cc/JN87-4JV4]. 
 1101. OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 11-12. 
 1102. Dellinger, supra note 862. 
 1103. Compare ESRB Report, supra note 988 with Kenechukwu Anadu, Mathias S. Kruttli, 
Patrick E. McCabe, Emilio Osambela, & Chaehee Shin, The Shift From Active to Passive 
Investing: Potential Risks to Financial Stability? (Sept. 17, 2019), (unpublished manuscript) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244467 [https://perma.cc/Y9NZ-GLYV]. 
 1104. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund 
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2013). 
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provisions governing open-end management investment companies. 1105  
Likewise, MMMFs are generally redeemable at a “stable” NAV ($1.00 per 
share); however, post-crisis rules designed to mitigate MMMF runs have 
adjusted these rules somewhat by introducing a “floating NAV” provision to 
account for underlying securities daily prices (rather than a $1.00 “stable share 
price”) on MMMFs that invest in corporate debt.1106 
 
ETF investors can’t transact directly with the fund sponsor to redeem their 
shares at the underlying NAV.1107  They must sell them into the secondary 
market (and find a willing counterparty), so in a panic they could be “trampled 
by the herd.”1108   The ETF redemption process is only available to a small 
number of “designated” authorized participants or “APs” who redeem ETF 
shares in “large blocks” and are incentivized through an arbitrage mechanism to 
eliminate price differences in the ETF secondary market and the underlying 
NAV.1109  Even though only APs can redeem ETFs there are still concerns that 
in a crisis or run on an ETF issuer, it won’t be able to satisfy AP redemption 
requests.1110 
 
Individual firms within the ETF operating ecosystem may be an 
independent source of risk since high levels of concentration in the industry can 
induce both operational and fire sale risk.1111 The failure of a large ETF firm, or 
AP, could “amplify or transmit risks to other parts of the financial system.”1112  
In a “stressed market” an ETF sponsor could face many redemption requests 
from APs,1113 or an AP withdraw, if the value of the secondary market ETFs 
 
 1105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 5(a)(1) (2012); INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 
Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Share Pricing, 
https://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/mfs/faqs_navs [https://perma.cc/EL8G-PBGJ]. 
 1106. See Kuhu Parasrampuria, SEC’s New Money Market Rules, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
2, 2-3 (2016) (noting that in addition to the “floating NAV” the reforms “also impose fees and 
redemption gates, which temporarily prohibit investors from withdrawing their investments in 
MMFs.”) 
 1107. See FIDELITY, Understanding How Mutual Funds, ETFs and Stocks Trade, FIDELITY 
LEARNING CENTER, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading-investing/trading/trading-
differences-mutual-funds-stocks-etfs [https://perma.cc/NL56-2VLH] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) 
(explaining the structure of funds trading). 
 1108. See Paul Amery, Will Investors Be Trampled By The Herd? FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 11, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/be19405a-652c-11e6-8310-ecf0bddad227 
[https://perma.cc/JPF9-DB76] (outlining the risks associated with herd behaviour when trading 
ETF funds). 
 1109. See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1026, at 873 (explaining the 
regulation around structured arbitrage in ETF trading). 
 1110. Amery, supra note 1108. 
 1111. See OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 3. 
 1112. OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 18. 
 1113. OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 12. 
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deviated significantly from the value of the underlying fund assets. 1114   AP 
redemption en mass could also spread selling pressure to the underlying assets 
themselves,1115  and then back to the ETF secondary market in what’s been 
described as a fire sale “feedback loop.”1116 
 
Asset managers have business relationships with a host of financial 
intermediaries and market participants including (among others) banks, 
insurance companies, broker-dealers and financial service providers through 
their securities lending arrangements.1117   They use third party services like 
pricing services, benchmark providers, security data providers, custodians, 
transfer agents, and technology platforms.1118  Many of these service providers 
have common clients adding another layer of connectivity.1119  Service providers 
in the ETF ecosystem facilitate regulatory compliant back office and settlement 
operations.1120  Some ETFs also contract “distributors”1121 to take orders from the 
APs and, often, to act as the liaison between the ETFs transfer agent and the 
APs.1122  In addition to APs, other firms are involved in the operation of an ETF 
 
 1114. See Natasha Doff, Hedge Fund Manager Stakes Own Cash on a Bet Against Credit ETFs, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/hedge-
fund-manager-stakes-own-cash-betting-credit-etfs-crumble [https://perma.cc/3YLB-WVAQ]. 
 1115. See Ian Foucher & Kyle Gray, Exchange-Traded Funds: Evolution of Benefits, 
Vulnerabilities and Risks, BANK OF CANADA FINANCIAL SYSTEM REVIEW (Dec. 2014) at 42 
(“APs can also transmit liquidity shocks from the ETF to the underlying assets (and vice versa). 
As ETFs and the underlying market become more interconnected, a small liquidity shock 
originating in either the ETF or the underlying securities could be amplified through a feedback 
loop (via APs).  This could result in a large liquidity shock and a reduction in price 
informativeness for both the ETF and the underlying market.”) 
 1116. Id. 
 1117. See OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 15. 
 1118. See BLACKROCK, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: 
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA00 (May 13, 2019), 
at 47, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/fsoc-interpretive-
guidance-supervision-regulation-certain-nonbank-financial-companies-051319.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GT9A-YAWK] (hereinafter “BlackRock Letter to FSOC”). 
 1119. See OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 21. 
 1120. See ETF.COM, So You Want To Launch an ETF? (July 1, 2006), 
https://www.etf.com/publications/journalofindexes/joi-articles/2305.html?nopaging=1 
[https://perma.cc/9UP2-X2F5]. 
 1121. See KPMG, ETF Playbook Glossary – Ecosystem of ETF Industry Roles, 2-3 (2016), 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/etf-playbook-glossary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NG7S-258H] (“Distributors have the role of conducting sales support for an 
ETF.  For example, the distributor will reach out to brokerage firms, registered investment 
advisors (RIAs), retirement plan owners to introduce the ETF to them, and support inclusion of 
the ETF into sell-side ETF inventories.  In some cases the ETF sponsor will act as the distributor, 
especially if it has existing fund wholesaler resources. Smaller ETFs, however, are more likely 
to utilize the services of a distributor since they typically lack a dedicated sales force.”) 
 1122. See ETF.com, supra note 1120. 
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including depositories, custodians, record keepers, transfer agents, index 
providers, exchanges, auditors, legal counsel, and administrators who provide 
technology, financial, regulatory or operational support.1123  The interconnected 
relationships with other financial market service companies could have the effect 
of “expos[ing] asset managers to risks that arise in other market sectors.”1124  
External risk exposure, from service company interconnection can also arise 
from an ETF mega issuer who offers “ancillary services.”1125 
 
Another way that BlackRock in particular is connecting the financial system 
is through its Aladdin computer system.1126  A recent European Banking Institute 
study calls Aladdin a “financial operating system,” and among “the most 
consequential and unexamined developments in global finance.” 1127  Aladdin 
literally  fills “warehouses” with hardware and is used not just by BlackRock’s 
extensive employee army but also by thousands of clients who pay for access.1128  
There are emerging concerns that the widespread use of Aladdin by other market 
participants is creating systemic risks through correlated investment 
exposures. 1129   The reach and influence of Aladdin’s financial modeling is 
extensive, with an “effect on the management of ten percent of the world’s 
financial assets, or around $20 trillion.”1130  This vast influence has led some to 
be concerned about the “unprecedented” influence of a single firm, which could 
also generate investor herding since many of the world’s largest sovereign 
wealth funds rely on Aladdin’s modeling.1131 The Federal Reserve also procured 
the services of BlackRock to manage its Secondary Market Corporate Credit 
 
 1123. See KPMG, supra note 1121. 
 1124. Elliot, supra note 890, at 4. 
 1125. Elliot, supra note 890, at 5. 
 1126. See BLACKROCK, An end-to-end portfolio management platform, 
https://www.blackrock.com/aladdin/offerings/aladdin-overview [https://perma.cc/B5JG-H8AJ]. 
 1127. Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, William A Birdthistle, Douglas W Arner, & Ross P. Buckley, 
Financial Operating Systems, European Banking Institute (EBI) Working Paper Series No. 
58/2020 ((Mar. 1, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532975 
[https://perma.cc/GLV6-RUU4]. 
 1128. Will Dunn, Meet Aladdin, The Computer “More Powerful Than Traditional Politics” 
NEWSTATESMAN AMERICA (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/spotlight/2018/04/meet-aladdin-computer-more-powerful-
traditional-politics [https://perma.cc/8TSY-CKQS]. 
 1129. See Lawrence White, HSBC signs deal to use BlackRock’s ‘Aladdin’ software worldwide, 
REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-blackrock/hsbc-signs-deal-
to-use-blackrocks-aladdin-software-worldwide-idUSKCN1R21NO [https://perma.cc/XD5M-
9P8E]. 
 1130. See Dunn, supra note 1128. 
 1131. Dunn, supra note 1128. 
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Facility in response to the coronavirus, and BlackRock will utilize Aladdin in 
this capacity, further evidencing its influence.1132 
 
Mega ETF firms are interconnecting investors, companies, countries and 
even employees throughout the globe. BlackRock has seventy offices in more 
than thirty countries and manages assets for clients in North and South America, 
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Australia.1133  Vanguard has reported, 
as of August 31, 2019, having 220 funds in markets outside of the U.S. with 
more than thirty million investors in 170 countries.1134  Industry trends point 
towards “outsourced solutions” for operational and “back office” functions like 
“fund administration, accounting and transfer agency.”1135  This connects ETF 
firms to other service providers, many of whom also have global operations.  
BlackRock’s Aladdin Implementation has been specifically referenced in 
focusing on a “global operating model.”1136 
v. Could ETF Interconnectivity Contribute to Systemic Risk? 
 
This section will explore how ETF driven interconnectivity could contribute 
to systemic risk and influence financial crises.  A variety of taxonomies 
characterize the transmission of systemic risk in financial crises.  For example, 
Professors Jeremy Kress, Patricia McCoy and Daniel Schwarcz identify two 
transmission mechanisms: “counterparty” transmission and “asset 
liquidation.”1137  For the purposes of simplicity this article will use a simple 
“direct” and “indirect” description, with numerous sub-components for each 
element of transmission. 
 
 1132. Dawn Lim, Federal Reserve Taps BlackRock to Purchase Bonds for the Government, 
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a. Direct Transmission of Systemic Shocks 
 
Liquidity shortages in ETFs could magnify a crisis fallout.1138  Asset 
managers, even as financial agents, can “create or amplify systemic risk” if they 
generate a “procyclical” impact on the financial cycle and induce contagion 
across other financial sectors.1139  The IMF, in its April 2019 Global Financial 
Stability Report, noted that ETFs may be driving liquidity “mismatch” and 
increasing the “likelihood of herding” both impacting liquidity demand. 1140  
They also may be attracting short term volatility traders.  For example, in 2013 
when the Federal Reserve proposed ending its quantitative easing program, short 
term traders aggressively sold fixed income ETFs, impacting the yield spreads 
of the underlying bonds.1141  Also, in the “flash crash” of 2010 ETF prices 
diverged significantly from their NAV.1142 
 
Professors Henry Hu and John Morley describe the starting point for ETF 
generated systemic risk as an impairment of the “expectations of easy exit.”1143  
Since many participants, who are relied on to support the ETF trading ecosystem 
(such as APs and market making firms), are driven by their own independent 
profit-seeking motives, it is uncertain whether they can be relied on to provide a 
“backstop” against panicked selling in a crisis.1144 APs may halt the process of 
redeeming or creating ETFs leading the ETFs themselves to trade as closed end 
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 1141. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977 at 23-24; C. Dannhauser, & S. 
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https://www.mtsu.edu/econfin/CaitlinDUpdated.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV2U-W6K3]. 
 1142. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977, at 24-5. 
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funds, and the secondary market price deviating from the NAV, with HFT and 
other market makers either widening their bid-ask spreads or leaving the 
market.1145  Investors could also look to pre-empt AP departure by shorting 
ETFs.1146 
 
ETFs are an attractive mechanism for “pessimistic” short sellers to 
“speculate or hedge.”1147  ETF short sellers can add to pro-cyclical selling in a 
crisis,1148 and empirical evidence suggests that “difficult to mimic underlying 
indexes” are more commonly the target of shorts with physical and synthetic 
ETFs having “equal changes to be sold short.”1149  Also, ETFs allow for the 
construction of “synthetic short[s]” of illiquid individual index component 
securities (for example by shorting an ETF and then buying long only some parts 
of the index),1150 and this could also exacerbate fire-sell pressures on certain 
stocks in a crisis.  Disappearing intermediaries can also affect liquidity in 
underlying asset classes which can exacerbate sell-offs and lead to contagion.1151  
Some worry that liquidity shortages in ETFs could generate sell-offs in other 
asset classes, including peer firm ETFs, as investors who can’t sell their ETF 
shares (or can only sell them at steep discounts) will move quickly to liquidate 
other investments.1152  This could also create a “feedback loop” as coordinated 
selling drives prices downward in both the ETF secondary and underlying asset 
markets.1153  This is particularly relevant for the growing segment of institutional 
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investors that look to ETFs as cash substitutes.1154  Relatedly, recent empirical 
research shows that ETF sell-offs have a greater effect on underlying bond prices 
than mutual fund sales.1155 
 
APs have a market-based profit incentive to perform arbitrage, which acts 
to simultaneously align the ETF share price and its underlying NAV.1156  APs 
have no legal obligation, to perform this arbitrage. 1157   APs are driven by 
discretionary and market-based incentives, and it’s uncertain how they are going 
to react in a crisis, including withdrawing from performing the ETF “arbitrage 
mechanism.”1158  Discretionary liquidity has proven elusive in prior crises (in 
both the portfolio insurance market in 1987 and in the auction rate securities 
market in the GFC).1159 The Central Bank of Ireland has also noted that a “stress 
event” at a large AP could impact ETF liquidity. 1160   If MM or AP firms 
consolidate,1161 it would reduce the number of APs who could remedy liquidity 
 
become more interconnected, a small liquidity shock originating in either the ETF or the 
underlying securities could be amplified through a feedback loop (via APs). This could result in 
a large liquidity shock and a reduction in price informativeness for both the ETF and the 
underlying market.”) 
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AFFAIRS (Nov. 2006), at 11–2 (relating to arbitrageurs failing to support the portfolio insurance 
market in the 1987 market crash); see also Howard Marks, Memo To Oaktree Clients Re: 
Liquidity (Mar. 25, 2015), available at https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-
source/memos/2015-03-25-liquidity.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/W3YJ-DXB2] 
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market and the parallels to ETFs). 
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shortages, since liquidity is often “fragile” during a crisis.1162  Further, HFT and 
other liquidity providers may “pause” in a stress event and withdraw from the 
market if the arbitrage mechanism leads to a decoupling of the ETF price and its 
NAV.1163 
 
In a report released before the coronavirus market crash, the UK’s Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) modestly rebutted contentions of fixed-income ETFs 
as a “threat to financial stability” due to liquidity mismatches,1164 citing the 
“resilience” of discretionary liquidity providers during periods of post-crisis 
market stress.1165  They acknowledge, however, emerging risks in the sector 
including “highly concentrated” markets for liquidity providers 1166  and 
authorized participants. 1167   Further, the FCA qualifies its support for 
discretionary liquidity providers as “preliminary” with “tentative evidence” 
during times of stress, and acknowledge the need for more research.1168  Others 
have countered that a true crisis, or market selloff, hasn’t happened since 2008, 
and ETFs as a nascent but quickly growing asset class haven’t been truly 
tested.1169  Additionally, the IMF in its April 2019 Global Financial Stability 
Report, highlights the growing risks of liquidity mismatches.1170 
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In March 2020, coronavirus-related fears caused a significant market sell-
off, with ETFs quickly becoming a crisis trading “tool of choice” (with some 
investors even using them as “substitutes for futures”).1171  Before the Federal 
Reserve announced its sweeping stimulus measures in response to the crisis, 
many ETFs (particularly corporate bond funds) traded at “steep discounts” from 
their net asset value, and a lack of dealer support in the underlying bond market 
was cited by researchers from Bank for International Settlements among the 
contributing factors leading to an impairment of ETF arbitrage and creating price 
distortions.1172 Bond ETF price dislocations during the coronavirus crisis show 
just how precarious ETF arbitrage can be, especially since a credit ETF can be 
traded much faster than its underlying bonds.1173 
 
 
Securities lending can transmit systemic shocks in several ways.1174  Loan 
collateral could be “mismatched” with lent securities (like equities held against 
bonds).1175  In a crisis the lent securities could deviate in value from the collateral 
and expose ETF fund holders to loss.1176  It’s been reported that BlackRock’s 
iShares Core UK Gilts, an ETF tracking Sterling denominated UK government 
bonds,1177 “has about two-thirds of the fund on loan at any one time and accepts 
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equities and other ETFs as collateral.”1178  Post GFC rules in the U.S. require 
loans to be “overcollateralized” (102 percent for U.S. securities and 105 percent 
for international) and also limit the amount of a fund’s underlying assets that can 
be lent out to one-third of the fund assets.)1179 
 
An ETF firm will also invest cash collateral.1180  U.S. rules curtail the level 
of risk that an ETF firm can take on with their cash collateral investments,1181 
yet a debtor could quickly return the borrowed securities and demand their cash 
collateral, forcing the lender to liquidate their investments at a loss.1182 This 
problem gets “exacerbated” if the invested securities have decreased in value 
themselves, or are experiencing liquidity shortages.1183  ETF securities lenders 
also expose their investors to counter-party risk (with greater exposure for 
synthetic ETFs).1184  Borrowers in a securities lending transaction with an ETF 
firm could fail in a crisis and the borrowed securities could be difficult to 
recover. 1185   ETF firms also contract with independent “lending agents” to 
facilitate securities lending transactions, and they could be materially affected if 
one of these lending agents experiences significant distress in a crisis. 1186 
 
Correspondingly, if a large ETF firm experienced material financial distress 
or failure, and defaulted on its contractual obligations, negative pressure would 
be put on contractual counterparties, which could trigger a “chain-reaction” of 
negative events.1187  This impairs financial stability if counterparties (and the 
financial system) are under stress, and experiencing concurrent losses.1188  It 
would cause disruption to ETF investors as well because, even though client 
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assets are “excluded” from the estate of a bankrupt asset manager, 1189  the 
resolution of an ETF firm could create delays and litigation for clients to recover 
assets. 
 
ETF firm “operational risks” could create disruption and informational 
opacity.1190  As noted by the ESRB, investor behavior can be affected if an ETF 
issuer experiences “frictions in their operations” like an arbitrage 
malfunction. 1191   The ESRB posits that, although operational risk does not 
normally generate systemic considerations, “in a highly concentrated segment 
like that of ETFs” an operational event at one firm can create “mistrust among 
investors towards the whole segment and thus widespread sales.” 1192   The 
domino effect from an adverse operational event at one of the mega-asset 
managers with significant ETF market share is, in many ways, analogous to the 
growing post-GFC fragilities in the central clearing of derivatives, where a small 
number of global banks now hold the reserves of the world’s largest clearing 
facilities, and the failure of one of these derivatives dealers could jeopardize the 
solvency of major clearinghouses.1193  Large institutions (financial or otherwise) 
could be also disrupted if ETFs are held on their balance sheets as “cash 
substitutes.”1194   Finally, an ETF investor who finds themselves holding the 
funds of a failed issuer could receive a cash distribution (provided there are 
sufficient assets to meet creditor demands) but only after the underlying assets 
are liquidated in what could be a lengthy, litigation filled, and uncertain 
process.1195 
b. Indirect Transmission of Systemic Shocks 
 
If a single ETF mega firm experienced material distress, investors who own 
funds of competitor firms may panic – and distrust in the “whole segment” of 
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the market could lead to fire sales.1196  Such an event can induce a form of 
“prisoners dilemma”1197 where investors rush to sell their funds (of any issuer) 
because they are unaware of the financial status of a particular ETF issuer.1198  
This is analogous to a bank run when depositors of one bank may witness the 
material distress of a peer bank (where they don’t have deposits) but choose to 
withdraw from their own bank because they are nervous that their bank may also 
be in jeopardy.1199  This is also an example of what Andrew Haldane describes 
as fragility onset through “homogeneity” in financial product holdings.1200  As 
more and more investors hold passive index products, a counterintuitive 
phenomenon emerges: an individual’s attempt at “diversification” (though an 
index fund) when enacted collectively, creates homogenization of the market as 
a whole. 1201   As Haldane notes, homogenized financial systems can be 
unpredictable in a crisis, since diversity strengthen the “durability” of the whole 
system.1202 
 
ETFs could contribute to the formation of investor herds in a crisis.  An ETF 
is a “momentum strategy” and underlying assets are purchased when ETF 
investor money “flows in” and underlying assets are sold when investor money 
“flows out.” 1203   With ETFs, speculators can trade across multiple markets 
“unhinged” from the intrinsic value of the constituent securities. 1204   Herd 
formation is influenced by the “co-movement” of asset prices since investors 
face simultaneous loss (as they have invested in the “systemic” rather than 
idiosyncratic components of risk).1205 Further, ETFs attract “directional traders” 
like HFT to take positions on entire asset classes, which both increases the 
volatility of constituent securities, 1206  and can drive investor “directional” 
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behavior.1207 
 
Herds can form in many ways in ETFs.  Investors who hold exotic ETFs, or 
fixed income ETFs, could also look to liquidate their holdings in a herd-
coordinated “flight to quality.”1208  ETFs that use leverage or “rule-based trading 
strategies” have procyclical potential.1209  A bear market sell-off in ETFs could 
also generate a collective fire-sale in the underlying assets.1210  A “stress event” 
affecting a large AP or market maker could also trigger an ETF investor herd.1211  
Similarly the failure of the arbitrage mechanism could drive a coordinated fire-
sale and other debilitating “chain reactions.” 1212   Additionally, an ETF firm 
experiencing financial or operational disruption (or in the grips of a fraud or 
other scandal) can also find itself subject to a run,1213 similar to a bank run, 1214  
as investors liquidate firm sponsored ETFs. 
 
A low-interest environment, post-GFC, has caused institutional investors to 
“search for yield,” through products like ETFs, and in a crisis a simultaneous 
sell-off could “amplify shocks.”1215  The IMF recently noted in a October 2019 
Global Financial Stability Report the “increasing holdings of riskier and more 
illiquid assets by institutional investors” in the face of declining interest rates.1216  
The report posits that as institutional investors seek out profit opportunities, 
correlated investment fund portfolios could “amplify market sell-offs” – and that 
this dynamic is contrary to the “traditional role they play in stabilizing markets 
 
 1207. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 20-1. 
 1208. See OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 10; Alessandro Beber, Michael W. Brandt & 
Kenneth A. Kavajecz, Flight-to-Quality or Flight-to-Liquidity? Evidence from the Euro-Area 
Bond Market, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 925, 926 (2009). 
 1209. See ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 22-3. 
 1210. See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1026, at 851-6; Hu & Morley, 
A Welcome Invitation, supra note 1026, at 1157-62 
 1211. See CBI Feedback Statement, supra note 1160 at 11. 
 1212. See ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 2, 22-23, 28. 
 1213. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 31. 
 1214. For an exploration of the behaviors of depositors in a bank run see Douglas W. Diamond 
& Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. OF POL. ECON. 401 
(1983). 
 1215. Carlo Svaluto Moreolo, Systemic Risk Debate Intensifies, INTELLIGENCE ON EUROPEAN 
PENSIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENTS (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.ipe.com/analysis/systemic-risk-debate-
intensifies/www.ipe.com/analysis/systemic-risk-debate-intensifies/10034171.fullarticle 
[https://perma.cc/S6TP-E2S8]. 
 1216. Global Financial Stability Report: Lower For Longer, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND (Oct. 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/global-
financial-stability-report-october-2019 [https://perma.cc/T347-EXU3]. 
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during periods of stress.”1217  ETFs have also become increasingly exotic in 
variety.1218  In the midst of a market panic investors may look to sell some of the 
exotic funds and crowd into safer asset classes, triggering an investor herd and 
contagion in both the exotic funds, and their underlying assets.1219 
 
Large ETF issuers also offer mutual funds.1220  Investors in a crisis-driven 
information cascade could look to early redemptions thinking it will provide an 
“economic advantage” since late redemptions could be exposed to a “less liquid” 
underlying portfolio.1221  However a number of risks emerge if a bottleneck of 
redemptions occurs for mutual funds offered by ETF issuers.  First, investors 
could be “gated” and unable to redeem mutual fund units, similar to the recently 
controversial Woodford funds in the U.K.1222  Fixed income funds have also been 
shown in one study to act similarly due to being evaluated based on “relative 
performance.”1223  Thus similar performing funds could facilitate coordinated 
redemption requests across fund companies.1224 
 
The impact of ETF (and underlying asset) fire sales, and investor collective 
actions, can transmit shocks to the real economy and influence corporate 
behavior.  Empirical evidence suggests that when equity fund-originated fire-
sales of firm shares cause an underpricing of the firms, they tend to respond with 
 
 1217. Id. at 3-4. 
 1218. See William Baldwin, Exotic ETFs: 11 Funds For When Tracking The S&P 500 Isn’t 
Good Enough, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2018/12/04/exotic-etfs-11-funds-for-when-tracking-the-
sp-500-isnt-good-enough/#37e15cce6f83 [https://perma.cc/CPM2-4AYT] (describing Faber’s 
eleven choices for exchange-traded funds and their risky, exotic nature). 
 1219. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 20. 
 1220. See BLACKROCK. What are Mutual Funds? 
https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/education/mutual-funds [https://perma.cc/X6ZQ-
6MYA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019) (listing a few large ETF issuers and the mutual fund options 
they offer). 
 1221. OFR Report, supra note 1096, at 12-6. 
 1222. See Owen Walker & Peter Smith, Neil Woodford Slams the Gate in Investors’ Faces, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ee03cb4a-8627-11e9-97ea-
05ac2431f453 [https://perma.cc/KJ89-J56K] (describing the Woodford funds controversy in the 
UK in which investors were unable to redeem mutual fund units). 
 1223. Michael Feroli, Anil K. Kashyap, Kermit Schoenholtz, & Hyun Song Shin, Market 
Tantrums and Monetary Policy, (U. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 101, 2014). 
 1224. See Antonio Falato, Ali Hortacsu, Dan Li & Chaehee Shin, Fire-Sale Spillovers in Debt 
Markets 108 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 392 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2887822 [https://perma.cc/U5BL-YBAS] (noting how flows of funds 
in mutual funds tend to mirror peers). 
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a correspondingly lower level of investment and employment than their industry 
competitors.1225  Similarly there is evidence of a “noisy” information effect 
causing firms to reduce their own capital investment when their product-market 
peers experience a stock price depreciation due to “non-fundamental” 
information (for instance based on a fire sale).1226  This is because corporate 
managers struggle to filter the signal from the noise in their peer’s stock price, 
and the resulting loss of investment can be significant, even for firms that are not 
otherwise under financial constraints.1227  Also, trading flows in corporate bonds 
can impact new corporate debt issuance decisions.1228 
vi. The Challenge of Regulating Highly Interconnected ETF Firms 
 
As previously noted, the operations of large ETF firms foster deep and 
complex interconnections and could facilitate both indirect and direct financial 
shocks during a crisis.  Hence there has been a post-GFC heightened focus on 
their potential systemic importance.1229 This section will canvass the complexity 
of that question by assessing the challenge in applying bank-like prudential 
oversight to ETF firms, the limitations in applying the FSOC’s proposed 
“activities-based” rules for non-bank SIFIs1230 to ETF issuers, and a variety of 
other alternative regulatory considerations and important developments to 
monitor. 
a. Post-Crisis Non-Bank Systemically Important Financial Institution 
Designation 
 
FSOC 1231  was created by The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (DFA)1232 for several aims, including to “identify risks 
 
 1225. See Harald Hau & Sandy Lai, Real Effects of Stock Underpricing, 108 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 392 (2013). 
 1226. Olivier Dessaint & Thierry Foucault & Laurent Frésard & Adrien Matray, Noisy Stock 
Prices and Corporate Investment, SWISS FINANCE INSTITUTE 18-73 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2707999 [https://perma.cc/JZ9H-XCU3]. 
 1227. Id. 
 1228. See Qifei Zhu, Capital Supply and Corporate Bond Issuances: Evidence From Mutual 
Fund Flows (May 2018), (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Texas at Austin), 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/65970/ZHU-DISSERTATION-
2018.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/F86D-T5D3]. 
 1229. See generally ESRB Report, supra note 988; OFR Report, supra note 1096; FSB 
Structural Vulnerabilities, supra note 936. 
 1230. Financial Stability Oversight Council 12 CFR Part 1310, Vol. 84 No. 49, 9028 (2019) 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Notice-of-Proposed-Interpretive-Guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89D8-MQAB] (hereinafter “FSOC Proposed Rules”). 
 1231. See FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL, About FSOC, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z8UN-
79X4] (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) (describing the duties and purpose of FSOC). 
 1232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
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to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material 
financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank 
holding companies or nonbank financial companies.”1233  The DFA gives FSOC 
authority to determine whether a “nonbank financial company’s material 
financial distress – or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of its activities – could pose a threat to U.S. financial 
stability.”1234   Pursuant to Section 113 of the DFA, the FSOC can make a 
“determination” that a nonbank financial company be subject to Federal Reserve 
supervision and prudential controls.1235  If designated as a non-bank SIFI, a firm 
will be “subject to consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal 
Reserve, including risk-based capital, leverage, liquidity, and risk management 
requirements.”1236  These standards are more onerous than a standard non-bank’s 
“baseline regulatory regime.”1237  A variety of “macroprudential tools” are also 
available to the Federal Reserve to ensure that the declared non-bank SIFI 
doesn’t transmit systemic risk “through the broader economy.”1238 
 
In 2013, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), General Electric 
Capital Corporation, Inc. (GE), and Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential) were 
designated non-bank SIFIs,1239 followed by a similar declaration for Metlife, Inc. 
(Metlife) in 2014.1240  In 2016 FSOC de-designated GE after the firm altered its 
risk profile and sold off certain assets.1241  This was followed by AIG being de-
designated in 2017 after undertaking similar activities.1242  Metlife had initially 
sued FSOC over its status,1243 and won in district court by shrinking its insurance 
 
113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (2017)). 
 1233. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). 
 1234. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
Designations, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/86R8-AXSR] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (hereinafter “FSOC Designations”). 
 1235. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012). 
 1236. Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential 
Financial, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 172 (2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2018/12/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Kress.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYD3-
LNSF]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1) (2012). 
 1237. Id. at 173. 
 1238. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1474. 
 1239. See FSOC Designations, supra note 1234. 
 1240. FSOC Designations, supra note 1234. 
 1241. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING GE CAPITAL GLOBAL 
HOLDINGS, LLC (2016). 
 1242. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS 
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION 
REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2017). 
 1243. Ryan Tracy, U.S. Judge Questions MetLife ‘Systemically Important’ Designation, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-judge-questions-
metlife-systemically-important-designation-1455747900 [https://perma.cc/6KB7-BCKU]. 
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business.1244  In early 2018, FSOC withdrew its appeal against Metlife.1245  The 
final institution to shed the label of a non-bank SIFI was Prudential, which was  
de-designated in 2018.1246 
b. Applying FSOC’s “Activities-Based” Guidance to ETF Firms 
 
Under the revised guidelines FSOC will only pursue an entity specific 
determination under Section 113 of the DFA if “a potential risk or threat cannot 
be addressed through an activities based approach.”1247  Before proceeding with 
a designation, FSOC will also perform a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and only 
proceed if the benefits outweigh the possible costs.1248  It’s highly unlikely the 
FSOC’s revised framework will capture asset managers like ETF firms. 1249  
Therefore, despite their size, growth, and complex interconnectedness none of 
the “giant three,”1250 even the largest of all - BlackRock -1251  will likely be 
legally “too big to fail” in the U.S. any time soon. This is welcomed by 
BlackRock, who lobbied heavily against enhanced supervision, 1252  and 
Vanguard, who lauded the FSOC’s changes.1253  Both firms have battled the “too 
big to fail” label for most of the decade.1254 They strongly rejected previous 
 
 1244. Pete Schroeder, MetLife, U.S. regulators agree to set aside legal fight, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-metlife-fsoc/metlife-u-s-regulators-agree-to-set-
aside-legal-fight-idUSKBN1F8064 [https://perma.cc/R8C5-GB5M]. 
 1245. Kress, supra note 1236 at 174; see also Alistair Gray, Trump Administration Drops 
Appeal in MetLife ‘Too Big to Fail’ Case, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/cfc31764-ff65-351d-95f2-78e7b413af4f [https://perma.cc/2JPU-
ELXH]. 
 1246. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS 
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION 
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2 (2018). 
 1247. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 1230, at 9028. 
 1248. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 1230, at 9029 
 1249. See Richard Berner, Kermit Schoenholtz & Lawrence J. White, Lowering The Bar on 
Financial Regulation is Fraught With Risk, AMERICAN BANKER (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/lowering-the-bar-on-financial-regulation-is-fraught-
with-risk [https://perma.cc/LCN5-FNL7]. 
 1250. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 864. 
 1251. See Loomis, supra note 1046. 
 1252. CAMPAIGN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, New Report Details How BlackRock Fought Off 
Government Regulation by Spending Big in Washington (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://blackrocktransparencyproject.org/2019/09/05/new-report-details-how-blackrock-fought-
off-government-regulation-by-spending-big-in-washington/ [https://perma.cc/FKD3-NLPK]. 
 1253. See BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118; VANGUARD, LETTER TO FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 
OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES; RIN 4030-AA00 (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0013 [https://perma.cc/6ED5-
EHWK] (hereinafter “Vanguard Letter to FSOC”). 
 1254. See Sheila Bair, Is BlackRock Too Big To Fail? FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2013), 
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Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Satya Thallam, What Happens If Investment Funds Are Labeled ‘Too 
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suggestions by the OFR,1255 in a 2013 report that they posed a “too big to fail” 
systemic risk.1256  Also, both firms signal that the costs of enhanced regulatory 
scrutiny, due to a non-bank SIFI designation, would likely flow through to 
investors in the form of higher fees.1257 
c. Counter Arguments Against Heightened ETF Issuer Regulatory 
Scrutiny 
 
BlackRock and Vanguard strongly opposed previous attempts by the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) to suggest the application of bank-like 
regulatory parameters to asset managers; 1258  advocating (and lobbying) 
strenuously that their operational structure was distinguishable from banks or 
insurance companies and that heighted Federal Reserve oversight, and non-bank 
SIFI controls, were inapplicable and an unnecessary regulatory burden. 1259  
BlackRock in particular has ushered extensive support for a “products and 
activities” approach to addressing risks in asset management.1260  This section 
will review the key arguments that are levied against prudential supervision for 
ETF issuers. 
 
The primary counter-argument against an asset manager being a non-bank 
SIFI is that it’s “fundamentally different” than a bank, or an insurance company, 
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 1255. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, 
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because it acts as an “agent” or “advisor” on behalf of its investors. 1261  
BlackRock submits that its role is a “provider of services” for a fee. 1262  
Relatedly, asset managers have significantly smaller balance sheets than banks 
and insurance companies, and other than securities lending operations don’t act 
as primary lenders.1263  An ETF firm’s assets are not acquired through leverage 
(unlike bank deposits),1264 and an asset manager doesn’t have access to “central 
bank liquidity.”1265  The largest ETF issuers use significantly less leverage than 
deposit taking banks.1266  Also, if an ETF issuer failed, an ETF’s underlying 
assets could be transferred to a new custodian.1267  As such, BlackRock describes 
its role in the ETF business as a “highly constrained fiduciary on behalf of the 
asset owner,” and if it fails to return monies to a client it doesn’t require a 
“disentangling from the asset manager’s own assets.” 1268   This argument, 
however, is weakened for asset managers that “invest on behalf of clients as well 
as themselves.”1269 
 
 
Substitutability is a factor in FSOC non-bank SIFI determinations, and asset 
managers, even the ETF mega-firms, argue that other firms can provide similar 
products and services, and that this mitigates against the need for heightened 
prudential oversight.1270  Substitutability generally refers to whether there are 
“readily available alternatives” to a financial product or service, or how hard is 
it to find a replacement to what the firm is providing in the marketplace?1271 As 
the argument follows, an index based ETF is highly substitutable, and thus 
applying “bank centric” parameters to an asset manager is a “misapplication” of 
regulation.1272 
 
 
 1261. Id. at 5-6; see also BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 5 (describing critical 
differences between a bank and an asset manager). 
 1262. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 5. 
 1263. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 5. 
 1264. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 3. 
 1265. Novick, supra note 1260, at 6. 
 1266. Lopez, supra note 1139, at 125. 
 1267. Joshua S. Wan, Systemically Important Asset Managers: Perspectives on Dodd-Frank’s 
Systemic Designation Mechanism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 826 (2016). 
 1268. BlackRock FSB Letter, supra note 1258, at 3. 
 1269. Moreolo, supra note 1215. 
 1270. Lopez, supra note 1139, at 126. 
 1271. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 12. 
 1272. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 31. 
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Another argument in favor of asset managers – even ETF mega issuers – 
not being subject to bank regulation is that they can’t access “central bank 
liquidity” or obtain customer deposits that are government insured.1273  Both 
elements have been historically present when applying prudential controls.1274  
BlackRock argued, in its submission to FSOC that “the absence of reliance on 
government guarantees or support” was a “critical difference” between 
themselves and a bank.1275  As a result, a lack of access to central bank liquidity 
distinguishes them from commercial and investment banks and government 
sponsored entities.1276  Further, unlike a deposit at a bank, ETF investors don’t 
have a “guarantee” on their investment principal.1277  This line of argument is 
somewhat weakened if the analogy to MMMFs hold true for fixed income ETFs 
used as cash substitutes by institutions. 1278   Given the Fed and Treasury’s 
previous bailouts of the MMMF industry, 1279  fixed income ETFs acting as 
“shadow” deposits could prompt government action and support in a crisis.1280 
 
It’s questionable whether enhanced prudential oversights for asset managers 
(like ETF issuers) using “bank regulatory principles to address systemic risk” 
will be efficient or effective.1281  ETFs issuers have not been traditionally subject 
to prudential controls.1282  Also, one could question if the Federal Reserve is best 
suited to regulate an ETF issuer, or whether the task should be fulfilled by 
securities regulators (with greater expertise).1283  Capital controls may also have 
reduced “utility” for asset managers since ETF risks largely emanate from the 
interconnective impact of their product (ETFs), rather than their own risk taking 
behaviors.1284  Also, the use of leverage by ETF issuers is generally at the “fund 
level” rather than firm operations.1285  Critics argue that enhanced controls won’t 
decrease systemic risk but will rather increase the cost of funds.1286  BlackRock 
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 1277. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 1118, at 64. 
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also argues that unlike other segments of the “shadow banking” world, its 
securities lending operations isn’t characterized by significant leverage. 1287  
Further post-GFC reform in the DFA mandates stress-tests on asset managers 
who cross certain asset thresholds, so there is already a measure of prudential 
oversight for this sector.1288 
d. Identifying Potential Value in ETF Mega Sponsor Concentration 
 
There are also several reasons to suggest that market concentration in asset 
management benefits consumers.  First, because of “economies of scale,” large 
ETF issuers can pass on operational efficiencies to investors (particularly 
institutional) in the form of lower costs.1289  Second, ETFs can act as “vehicles 
of price discovery” for underlying assets,1290 particularly for illiquid underlying 
like fixed income and high yield bond ETFs.1291  Others suggest that ETFs 
perform a “stabilizing”, or economic shock absorbing function in a crisis, or 
during periods of extreme volatility, by “providing direct exposure to a physical 
basket of stocks in place of levered derivatives” and evidence of this 
phenomenon occurred in the Greek financial crisis of 2015.1292  BlackRock in its 
May 2019 submission to FSOC on the revised activities based framework for 
non-bank SIFIs has argued as much, citing how in both 2015 and 2018, ETFs for 
“high yield” bonds acted as a “shock absorber” during bouts of heightened 
volatility.1293 
e. The Limits of Activities-Based Regulation For Interconnected ETF 
Firms 
 
There are concerns that FSOC’s activities-based framework could decrease 
financial system stability.1294  Given the revised guidance, it seems unlikely that 
an asset manager will be legally labeled a non-bank SIFI.1295  Former Treasury 
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 1290. Novick, supra note 1260, at 15. 
 1291. SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977; BlackRock, Viewpoint Bond ETFs, Benefits, 
Challenges, Opportunities (July 2015), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-bond-etfs-benefits-
challenges-opportunities-july-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5TD-LH93]. 
 1292. Seyffart & Balchunas, supra note 979. 
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Secretaries Timothy Geithner and Jacob Lew, along with former Federal Reserve 
Chairs Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen have stated, in written comments to 
FSOC, that the proposed changes effectively “neuter the designation 
authority.”1296   Numerous commentators and academics view “activity” and 
“entity” oversight as “complementary” rather than “substitutive.”1297  Others 
suggest a “tailored” approach to regulating systemically important non-
banks. 1298   This section will outline how an activities framework may not 
effectively mitigate the interconnection-based risks in ETFs. 
 
The FSOC’s revised guidance requires a quantified assessment of the 
“likelihood” of a firm experiencing financial distress.1299  Interconnection risks 
are very hard to quantify, and the final subsection will highlight regulatory 
measures that could create more transparency and effective monitoring for 
ETFs. 1300   Better Markets, in its FSOC submission, notes that for highly 
connected and complex firms, with opaque and global operations and fee 
generating activities, predicting financial distress is extremely challenging (and 
it didn’t happen prior to the GFC).1301  The failure of regulators to anticipate the 
systemic risk of CDS and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) used by complex 
and interconnected firms, makes one skeptical that regulators will be able to 
successfully predict the activities underlying the next major crisis.1302  Professors 
Kress, McCoy and Schwarcz have persuasively argued that it is easier to identify 
“ex ante” large and highly interconnected firms than systemically risky 
activities. 1303   They also note (citing economist Frank H. Knight’s 
“unknowables” concept) that systemic risk predictions require “quantitative 
 
 1296. Geithner et al., supra note 906. 
 1297. AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM EDUCATION FUND, LETTER TO FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: RIN 4030-AA00, “AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NON-BANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES” (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0027 [https://perma.cc/MP2T-
BCPF]; Letter from Legal Scholars, supra note 881; Kress, McCoy, & Daniel B. Schwarcz, 
supra note 874. 
 1298. Richard Berner, Kermit Schoenholtz, Lawrence J. White, Lowering The Bar on Financial 
Regulation is Fraught With Risk, AMERICAN BANKER (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/lowering-the-bar-on-financial-regulation-is-fraught-
with-risk [https://perma.cc/A9R3-PEFG]. 
 1299. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 1230, at 9035. 
 1300. See infra Section V(vi). 
 1301. Better Markets, supra note 881. 
 1302. Jeremy Kress, The Case Against Activity-Based Financial Regulation, COLUMBIA LAW 
SCHOOL BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 16, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/11/16/the-
case-against-activity-based-financial-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/B8CD-68HF]. 
 1303. Id.; Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1463. 
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projections” which are impossible.1304 
 
Geithner, Bernanke, Yellen and Lew in their FSOC submission suggest that 
the risk profile of a non-bank can (and did in the lead up to the GFC) “change 
rapidly” and also the “path” of a crisis is dependent on economic factors that are 
impossible to predict.1305  As noted by Professors Kress, McCoy and Schwarcz, 
the number of rapidly changing “potential explanatory variables” and the 
interplay of “behavioral elements” in the context of a crisis make a “statistical 
inference” of firm distress and systemic risk transmission unknowable.1306  This 
is why the FSOC designation power was designed in the first place – to give a 
“pre-emptive” tool that can only work ex ante (Geithner et al. liken the failure 
of a large interconnected non-bank to a nuclear power plant where safety 
guidelines can be imposed in the midst of a “meltdown.”)1307 
 
The activities-based framework requires CBA prior to making an entity 
designation. 1308   Better Markets in its submission to FSOC states that this 
requirement makes a designation “almost impossible as a practical matter.”1309  
If a non-bank (like an ETF issuer) became systemically important during a crisis, 
the “burdensome,” time consuming, and “imprecise” administrative process in 
making a declaration could render the enhanced measures ineffective. 1310  
Interconnectedness can serve as a “conduit for contagion.”1311  Relatedly, there 
are “serious analytical challenges” in even attempting such a calculus, as 
prudential regulatory measures are difficult to accurately assess, and may create 
litigation risk.1312  Further, the use of CBA in financial regulation has been highly 
criticized by scholars such as Professor John Coates who describe it as 
“unfeasible” particularly for unquantifiable costs like potential systemic 
risks.1313  Professor Jeffrey Gordon has also described CBA as “empty” since 
finance is “based on a series of trade offs of values that are normatively derived” 
 
 1304. See Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1483; FRANK K. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 6, 214–15, 224–25 (Dover Publ’ns Inc. 2006) (1921). 
 1305. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1306. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1483. 
 1307. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1308. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 1230, at 9034. 
 1309. Better Markets, supra note 881. 
 1310. Better Markets, supra note 881. 
 1311. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 4. 
 1312. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1486. 
 1313. John C. Coates IV, Cost Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L. J. 882, 1010-11 (2015). 
 
 
 
177 
and based on “pragmatic” design.1314 
 
Geithner et al. suggest that “following the steps outlined in the guidance” 
the revised process could take up to six years (even more) to declare a non-bank 
SIFI, and the activities review alone would take “at least” two years.1315  They 
suggest this timeline is “unworkable” given the speed that the GFC 
materialized.1316  They note, “[e]ven in the months leading up to the crisis, it was 
not clear which financial firms were most at risk of failing nor was it clear how 
the risks from the failure of those firms would impact other financial institutions, 
financial markets, or the economy as a whole.”1317  An operational disruption or 
stress event at a large ETF issuer could precipitate a run on the firm, or a cascade 
to peer funds or underlying assets. 1318   This warrants strong risk mitigation 
efforts at an ETF issuer firm level.  Fear driven overreaction from informational 
uncertainty is common in a crisis, even if the ultimate damage turns out to be 
“rather modest.”1319  This is because market crises take place in a “complex, 
adaptive network” which is characterized by financial and non-financial 
“interconnections.”1320  This is relevant to ETFs given the numerous market 
participants in a complex operating ecosystem. 
 
The risks stemming from ETFs transcend singular parties, and are largely 
driven by interconnective complexity, individual incentives, collective actions, 
and the potential for non-linear responses.1321  Thus, regulatory measures need to 
consider all impacted market segments.  The activities-based framework relies 
on a firm’s primary regulator to mitigate systemically risk activities,1322 and in 
 
 1314. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call For Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 
43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S353, S366-S368 (2014). 
 1315. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1316. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1317. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1318. See infra Section IV(i)(d). 
 1319. Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane has noted this phenomenon in both 
financial markets and in medical crises, comparing the over-reaction from the outbreak of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) to the way banks and financial market participants reacted 
when Lehman Brothers failed, in both cases the actual damage was “relatively modest” despite 
significant economic costs from the initial reaction.  See Haldane, supra note 901 at 1 (“These 
similarities are striking.  An external event strikes.  Fear grips the system which, in consequence, 
seizes.  The resulting collateral damage is wide and deep.  Yet the triggering event is, with 
hindsight, found to have been rather modest.  The flap of a butterfly’s wing in New York or 
Guangdong generates a hurricane for the world economy.  The dynamics appear chaotic, 
mathematically and metaphorically.”) 
 1320. Haldane, supra note 901, at 1. 
 1321. See infra Section IV. 
 1322. Kress, supra note 1236. 
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the case of an ETF issuer, this would be the SEC.1323  Under the revised guidance 
the FSOC will use “informal measures” to influence other regulators; however, 
these measures are non-binding,1324 and the process of seeking harmony creates 
logistical complexity, coordination costs and litigation risks.1325  The FSOC’s 
powers, under an activities-based framework, have thus been criticized as akin 
to those of “a glorified think tank.” 1326   Some academics suggest that an 
activities-based systemic risk regulator can only be effective if deployed through 
a consolidated federal regulator, and the current level of “jurisdictional 
fragmentation” in the U.S. “undermine[s]” the ability to successfully implement 
this approach.1327  Also, given the global nature of mega ETF firm operations, an 
effective activity-based regulatory framework would require coordinated 
international regulatory harmony, and this could be nearly impossible to obtain. 
 
As noted by Geithner et al., in the GFC there was “no one activity that 
propagated risk through the system.”1328  Further, Professors Kress, McCoy and 
Schwarcz posit that the “systemic riskiness” of a firm is “cumulative,” and 
“inherently a product of the interrelations among its various activities and risk-
management activities.”1329  They point to examples from the GFC including the 
relationship between AIG’s derivatives and securities lending practices, and the 
“interactions” of activities undertaken by Lehman and Bear Stearns, from repo 
agreements and commercial paper to MBS. 1330   The “known and unknown 
activities” that facilitate instability during a crisis like contagion sell-offs, runs 
on non-bank firms; and the impact of “systemic interconnections” makes an 
activities-based framework inadequate to prevent systemic risk transmission 
from non-bank financial companies.1331 
 
An activities-based framework is unlikely to address the “combination of 
activities” undertaken by one entity.1332  An entity-based declaration, that uses 
 
 1323. See Wan, supra note 1267, at 810 (noting the Commission’s role as a primary regulator 
in the ETF context). 
 1324. See 12 U.S.C. § 5330(c)(2) (noting such a distinction). 
 1325. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1326. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1463. 
 1327. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1505-1506. 
 1328. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
 1329. See Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1462 (noting the inherent blind spots 
present in an activities-based approach). 
 1330. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1462. 
 1331. See Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1489-1492 (further discussing the 
limitations of an activities-based framework). 
 1332. Geithner et al. supra note 906. 
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prudential measures, can at least limit the “cumulative impact” of large, 
interconnected firms in a crisis, and give the regulator extensive insight into the 
risk profile of the entity and its interconnected parts.1333 The failure of a large 
ETF firm could have significant consequences for the economy, yet under the 
revised FSOC guidelines by the time a non-bank SIFI experiences material 
distress it could be “too late.”1334  Additionally (and perhaps most importantly) 
as noted by the DTCC, one of the most effective ways to “address 
interconnectedness risks” is to increase the “resilience of the most 
interconnected”1335 and the growth of the mega ETF firms (combined with the 
complex interconnectedness factors cited above)1336 makes a strong argument for 
heightened oversight.  As noted by Andrew Haldane, “[i]t is only when the hub 
– a large or connected financial institution – is subject to stress that network 
dynamics will be properly unearthed.”1337 
f. Continuing ETF Risk Monitoring & Alternative Regulatory 
Considerations 
 
The FSOC declaratory power for non-bank SIFIs is not a perfect 
administrative tool, and it may have several deficiencies from the perspective of 
administrative law.1338  It does, however, serve as a safeguard for systemic risks 
of highly interconnected non-banks.  Given the speed at which a crisis (like the 
GFC) can crystalize, measures that can help both detect, and mitigate, 
interconnected shock transmission is only “effective” if instituted in advance of 
a panic. 1339   This final subsection will assess other alternative regulatory 
considerations or measures, and the most important areas for future assessment 
in ETFs.  It highlights the challenges that lay ahead, as systemic risk transmission 
from ETFs is most likely to come from collective actions, and non-linear 
responses, which are very difficult to test or prevent. 
 
 
 1333. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874, at 1463. 
 1334. See Gregg Gelzinis, Don’t Put SIFI Designations on the Bank Burner, AMERICAN 
BANKER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-put-sifi-designations-
on-the-back-burner [https://perma.cc/VXP5-AK4E] (emphasizing the need for the FSOC’s 
promptness when assessing potential SIFIs). 
 1335. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913 at 2. 
 1336. Supra, Section IV (d). 
 1337. Haldane, supra note 901, at 6 (noting that this “small world property” has also been 
shown to exist in physical networks such as the internet and forest fires). 
 1338. See Robert F. Weber, The FSOC’s Designation Program as a Case Study of the New 
Administrative Law of Financial Supervision, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2019) (discussing such 
deficiencies). 
 1339. Id. 
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As noted above, 1340  the ETF ecosystem is continually reliant on the 
voluntary participation of intermediaries (APs) who act, not under legal 
obligation, but rather with discretionary market-based incentives, and their 
departure from this ecosystem could trigger numerous externalities.1341  Given 
the importance of AP arbitrage to the integrity of ETFs, regulatory measures that 
provide greater transparency around this function, such as those recently 
proposed by Professors Hu and Morley,1342 are worthwhile to consider.  Further, 
it is worthwhile to study AP’s behavioral and market incentives to better 
understand the specific scenarios which would influence their departure from 
performing arbitrage.1343  Relatedly, it is important to study the incentives of 
other market makers, including high frequency traders, to understand when they 
will depart from providing liquidity support.1344 
 
Despite the challenges identified above in designating an asset manager a 
non-bank SIFI, Professors Schwarcz and Zaring posit that FSOC’s  “threat” of 
levying such a designation could both the curb risk taking behaviors of the non-
banks and hold their primary regulators to a higher standard of accountability.1345  
Despite being seen by some as undermining the “notice-and-comment” 
process,1346 the authors suggest threat based regulation is particularly useful 
when “risks are hard to identify” and “perils of mistake are great.”1347  The ability 
for a regulator to “buy an option” has been previously noted by Professor 
Sunstein as useful when regulators are operating with informational opacity.1348  
 
 1340. Supra, Section (V)(a)(ii). 
 1341. The importance of discretionary actors to the continued stability of the ETF ecosystem 
has been noted by several researchers, see Clements, supra note 1158; Hu & Morley, A 
Regulatory Framework, supra note 1026; Hu & Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-
Traded Funds, supra note 1026; CBI Discussion Paper, supra note 1020; Ramaswamy, supra 
note 1158 (all noting the significance of such discretionary actors). 
 1342. See Hu and Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 1026, at 849; see also Hu & 
Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds, supra note 1026, at 1159-61 
(advocating for a single regulatory framework for ETFs, organized around the “arbitrage 
mechanism” that requires enhanced “qualitative” and “quantitative” assessments for this crucial 
function.  The authors suggest disclosures analogous to a “management discussion & analysis” 
(MD&A) for a specific fund’s “arbitrage mechanism”). 
 1343. See Hu & Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds, supra note 1026, 
at 1194-5 (discussing such scenarios and their overall effect on successful arbitrage). 
 1344. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty? Exploring The Boundaries of Fiduciary 
Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31, 32 (2011) (discussing such incentives). 
 1345. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 904, at 1817. 
 1346. Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 904, at 1819. 
 1347. Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 904, at 1819. 
 1348. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 845-46 
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The risks emanating from operation of an ETF are complex, and largely derived 
from unknowns about how collective actors will pursue discretionary incentives 
or act with behavioral biases like forming herds.1349  Perhaps, for these reasons, 
this should give us pause to depart from the FSOC entity-based declaratory 
powers. 
 
 
There are several key areas to monitor in ETFs going forward.  First, 
numerous “structural vulnerabilities associated with asset management 
activities,” identified in 2017 by the FSB, are still relevant - including liquidity 
mismatch between ETFs and underlying securities, the use of leverage and 
derivatives in funds, securities lending activities, and the possibility of firm level 
operational disruption. 1350   Relatedly, factors identified by the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), like the impact of ETFs on the co-movement of 
indices and underlying securities, 1351  the volatility 1352  and co-movement of 
underlying asset prices between themselves 1353  (leading to “simultaneous” 
investor loss), the various scenarios giving rise to an ETF arbitrage breakdown 
where APs or other market makers step away from performing this function, and 
the extent (and contributing factors) that ETFs create investor “correlated 
exposures” and contagion.1354  Interestingly, AP withdraw and ETF investor 
panic respectively mirrors the “hide” or “flight” phenomenon in epidemiology 
in relation to behavioral responses to disease.1355 
 
The ESRB also identifies the potential for counterparty risk through 
synthetic ETFs and securities lending, and the “materialisation of operational 
risk” for key ETF ecosystem participants such as ETF sponsors, APs and market 
makers given industry concentration.1356  There are also strong reasons, such as 
institutional adoption as cash and MMMF substitutes, and industry moral hazard 
and originate to distribute, to consider fixed income and loan ETFs a key 
 
(2006). 
 1349. Infra Section IV(ii)(b). 
 1350. FSB Structural Vulnerabilities, supra note 936, at 9-10. 
 1351. See ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 19-22 (presenting such factors depicting this 
impact). 
 1352. See Ben-David et al., supra note 1206. 
 1353. See Z. Da & S. Shive, ETFs and asset return correlations, 24(1) EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 136 (2018). 
 1354. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 2-3. 
 1355. Haldane, supra note 901, at 7. 
 1356. ESRB Report, supra note 988, at 2-3, 32. 
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segment of the industry to monitor going forward.1357  This is a market that has 
experienced significant U.S. and international post-GFC growth.1358  Risky sub-
classes of the fixed income ETF market, like emerging market debt, and high 
yield, are also growing.1359 
 
ETF capital flows are contributing to a passive-investment generated proxy 
voting bottleneck, with power materially concentrating in the hands of very few 
firms.1360  The ominous near-reality of intermediated capital markets overseers – 
essentially “ruling on capital’s behalf” - is the path ETFs investors find 
themselves on.1361  It’s possible that ETF mega issuers have the capacity, and 
expertise, to make better governance judgments than ordinary investors.  Yet, 
recent reports suggest “hidden dangers” in their power, like deleterious effects 
on competition, corporate investment, innovation and consumer welfare. 1362  
Also, indexing creates a gatekeeping function making asset managers stewards 
of the economy as a whole.1363  Professor John Coates calls this the “greatest 
concentration of economic control in our lifetimes.”1364 BlackRock has signaled 
intentions to use their influence to enact climate change initiatives.1365  Asset 
manager proxy voting control has systemic implications, and will require policy 
 
 1357. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977, (discussing such rationale). 
 1358. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977, at 6 (“Assets in fixed income open-end 
mutual funds and ETFs have seen rapid growth in recent years. Overall, fixed income mutual 
funds and ETFs account for 11% of the U.S. bond market (US government bonds, corporate 
bonds, and tax-exempt bonds) as of December 2018, up from 7% a decade earlier.”) 
 1359. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 977 (“Fixed income ETFs have experienced 
growth in a variety of sub-asset classes of the bond market in recent years. Initially, these were 
typically portfolios of investment grade and government bonds, but have been extended to other 
categories including high-yield bonds, emerging market bonds, and even bank loans.”). 
 1360. ETFs, and other index investments, are polarizing, and some market participants have 
even gone as far as to associate them with a form of “Marxist economy” or central planning, see  
Teresa Rivas, ‘Passive Investing Is Worse Than Marxism’: Bernstein, BARRON’S (Aug. 23, 
2016), https://www.barrons.com/articles/advisors-cash-is-king-amid-uncertainty-51546881439 
[https://perma.cc/NH3F-ZKF7]. 
 1361. See Christophers, supra note 1051. 
 1362. See David McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund 
Takeover, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-hidden-dangers-of-the-great-index-
fund-takeover [https://perma.cc/RQ3L-4LBD] (discussing the various dangers attributed to 
prominent ETF issuers). 
 1363. See id. (noting that “[f]und companies have multiple tools to influence corporate 
behavior, such as developing preferred policies on executive compensation, carbon footprints, 
gender diversity, and other governance matters. They often do this in coordination with other 
industry leaders . . . .”). 
 1364. See Coates, supra note 1052. 
 1365. See Steven Mufson & Rachel Siegal, BlackRock makes climate change central to its 
investment strategy, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/14/blackrock-letter-climate-change/ 
[https://perma.cc/XKT2-4VBB]. 
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attention.1366  It also forces regulators, and systemic risk monitors, to ask whether 
certain firms could ever have too much voting power?  Even if it’s market forces 
that are generating it. 
 
Individual ETFs don’t evoke the most concern in this market (although 
certain ETFs like inverse, leveraged and “non-transparent” varieties are 
problematic).  Rather, instability comes from collective actions, interconnection, 
discretionary behaviors, non-linear impacts, crowd behaviors (like information 
cascades, runs and fire sales).  One of (many) challenges in this area is that some 
interconnectedness is desirable (since “financial networks tend to be robust yet 
fragile”), yet the “optimal” level of interconnectedness is difficult to ascertain, 
and precise policy measures challenging to create.1367  As a result, regulation 
should at least enhance the “resilience” of financial firms that are most centrally 
interconnected.1368 Unfortunately, the U.S. doesn’t have an effective regulatory 
framework to deal with the complexities, and interconnections, inherent in the 
modern financial “ecosystem.”1369. 
 
Some have recently called for more U.S. asset managers to get “stress 
tested” like banks, and regulators in Europe appear to be ahead of the curve of 
the Americans at this point. 1370   Stress tests would need to stretch across 
individual firms and capture collective actions in the ETF ecosystem to be truly 
effective.  As such, ETFs are an area where the use of technology (or “regtech”) 
for enhanced supervision may have important utility in the future.1371  However, 
on the use of technology Professor Erik Gerding cautions that systemic and other 
forms of complexity in financial markets may be better confronted by 
 
 1366. See Coates, supra note 1052, at 20-23 (providing a broad discussion of the policy options 
that are possible in response to the concentration of corporate shareholders because of the growth 
of index funds including self-regulatory codes or regulations regarding stewardship, voting 
dilution, ownership “caps” or other “structural limits” imposed on ETF firms.) 
 1367. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 10. 
 1368. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 913, at 11. 
 1369. Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short, CORNELL 
LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 20-03; EUROPEAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (ECGI) LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 494/202; COLUMBIA LAW & 
ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 617 (2020) 
available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2604 
[https://perma.cc/G9AB-U532]. 
 1370. See Mark Gilbert, Banks Get Stress Tested. So Should Asset Managers, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (July 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-04/banks-get-
stress-tested-so-should-asset-managers [https://perma.cc/TEL9-LRTN]. 
 1371. See Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the 
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J.INT’L L. & BUS. 371 (2017). 
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adjustments to “old-fashioned disclosure” rather than “hi-tech disclosure 
solutions.”1372  A potentially more useful technological framework to envision is 
Andy Haldane’s dream of a “Star Trek chair and a bank of monitors” that tracks 
the global flow of ETFs in “close to real time” similar to weather systems and 
internet traffic.1373  Access to data, and global regulatory coordination costs stand 
as obvious frictions to this vision. Professor Gerding adds further caution that 
regulators need to be careful about delegating or outsourcing risk modeling to 
private industry (a phenomenon that was widespread in the lead up to the 
GFC).1374 
 
As noted, the SEC recently approved four applications for “non-
transparent” ETFs.1375  This is a significant development and one worthy of 
continued investigation.  The SEC will require approved non-transparent ETFs 
to only invest in securities that trade on exchanges, and also to provide APs with 
a daily “‘proxy’ portfolio” (identifying assets but not portfolio weights).1376 It’s 
believed that APs can perform the arbitrage function through the proxy 
portfolio, 1377  and those in support of this development suggest that it will 
promote more active management, which will improve market efficiency.1378  
Further, advocates say that concealing fund compositions allows for more 
competition in the market and mitigates the poaching of novel index 
strategies.1379 Yet there are numerous uncertainties about how these structures 
will affect market stability.  True arbitrage is risk-free, or guaranteed.1380  If an 
AP doesn’t know an index’s exact composition it can’t ensure true arbitrage.1381  
If transparent plain-vanilla ETF structures risk arbitrage breakdown, surely non-
transparent structures are even more precarious. 
 
 1372. See Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload, Complexity, and 
Other Information Failures? 90 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1149 (2016). 
 1373. See Haldane, supra note 871, at 7. 
 1374. See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial 
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009). 
 1375. See Jackson and Lee, supra note 997. 
 1376. Jackson and Lee, supra note 997. 
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 1378. See Bailey McCann, What To Know About ‘Nontransparent’ ETFs, THE WALL STREET 
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own one? MARKETWATCH (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/get-ready-for-
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 1380. See Philip H. Dybvig, and Stephen A. Ross, Arbitrage, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS: VOLUME 1–8, 188-197 (2d ed. 2008). 
 1381. See Jackson and Lee, supra note 997, at footnote 6. 
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Another area of ETF systemic risk consideration worthy of ongoing 
investigation is the regulation of index providers.  SEC Commissioner Robert J. 
Jackson Jr. and Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon have identified that indexes 
may not be as transparent as otherwise believed and are vulnerable to bias and 
manipulation.1382  Index creation is subject to very little regulatory oversight.1383  
Index providers face conflicts of interest; for example it’s been reported that 
MSCI (the worlds largest index provider) was pressured (and threatened) by the 
Chinese government to include more Chinese companies in their indices to 
facilitate foreign investment capital flows into China.1384  Professor Adriana 
Robertson recently documented how the “overwhelming majority” of indexes in 
a surveyed sample were used as a benchmark for a single fund, and a “substantial 
fraction” of ETFs track indices created by the ETF issuer or an affiliate. 1385 
vii. Conclusion: What Are The Costs of Liquidity Transformation? 
 
It’s easy to wonder whether the true costs of ETF liquidity transformation 
are under-estimated.  ETFs that hold bonds and bespoke loans create instant 
liquidity for retail investors to markets that are opaque and otherwise difficult to 
access.1386 History lends caution when illiquid underlying assets are synthesized 
into instantly liquid financial products.1387  The idea of transforming something 
that’s fundamentally “illiquid” (like a loan) into something “liquid” (an ETF that 
represents a loan basket) evokes a liquidity “mismatch” and “illusion” concern 
(reminiscent of MBS in the GFC).1388  Deposit insurance, and central banks 
acting as “lenders of last resort,” curb bank run and systemic risks.1389  This 
 
 1382. See Jackson & Solomon, supra note 1086. 
 1383. See DeCambre, supra note 1088. 
 1384. See Bird, supra note 1087. 
 1385. See Adriana Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and ‘Index 
Investing’, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795 (2019). 
 1386. See Chris Flood, ‘Big Ticket’ Trades Made Possible By Bond ETF Liquidity, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b5e0bb88-5865-11e8-806a-808d194ffb75 
[https://perma.cc/C3HM-MMWX]. 
 1387. See Daniel Zwirn, Jim Kyung Soo Liew & Ajakh Ahmad, This Time Is Different, but It 
Will End the Same Way: Unrecognized Secular Changes in the Bond Market since the 2008 
Crisis That May Precipitate the Next Crisis (Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379979 [https://perma.cc/6U8Q-QN8X]. 
 1388. Id. See also Stephen Gandel, There’s a Time Bomb Bigger Than the VIX in the Market, 
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
07/there-s-a-time-bomb-bigger-than-the-vix-in-the-market [https://perma.cc/ZK9Y-57M4] 
(“ETFs, like stocks, can be bought and sold in milliseconds. But bank loans cannot.  Loans trade 
in over-the-counter markets with much less volume and settlement times that can stretch out a 
month.”) 
 1389. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 210, 225 (2008). 
 
 
 
186 
“extraordinary” government support has not been “normally” available to other 
firms, 1390  and represents a social “cost” of the intermediation, liquidity and 
maturity transformation services that a bank provides.1391 
 
The MMMF crisis showed, however, that the government was willing to 
support “shadow deposits” in the GFC.1392  As a result, the MMMF market now 
benefits from an “implicit” guarantee of emergency government support.1393  
Like MMMFs, ETFs also offer liquidity transformation by turning less liquid 
(often bespoke) loans into cash substitutes.1394  In an unprecedented move to 
mitigate the economic fallout from the coronavirus,1395 on March 23, 2020 the 
Federal Reserve established the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
with authorization to purchase investment grade corporate ETFs.1396 Now that 
the government is supporting the ETF market, perhaps firms providing such 
liquidity transformation services should have heightened safeguards. 
 
While ETFs have many benefits, and strong demand factors, 1397  their 
popularity has also spawned complex interconnected ETF mega firms, with 
growing influence over the decisions of nearly every publicly traded corporation 
in America.1398  In many ways ETFs are a “tragedy of the commons” problem 
where what’s good for the individual is sub-optimal for the group. 1399  
Empirically there’s a “real prospect” that these ETF firms will one day have 
voting control over all large publicly traded companies in America.1400  These 
mega ETF sponsors are growing to an unprecedented size,1401 while fostering 
 
 1390. Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After The Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. REV. 75, 78 
(2011). 
 1391. See id. at 119-120. 
 1392. See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft & Boesky supra note 1076, at 61-64 (discussing the 
“shadow” banking system and the government’s intervention to support it during the GFC); 
Blinder, supra note 909, at 147-48; Logan, Nelson & Parkinson, supra note 1075, at 9-11. 
 1393. See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
1155, 1163, 1190. 
 1394. See supra Section IV(d)(v). 
 1395. See Andrea Riquier, The Fed is Going to Buy ETFs. What Does It Mean? 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fed-is-going-to-buy-
etfs-what-does-it-mean-2020-03-23 [https://perma.cc/S5Y8-5VZQ]. 
 1396. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Tools, Secondary Market 
Corporate Credit Facility, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T6DH-YCJL]. 
 1397. See supra Section IV(c). 
 1398. See supra Section IV(d)(ii). 
 1399. See Conrad de Aenlle, Opinion: John Bogle has a warning for index fund investors, 
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/john-bogle-has-a- 
warning-for-index-fund-investors-2017-06-01 [https://perma.cc/49EU-WLS5]. 
 1400. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 864, at 737-741. 
 1401. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock’s Assets Blow Past $7 Trillion in Milestone For Investment 
Giant, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrocks-
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deep and complex interconnections.1402  The popularity of ETFs gives rise to 
systemic risks not otherwise present in other managed asset classes like those 
associated with the arbitrage function, and derived from directional and noise 
traders attracted to the liquidity of ETFs; yet it has also reinforced common 
concerns like securities lending.1403   Post-GFC reforms have not curbed the 
growth and concentration of the largest asset managers, just as they haven’t 
prevented a few mega-banks from becoming the most important players in nearly 
all of the world derivatives clearinghouses.1404  These same mega banks also 
happen to be some of the largest APs in the ETF ecosystem.1405 
 
Interconnectivity in financial markets can both absorb and amplify shocks, 
making them at once “robust” and “fragile”.1406  It’s increasingly prudent to 
consider financial markets together as a “system” and design regulatory 
structures in this light.1407  Systemic risk in this sector is most likely to be a by-
product of the collective actions of a myriad of interconnected counterparts, and 
manifest through phenomena such as discretionary withdrawals of key market-
incentivized intermediaries, crowd behaviors from correlated exposures giving 
rise to information cascades, runs, fire sales, and non-linear impacts.1408  The 
FSOC’s activity, and entity-based, frameworks, when evaluated individually for 
ETFs have limitations.  As advocated by previous scholars, 1409  it would be 
prudent to not consider these approaches as mutually exclusive but look at them 
as complimentary, and this is particularly true for the ETF mega-players.  These 
giant asset managers may be growing “too connected to fail” and the most 
effective regulatory framework will require a cross-market “system-wide” 
toolkit to monitor and assess the collective behavior of all participants.1410 
 
ETFs as a financial market case study highlight externalities associated with 
complex systems including what Andrew Haldane identifies as tensions in 
robustness and fragility onset through complexity and “homogeneity,” 
 
assets-blow-past-7-trillion-in-milestone-for-investment-giant-11579089828 
[https://perma.cc/PDB4-ZKLP]. 
 1402. See supra Section IV(d). 
 1403. Id. 
 1404. See Alvarez & McPartland, supra note 878, at 11-19; 
 1405. See BLACKROCK, A Primer, supra note 1027, at 3 (BlackRock lists the following 
examples of “Common U.S. APs” as “Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jeffries, JP Morgan, KCG, Morgan Stanley, UBS 
Securities, Virtu.”) 
 1406. See Haldane, supra note 871, at 3-5. 
 1407. Haldane, supra note 871, at 3-5. 
 1408. See infra Section V. 
 1409. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 874. 
 1410. See Haldane, supra note 901, at 13. 
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“feedback effects” in periods of heightened stress, unknown risks (the so called 
“Knightian uncertainties”), and network “dimensionality” due to financial 
innovation. 1411   Haldane suggests that, given these dynamics, policy 
prescriptions should increasingly include access to data to map the global 
financial network, improved communication across the network, regulations to 
“vaccinate the ‘super-spreaders’ to avert financial contagion,” and the 
implementation of safeguards against the “network’s dimensionality and 
complexity.”1412  As a result, there is merit in ensuring that the most centrally 
connected entity in this ETF ecosystem - the issuer itself – is economically 
resilient and has adequate safeguards and controls in place, while also assessing 
activities across the network, and the behavior of its numerous interconnected 
participants.1413 
  
 
 1411. Haldane, supra note 901, at 2. 
 1412. Haldane, supra note 901, at 2. 
 1413. See Gilbert, supra note 877. 
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Chapter V: Exchange Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices 
Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds 
 
The following chapter is forthcoming to be published in the Fall 2020 edition of the VIRGINIA 
LAW & BUSINESS REV. as “Exchange Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine 
Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds” and is available online here: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680219  
I. Abstract 
 
Despite their incredible popularity and importance to modern capital 
markets, exchange traded funds (ETFs) are extremely difficult to compare side-
by-side.  Investors who successfully navigate the initial challenges of product 
choice overload, and opaque index construction methodology, soon encounter a 
wide array of discretionary operational, management, marketing, and financial 
practices of ETF sponsors that combine to undermine simple product and 
performance comparisons. This dilemma is compounded by disclosure 
effectiveness challenges given investor cognitive limitations and behavioral 
tendencies. This article is the first scholarly work, amongst a growing body of 
ETF studies, to illustrate why accurate “apples to apples” product comparisons 
in ETFs are so challenging (at times even impossible) to perform. It presents a 
variety of ETF case studies to demonstrate this challenge including recent 
performance instabilities in the coronavirus pandemic.   
 
It advocates for continued positive momentum around investor-focused 
reforms in ETFs, building on encouraging steps undertaken by the U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission in its recent “Rule 6c-11” under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. It makes several recommendations to 
improve ETF product comparisons including standardizing website formats and 
layouts for information presentation, uniform calculation methodologies of key 
ETF variables, an ETF naming convention, and standard terms in sustainable 
investing.  ETF investors would also greatly benefit from a systematized and 
structured electronic reporting mechanism whereby standardized data is 
provided by ETF sponsors to a centrally controlled public repository.  Additional 
studies are warranted on strategic ETF disclosure ordering, digital enhancement, 
and added contextual discussion around critical concepts like arbitrage and index 
composition methodology.  The ETF “model portfolio” industry is also an 
emerging concern that should be assessed, and the article provides suggestions 
to reduce informational opacity and improve comparative assessments. 
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II. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade exchange traded funds (ETFs) have surged in both 
popularity1414and variety1415 - fueled by an array of diverse and compelling 
demand factors. 1416  Yet despite their popularity, it is extremely difficult to 
effectively compare products side by side.  Navigating the “shear breadth of 
products all tracking the same index” can be confusing, if not completely 
overwhelming.1417 One recent report noted twenty four separate ETFs that track 
the S&P Net Total Return Index ($US). 1418   ETFs can also be difficult to 
distinguish from mutual funds, or other passive investments tracking similar 
 
1414
 See Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall 
Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 17-19, 27-31 
(2019) (Describing the importance of ETFs and index funds in modern day capital markets); 
M. Lettau & A. Madhavan, Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for Economists, 32(1) JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 135, 135-138 (2018) (Describing the importance and operating 
structure of an ETF as an investment product that provides exposure to an underlying asset 
pool but, unlike a mutual fund, trades intraday on a stock exchange). 
1415
 Recent estimates from consulting firm ETFGI Global, reports that from 2008 to 2019 the 
number of ETFs globally grew from 1617 to 6940, while the value of assets held in ETF 
products, during the same period also grew from $716 billion to over $6 trillion.  See ETGFI, 
ETFGI report assets in the global ETFs and ETPs industry which will turn 30 years old in 
March started the new decade with a record 6.35 trillion US dollars (January 16, 2020), 
https://etfgi.com/news/press-releases/2020/01/etfgi-reports-assets-global-etfs-and-etps-
industry-which-will-turn-30. 
1416
 The demand factors underlying the growth of ETFs are diverse and include: passive 
investment outperformance over active management styles (and investors becoming 
disillusioned with active managers in light of their failure to predict and guard against the 2008 
financial crisis); the ability to obtain low-cost diversification; intra-day liquidity on secondary 
markets (positively distinguishing ETFs from index mutual funds); potential tax advantages 
over mutual funds; the ability to obtain exposure to opaque and otherwise difficult to access 
asset classes (like over-the-counter bonds and leveraged loans); the emergence of novel 
indexing structures by competing ETF sponsor firms; the growth of securities lending within 
the ETF industry; short-duration credit ETFs being used as institutional cash substitutes; and 
certain economies of scale of large ETF issuers. See Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some 
Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 22(4) U. PA. J. OF BUS. L. 722, 736-755 (2020), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516936. 
1417
 See Anna Fedorova, ETF Index Tracking and How Performance Can Vary, WHAT 
INVESTMENT (December 19, 2019), https://www.whatinvestment.co.uk/etf-index-tracking-and-
why-different-etfs-track-the-same-index-2617113/. 
1418
 Id.; see TRACKINSIGHT, S&P 500 Net Total Return – USD, 
https://www.trackinsight.com/en/index/379 (accessed July 11, 2020). 
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indices.1419 Accessible ETFs now number in the many thousands.1420 Add to this 
an opaque product menu of ETFs tracking diverse asset classes, equities, bonds, 
commodities, numerous commercial and bespoke indices, investment styles, 
sectors, regions, currencies, brands and issuers.1421  
 
Yet index duplication and choice overload are only two challenges, 
among many, that undermine accurate “apples to apples” product comparisons 
in ETFs.  This article is the first scholarly critique, in a growing body of ETF 
studies, to show why side-by-side product comparisons in ETFs are 
exceptionally difficult (at times even impossible) to perform.  It presents a 
variety of discretionary operational, management, marketing, and financial 
practices that ETF sponsors engage in that impair investor attempts to make 
simple product and performance comparisons.1422 It also shows how product 
comparisons are obscured by disclosure effectiveness challenges in light of 
investor cognitive limitations and behavioral tendencies.1423 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently improved the 
ability of investors to compare ETFs by adopting “Rule 6c-11” under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).1424 This rule standardized the process 
to launch for certain ETF structures without having to obtain a costly exemptive 
order.1425 While a positive step, more can be done to improve ETF product 
 
1419
 See Simon Constable, Spoilt Rotten: Are There Too Many Mutual Funds and ETFs? 
FORBES (May 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/05/16/spoilt-for-
choice-are-there-too-many-mutual-fund-etf-choices/#1db937c92f37; See Edwin J. Elton, 
Martin J. Gruber & Andre de Souza, Passive Mutual Funds and ETFs: Performance and 
Comparison, NYU STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS WORKING PAPER (April 29, 2019), at 3-6, 
available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/eelton/working_papers/Passive_Mutual_Funds.pdf. 
1420
 See ETFGI, supra note 1415. 
1421
 See ETF.COM, Lists of ETFs, available at https://www.etf.com/channels (last assessed July 
11, 2020) 
1422
 See infra Part I. 
1423
 See infra Part II. 
1424
 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Exchange Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 33,646 (September 25, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 57,162, 57,166 (Oct. 24, 2019) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 232, 239, 270, 274), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf (hereinafter “Rule 6c-11”). 
1425
 The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2020), authorizes open-
ended management investment companies, unit investment trusts, and closed-end structures, 
but does not specifically authorize exchange traded funds (which combine features of both 
open-end and closed end structures). As a result, prior to Rule 6c-11, ETFs desiring to operate 
had to obtain exemptive relief from certain provisions of the ICA. For example, among others, 
relief was required from Section 2(a)(32) rules in relation to the definition of “Redeemable 
Securities” (since ETFs are only redeemable in “creation units” by authorized participants 
(APs) at net asset value, and not by investors in individual units who must otherwise transact in 
the secondary market), and Section 22(d) rules in relation to the redemption of ETF shares at 
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comparisons.1426 This article advocates for further investor-focused reforms by 
standardizing ETF website formats and layouts, requiring uniform calculation 
methodologies of key ETF variables, creating a formal ETF naming convention, 
and standard terms for sustainable investing.1427 Comparative frictions could 
also be materially reduced with systematized and structured electronic reporting 
by ETF sponsors of standardized data to a centrally controlled public 
repository.1428 Investors also stand to materially benefit from additional studies 
around strategic disclosure ordering and digital enhancement, and further 
contextual discussion around critical concepts like ETF arbitrage and index 
composition methodology. 1429   Also, cash-like ETFs, and the ETF “model 
portfolio” industry are emerging concerns that should be assessed to ensure 
market stability, reduce informational opacity, standardize disclosure and 
improve comparisons.1430   
 
The article proceeds in Part I by showing how discretionary ETF sponsor 
operational, financial, marketing and management practices undermine the 
ability of investors to perform side-by-side product comparisons – even for 
similarly named funds.  It also discusses emerging challenges with the ETF 
“model portfolio” industry and with active, non-transparent, and “smart-beta” 
ETF structures. Part II shows how behavioral tendencies, and information 
processing limitations, deducted from behavioral finance and judgment decision 
making (JDM) literature, when assessed in conjunction with mandated 
investment disclosures, combine to compound the challenge of ETF 
comparisons. The article concludes in Part III by identifying improvements made 
by Rule 6c-11, and then advocating for additional investor-focused reforms that 
will make ETF side by side comparisons easier for investors and reduce 
informational opacity in ETF “model portfolios”.  
 
net asset value (NAV) by APs, despite concurrent secondary market trading by investors, when 
NAV can potentially deviate from secondary prices; together with exemptive relief from 
certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--aa (2020), and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a--nn (2020). This exemptive relief was often 
expensive, time-consuming, and inefficient.  See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 34-42; See 
Comment Letter to SEC of the ETF Committee of the Asset Management Group of the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association on File No. S7-15-18 (September 28, 
2018), at 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4460525-175804.pdf 
(“SIFMA Comment Letter I”); see Comment Letter to SEC of Invesco on File No. S7-15-18 
(September 26, 2018), at 7-10, 20-22, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-
18/s71518-4434256-175698.pdf (“Invesco Comment Letter”). 
1426
 See infra Part III. 
1427
 See infra Part III(b)-(g). 
1428
 See infra Part III(b). 
1429
 See infra Part III(c)-(e). 
1430
 See infra Part I(c)(iii) & Part III(f)–(g). 
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iii. Part I, ETF Industry Practices That Create Investor Confusion 
 
In Part I, this article illustrates why true side-by-side ETF product 
comparisons are extremely difficult (at times even impossible). It shows how 
supposedly similar ETFs can exhibit significant variations because of ETF 
sponsor discretion in replicating an index and attempting to minimize tracking 
errors; diverse financial, operational, and marketing activities of ETF sponsors; 
and inconsistencies in fund names and product compositions.   
 
a. Index Replication Discretion and Tracking Errors 
 
The first source of investor confusion relates to how an index is 
replicated, and the actions ETF sponsors take to minimize index tracking errors.  
ETFs bearing consistent names and tracking similar or related indices, can be 
(and often perform) very differently. This subsection highlights how an ETF may 
deviate from the index it seeks to track; and how its trading price may also 
dislocate from its underlying net asset value (NAV). It also discusses the 
phenomenon of custom and bespoke ETF indexes, and how this contributes to 
investor difficulty when comparing funds.   
 
 
ETFs normally track an “index,” which is a representative measure of the 
performance of a “basket” of assets.1431 Index investing thus provides “instant, 
liquid exposure” to worldwide markets and asset classes. 1432  Many popular 
indices are commercially sponsored like the Dow Jones Industrial Index 
(representing thirty “blue chip” U.S. industrial stocks), the Russell 2000® Index 
(a “capitalization-weighted index” that tracks the 2000 smallest publicly traded 
companies in the U.S.) and the Nasdaq-100 Index (an index that tracks the 100 
“largest and most actively traded non-financial” securities on the Nasdaq Stock 
 
1431
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Fast Answers Market Indices, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersindiceshtm.html (last accessed June 27, 2020) (hereinafter “SEC Indices”). 
1432
 See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became the Market, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-market/?srnd=etfs  
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Market). 1433  ETF issuers frequently replicate popular indices, 1434  as this 
mitigates the risk of clients seeking out desired index structures elsewhere.1435  
 
Unfortunately, there is significant “variety” in the number of indices, and 
how they are constructed.1436 Consider, two distinct ETFs which supposedly 
track the same index, and possess the same name of “U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF” 
(issued respectively by BlackRock1437 and Schwab1438). On March 31, 2020, 
these two ETFs had different holdings and portfolio maturity compositions,1439 
supporting recent contentions (discussed in detail below) that indexing is 
actually “active” investment management.1440 The choice of index replication 
 
1433
 See SEC Indices, supra note 1431. 
1434
 Some suggest indices operate “largely unregulated” in the U.S. and create instability 
because of informational opacity, a potential for market manipulation, and the emergence of 
conflicts of interests including pressures from foreign governments relating to index 
composition, see Jenna I. McCarthy, Benchmarking The World: A Proposal For Regulatory 
Oversight of Stock Market Index Providers, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1191, 1218-1227 
(2018); Robert J. Jackson & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What’s Really In Your Index Fund? 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (February 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/opinion/index-fund.html 
1435
 FINANCIAL TIMES, ETF Q&A: The good the bad and the synthetic (January 31, 2010), 
https://www.ft.com/content/44f0b7b6-0cce-11df-b8eb-00144feabdc0; This phenomenon also 
confers advantages on large incumbent ETF issuers, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The 
Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 731 (2019) (“However, the nature of index 
fund offerings is such that, if investors show interest in an indexed product that is not currently 
offered by the Big Three, the Big Three can swiftly offer a very similar competing product.”) 
1436
 See Fisch, Hamdani, & Solomon, supra note 1414 at 21-22 (“Although a passive fund is a 
fund that is managed to track an index, there are a wide variety of indexes, meaning that there 
is substantial variation among passive funds. The construction and management of the index is 
not passive but entails a form of managed investing, if not by the passive funds themselves, 
then by the index providers.”) 
1437
 See BLACKROCK ISHARES CORE U.S. AGGREGATE BOND ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239458/ishares-core-total-us-bond-market-etf (assessed 
July 15, 2020). 
1438
 See SCHWAB U.S. AGGREGATE BOND ETF, https://www.schwabfunds.com/products/schz 
(assessed July 15, 2020). 
1439
 The Schwab U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF had a portfolio maturity of 2.7% less than 1 year, 
26.2% between 1-3 years, 32.8% between 3-5 years, 11% between 5-7 years, 9% between 7-10 
year, 18.2% greater than 10 years, see SCHWAB U.S. AGGREGATE BOND ETF (SCHZ) Fact 
Sheet (March 31, 2020), available at https://www.schwabfunds.com/resource/schz-fact-sheet; 
The BlackRock iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF had a portfolio maturity of 2.28% less 
than 1 year, 23.26% between 1-3 years, 35.2% between 3-5 years, 11.49% between 5-7 years, 
8.99% between 7-10 years, 18.78% greater than 10 years, see BLACKROCK ISHARES CORE U.S. 
AGGREGATE BOND ETF (AGG) Fact Sheet (March 31, 2020), available at 
https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/fact-sheet/agg-ishares-core-u-s-aggregate-bond-etf-fund-
fact-sheet-en-us.pdf. 
1440
 See infra Part I(a)(iv); see Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated 
Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795 (2019). 
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method also has significant impacts on whether an ETF will produce tracking 
errors (a matter also discussed extensively below).1441 
 
Further, while full physical replication of an index (investing in all its 
listed assets1442) is possible, it is costly and often unpractical for ETFs.1443 It’s 
also challenging when an index has many securities that represent only a small 
portion of its total capitalization.1444 If an ETF tracks an index that includes 
illiquid securities, full physical replication also makes it very costly for ETF 
authorized participants (APs) 1445  to acquire underlying securities when 
performing arbitrage.1446 The difficulties in full replication make a “sampling 
method” common in ETFs.1447 Sampling has been described as a form of “active 
management” since ETF investors are dependent on the discretionary security 
selections of fund managers.1448 In addition to sampling replication, other index 
construction methods include synthetic,1449 and optimization1450 (which includes 
 
1441
 See infra Part I(a)(iii); see Sam Bourgi, The Hidden Risks and Costs of ETFs, ETF 
DATABASE (January 10, 2017), https://etfdb.com/etf-education/hidden-risks-costs-etfs/. 
1442
 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, The Growing Importance of Exchange Traded Funds in the 
Financial Markets, Monthly Report 79, 83-84 (Oct. 2018) (Ger.), 
https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/766600/2fd3ae4f0593fb2ce465c092ce40888b/mL/2
018-10-exchange-traded-funds-data.pdf (explaining the various methods of ETF index 
replication and distinguishing “physical” replication from “synthetic” methodologies.) 
1443
 Id; see Fedorova, supra note 1417. 
1444
 See Fedorova, supra note 1417 (“The bottom 50 stocks in the FTSE All-Share make up 
less than 0.5% of the index, meaning the transaction costs involved in buying these stocks far 
outweigh the benefits of owning them.”) 
1445
 See ROCHELLE ANTONIEWICZ & JANE HEINRICKS, INV. CO. INST., THE ROLE AND 
ACTIVITIES OF AUTHORIZED PARTICIPANTS OF EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 1 (Mar. ed. 2015), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_15_aps_etfs.pdf (“APs are U.S. registered self-clearing broker-
dealers that can process all required trade submission, clearance, and settlement transactions on 
their own account, as well as full participating members of the National Securities Clearing 
Corporation and Depository Trust Company.”); SEE BLACKROCK, A PRIMER ON ETF PRIMARY 
TRADING AND THE ROLE OF AUTHORIZED PARTICIPANTS 3, 3 ex. (2 Mar. ed. 2017) (hereinafter 
BLACKROCK, A PRIMER) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-etf-primary-trading-
role-of-authorized-participants-march-2017.pdf (listing Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jeffries, JP Morgan, KCG, 
Morgan Stanley, UBS Securities, Virtu as “[e]xamples of [c]ommon US APs”). 
1446
 See BOCCONIS STUDENTS INVESTMENT CLUB, Advanced ETF Mechanics and its Flaws 
(April 7, 2019), http://bsic.it/advanced-etf-mechanics-and-its-flaws/. 
1447
 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 1442 at 83-84. 
1448
 Sloane Ortel, Paul Kovarsky & Antonella Puca, How to see the hidden risks of ETFs, CFA 
INSTITUTE (January 1, 2018), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2018/01/18/how-to-see-the-
hidden-risks-of-etfs/; see Fisch, Hamdani, & Solomon, supra note 1414 at 21; Robertson, 
supra note 1440. 
1449
 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 1442 at 83-84. 
1450
 See TRACKINSIGHT, How is Optimized Sampling Conducted? 
https://www.trackinsight.com/en/education/education-optimised-sampling (accessed July 15, 
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“stratified sampling.”) 1451  These methods potentially introduce tracking 
error.1452 A synthetically replicated ETF uses derivatives (with cash collateral), 
where the ETF sponsor enters into a swap transaction.1453 
 
 
When ETFs trade in the secondary market, their prices will sometimes 
dislocate from their underlying NAV.1454 For example, on August 24, 2015, the 
U.S.’s two largest S&P 500 tracking ETFs traded at both a discount to and a 
premium from, respectively, their NAVs at the exact same time.1455 Several 
instances of significant premiums and discounts in ETFs have been noted in the 
literature over the last decade. 1456  Every ETF trades differently, and price 
dislocations have tremendous ramifications for investors who may unknowingly 
purchase an ETF above its fair market value (at a “premium”) or sell below what 
its worth (at a “discount”).1457 ETF secondary market prices only align with their 
underlying NAV when financial intermediaries (the aforementioned APs) 
redeem or create new ETF shares in a process called “arbitrage.”1458 APs have a 
contractual right but not a legal or fiduciary “obligation” to perform this 
 
2020) (“The primary idea of the optimisation is to build a new portfolio with the same 
characteristics as the index with less securities to reduce transaction cost and/or the exposure to 
illiquid assets.”) 
1451
 See id. (“the portfolio manager divides the underlying securities of the benchmark into 
multiple risk buckets with similar characteristics and selects individual securities to build the 
new portfolio.”); see Comment Letter to SEC of BlackRock on File No. S7-15-18 (September 
26, 2018), at 4, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4428129-
175691.pdf (hereinafter “BlackRock Comment Letter”) (“Most bond index ETF portfolio 
managers employ a set of techniques to effectively sample bonds from the broader underlying 
index.”) 
1452
 See Part I(i)(c). 
1453
 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK supra note 1442 at 83-84. 
1454
 See Marc Gerstein, Why Your Supposedly Stable Fixed-Income ETF Fell Off A Cliff, 
FORBES (March 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcgerstein/2020/03/23/why-your-
supposedly-stable-fixed-income-etf-fell-off-a-cliff/#7a1c08bf7ba5. 
1455
 See Hu & Morley 1, infra note 1459 at 846. 
1456
 See Bhattachaya & O’Hara, infra note 1460 at 3-4; Hu & Morley 1, infra note 1459 at 
856-863. 
1457
 See ETF.COM. Understanding Premiums and Discounts, https://www.etf.com/etf-
education-center/etf-basics/understanding-premiums-and-discounts?nopaging=1 (last accessed 
June 28, 2020); Ben Johnson. Navigating ETF Discounts and Premiums During Turbulent 
Times, MORNINGSTAR (March 20, 2020), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973313/navigating-etf-discounts-and-premiums-during-
turbulent-times. 
1458
 See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make 
Markets Less Stable? Part I, Liquidity Illusions, 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J. 14, 25-26 (2020). 
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arbitrage.1459 In a normally functioning market, APs have a market incentive to 
perform this arbitrage because they can extract risk free profits. 1460  This 
arbitrage function is heavily automated by computer algorithms – a phenomenon 
recently criticized as exacerbating market volatility.1461  
 
The problem is that markets are often abnormal, and ETF arbitrage 
malfunctions and trading price dislocations can both harm investors and obscure 
product comparisons. Further, ETFs that track similar indices will exhibit 
different dislocations in a crisis. 1462  There are numerous factors that can 
contribute to APs withdrawing from performing arbitrage including a lack of 
desire to deal in undesirable securities,1463 “inventory risk” during periods of 
market stress,1464 an inability to acquire and “transact in” certain underlying or 
illiquid assets,1465 and conflicts when acting as dealers in the underlying asset 
market (especially for less liquid assets like bonds).1466 Price dislocation risk is 
 
1459
 See Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded 
Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 853 (2018) (hereinafter “Hu & Morley 1”); See Henry T.C. Hu 
& John Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Commendable Start 
and a Welcome Invitation, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1196 (2019) (hereinafter “Hu & Morley 
2”) 
1460
 See Ayan Bhattachaya & Maureen O’Hara, ETFs and Systemic Risks, CFA INSTITUTE 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION BRIEF (January 2020) at 5, available at https://www.cfainstitute.org/-
/media/documents/article/rf-brief/etfs-and-systemic-risks.ashx (“For instance, if the ETF is 
trading at a premium, authorized participants would sell short the ETF while simultaneously 
buying the underlying securities. At the end of the day, authorized participants would deliver 
the basket of securities to the sponsor in exchange for ETF shares, thus closing out the short 
position for a profit.”) 
1461
 See Gerry Frigon, ETFs are Exacerbating Market Volatility, FORBES (April 28, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2020/04/28/etfs-are-exacerbating-market-
volatility/#783c7532477e. 
1462
 See Johnson, supra note 1457 (“The March 12 closing prices for Vanguard Total Bond 
Market Index ETF (BND), iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF (AGG), and Schwab U.S. 
Aggregate Bond ETF (SCHZ) represented respective discounts to the funds' NAVs of 6.2%, 
4.4%, and 6.3%.”) 
1463
 See Clements, New Funds, supra note 1458 at 30-32. 
1464
 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION SUBCOMMITTEE ON ETFS AND BOND 
FUNDS, Report on the Design of Exchange- Traded Funds and Bond Funds—Implications for 
Fund Investors and Underlying Security Markets under Stressful Conditions. Prepared for the 
Fixed Income Market Structure Advisory Committee (2019), at 19, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fixed-income-advisory-committee/etfs-and-bond-funds-
subcommittee-report-041519.pdf (hereinafter “SEC Bond Subcommittee”). 
1465
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Bluefin Trading, LLC on File No. S7-15-18 (October 19, 
2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4544409-176131.htm 
(“Bluefin Comment Letter”) 
1466
 See Kevin Pan & Yao Zeng, ETF Arbitrage Under Liquidity Mismatch 2, EUROPEAN 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD WORKING PAPER NO. 59 (2017), 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srk:srkwps:201759. 
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a significant factor that can affect ETF investor portfolio performance.1467 Rule 
6c-11 did not prescribe a minimum number of APs per ETF to perform the 
arbitrage function,1468 despite expressed concerns about arbitrage and market 
making instability in stressed markets, and potential “anticompetitive behavior” 
due to AP concentration.1469 Yet to compare ETFs side by side one must assess 
the arbitrage robustness of individual ETFs, a task which is very difficult.1470 
 
A critical case study in ETF price dislocation, and the fragility of AP 
arbitrage in a crisis, is the recent market sell-off associated with the coronavirus 
pandemic. Severe NAV discounts emerged in ETFs in March 2020 as the market 
priced in the significance of the pandemic.1471 Corporate bond ETFs in U.S. and 
European markets (most noticeably high-yield credit ETFs) were particularly 
affected, with ETF secondary market prices dropping precipitously below their 
NAV.1472  Some of the discounts were “historic” such as the Vanguard Total 
Bond Market ETF, which traded 6.2 percent below its NAV in March,1473 and 
the BlackRock iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF which 
traded at a 5 percent discount to NAV.1474 Even normally “ultra-stable” short-
maturity bond ETFs experienced historic single day losses, with Bloomberg 
 
1467
 See BOCCONI STUDENT INVESTMENT CLUB, Investing in the ETF Era, (March 3, 2019), 
https://bsic.it/investing-in-the-etf-era/. 
1468
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 54.  
1469
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Jane Street Capital, LLC on File No. S7-15-18 (October 
19, 2018), at 5-6, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467045-
175801.pdf (“Jane Street Comment Letter”); Bluefin Comment Letter, supra note 1465. 
1470
 See Hu & Morley 1, supra note 1459 at 892-900; Clements, supra note 1458 at 31-32. 
1471
 See Gillian Tett, ETFs are the canary in the bond coal mine, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 29, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6bdc7747-3ab9-4410-a4b2-ba9acbe204e8; Lewis Braham, 
Emerging Market ETF Pricing Another Victim of the Coronavirus Outbreak, BARRON’S 
(March 26, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/emerging-market-etf-pricing-another-
victim-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak-51585217700; Ryan Clements, What Have We Learned So 
Far About ETFs In The COVID-19 Crisis? DUKE FINREG BLOG (April 3, 2020), 
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/04/03/what-have-we-learned-so-far-about-etfs-in-the-
covid-19-crisis/; Andrea Riquier, ETFS behaving badly: ‘exactly what they are supposed to do’ 
or ‘just what we feared’? MARKETWATCH (March 28, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-to-think-about-the-turbulence-in-etf-pricing-
and-heres-what-to-do-about-it-2020-03-27. 
1472
 See Sirio Aramonte & Fernando Avalos, The recent distress in corporate bond markets: 
cues from ETFs, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BULLETIN NO. 6 (April 14, 2020), 
1-4, available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull06.pdf.  
1473 See Dawn Lim, Bond ETFs Flash Warning Signs of Growing Mismatch, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (March 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bond-etfs-flash-warning-
signs-of-growing-mismatch-11584964801; 
1474
 See Katherine Greifeld, Fed Lifeline Saves Bond Funds Teetering on Brink of ETF Hell, 
BLOOMBERG (March 28, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-28/fed-
lifeline-shields-bond-funds-teetering-on-brink-of-etf-hell. 
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reporting that during peak volume “roughly 70 fixed-income ETFs were trading 
with at least a 5% discount to their net asset value, and 16 traded at a discount of 
10% or greater.”1475 Bond ETF discounts emerged because APs and market 
makers stopped performing arbitrage in credit ETF during the sell-off as bonds 
became “difficult to unload.”1476 Massive discounts (as high as 15 percent) also 
surfaced in emerging market ETFs.1477 
 
These massive price dislocations persisted in credit ETFs until the 
Federal Reserve intervened with its Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
(SMCCF), 1478  at which point ETF prices realigned with their underlying 
NAV. 1479  The SMCCF included an unprecedented act of purchasing credit 
ETFs.1480  The impetus for this unheralded move by the Fed was to “restore 
order” between corporate credit and ETF markets, and remedy the steep price 
“inconsistencies” that had emerged in the latter.1481  The Fed’s foray into ETFs 
was controversial since BlackRock (the world’s largest ETF sponsor) was tasked 
to oversee purchases, despite a clear conflict being able to purchase its own 
funds.1482  In the first two months after the SMCCF, over half of the ETFs 
purchased by the government (mostly from large banks and investment 
companies) were BlackRock products, and this created a corresponding surge of 
$2.9 billion of new investor funds into BlackRock’s flagship investment grade 
 
1475
 See Brian Chappatta, Bond ETFs Will Never Be The Same After Coronavirus, 
BLOOMBERG OPINION (March 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-
03-23/coronavirus-bond-etfs-will-never-be-the-same-after-this-crisis. 
1476
 See Katherine Greifeld & Luke Kawa, Fed’s Historic Step Into Credit Markets May Cure 
ETF Dislocations, BLOOMBERG (March 23, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-23/fed-credit-backstop-fuels-surge-in-
investment-grade-bond-etfs. 
1477
 See Lewis Braham, Emerging Market ETF Pricing Another Victim of the Coronavirus 
Outbreak, BARRON’S (March 26, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/emerging-market-
etf-pricing-another-victim-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak-51585217700 
1478
 FEDERAL RESERVE, POLICY TOOLS, SECONDARY MARKET CORPORATE CREDIT FACILITY, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm (last visited June 28, 2020). 
1479
 See Katherine Greifeld, One Month of Fed ETF Buying Redraws $4 Trillion Market 
Contours, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-
16/a-month-of-fed-bond-etf-buying-and-what-it-did-to-markets. 
1480
 See Andrea Riquier, The Fed is Going to Buy ETFs. What Does It Mean? MARKETWATCH 
(March 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fed-is-going-to-buy-etfs-what-
does-it-mean-2020-03-23. 
1481
 See Greifeld & Kawa, supra note 1476. 
1482
 See Richard Henderson & Robin Wigglesworth, Fed’s big boost for BlackRock raises 
eyebrows on Wall Street, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 27, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/08b897a5-aadb-40d7-922c-431154ed968a. 
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credit ETF.1483  Also, with BlackRock at the helm, the Fed purchased hundreds 
of millions of dollars of BlackRock high-yield (junk-bond) ETFs.1484  
 
In a recent publication, I identified the similarities between ETFs and 
instabilities in Auction Rate Securities (ARS) market in 2008, and portfolio 
insurance in 1987.1485 The coronavirus pandemic strengthens both comparisons. 
First, the ARS market failed when financial intermediaries stopped providing 
liquidity support (they were under no legal obligation to do so) as their internal 
risk profile changed because of losses incurred from the crisis.1486  In an April 
2020 report, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) noted that ETF 
arbitrage was similarly impaired during the sell-off because dealers managed 
their own risks by providing “less support to corporate bond liquidity” in an 
attempt to “preserve balance sheet capacity in a context of increasing 
uncertainty.”1487 Dealers wouldn’t take on additional credit risk, and they also 
widened their bid-ask spreads on underlying bonds, which contributed to steep 
price NAV discounts.1488  Both ARS and ETF arbitrage breakdown show that 
discretionary liquidity is fragile in a crisis when it’s needed most.  
 
Next, as noted above, the coronavirus pandemic resulted in significant 
price dislocations from NAV in credit and emerging market ETFs.1489 Also, as 
mentioned, AP arbitrageurs didn’t quickly step in to remedy the discounts 
because of the difficulty (and opacity) operating in the underlying market.1490 
The breakdown of arbitrage in ETFs (at a time when it was needed) recalls the 
state of the market on October 19, 1987 as index futures and cash prices 
exhibited a significant decoupling when normally present arbitrageurs retreated 
since they couldn’t accurately assess prices in the midst of the panic.1491 
 
1483
 See Matthew Boesler, Katherine Greifeld & Catarina Saraiva, Fed Reveals ETFs It 
Purchased in Emergency Lending Program, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-29/fed-reveals-which-etfs-it-purchased-in-
emergency-lending-program. 
1484
 Id.  
1485
 See Clements, supra note 1458 at 45-51.  
1486
 Id. at 49-51. 
1487
 Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 1472 at 4. 
1488
 Id.  
1489
 See Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 1472 at 1-4. 
1490
 See Greifeld & Luke Kawa supra note 1476. 
1491
 See Clements, supra note 1458 at 45-49; Floyd Norris, A Computer Lesson Still 
Unlearned, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2012),https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/business/a-
computer-lesson-from-1987-stillunlearned-by-wall-street.html; Mark Carlson, Fed. Red. Bd., 
2007-13, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE 
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When comparing ETFs, an investor must look beyond historical returns, 
and evaluate the extent an ETF’s performance accurately reflects the underlying 
index it seeks to replicate.1492 Performance deviation of an ETF from its index is 
a “replication risk,” also commonly known as “tracking error.”1493 If an ETF 
consistently incurs tracking errors, then the “set it and forget it” investment ethos 
that powers passive indexing is largely undermined.1494 Also, an investor needs 
to know the tracking errors of similarly named ETFs in order to compare 
products and make suitable investment decisions.  
 
For example, a low fee ETF with significant tracking error will cause 
returns to deviate from what an investor otherwise expects.1495 Year over year 
tracking errors have been reported in ETFs benchmarking high yield bonds,1496 
and emerging market indices.1497 The annual percentage lag of an ETF relative 
to its tracked index has also been called a “hidden” or “extra fee” that many 
investors may not even be aware of at all, and should be added to an ETF’s 
expense ratio as an “effective cost” to fully assess a fund.1498  The factors that 
influence ETF tracking errors are diverse and include share repurchases and 
issuances, seasonal influences, spin-offs, index replication strategy and 
revisions, fund size, stock consolidation, dividend policy, seasonal factors, and 
premiums and discounts to net asset value. 1499  A recent working paper by 
scholars at the NYU Stern School of Business and St. John’s University suggests, 
however, that the “major determinants” in ETF performance differentials for 
 
FEDERAL RESERVE RESPONSE IN FINANCE AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, DIV. OF RES. STAT. 
& MONETARY AFFAIRS (Nov. 2006), at 11-12. 
1492
 See Eric Fontinelle, ETF Tracking Errors: Protect Your Returns, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/exchangetradedfunds/09/tracking-error-etf-funds.asp 
1493
 Id.; see Michaela Dorocáková, Comparison of ETF´s performance related to the tracking 
error, 10(4) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 154, 158 (2017)  
1494
 See Ortel, Kovarsky & Puca, supra note 1448. 
1495
 Fontinelle, supra note 1492. 
1496
 See Lisa Abramowicz, Uncovering a Hidden Junk-Bond ETF Fee, BLOOMBERG OPINION 
(August 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-08-18/an-extra-fee-may-
be-hiding-in-that-junk-bond-etf-cost. 
1497
 Ortel, Kovarsky & Puca, supra note 1448. 
1498
 Abramowicz, supra note 1496; see Steve Johnson, Why ‘tracking difference’ is a vital 
metric for passive ETFs, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 27, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/80917014-0d39-438c-b3b8-cb645d3c2a43. 
1499
 Dorocáková, supra note 1493 at 154, 158-160. 
 
 
 
202 
funds that track similar indices are “the number of passive funds in the same 
family” as well as “the amount of securities lending they do.”1500 
 
Tracking error must also be viewed “in context” because it can arise due 
to numerous factors including costs and chosen replication methods,1501 and cash 
management and settlement activities.1502 One of the reasons that tracking errors 
are prevalent in ETFs is because many indices are based on “market 
capitalization” and the number of securities per company are routinely in flux 
(given changes in value of the constituent shares). 1503  Another factor that 
generates tracking errors are diversification rules that prevent an individual stock 
to comprise more than twenty five percent of the ETF’s underlying portfolio.1504 
This is a particular problem for niche or specialized sector funds where its 
tracked index may not have similar constraints.1505 Trading and management 
fees also create tracking error.1506  
 
Further, ETFs that use physical replication have been noted as being 
more prone to tracking error than those synthetically replicated with 
derivatives.1507 Large samples (approaching full physical replication) are costly 
but reduce tracking error.1508 As a result, “sampling” methods are often enhanced 
synthetically for optimization.1509 Finally, an ETF has a constant “trade-off” 
between minimized costs and ensuring efficient tracking, and as will be shown 
below, efforts to minimize tracking errors can result in larger trading premiums 
and discounts.1510 
 
 
1500
 See Elton, Gruber & de Souza, supra note 1419 at 28. 
1501
 Fedorova, supra note 1417. 
1502
 See infra Part I(ii)If); see Comment Letter to SEC of Deschert LLP on File No. S7-15-18 
(September 28, 2018), at 3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4458072-175786.pdf (“Dechert Comment Letter”), (“Specifically, without the ability to place 
T-1 orders, the following undesirable consequences could ensue: (i) ETFs would have cash 
received in a creation order remain uninvested for a day, thus hampering the ETFs ability to 
achieve its investment objective (and increasing index tracking error for index-based ETFs) for 
that day.”) 
1503
 See Fontinelle, supra note 1492. 
1504
 See Exchange Act, supra note 1425 at Section 11(d)(1), Rule 4e-5; Dechert Comment 
Letter, supra note 1502 at 10-11. 
1505
 Fontinelle, supra note 1492. 
1506
 Id. 
1507
 See Bourgi, supra note 1441. 
1508
 See Bocconis, supra note 1446. 
1509
 Id.  
1510
 See infra Part I(b)(i). 
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The universe of tracked indices seems ever-expanding and now features 
many thousands of product choices amongst asset (and multi-asset) classes, 
sectors, industries (including novel types like blockchain and cannabis), region 
and multi-regions, countries, commodities, currencies, a variety of credit themes 
(like bond type and duration), alternatives, and “styles” including volatility, 
factoring, inverse and leveraged.1511 The modern proliferation of ETFs has also 
given rise to emerging concerns contesting whether index funds are in-fact 
“passive.” 1512  Illuminating research from Professor Adrianna Robertson has 
revealed that “passive” ETFs aren’t passive at all, but rather what she calls 
“delegated management.”1513 Robertson shows, that despite the vast majority of 
ETF’s having a “primary objective” of tracking an index,1514  a “substantial 
fraction” of such ETFs track a bespoke index created by the ETF manager or an 
affiliate.1515 She warns, given this compositional “heterogeneity,” that investors 
should proceed cautiously when assessing “baselines” or benchmarks as 
measurement mechanisms. 1516  More troubling, Robertson finds empirical 
support, warranting more investigation, that ETF managers may take advantage 
of “unsophisticated” investors by displaying similar management fees as other 
ETFs (a metric investors are often attuned to) but including the costs of affiliate 
licensing in more opaque expense ratios.1517 
 
b. Variable Financial, Operational & Management Practices  
 
This subsection will show how ETF sponsors use non-standardized and 
inconsistent NAV calculation methodologies; outline problems when APs utilize 
customized baskets in their arbitrage activities; assess difficulties in determining 
 
1511
 See ETFDB.COM, ETF Directory, https://etfdb.com/etfs/ (last visited July 11, 2020).  
1512
 See Robertson, supra note 1440. 
1513
 See id. at 796-798 (“Rather than being passive in any meaningful sense, index investing 
simply represents a form of delegated management, whereby the investor (the principal) 
empowers a delegee (her agent) to make decisions on her behalf. Instead of being truly passive, 
tracking an index almost always implies choosing a managed portfolio.”) 
1514
 See id. at 833, Robertson reports that out of a sample of 571 U.S. ETFs, 553 of them were 
“index based” or designed to track a particular index – see id. fn.139. 
1515
 See id. at 833, 836. 
1516
 See id. at 797-798, 805-806. 
1517
 See id. at 834-835 (“Ultimately, I find evidence most consistent with the second 
explanation--that managers are taking advantage of the popularity of ETFs and that investors 
are primarily concerned with management fees.”); see at 841. 
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daily ETF portfolio compositions; identify structural distinctions across ETFs; 
highlight challenges for investors when comparing fees and liquidity in ETF 
peers; note the opacity in securities lending profit pass-throughs; and identify 
several variable cash management and liquidity operations of ETF sponsors.  
 
 
In order to accurately evaluate and compare ETFs, an investor must know 
a fund’s NAV per share (which when calculated during the trading day is called 
“intraday indicative value or “IIV”).1518 A fundamental challenge for investors 
comparing ETFs is that there isn’t a standardized methodology for calculating 
IIV, and as noted by the SEC it can be “calculated in different and potentially 
inconsistent ways.” 1519  ETF analyst Elisabeth Kashner has argued that 
conflicting NAV calculation methods make it extremely difficult to undertake a 
true side-by-side ETF performance comparison.1520  Kashner notes, “NAVs can 
be designed to minimize calculated tracking difference or premium / discount” 
and suggests that choosing one method eliminates an ETFs ability to minimize 
the other.1521   
 
She posits that ETF performance comparisons are at times “impossible” 
because, due to often undisclosed calculation methodologies, “return difference 
might be explained by FX conversion times rather than economic exposure.”1522 
In support of her argument she shows how two ETFs (Schwab Emerging Markets 
 
1518
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 61-63. 
1519
 Id. at 63. 
1520
 Elisabeth Kashner, Will the Real ETF Valuation Metric Please Stand Up, FACTSET 
(March 21, 2019), https://insight.factset.com/will-the-real-etf-valuation-metric-please-stand-
up; Elisabeth Kashner, The Wild West of ETF Performance, ETF.COM (March 22, 2019), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/wild-west-etf-performance?nopaging= 
(identifying an “end of day” valuation methodology to “align strike times with capital market 
closings” and an alternative valuation methodology based on “synchronizing with benchmark 
valuation”). 
1521
 Kashner, Will the Real, supra note 1520 (“For two-thirds of all U.S. ETFs, the choice is a 
bitter one. Aligning strike times with capital market closings minimizes premiums/discounts 
but can wreak havoc with tracking difference. Synchronizing with benchmark valuation 
tightens tracking difference but blows out premium/discount results.”); See Elton, Gruber & de 
Souza, supra note 1419 at 7. 
1522
 Kashner, Will the Real, supra note 1520. 
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Equity ETF1523 and Invesco PureBeta FTSE Emerging Markets ETF1524) which 
both track the FTSE Emerging Index, have different NAV calculation methods 
and significantly similar underlying portfolios, and that this is commonly the 
case for a variety of ETF styles across fund issuers.1525 Kashner suggests the 
only viable solution is a standardized requirement for both NAV calculation 
methods. 1526  Unfortunately, the SEC did not mandate a standardized NAV 
calculation methodology (or address the two prongs noted by Kashner) in Rule 
6c-11.1527 IIV calculation variability was also identified by investment manager 
Eaton Vance in their comment letter to Rule 6c-11, who called on the SEC to 
adapt better disclosure requirements for how ETFs calculate their daily NAV.1528 
Eaton Vance advocated that without more context and description on how an 
ETF calculates its NAV, “the utility of its premium/discount disclosures 
significantly diminishes.”1529  
 
 
Rule 6c-11 increased the flexibility of APs to negotiate and deliver 
customized asset baskets (including baskets comprised of cash), which may not 
align, pro rata, with disclosed ETF portfolio holdings, in the redemption and 
 
1523
 See Schwab, Emerging Markets Equity ETF, https://www.schwabfunds.com/products/sche 
(accessed July 1, 2020). 
1524
 See Invesco, PureBetaSM FTSE Emerging Markets ETF, 
https://www.invesco.com/us/financial-products/etfs/product-detail?productId=ETF-PBEE 
(accessed July 1, 2020). 
1525
 Kashner, Will the Real, supra note 1520 (Kaschner identifies that Vanguard, Invesco, First 
Trust, VanEck, ProShares and JP Morgan normally apply “end of day” valuation 
methodologies to “align strike times with capital market closes” while BlackRock, State Street 
Global Advisors (SPDR), Charles Schwab, WisdomTree, PIMCO and Northern Trust 
synchronize their valuations with benchmark valuations.) 
1526
 Id. 
1527
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 discussion at 64-66; see infra Part III(i). 
1528
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Eaton Vance Corp. on File No. S7-15-18 (October 4, 
2018), at 10, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4486351-
175882.pdf (“Eaton Vance Comment Letter.”)(“As part of the current rulemaking process, we 
believe the Commission should consider adopting requirements for ETFs to better disclose how 
they calculate daily NAVs. We are aware of two significant differences in valuation practices 
among ETF sponsors: (a) whether the ETF normally values portfolio holdings that trade on 
markets that are closed at the time the ETF’s NAV is determined (generally 4:00 PM eastern 
time) based on local market closing prices (Local Close Pricing) or whether the ETF routinely 
adjusts valuations from local market closing prices to reflect subsequent market movements 
(Fair Value Pricing); and (b) whether the ETF’s fixed income holdings are generally valued at 
the bid side of the market (Bid Pricing) or at the midpoint of the bid‐ask spread (Mid Pricing)”) 
1529
 Id. 
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creation process.1530 The use of customized baskets is intended to make ETF 
arbitrage, creations and redemptions more efficient,1531 and alleviate the “day to 
day frictions” associated with APs procuring an ETF’s constituent holdings 
(which vary in availability).1532 It’s also said to facilitate faster redemptions and 
creations.1533 The problem, however, is that the new rule could benefit large 
financial institutions to the detriment of retail investors since it may exacerbate 
tracking error if an ETF sponsor accepts cash or other collateral that doesn’t 
match the index.1534  It could also create a conflict, which might harm ETF 
investors, if an AP either “cherry-picked” (pressured the ETF sponsor to give 
them desirable securities during a redemption) or “dumped” (pressured the ETF 
sponsor to accept securities they otherwise want to liquidate).1535  Customized 
baskets also introduce a form of “correlation risk” since the actual composition 
of the underlying basket could deviate from the index it tracks.1536 
 
An ETF sponsor that accepts cash in the basket delivery or redemption 
process potentially introduces tracking error, unless the cash is quickly 
reinvested in the constituent index securities.1537  A December 2019 study by the 
Bank of Canada indicated that cash substitution was a growing trend in U.S. 
credit ETFs before the coronavirus crisis, especially for new ETF issuers.1538  
 
1530
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 80-81. The rule does, however, establish requirements 
on the APs who wish to use custom baskets (“In addition, as proposed, the rule will provide an 
ETF with flexibility to use “custom baskets” if the ETF has adopted written policies and 
procedures that: (i) set forth detailed parameters for the construction and acceptance of custom 
baskets that are in the best interests of the ETF and its shareholders, including the process for 
any revisions to, or deviations from, those parameters; and (ii) specify the titles or roles of 
employees of the ETF’s investment adviser who are required to review each custom basket for 
compliance with those parameters.”) 
1531
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Flow Traders on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), at 1, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4462733-175818.pdf (“Flow 
Traders Letter”); SIFMA Comment Letter I, supra note 1425 at 6-7; Comment Letter to SEC 
of Oppenheimer Funds on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), at 2, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4462743-175820.pdf (“Oppenheimer Funds 
Comment Letter”) 
1532
 See Izabella Kaminska, A Little ETF Rule Change That Could Make A Big Difference, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (February 6, 2020) https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/02/05/1580899809000/A-
little-ETF-rule-change-that-could-make-a-big-difference/;  
1533
 Id. 
1534
 Id.  
1535
 Id.; see Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 82-83. 
1536
 See Kaminska, A Little ETF Rule, supra note 1532. 
1537
 See Izabella Kaminska, What’s Really In Your ETF Basket? FINANCIAL TIMES (February 
9, 2020) - https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/02/07/1581077071000/What-s-really-in-your-ETF-
basket--/. 
1538
See Rohan Arora, Sebastien Betermier, Guillaume Ouellet Leblanc, Adriano Palumbo & 
Ryan Shotlander, Creations and Redemptions in Fixed-Income Exchange-Traded Funds: A 
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When fixed-income ETFs utilize cash for redemptions or creations they depart 
from an “in-kind” transfer model, and this “transfers the liquidity risk from the 
ETFs to the authorized participants (APs), which are typically financial 
institutions.”1539 Cash redemption, however, creates liquidity risk, and a “first 
mover” problem because of the potential for “redemption runs” if an underlying 
basket of securities deteriorates in quality and liquidity (a phenomenon which 
isn’t present in an in-kind model).1540 It’s been argued that ETF disclosures don’t 
effectively capture how this liquidity risk gets “transferred” from dealers to ETF 
investors when ETF sponsors accept cash redemptions.1541.  
 
In the early days of the ETF industry, AP customized basket delivery was 
common; however, after 2006 the SEC levied restrictions on basket delivery 
composition “requiring they generally corresponded pro rata to the advertised 
portfolio holdings.”1542 Also, basket customization is common in European ETF 
markets. 1543  Rule 6c-11 affirmed the longstanding requirement for ETFs to 
prominently disclose on their websites portfolio holdings, in a standardized 
format, used to calculate an ETF’s NAV, and such information would be 
“publicly available and free of charge.” 1544  Standardized disclosure of ETF 
portfolio holdings garnered much industry support, 1545  although there were 
 
Shift From Bonds To Cash, BANK OF CANADA STAFF ANALYTICAL NOTE 2019-34 (December 
2019), available at https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/12/staff-analytical-note-2019-34/. 
1539
 Id.  
1540
 Id. (“When ETF shares are redeemed in kind, the fund manager delivers a basket of bonds 
and does not have to liquidate its bonds to meet investors’ requests to redeem. Consequently, 
the first-mover advantage, in which investors have an incentive to redeem ahead of others, does 
not exist in the in-kind model.”) 
1541
 See Kaminska, What’s Really, supra note 1537. 
1542
 Kaminska, A Little ETF Rule, supra note 1532; see Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 81-82. 
1543
 See Kaminska, What’s Really, supra note 1537. 
1544
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 68 & 97. 
1545
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Stuart Cary on File No. S7-15-18 (July 3, 2018), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-3996593-167212.htm (“Cary Comment 
Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of Dave Nadig, Managing Director of ETF.com on File No. 
S7-15-18 (August 28, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
173138.htm (“ETF.com Comment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of Jack Reagan on File 
No.S7-15-18  (July 12, 2018) available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4042310-168701.htm (“Reagan Comment Letter”); BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 
1451 at 13-14; Comment Letter to SEC of CBOE Global Markets on File No. S7-15-18 
(October 1, 2018), at 3-4, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4467060-175843.pdf (“CBOE Comment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of BNY Mellon on 
File No. S7-15-18 (July 3, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-
18/s71518-4445496-175723.pdf (“BNY Mellon Comment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of 
Fidelity Investments on File No. S7-15-18 (September 28, 2018) at 3, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4460527-175805.pdf (“Fidelity Comment 
Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of Charles Schwab Investment Management on File No. S7-
15-18 (October 1, 2018) at 6-7, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
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concerns about the potential to “front run” or “piggy-backing” on portfolio 
disclosures.1546 Rule 6c-11 does not, however, require ETF issuers to disclose 
their customized baskets. 1547  In addition to citing increased costs, the SEC 
suggested that customized basket creation and redemption information is 
available from the National Securities Clearing Corporation, the AP, or an ETF 
itself.1548 This may be a tenuous justification, however, since retail investors 
incur significant costs and difficulties obtaining this information; as such, it’s 
been suggested that the rule creates a “privileged access” that favors investment 
institutions over investors.1549 
 
 
While ETFs may share the arbitrage mechanism, there is variation on the 
most common structures. Structure is important when ETFs track similar 
underlying assets because of distinctions in governance, internal operations (like 
securities lending), dividends, use of derivatives, cash management, taxation, 
termination dates, which can affect performance (NAV premiums and discounts 
and index tracking errors).1550 The most common ETF structure in the U.S. is the 
“open-end fund”1551 - the same classification as mutual funds registered under 
the ICA1552 with additional parameters under the Securities Act of 19331553 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1554  Other ETF structures include Unit 
Investment Trusts (UIT), Grantor Trusts, Limited Partnerships (LPs), C 
 
4465587-175824.pdf (“CSIM Comment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of Virtu Financial 
on File No. S7-15-18 (October 3, 2018), at 3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
15-18/s71518-4480209-175867.pdf (“Virtu Comment Letter”) ; See Eaton Vance Comment 
Letter, supra note 1528 at 3-4. 
1546
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 69; Invesco Comment Letter, supra note 1425 at 14. 
1547
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 94 (“After considering comments, however, the 
Commission is not including a basket publication requirement in rule 6c-11.”) 
1548
 Id. at 95. 
1549
 Kaminska, A Little Rule, supra note 1532. 
1550
 See Aaron Levitt, The 7 Different ETF Structures, ETFDB.COM (April 20, 2016), 
https://etfdb.com/portfolio-management/the-7-different-etf-structures/; see supra Part I(i)(b) & 
(c). 
1551
 Id.; See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 154 (“ETFs are predominantly structured as open-
end funds.”) 
1552
 See supra note 1425.  
1553
 Id.  
1554
 Id.; see Dechert Comment Letter, supra note 1502 at 7-8 (“the ETF structure – in which 
ETFs simultaneously issue new shares on a continuous basis while the ETF’s shares trade on 
an exchange – is not specifically contemplated by the Exchange Act.  Accordingly, ETFs 
generally seek relief from certain Exchange Act sections and rules.”) 
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Corporations, and Exchange Traded Managed Funds (ETMFs).1555 Related are 
exchange traded notes (ETNs), which are unsecured debt instruments that 
provide a return based on an underlying reference or index.1556  
 
Another particular structural distinction is the idiosyncratic nature of 
Vanguard’s “share class” design which, as noted by Professors Henry Hu and 
John Morley may confer some advantages on the company.1557  They state, “[a] 
share class ETF can be created when a conventional mutual fund issues a new 
class of shares to be traded on an exchange and purchased and redeemed in a 
process resembling the creation and redemption process for an ETF.”1558 They 
add that share class ETFs may have advantages over other funds including “the 
ability to spread costs over a larger pool of assets,” and “the ability to manage 
cash more efficiently” against a wide redemption pool.1559 
 
 
ETFs are commonly marketed for their “low cost” value proposition.1560 
They are generally “cheaper” than mutual funds,1561 with lower administrative 
costs.1562  Fees in ETFs are extremely competitive across fund companies, and 
are effectively a very small proportion of assets under management.1563 Some 
scholars, however, posit that this hyper-competitive fee environment is 
contributing to ETF sponsors underinvesting in governance and stewardship, and 
excessively deferring to corporate managers. 1564  Yet there are also “hidden 
 
1555
 See Levitt, supra note 1550. 
1556
 Id.; See Akane Otani & Sebastian Pellejero, Bankrupt in Just Two Weeks’ – Individual 
Investors Get Burned by Collapse of Complex Securities, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 1, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankrupt-in-just-two-weeksindividual-investors-get-
burned-by-collapse-of-complex-securities-11591020059. 
1557
 See Hu & Morley 1, supra note 1459 at 883. 
1558
 See Hu & Morley 2, supra note 1459 at 1168.  
1559
 Id. at 1168-1169. 
1560
 See AJ Horch, Here’s Why Investors Started Pouring Trillions into Exchange Traded 
Funds, CNBC (May 29, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/29/why-investors-are-pouring-
trillions-into-exchange-traded-funds.html 
1561
 Mutual funds have been criticized in recent scholarship as levying excessive fees to the 
detriment of investors, see Stewart Brown & Steven Pomerantz, Some Clarity on Mutual Fund 
Fees, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 767, 812 (2018)  
1562
 Stoyan Bojinov, Why are ETFs so Much Cheaper Than Mutual Funds, ETFDB.COM (June 
24, 2015), https://etfdb.com/etf-education/etfs-vs-mutual-funds-why-etfs-are-cheaper/. 
1563
 See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2054-2055 (2019). 
1564
 See id at 2055, 2057-2058  
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costs” in ETFs that investors must understand in order to make effective product 
comparisons.1565 Some of these may be opaque or unfamiliar like advisory and 
index licensing fees.1566   
 
In order to compare ETFs side-by-side it’s necessary to look at “costs in context” 
across similar funds.1567 To do so, an ETF investor must first identify the index 
replication method an ETF issuer is using for a fund.1568 For example, if an ETF 
issuer is using an “optimization” or sampling method to lower costs, then the 
index isn’t fully replicated.1569 As a result, a sampling-style ETF risks incurring 
tracking errors (which is a “hidden” cost for an ETF investor) if the excluded 
securities outperform, resulting in a chosen ETF sample deviating from its 
benchmark index.1570 In making a relative cost assessment between funds it is 
also necessary to understand “turnover” as this can increase commission 
expenses in an ETF.1571 
 
ETF price dislocations from NAV (premiums or discounts) highlighted 
above,1572 also create an overlooked cost for ETF investors.1573 In other words, 
if an investor purchases an ETF at a premium (and / or sells the ETF at a 
discount) this acts as a significant cost against an investor’s “realized return.”1574  
A 2016 Journal of Portfolio Management study showed that during periods of 
ETF price dislocation “deviations from NAV are often much greater than the 
 
1565
 See Bocconis, supra note 1446. 
1566
 See Robertson, supra note 1440 at 837-841. 
1567
 See Justin Kuepper, Three Tips for Reading an ETF Prospectus, ETFDB.COM (October 20, 
2016), https://etfdb.com/portfolio-management/three-tips-for-reading-an-etf-prospectus/. 
1568
 Fedorova, supra note 1417. 
1569
 Id. 
1570
 See Ben Johnson & Christine Benz, Don’t Overlook These Hidden ETF Costs, 
MORNINGSTAR (March 14, 2017), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/796870/dont-
overlook-these-hidden-etf-costs. (highlighting how such “sampling error” manifested in the 
BlackRock iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF.) 
1571
 Id.; see Kuepper, supra note 1567. 
1572
 See supra Part I(a)(ii).  
1573
 See Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 8-9 (“Accordingly, we believe the 
cost to buy or sell an ETF’s shares is appropriately measured by the difference between an 
investor’s all‐in purchase or sale price and the value per share of the fund’s net assets at the 
time the trade price is determined. Over an investor’s full holding period, his or her trading 
costs sum to the difference between the return of the ETF itself over the period and the 
investor’s realized return. In addition to any commissions that apply, the cost to buy an ETF 
includes the premium to current value at which shares are acquired, and the cost to sell an ETF 
includes the discount from current value at which shares are sold.”) 
1574
 Id. at 9. 
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bid-ask spreads suggest.” 1575  Thus investors may not be aware of such 
“transaction costs” when they go to trade.1576  
 
ETFs that track the same index often have different expenses.1577  Recent 
research has revealed that higher fee ETFs can not only survive, but thrive, if 
they are more liquid in the secondary market than their lower fee 
counterparts.1578 For example, the study notes that State Street Global Advisors 
SYP ETF (that tracks the S&P 500) has nearly twice the assets under 
management, twenty times the daily trading volume, and ten times higher 
turnover, despite being nearly twice as expensive as peer indexes tracking the 
S&P 500.1579 This is because higher fee, more liquid ETFs, attract shorter-term 
traders who are “relatively insensitive to the fee,” and this has significant 
implications for investors because when multiple ETFs compete around the same 
index, secondary market liquidity is spread between the competing funds.1580  
The authors posit that since liquidity originates in the secondary market, and is 
not controlled by the ETF issuer, there is a form of “prisoner’s dilemma” 
between investors, and a “first mover” advantage for ETF sponsors.1581 Most 
notably they identify an opportunity for an ETF sponsor to “extract a rent (via 
 
1575
 See J.J. Angel, T.J. Broms & G.L. Gastineau, ETF Transaction Costs Are Often Higher 
Than Investors Realize, 42(3) JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 55 (2016), available at 
https://jpm.pm-research.com/content/42/3/65.full. 
1576
 Id.; see Antti Petajisto, Inefficiencies in the Pricing of Exchange-Traded Funds, 73(1) 
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 24, 24 (2017) available at 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/financial-analysts-journal/2017/inefficiencies-in-the-
pricing-of-exchange-traded-funds (“the difference between [an ETF's] share price and the value 
of the underlying portfolio is often economically significant, indicating that the unsophisticated 
investor may face an unexpected additional cost when trading ETFs.”); see Eaton Vance 
Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 9 (“variations in ETF premiums and discounts often 
contribute far more to the trading costs paid by ETF investors than commissions, bid‐ask 
spreads and market impact combined.”) 
1577
 This phenomenon is clearly evident when you compare the fees of three large ETFs which 
track the same S&P 500 Index. The Vanguard S&P 500 ETF (VOO) has an expense ratio of 
0.03% (see Vanguard S&P 500 ETF, https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/profile/fees/voo, 
accessed July 7, 2020); The BlackRock iShares Core S&P 500 ETF has an expense ratio of 
0.03% (see BlackRock iShares Core S&P 500 ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239726/ishares-core-sp-500-etf, accessed July 7, 2020); 
and the State Street Global Advisors SPDR® S&P 500® ETF Trust has an expense ratio of 
0.0945% (see SPDR® S&P 500® ETF Trust, 
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/funds/spdr-sp-500-etf-trust-spy, accessed July 7, 
2020). 
1578
 See Marta Khomyn, Talis J. Putnins & Marius Zoican, The Value of ETF Liquidity, 
EUROPEAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION 2020 HELSINKI (March 26, 2020), available 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561531. 
1579
 Id. at 1. 
1580
 Id. at 2. 
1581
 Id. at 1-2. 
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their fee) from the liquidity externalities of their client.”1582  This research helps 
to illuminate why the largest ETFs can maintain relatively high fees despite a 
“race to the bottom” in fee structures by new ETF issuers.1583 
 
 
Securities lending by ETF firms has significantly increased in the U.S. 
since the 2008 global financial crisis.1584 Securities lending, together with credit 
default swaps, were two principle factors in the downfall of AIG in the 2008 
crisis.1585 The practice has been described as both a “hidden source of return” for 
ETF sponsors,1586 and the “best-kept secret in the ETF business.”1587  Mutual 
funds and pensions often lend out the securities they hold, 1588  and this has 
particular appeal for short sellers in search of high demand stocks.1589  ETF 
investors may potentially benefit from fees generated from securities lending (in 
the form of reduced costs);1590 however, they are also exposed to new risks – like 
counterparty default, 1591  and potentially insufficient or “mismatched” 
collateral.1592  The amount of profit that passes through to ETF investors is 
 
1582
 Id. at 2. 
1583
 Id.  
1584
 See Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Securities Lending Boom Sparks Concerns on 
Returns and Voting, REUTERS (November 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-
lending-analysis/securities-lending-boom-sparks-concerns-on-returns-and-voting-
idUSKCN1ND0JA; Jessica Tasman-Jones, SJP Securities Lending More Than Doubles at 
Blackrock, PORTFOLIO ADVISER (August 14, 2019), https://portfolio-adviser.com/sjp-
securities-lending-more-than-doubles-at-blackrock/. 
1585
 See Robert McDonald & Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight, 29(2) J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 81, 81-95 (2015). 
1586
 See Lewis Braham, ETFs’ Hidden Source of Return – Securities Lending, BARRON’S 
(April 7, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/etfs-hidden-source-of-returnsecurities-
lending-1523054918. 
1587
 See Lara Crigger, Is Securities Lending Good For ETF Investors? ETF.COM (February 26, 
2018), https://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/securities-lending-good-etf-
investors?nopaging=1. 
1588
 Id.  
1589
 Id. 
1590
 See BLACKROCK, BlackRock Securities Lending, Unlocking The Potential of Portfolios 
(2019), available at https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/literature/brochure/us-retail-
securities-lending-brochure.pdf; 
1591
 See Christophe Hurlin, Grégoire Iseli, Christophe Perignon, & Stanley Yeung, The 
Counterparty Risk Exposure of ETF Investors, HEC PARIS RESEARCH PAPER NO. FIN-2014-
1050 (March 12, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462747. 
1592
 See BlackRock Securities Lending, supra note 1590; Attracta Mooney, Stock Lending By 
ETF Operators Worries Investors, FINANCIAL TIMES (February 4, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d4706b0e-e40a-11e7-a685-5634466a6915; See Adam 
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varied amongst ETF sponsors, and is not always clear from disclosures.1593  
Also, not all ETFs structures can use securities lending, for example it is 
prohibited in ETFs that are organized as UITs.1594 
 
Securities lending in ETFs can expose investors to many risks including 
losses from “mismatched” collateral, counter-party risk (relating to firms ETF 
sponsors lend securities to), and recovery risks, costs or delays if lent securities 
are difficult to trace in a borrower operational failure.1595  As a result, many ETF 
investors may want to know the extent, and details, of such activities by 
competing ETF sponsors when comparing products – beyond mere expense 
reduction. Consider an ETF investor looking to compare small capitalization 
ETFs trading on U.S. markets for their securities lending practices. Despite 
encountering overwhelming product choice ex ante,1596 our investor compares 
three small cap ETFs with the highest assets under management in this product 
segment from three ETF sponsors (Blackrock, Vanguard and Schwab).1597 None 
of the ETF’s websites, or fact sheets, contains information on securities 
lending.1598  The first mention of securities lending for BlackRock and Schwab 
is merely boilerplate, without fund specific details, and found in the summary 
prospectus (Vanguard’s summary prospectus was silent).1599 It is only in the 
exceedingly dense Statement of Additional Information (SAI), which aggregates 
 
McCullough, Examining the Risks and Rewards of Securities Lending, MORNINGSTAR 
(December 12, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/904334/examining-the-risks-and-
rewards-of-securities-lending. 
1593
 See Siobhan Riding, Fund Groups Challenged Over Securities Lending Practices, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/62946b2e-1a36-3bd9-9515-
f48dfda43b2a. 
1594
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 19; Levitt, supra note 1550. 
1595
 See Clements, supra note 1458 at 44-45. 
1596
 The effort to even isolate a suitable ETF in this category (small capitalization equity) 
highlights the “paradox of choice” discussed below, see infra Part II(c).  Industry aggregators 
ETF.com lists 130 small capitalization equity ETFs that trade in U.S. markets representing over 
$210 billion of assets under management, see ETF.com, Small Cap ETF Overview, 
https://www.etf.com/channels/small-cap-etfs (last accessed July 11, 2020).  
1597
 See BlackRock iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239774/ishares-core-sp-smallcap-etf; Vanguard Small-
Cap ETF, https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/profile/VB; Schwab U.S. Small-Cap ETF, 
https://www.schwabfunds.com/products/scha (all accessed July 7, 2020). 
1598
 Id.; See BlackRock IJR Fact Sheet (March 31, 2020), available from 
https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/fact-sheet/ijr-ishares-core-s-p-small-cap-etf-fund-fact-
sheet-en-us.pdf; Vanguard VB Fact Sheet (March 31, 2020), available from 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/iippdf/pdfs/FS969R.pdf, Schwab SCHA Fact Sheet (March 31, 
2020), available from https://www.schwabfunds.com/products/scha. 
1599
 Compare BlackRock iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF 2019 Summary Prospectus 
(August 1, 2019 as revised June 25, 2020), Schwab U.S. Small-Cap ETF Summary Prospectus 
(February 25, 2020) and Vanguard Small-Cap ETF Summary Prospectus (April 28, 2020). 
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data for numerous sponsored funds concurrently, where financial details for 
securities lending is provided for these specific ETFs.1600  
 
 
Another challenge in comparing ETFs is the significant variation in cash 
management, dividend reinvestment and timing practices amongst ETF 
sponsors.1601 This includes reinvestment turn-around time when an ETF accepts 
cash in a customized AP basket exchange.1602 Also, open-ended ETFs registered 
as investment companies can reinvest dividends and interest; however, ETFs 
organized as UITs (like State Street Global Advisors SPDR S&P 500 ETF 
Trust1603) cannot reinvest but must payout cash dividends, and this can “create a 
cash drag during rising markets.”1604 This distinction, along with restrictions on 
securities lending and the use of derivatives can cause UITs to deviate in 
performance from open-ended ETFs tracking similar underlying. 1605  ETFs 
allowing for cash redemptions may also find a drag on performance, due to larger 
cash positions.1606 
 
Larger ETFs can also have significant “liquidity advantages” for their 
investors, and liquidity differentials can affect the “total return” of investors due 
to reduced trading costs.1607 Liquidity is “often misunderstood” with ETFs, and 
 
1600
 Compare BlackRock iShares® Trust Statement of Additional Information (August 1, 2019 
as revised June 25, 2020), Vanguard Index Funds Statement of Additional Information (April 
28, 2020), Schwab® Equity ETFs, Statement of Additional Information (December 18, 2019). 
1601
 See Bourgi, supra note 1441. 
1602
 See Arora et al., supra note 1538. 
1603
 See BLOOMBERG, SPY:US, SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SPY:US (accessed July 1, 2020)(“This ETF is structured as 
a Unit Investment Trust and pays dividends on a quarterly basis.”); See Greg McFarlane, S&P 
500 ETFs: What Every Investor Should Know, INVESTOPEDIA (March 7, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/090414/sp-500-etfs-what-every-investor-
should-know.asp  
1604
 Levitt, supra note 1550; See James Chen, Dividend Drag, INVESTOPEDIA (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dividend-drag.asp (“Dividend drag is a negative effect 
of the dividend structure of a unit investment trust (UIT), a type of unmanaged exchange-
traded fund (ETF), in a rising market. SEC rules stipulate that unit investment trusts, which 
require no board of directors, must pay out profits as cash dividends to investors instead of 
reinvesting in the portfolio. In a rising market, this means the ETF will underperform similar 
funds with the ability to reinvest.”) 
1605
 See Levitt, supra note 1550; Rule 6c-11, supra note 11 at 19. 
1606
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 83. 
1607
 See Bebchuk & Hirst, The Specter, supra note 1435 at 729. 
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opaque concepts like “implied liquidity”1608 are more reflective of the actual 
liquidity of an ETF than commonly cited metrics like “average daily 
volume.”1609 Professors Lucian Bebchuck and Scott Hirst, in a recent study on 
the ominous growth of the “giant three” ETF issuers (BlackRock, Vanguard and 
State Street) note, “[a]n ETF, with fewer assets can be expected to have lower 
liquidity and more significant bid-ask spreads than a larger ETF, which will 
operate to reduce the total return the investor will enjoy from holding the 
ETF.”1610 The authors suggest that such a phenomenon confers both a “first-
mover” and a “network” benefit on large incumbent ETF issuers.1611 Another 
operational challenge that undermines the ability of investors to make easy 
performance comparisons is the propensity of “failures to deliver” (FTD) in 
some ETFs.1612 FTD has been documented as occurring in ETFs when an AP 
engages in an “operational shorting” strategy, 1613  and also contributing to 
increased market volatility.1614 The possibility of FTD can lead to increased 
costs for investors who buy and hold ETFs.1615 
 
c. Naming and Product Composition Inconsistencies & Firm Marketing 
Activities 
 
 
1608
 Implied liquidity measures “what can be potentially traded in ETFs based on its 
underlying assets” See Bourgi, supra note 1441. 
1609
 Bourgi, supra note 1441. 
1610
 Bebchuk & Hirst, The Specter, supra note 1435 at 729.  
1611
 Id.  
1612
 A “failure to deliver” occurs when a short seller “does not own the underlying assets and 
so cannot make the delivery” see Gordon Scott, Failure to Deliver, INVESTOPEDIA (August 2, 
2019) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/failuretodeliver.asp. 
1613
 See Richard B. Evans, Rabih Moussawi, Michael S. Pagano, & John Sedunov, ETF Short 
Interest and Failures-to-Deliver: Naked Short-Selling or Operational Shorting? DARDEN 
BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER NO. 2961954 (November 20, 2018), at 35, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961954 (the authors describe an “operational short” as “the 
AP sells ETF shares but postpones their creation and delivery, which delay is effectively a 
form of short-selling. The AP owes or is short the ETF shares until they ultimately deliver 
those shares to the investor who purchased them in the secondary market.”) 
1614
 Thomas Stratmann & John W. Welborn, Exchange-Traded Funds, Fails To Deliver, and 
Market Volatility, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WORKING 
PAPER NO. 12-59 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183251. 
1615
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Professor James J. Angel, on File No. S7-15-18 (October 
1, 2018), at 6, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467037-
175796.pdf (“Angel Comment Letter”); (“fails to deliver do cause harms to other investors: 
long investors who are failing to receive are deprived of the stock lending revenue they could 
otherwise generate.”) 
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This subsection will identify investor comparative challenges from not 
having a universal naming convention in ETFs. It will introduce the concept of 
index composition risk, highlight marketing practices of ETF sponsors that 
contribute to investor confusion, and identify emerging issues with ETF “model 
portfolios”, and active, non-transparent and “smart-beta” ETF structures.  
 
 
Rule 6c-11 didn’t impose a standardized nomenclature to distinguish 
ETFs from levered or inverse exchange traded products (ETPs),1616 or exchange 
traded notes (ETNs) which are unsecured debt instruments that provide a return 
linked to a reference entity or basket (using swap contracts or other 
derivatives). 1617  Recently “investment giants” BlackRock, State Street and 
Invesco called on exchange data feeds (Nasdaq, NYSE Arca and CBOE Global 
Markets) to adopt a precise and narrowed definition of an ETF that didn’t include 
ETNs, levered or inverse ETPs, or tradable products with commodity derivatives 
exposure.1618  This proposal mirrors prior scholarly calls for a clear regulatory 
definition of an ETF.1619  This distinction is important because ETPs and ETNs 
have unique risks – like credit risk of an issuing bank in the case of an ETN.1620 
 
Name confusion impairs ETF product comparisons since two funds, 
which have similar names and track similar indices, can actually be comprised 
of very different securities and composite weights.1621 It is also very challenging 
to compare, side-by-side, ETFs with “idiosyncratic objectives” or country-
specific varieties, since they may have heterogeneous holdings, despite similar 
names.1622 For example, consider two ETFs with similar names, both offering 
total market singular country exposure to Israel (the VanEck Vectors Israel 
 
1616
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 116-118. 
1617
 See FIDELITY, Exchange Traded Notes, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-
center/investment-products/etf/types-etfs-etns. 
1618
 See Dawn Lim, Investment Giants Want Exchange To Enforce Labeling System For ETFs, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investment-giants-
want-exchanges-to-enforce-labeling-system-for-etfs-11589400300. 
1619
 See Hu & Morley 2, supra note 1459 at 1162. 
1620
 See Fidelity, supra note 1617. 
1621
 See Ortel, Kovarsky & Puca, supra note 1448. 
1622
 Id. 
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ETF,1623 and the BlackRock iShares MSCI Israel ETF1624), on the date of inquiry 
had different portfolio weights for top holdings, and varied sector exposures.1625  
Relatedly, some stocks can be characterized, concomitantly, as dividend, 
growth, and value.1626  One market participant analogized ETFs as a “vaudeville 
act” and analogized certain stocks (like Exxon) - used in multiple ETF types - as 
“a kind of ETF Swiss Army Knife.”1627  In other cases, ETFs that have the 
semblance of diversification (on the basis of their name) can be quite heavily 
weighted in only a very few stocks.1628  
 
Further, an ETF’s name may not align with investor intuition. A recent 
Canadian report noted that “value” ETFs often don’t contain “true value 
stocks.”1629 Another industry report noted that BlackRock’s iShares Emerging 
Markets Minimum Volatility ETF1630 has had at times a lower “beta”1631 than the 
actual S&P 500, and that this defies logic.1632 The problem of “composition risk” 
 
1623
 See VanEck Vectors Israel ETF, https://www.vaneck.com/etf/equity/isra/overview/ 
(accessed July 8, 2020).  
1624
 See BlackRock iShares MSCI Israel ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239663/ishares-msci-israel-capped-etf (accessed July 8, 
2020).  
1625
 On the date of inquiry (July 8, 2020) the ETFs had notably varied sector exposure weights. 
VanEck’s top four sectors were Information Technology (45.2%), Financial (16.6%), Health 
Care (14.1%), and Real Estate (6.3%); BlackRock’s top four sectors were Information 
Technology (40.77%), Financials (20.18%), Health Care (10.61%) and Real Estate (9.09%). 
See supra notes 200 & 201.  
1626
 See GRANT’S INTEREST RATE OBSERVER, On the ETF Divide, Volume 34, No. 19b 
(October 14, 2016). 
1627
 Id. at 2. 
1628
 Id. 2; see Satyajit Das, These are just some of the ways ETFs and index funds are making 
financial markets more unstable, MARKETWATCH (May 16, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/etfs-and-index-funds-have-made-financial-markets-more-
unstable-2020-05-15; Consider, for example, the case of BlackRock iShares U.S. Energy ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239507/ishares-us-energy-etf (accessed July 8, 2020), 
which despite the semblance of diversification in its name had, at the time of inquiry, over 45% 
of its entire portfolio invested in only two stocks, Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron Corp. 
1629
 See George Athanassakos, Why investors aren’t getting true value stocks with value ETFs, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (October 2, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/etfs/article-why-investors-arent-getting-
true-value-stocks-with-value-etfs/. 
1630
 See BlackRock iShares Edge MSCI Min Vol Emerging Markets ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239641/ishares-msci-emerging-markets-minimum-
volatility-etf (accessed July 7, 2020).  
1631
 The term “beta” is commonly used to measure a “stock’s volatility in relation to the 
overall market.” See Ben McClure, What Beta Means When Considering a Stock’s Risk, 
INVESTOPEDIA (February 18, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/beta-know-risk/. 
1632
 See Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, supra note 1626 at 3. (suggesting that it goes against 
intuition for the S&P 500’s beta to be higher than an emerging market index since the latter 
contained global exposure with “geopolitical” risk). 
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(where investors compare two similarly named ETFs with different underlying 
assets) plagues industry and sector ETFs like healthcare.1633 Naming precision 
is also relevant in light of recent troubles in leveraged and other funds holding 
exposures to commodity futures like oil.1634 For instance it’s been suggested that 
investor harm in oil ETFs during the coronavirus pandemic sell off in March 
2020 could have been averted (at least mitigated) had the USCF United States 
Oil Fund (USO),1635 been named the “United States Oil Futures Fund.”1636 
 
 
Investor difficulty comparing ETFs is exacerbated by the marketing 
practices of ETF sponsors and investment advisors. Studies on mutual fund 
choice provides evidence that fund selection is influenced by marketing and 
“salesmanship.”1637 The same logic applies to ETFs.  The SEC recently fined 
Wells Fargo $35 million for marketing poorly-suited inverse ETFs to clients 
between 2012 and 2019.1638 Advisors can also easily hype-up thematic ETFs, 
many of which end up closing, without providing adequate details to clients of 
potential tax consequences if the funds liquidate.1639  
 
ETF sponsors may also look to leverage the nascent popularity of socially 
responsible and sustainable investing.1640 This trend relies on a variety of terms 
or acronyms including “impactful,” “sustainable,” “ESG” (environmental, social 
and governance), “SRI” “green,” “inclusion,” “exclusion,” “philanthropic,” and 
 
1633
 See Bourgi, supra note 1441. 
1634
 See Andrea Riquier, Are ETFs safe….for retail investors? MARKETWATCH (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-etfs-safe-for-retail-investors-2020-05-07. 
1635
 See USCF, United States Oil Fund (USO), https://www.uscfinvestments.com/uso 
(accessed July 8, 2020).  
1636
 Riquier, supra note 1634. 
1637
 See James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 93 WASH. U. L. Q. 907, 910 (2005); Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Jeffrey A. 
Busse, Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 285-286 (2004) 
(revealing that certain poorly performing index mutual funds with also have high distribution 
costs). 
1638
 See Janet Levaus & Ginger Szala, Why SEC Fined Wells Fargo $35M Over Inverse ETFs, 
THINKADVISOR (March 30, 2020), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/03/30/sec-fines-wells-
fargo-35m-over-inverse-etf-recommendations/. 
1639
 Id. 
1640
 See Bernice Napach, SRI, ESG or Sustainable Investing? Confusion Over Names Limits 
Growth, Report Says, THINKADVISOR (November 8, 2019), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/11/08/sri-esg-or-sustainable-investing-confusion-over-
names-limits-growth-report-says/. 
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“socially responsible,” among others.1641   In July 2020, industry aggregator 
ETF.com listed 109 ETFs trading in the U.S. which included a “socially 
responsible” mandate. 1642  An October 2019 report from the Institute for 
International Finance suggests that the “sheer proliferation” of such terms is 
causing investor confusion.1643 The report lists 80 different characterizations of 
sustainable investment products, and states at best the investment industry is 
“inadvertently” confusing investors, and at worse “greenwashing” or 
“intentionally misleading” them about how such investments relate to 
sustainability.1644  
 
Recent industry research on global investor behavior adds that actual 
investments in sustainable finance is “significantly lagging” the expressed 
intentions of those wanting to invest in the sector; and that “independent ratings 
confirming that the fund takes a sustainable approach” would help in this 
regard.1645 This recommendation aligns with prior reports suggesting “a lack of 
information or understanding” prevents sustainable investments.1646  
 
 
The ability to “comparison-shop” is particularly challenging in the 
emerging ETF “model portfolio” industry.1647 These “prepackaged investment 
 
1641
 Id.  
1642
 See ETF.COM, Socially Responsible ETF Overview, 
https://www.etf.com/channels/socially-responsible-etfs (accessed July 7, 2020). 
1643
 INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, The Case For Simplifying Sustainable Investment 
Terminology, IIF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP REPORT (October 2019), 1, 
available at https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/Regulatory/IIF%20SFWG%20-
%20Growing%20Sustainable%20Finance.pdf. 
1644
 Id. at 1-2. 
1645
 See SCHRODERS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED, News Release, Schroders Global 
Investor Study 2019: People’s sustainable investment ambitions fail to reflect their actions, 
(September 17, 2019), https://www.schroders.com/en/media-
relations/newsroom/all_news_releases/schroders-global-investor-study-2019-peoples-
sustainable-investment-ambitions-fail-to-reflect-their-actions/. 
1646
 See SCHRODERS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED, News Release, Schroders Global 
Investor Study 2018: Minority of people globally concerned investing sustainably would hinder 
returns (September 16, 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/media-
relations/newsroom/all_news_releases/schroders-global-investor-study-2018--minority-of-
people-globally-concerned-investing-sustainably-would-hinder-returns/. 
1647
 Asjylyn Loder, How’s Your ETF Portfolio Doing? Good Luck Finding Out, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (April 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hows-your-etf-portfolio-doing-
good-luck-finding-out-11554689640. 
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portfolios,” that use ETFs as component parts rather than individuals stocks, 
mutual funds or bonds, have surged in popularity (lockstep with the expansion 
of available ETF products) and are widely marketed by banks, discount brokers 
and fintech “robo-advisory” platforms. 1648  The universe of available ETF 
products has grown so vast that many investors prefer to “outsource” portfolio 
composition decisions.1649  Such a move requires an investor to “go beyond fees 
and gauge performance” when evaluating what pre-packaged portfolio to 
purchase, and this presents significant challenges.1650  
 
The rules governing “side-by-side comparisons” for ETF model 
portfolios are sparse, largely non-compulsory, and generally fall within the 
SEC’s adviser advertising rules governing false or misleading statements.1651 As 
such, it is extremely difficult for an individual investor to engage in an apples-
to-apples comparison since some firms choose not to report their performance, 
there is no uniform accounting standard, and the portfolios themselves have 
“varying degrees of customization.”1652 The tools to perform such a comparison 
may be are available, but generally exist behind expensive paywalls like 
Morningstar and because of costs are largely inaccessible to many investors.1653 
 
 
Finally, a new frontier of ETF products including “smart beta” (also 
known as “factor” based), active, and non-transparent funds create unique 
challenges for investor comparisons.  A “smart beta” ETF is a “long only” 
portfolio that includes a “factor tilt” (such as growth or value).1654 Smart beta 
ETFs are often devised around “rules” such as “momentum” or “volatility” or 
factors (such as value, growth or dividend).1655 This distinguishes smart-beta 
ETFs from conventional structures that are weighted by market 
 
1648
 Id.  
1649
 Id.  
1650
 See Leo Almazora, Why There’s No Telling Who’s Winning in ETF Portfolios, WEALTH 
PROFESSIONAL (April 11, 2019), https://www.wealthprofessional.ca/investments/etfs/why-
theres-no-telling-whos-winning-in-etf-portfolios/256384. 
1651
 See Loder, supra note 1647. 
1652
 Id.  
1653
 Id. 
1654
 Nicolas Rabener, Smart Beta: Broken By Design? CFA INSTITUTE (February 11, 2019), 
https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/02/11/smart-beta-broken-by-design/. 
1655
 Ryan Vlastelica, Smart Beta ETFs may not be the smartest bet over the long-term, 
MARKETWATCH (January 1, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/smart-beta-etfs-may-
not-be-the-smartest-bet-over-the-long-term-2017-01-12. 
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capitalization.1656 Many smart-beta ETFs use a combination of factors, described 
as a “mixture” of both active and passive management. 1657  In addition to 
leveraging academic research which suggests factoring is associated with higher 
returns,1658 smart-beta funds look to mitigate the high fees and general opacity 
associated with active funds and the tracking errors in passive structures.1659  
 
Smart beta ETFs have shown to be “wildly inconsistent” in their 
performance, and have not shown evidence of outperforming passive strategies, 
despite their higher fees.1660  They have also exhibited significant secondary 
market price premiums and discounts to NAV. 1661  One analyst calls this 
emerging ETF sector part of a finance “reality distortion field” that is more about 
marketing than actual performance.1662 The way that these ETFs are constructed 
widely vary, and the academic support backing smart beta often doesn’t factor 
in transaction costs which erode returns.1663 Also, there is evidence that investors 
don’t really understand the factors that generate the “best return,” or at least 
don’t exhibited it in their investment choices.1664 One industry report recently 
noted that marketing certain factors (like “growth”) seem to attract as much 
investor money as those focused on “value”, despite the former not showing 
excess returns empirically.1665 Momentum strategies attract little investor capital 
despite empirical support for higher returns.1666 Smart-beta ETFs are also very 
difficult to compare side-by-side because there are limited products in factor 
types, and disproportional holdings within classifications.1667 
 
 
1656
 BROADRIDGE, Smart Beta Benchmarking: A Statistical Perspective (2017), at 2, 
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-smart-beta-benchmarking-a-statistical-
perspective.pdf. 
1657
 Id. 
1658
 See E.F. Fama & K.R. French, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, 33 
J OF FIN. ECON. 3 (1993). 
1659
 See Broadridge, supra note 1656 at 2. 
1660
 See Vlastelica, supra note 1655 
1661
 See Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 5. 
1662
 Rabener, supra note 1654. 
1663
 Id. 
1664
 see Nicolas Rabener, ETFs: Smart Beta or Smart Marketing? IPE MAGAZINE (April 
2018), https://www.ipe.com/etfs-smart-beta-or-smart-marketing/10023929.article 
1665
 Id. (“growth and value tend to be negatively correlated, which implies that if value stocks 
show structural positive returns, then growth stocks are likely to generate negative excess 
returns over time.”) 
1666
 Id.  
1667
 See Broadridge, supra note 1656 at 7. 
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Similarly, “active” and “non-transparent” ETF structures, despite recent 
signs of popularity, 1668  present comparative challenges for investors when 
choosing between investment managers. 1669  Supporters of actively managed 
ETFs posit that they will improve market efficiency.1670 In May 2019, the SEC 
provided exemptive relief, for the first time, for a “non-transparent” actively 
managed ETF.1671 In November 2019 four more “non-transparent” ETFs were 
approved by the SEC with the requirement of disclosing a daily “proxy 
portfolio” to investors of underlying securities, but not basket weights.1672 The 
justification for weighting opacity is that it facilitates competition and decreases 
the ability for firms to duplicate indexing strategies.1673 Yet there are standing 
concerns about how non-transparent ETFs will affect markets, and doubts on the 
real benefits of “opaqueness.”1674 As identified by SEC Commissioners Robert 
J. Jackson Jr. (as he was then) and Allison Herren Lee, if an AP doesn’t know 
an ETF’s precise underlying basket then arbitrage could be impaired, leading to 
investors buying or selling at prices that don’t reflect NAV in times of market 
turmoil.1675  
 
iv. Part II, Compounding ETF Confusion? Disclosures and Investor Behavior 
 
 
1668
 See John Coumarianos, Stage Set For Broader Array of ETFs, Especially Active Ones, 
BARRON’S (December 20, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/stage-is-set-for-a-broader-
array-of-etfs-especially-active-ones-51576877127; Lizzy Gurdus, ‘This could be the year’ for 
active management, says NYSE head of exchange traded products, CNBC (May 30, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/30/nyse-etf-chief-talks-state-of-industry-as-assets-under-
management-rise.html. 
1669
 See Karen Hube, It’s a Weird Market. Time To Go Active, BARRON’S (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/active-stock-picking-strategies-gain-appeal-as-markets-
fluctuate-51590192074. 
1670
 See Bailey McCann, What To Know About ‘Nontransparent’ ETFs, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (May 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-to-know-about-nontransparent-
etfs-11557108061. 
1671
 See Precidian ETFs Trust, Investment Company Act Release No. 33477, 2019 WL 
2176712 (May 20, 2019); Precidian ETFs Trust, Notice of Application, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 33440, 2019 WL 1529571 (April 8, 2019). 
1672
 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Public Statement, Statement of 
Commissioners Jackson and Lee on Non-Transparent Exchange Traded Funds (November 15, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-lee-2019-11-15 
(hereinafter “Jackson Lee Statement”) 
1673
 See Andrea Riquier, What is a ‘non-transparent’ ETF, and why would anyone want to own 
one? MARKETWATCH (December 11, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/get-ready-
for-a-new-flavor-of-etf-non-transparent-2019-11-15. 
1674
 Id.  
1675
 See Jackson Lee Statement, supra note 1672 at FN6.  
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In Part II, this article shows how investor cognitive limitations and 
behavioral tendencies around mandated investment disclosures compound the 
difficulty in ETF product comparisons and making suitable decisions. 
 
a. The Limits of Investor Rationality and the Use of Decision-Making 
Shortcuts  
 
Despite influential works asserting investor “rational expectations” and 
“efficient” markets,1676 a variety of studies counter that investors are error prone, 
limited in their rational functioning, and subject to a wide range of decision-
making biases and cognitive limitations when processing information. 1677 
Studies of this nature look to test “judgmental processes” when investors assess 
information and make decisions.1678 Mandated securities disclosure serves many 
worthy public policy goals.1679  Yet the usefulness to investors of mandated 
 
1676
 See J.F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, 29(3) 
ECONOMETRICA 315 (1961); Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets a Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25(2) J. FIN. 383 (1970); Eugene F. Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, Nobel 
Prize Lecture (December 8th, 2013), available at,  
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/fama-lecture.pdf; 
1677 See H.A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63(2) PSYCH.REV. 
129 (1956); Paul Slovic, Psychology Study Of Human Judgment: Implications For Investment 
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disclosure is (in part) contingent on their ability to accurately organize, 
synthesize and utilize information to make better decisions.1680 As famously 
described by Professor Herbert Simon, humans are rational only within the limits 
of their capacity to compute (a concept known as “bounded rationality”).1681 The 
complexity (and volume) of mandated securities disclosure in ETFs thus collides 
with the very human tendency to use decision making rules (known as 
“heuristics”) to simplify and de-complexify daily choices.1682  
 
Securities regulators globally are assessing how to integrate learnings 
from behavioral finance and JDM research into investment disclosures.1683 Such 
initiatives aim to enhance market efficiency, and limit the “internalities” 
imposed on investors through their own poor decision making.1684  Heuristics 
are critical to navigate modernity, and for the most part they work tremendously 
well; yet, they can also lead to bad decisions when we are faced with complex 
variables or challenging tasks.1685 Judgment errors in processing information 
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have even been documented in the context of experts in their own domain.1686 
Further, even the most sophisticated institutional investors (which often hold 
ETFs in their portfolios1687) are prone to investor biases.1688 Professor Elisabeth 
de Fontenay has identified how shareholder shortcomings affect even the most 
powerful and sophisticated investors thus revealing the “ideal investor” concept 
to be a myth.1689 
 
Compounding the challenge of navigating complex investment 
disclosures is the fact that retail investors often lack financial literacy – an 
observation confirmed by the SEC.1690 Research undertaken by the Investment 
Funds Institute of Canada reveals that how investors react to fee disclosure is 
also influenced by their investment knowledge and financial literacy. 1691 
Professor Lisa Fairfax has extensively documented how widespread financial 
illiteracy in the U.S. poses “a significant, widespread, and long-term challenge 
to our current federal securities regime” since it uses disclosure (and assumes 
that investors both understand, and can effectively use it to make suitable 
decisions) as its primary investor protection tool. 1692  She notes financial 
illiteracy makes investors “ill-equipped” to avoid “inappropriate” investments, 
and this leads to market inefficiency.1693  One finds ETF-related support for 
Fairfax’s thesis via investor interest in levered ETFs, which are a poor long-term 
investment due to a daily (or other periodic) “reset” feature.1694  Fairfax contends 
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that any “signaling function” allegedly performed by institutional investors, 
advisers and financial intermediaries to reliably offset the problems of retail 
investor financial illiteracy is inconsistent, potentially misaligned, and 
contestably assumes its own level of financial literacy.1695 
 
b. Rational Choice Theory and Assumptions Underlying ETF Disclosures 
 
Underpinning securities regulation is an assumption that if investors are 
provided with prescribed disclosure they will make choices leading to efficient 
market outcomes.1696  A body of scholarship suggests otherwise.1697  It is not 
certain that all publicly disclosed information is incorporated into the price of 
securities upon dissemination.1698 There are numerous reports of markets failing 
to exploit arbitrage opportunities or respond to new information.1699 Further, 
even in the existence of arbitrage opportunities, those collectively recognizing 
them must possess both the capital, and willingness to act, in order to effectively 
“exploit the mispricing.”1700 Just because information is available does not mean 
that investors will make correct judgments about that information.  Research has 
shown that investment decisions are also influenced by irrelevant information, 
social biases,1701 a discounted view of the future, and emotional states.1702 In 
order to make rational choices investors must fully understand their preferences, 
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possess “computational” abilities to interpret relevant information, exhibit 
consistency in their choices, and utilize cognitive processes that are “fully 
logical” – and none of these premises are certain.1703  
 
The rational actor assumption also disregards the propensity for investor 
“herds” to form.1704 Recent ETF reports from the CFA Institute have highlighted 
how the “systematic” risk factor in an ETF can “function as a coordinating 
device” or “focal point” for investors to form herds. 1705  Others have noted 
growing evidence of ETFs as a “driver” of markets, with increasing price 
correlations between index constituent securities and amongst ETFs.1706  ETFs 
drive market events because high liquidity attracts short term speculators, who 
introduce non-fundamental noise into the price of underlying securities - a 
phenomenon witnessed in 2013 when trading in credit ETFs materially impacted 
the yield spreads on underlying bonds;1707 and in 2018 when inverse VIX fund 
trading may have generated an adverse “feedback loop” in the underlying VIX 
itself.1708 
 
c. Information Overload and the Emerging ETF “Paradox of Choice” 
 
ETFs present a prime case study for the dual cognitive frictions of 
“information overload” 1709  and the “paradox of choice.” 1710  Maximum 
information dissemination is not efficient if the costs of impaired decision-
making outweigh marginal benefits.1711  The deleterious impact of “information 
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overload” on investors has been well documented, 1712  as has the “limited 
attention” of consumers in general.1713 Research has also shown that lengthy 
disclosures can be ineffective.1714 A prospective ETF investor has an exhaustive 
(and largely unrealistic) plight attempting to navigate, for multiple comparative 
fund choices, cumulatively dense and voluminous ETF fact sheets, summary and 
full prospectus, SAI, and ongoing disclosures like semi-annual and annual 
reports to get a clear and comprehensive side-by-side picture.1715  
 
Numerous psychological studies suggest that more information does not 
always lead to better judgment.1716  In fact, too much information can impair 
judgment. 1717  It can also have negative “affective impacts.” 1718   More 
information can irrationally increase a decision maker’s confidence (even if it’s 
not justified by more accurate decisions).1719 Lengthy disclosures also lead to 
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cognitive complexities associated with information “accumulation.”1720 This is 
compounded by the difficulty in undertaking complex assessments which 
require analysis of numerous variables concomitantly.1721  There is also evidence 
of investor “aversion” to disclosure that can make them uncomfortable (like 
conflict of interest disclosures).1722  
 
Notably, investors do not always respond in ways predicted by regulators 
when they are given additional information, and this is compounded when one 
considers evidence of widespread financial illiteracy.1723  After the 2008 crisis, 
the SEC instituted significant money market mutual fund reform, which among 
other measures increased the amount, and detail, of required information for 
underlying asset values, believing such measures would “increase market 
discipline, which could ultimately deter situations that could lead to heavy 
redemptions.”1724 In a recent study, Professors Dan Awrey and Kathryn Judge 
suggest that these reforms may have actually reduced market discipline by 
“increasing the government footprint.”1725 This iatrogenic backfire effect has 
significant relevance to ETF disclosure reforms in Rule 6c-11 below.1726 
 
Relatedly, a “paradox of choice” 1727  has emerged in ETFs. In 2017 
Bloomberg reported that the number of indexes had eclipsed the number of 
publicly traded stocks. 1728   Recent estimates from consulting firm ETFGI 
Global, notes that from 2008 to 2019 the number of available ETF products 
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increased from 1617 to 6940 globally.1729  Despite this surge in product variety, 
the SEC justifies Rule 6c-11 on the economic premise that by reducing 
regulatory costs, and time to launch for new ETFs, that investors will be provided 
with more product choice. 1730  Unfortunately, having “more choices” is not 
unequivocally a good thing.1731 There are many reasons why more choice in 
ETFs could be making investors worse off.  First, too many investment choices 
can lead to confusion, even potential unhappiness (due to “missed opportunity” 
regret1732), and “decision avoidance,”1733 leading to not investing at all (and 
risking wealth erosions from inflation).1734  
 
Too many ETF choices can also cause investors to inadvertently increase 
the risk profile of their portfolios by taking sector or geographic exposures 
(particularly in relation to thematic or “style” based ETFs1735) without fully 
realizing it.1736 Too many choices can also lead to investors relying on a “default 
option” 1737  which could potentially favor large and well known ETF 
incumbents. 1738  Attempts to avoid decisions also strengthen demand for 
informationally opaque industry trends like ETF “model portfolios,” and 
suggested reforms to this industry are discussed below.1739  The windfall default 
to established firms because of choice aversion is supported by the “quality 
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heuristic,” in that some may imply that an ETF sponsor that is “well-known” is 
equated with “lower-risk.”1740 Finally, choice overload can lead to “secondhand 
information” reliance rather than individual research, making investors 
susceptible to herding, or what Professor Barry Schwartz calls a “bandwagon 
effect,” or a “broad, but mistaken, consensus.”1741 As noted, this is significant 
given the propensity for investor herds in ETFs.1742 
 
d. ETF Relative Assessments and the Use of “Reference” Points 
 
JDM research suggests that decision making is enhanced, particularly 
when assessing costs and benefits, if a suitable comparative is provided.1743 As 
noted by Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their seminal paper 
on “prospect theory” people evaluate the consequences of their choices from 
initial “reference points.”1744 These are known as “anchors” and they can service 
as “an unintended reference point which influences subsequent value 
judgments.”1745 Unfortunately, investors must undertake substantial efforts, with 
technical domain knowledge, to effectively compare ETFs where reference 
points or easy comparatives aren’t always obvious.  
 
Rule 6c-11 mandates enhanced disclosure for ETFs on sponsor 
websites. 1746  Yet these enhanced disclosures do not require a standardized 
layout.1747 The SEC acknowledged that “[i]nvestors seeking to compare multiple 
ETFs will have to visit the website of every ETF, navigate to the relevant section 
of the website, and extract the information provided in the layout chosen by the 
fund.”1748  This could have the ultimate effect of decreasing, if not significantly 
undermining, the “informational benefits of the new disclosures” - a point 
explicitly conceded by the SEC.1749  While the SEC’s hope that competition 
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amongst “third party service providers” will ease the cost of comparative 
assessments for investors, 1750  these (if available) will likely exist behind 
expensive commercial pay walls and be inaccessible to many investors. 
 
Also, when ETF investors attempt to compare products there is a 
potential for a disproportionate windfall in investment assets to flow to the 
largest ETF firms because of a concept called “overreliance on salience.”1751 
This could create a bias for “brand names” as “perceptions of quality based on 
the brand’s profile” rather than investors looking into the specific details and 
factors associated with a particular fund.1752 Salience could also be generated by 
the steady media mention of the largest ETF firms – particularly BlackRock in 
light of its growing influence within the U.S. government in facilitating 
coronavirus stimulus.1753 This concept is supported by empirical evidence that 
the largest ETF firms are in fact capturing the bulk of new investment flows.1754 
 
e. “Processability” and the Importance of Context in Information Delivery 
 
Information disclosure can increase competition, improve product 
quality, alter consumer behavior, and aid in better decision making if it is used 
correctly. 1755  Information will only be used correctly if it is effectively 
processed.1756  Professors James Cox and John Payne define processability as 
“the cognitive ease with which information can be comprehended and used” and 
state that it is a “function of the way the information is presented, the kind of 
processing to be undertaken, and the knowledge base of the consumer.”1757 Not 
 
1750
 Id. 
1751
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 33. 
1752
 Id. at 21. 
1753
 See Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, A Glaring New Conflict of Interest Undermines Public Trust 
in Federal Reserve, FORBES (April 20, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pedrodacosta/2020/04/20/a-glaring-new-conflict-of-interest-
undermines-public-trust-in-federal-reserve/#579ec165135d. 
1754
 See Bebchuk and Hirst, The Specter, supra note 1435 at 723 (“Over the last decade, more 
than 80% of all assets flowing into investment funds has gone to the Big Three, and the 
proportion of total funds flowing to the Big Three has been rising through the second half of 
the decade.”) 
1755
 See Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 930-93; Michael B. Mazis, Richard Staelin, Howard 
Beales & Steven Salop, A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation, 45 J. 
MARKETING 11 (1981). 
1756
 See J. Edward Russo, Gene Krieser & Sally Miyashita, An Effective Display of Unit Price 
Information, 39 J. MARKETING 11 (1975). 
1757
 Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 931. 
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all information that is available will be readily processible,1758 and information 
will be more effectively processed if it is delivered with adequate context.1759 
Effective “context” (also called “framing effects”) may also require particularly 
wording in disclosures. 1760  Professors Cox and Payne also note, impactful 
information must be “easy to process,” and since processing is “costly” it is 
common for consumers to “accept information in the format in which it is given 
rather than expending cognitive effort to transform it.”1761 Context is also needed 
for “common or familiar attributes” among competing choices.1762  
 
Rule 6c-11 made several improvements to contextual disclosure 
including enhanced website disclosures of key ETF variables, visuals and tables 
illustrating trading discounts and premiums, contextual discussions around 
periods of prolonged trading price dislocations from NAV, and contextual 
disclosures relating to bid-ask spreads.1763 Yet there is more that can be done to 
enhance investor context, improve processability, and allow for simplified 
product comparisons. Part III will canvass many such ideas including 
standardized calculation methods and website layout formats, the use of digital 
enhancements, centralized reporting of key ETF variables in standardized digital 
formats; and enhanced contextual disclosures around index construction 
methodology and variability and AP arbitrage instability.1764  
 
f. ETF Disclosure Ordering and the “Primacy” and “Recency” Principles 
 
A variety of psychological studies have revealed that information 
identified at the beginning (the “primacy effect”1765), and the end (the “recency 
 
1758
 See J. Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price Information, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 193 
(1977). 
1759
 See Slovic, supra note 1677; Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. 
MacGregor, Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for 
Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329 (2002); Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability 
Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations 
of Alternatives, 67(3) ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES, 247-257, 250 
(1996); Kuepper, supra note 154. 
1760
 See David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of 
Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 78 (1995). 
1761
 Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 932. 
1762
 Id. at 934; Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 1759 at 334. 
1763
 See infra Part III(a); see Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 243-249. 
1764
 See infra Part III (b)-(g). 
1765
 See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Primacy Effect, 
https://dictionary.apa.org/primacy-effects (last accessed July 4, 2020). 
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effect” 1766 ), of a document is more likely to be recalled than information 
contained in the middle. 1767  This concept was originally coined the “serial 
position effect” and it’s been used in technology to understand internet use 
habits,1768 in advertising to influence behavior,1769 and generally to enhance user 
experience across various domains including digital arts, interface and web 
design.1770  
 
The serial position effect can contribute to investor confusion when one 
assesses ETF website disclosures. As noted, Rule 6c-11 mandates enhanced 
website disclosures, but allows for discretion in the layout and presentation 
method of required variables.1771 Consider an ETF investor wanting exposure to 
a basket of assets that tracks U.S. real estate investments. In addition to a 
conundrum of product choice ex ante,1772 our investor encounters significant 
heterogeneity in information presentation formats when looking across ten 
different ETF issuers (Vanguard, Schwab, State Street Global Advisors, 
BlackRock, JP Morgan, Fidelity, Pacer, Invesco, First Trust and Vident).1773 
 
1766
 See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Recency Effect, 
https://dictionary.apa.org/recency-effect (last accessed July 4, 2020). 
1767
 See B.B. Murdock, The serial position effect of free recall, 64(5) JOURNAL OF 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 482 (1962); A.M. Glenberg, M.M. Bradley, J.A. Stevenson, 
T.A. Kraus, M.J. Tkachuk, A.L. Gretz, J.H. Fish, & B.M. Turpin, B. M., A two-process 
account of long-term serial position effects, 6(4) JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
HUMAN LEARNING AND MEMORY, 355 (1980), available at https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-
7393.6.4.355; Murray Glanzer & Anita R. Cunitz, Two Storage Mechanisms in Free Recall, 
5(4) JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR 351 (1966), available at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022537166800440. 
1768
 See Jamie Murphy, Charles Hofacker & Richard Mizerski, Primacy and Recency Effects 
on Clicking Behavior, 11(2) JOURNAL OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 522 (2006), 
available at https://academic.oup.com/jcmc/article/11/2/522/4617731. 
1769
 See W. Scott Terry, Serial Position Effects in Recall of Television Commercials, 132(2) J. 
GEN. PSYCHOLOGY 151-163 (2005), available at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15871298/. 
1770
 See Euphemia Wong, Serial Position Effect: How To Create Better User Interfaces, 
INTERACTION DESIGN FOUNDATION (2018), https://www.interaction-
design.org/literature/article/serial-position-effect-how-to-create-better-user-interfaces. 
1771
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 187. 
1772
 On July 4th, 2020, according to industry aggregator ETF.com there were 22 real estate 
ETFs trading in the U.S., see ETF.com, Equity: U.S. Real Estate, 
https://www.etf.com/Equity_U_S_Real_Estate (accessed July 4, 2020). 
1773
 Compare and contrast the website layouts and design for Vanguard Real Estate ETF 
(VNQ), https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/profile/overview/vnq; Schwab U.S. REIT ETF, 
https://www.schwabfunds.com/products/schh; State Street Global Advisors, The Real Estate 
Select Sector SPDR® Fund, https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/funds/the-real-estate-
select-sector-spdr-fund-xlre; BlackRock iShares U.S. Real Estate ETF, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239520/ishares-us-real-estate-etf; JPMorgan 
BetaBuilders MSCI US REIT ETF, https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-
management/gim/adv/products/d/jpmorgan-betabuilders-msci-us-reit-etf-etf-shares-
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Given this overwhelming layout non-uniformity, one wonders what initial or 
“recent” information is actually being retained by a diligent investor other than 
the obvious, immediately noticeable markers (like trading price, NAV or 
expense ratio), which are far from the whole story about an ETF.1774  
 
g. ETF Attribute “Evaluability” and Subjective Factor Weighting 
 
An ETF investor is tasked with comparing multiple fund attributes for 
each evaluated fund.  A JDM concept called the “evaluability hypothesis” 
(EH) 1775  has significant implications for how investors interpret and make 
decisions around comparable ETF investment products. Professor Christopher 
Hsee defines the EH as, “[w]hen two stimulus options involve a trade-off 
between a hard-to-evaluate attribute and an easy-to-evaluate attribute, the hard-
to-evaluate attribute has a lesser impact in separate evaluation than in joint 
evaluation, and the easy-to-evaluate attribute has a greater impact.”1776  A “hard 
to evaluate” attribute is one where “the evaluator does not know how good a 
given value on the attribute is without comparisons.”1777 An “easy to evaluate” 
attribute is one that can independently ascertained.1778 Hsee demonstrated the 
EH across a variety of studies including employer decisions in hiring computer 
programmers, and consumer preferences for TVs and compact disk players.1779 
He found that when evaluating options separately, evaluators “base their 
evaluation chiefly on the easy-to-evaluate attribute alone,”1780 while in a joint 
 
46641q738; Fidelity MSCI Real Estate Index ETF, https://institutional.fidelity.com/app/funds-
and-products/etf/snapshot/FIIS_ETF_FREL/fidelity-msci-real-estate-index-etf.html; Pacer 
Benchmark Data & Infrastructure Real Estate SCTR ETF, 
https://www.paceretfs.com/products/srvr; Invesco KBW Premium Yield Equity REIT ETF, 
https://www.invesco.com/us/financial-products/etfs/product-detail?ticker=KBWY; First Trust 
E&P REIT Index Fund (FRI), 
https://www.ftportfolios.com/retail/etf/etfsummary.aspx?Ticker=FRI; Vident PPTY, U.S. 
Diversified Real Estate ETF, https://www.videntfunds.com/funds/ppty (all ETF websites last 
accessed July 4, 2020).  
1774
 See supra Part I; see Johnson, supra note 1457. 
1775
 See Hsee, supra note 1759. 
1776
 Id. at 250. 
1777
 Id. at 249. 
1778
 Id. 
1779
 Id. at 251-254.  The results from Hsee’s EH study are consistent with similar findings in 
judgment decision making. See M.H. Bazerman, G.F. Loewenstein, S.B. White, Reversals of 
preference in allocation decisions: Judging an alternative versus choosing among alternatives, 
37 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 220 (1992). 
1780
 Hsee supra note 1759 at 249. 
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comparison evaluators can compare hard to evaluate attributes against each 
other.1781  
 
A key implication of Hsee’s study for ETFs is that “hard to evaluate” 
attributes (like hidden fees, securities lending, custom baskets, tracking error, 
NAV calculation methods, premiums and discounts, and index composition 
methodology) are most effectively assessed in a comparative format. 1782 
However, as this article has demonstrated, due to wide ETF issuer discretion in 
calculating NAV and IIV, index replication and composition processes, 
operational, management and marketing practices, naming conventions, and 
website layouts, true product comparisons are extremely difficult (perhaps even 
impossible). If an investor evaluates an ETF individually (or “separately”), then 
according to Hsee, “because people do not know how to evaluate an option’s 
value on the hard-to-evaluate attribute, they have to base their evaluation chiefly 
on the easy-to-evaluate attribution alone.”1783  
 
As this article has shown, however, an easy to evaluate attribute (like 
expense ratio or performance) does not paint a complete picture. Therefore, a 
centralized, standardized reporting mechanism and data repository, allowing for 
true comparatives amongst similar ETFs, and made available to all investors free 
of charge, would seem prudent. 1784  This would aid in assessing “hard to 
evaluate” criteria. A centralized and standardized reporting mechanism, when 
combined with a uniform website layout format would also help remedy a related 
challenge that when an ETF investor chooses between products they will 
subjectively weight fund attributes – a phenomenon that has been described as 
an “error in self-insight.”1785  
 
h. Is a Dollar Always a Dollar? Assessing Direct Versus Indirect ETF Fees 
 
 
1781
 Id at 250 (“In joint evaluation, people could compare one option against the other, and this 
comparison would increase the evaluability of the otherwise hard-to-evaluate option.”) 
1782
 Id. at 256. 
1783
 Hsee supra note 1759 at 249. 
1784
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Morningstar on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), at 1-
2, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4460574-175789.pdf 
(“Morningstar Comment Letter”) (“We strongly encourage the Commission to have the 
information filed in a standardized format into a public database, such as EDGAR, through 
which fund sponsors will provide the information about their products.”) 
1785
 See Slovic, supra note 1677 at 787. 
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Finally, not all ETF expenses affect investors emotionally in the same 
way, and direct fees may feel more significant than “indirect” costs.1786 The 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) in a study on how behavioral insights 
could be used to improve investment fee disclosures notes, “[i]nvestors may 
experience less pain of payment for indirect charges than they do for direct 
charges.” 1787  Thus opaque or hidden, but still potentially material, indirect 
expenses incurred from holding ETFs, like tracking errors,1788 or transacting at 
a price premium or discount to NAV,1789 may not be given as much attention by 
investors than transparent direct fees like expense ratios. Also, because of a 
phenomenon commonly known as the “peanut effect,” small fees are discounted 
when assessed year over year, despite having a significant compounding 
impact.1790  This effect is exacerbated by a phenomenon known as “hyperbolic 
discounting” where long-term impacts are less focused on than near term-
effects.1791  ETF tracking error has the potential to massively erode investor 
returns, but it might be discounted given its long-term impact. Another relevant 
phenomenon is the “zero price effect,” where people feel excitement around free 
products, and this can lead to bad decisions.1792 ETF’s marketed as “no-fee” 
might be capitalizing on this effect, despite having expenses associated with 
underlying assets.1793 
 
v. Part III, How ETF Investor Performance Comparisons Can Be Improved 
 
In Part III, this article summarizes improvements in ETF comparisons 
made by Rule 6c-11. It gives recommendations for additional enhancements 
using two key concepts: standardization and central reporting. Investors would 
widely benefit from standardized website formats and layouts, uniform 
calculation methodologies of key ETF variables (like NAV and IIV), and 
 
1786
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Improving Fee Disclosure, supra note 1683 at 16; D. 
Prelec & G. Loewenstein, The red and the black: Mental accounting of savings and debt, 17(1) 
MARKETING SCIENCE 4 (1998). 
1787
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Improving Fee Disclosure, supra note 1683 at 16. 
1788
 See supra Part I(a)(iii). 
1789
 See supra Part I(a)(ii) & Part I(b)(iv). 
1790
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Improving Fee Disclosure, supra note 1683 at 18-19. 
1791
 Id. at 19; see D. Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112(2) THE 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 443 (1997). 
1792
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 33. 
1793
 See Bryan Borzykowski, Are no-fee ETFs really free? MONEYSENSE (September 4, 2018), 
https://www.moneysense.ca/save/are-no-fee-etfs-really-free/ (detailing how some ETFs that are 
marketed as “no-fee” still have expenses associated with the underlying assets that affect 
returns).  
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industry standard ETF nomenclature. Also, structured electronic reporting by 
ETF sponsors of standardized data to a centrally controlled public repository 
would also greatly enhance comparative assessments. Investors would also 
benefit from strategic ordering, digitally enhanced disclosure, and contextual 
discussion around critical concepts like AP arbitrage and index composition 
methodology.  Part III concludes by calling for specific reform in the ETF 
“model-portfolio” industry.  
 
a. SEC Disclosure Amendments That Facilitate ETF Performance 
Comparatives 
 
The SEC has taken significant steps since the 2008 crisis to improve the 
effectiveness of disclosures,1794 and aid investor comprehension through “plain 
language” guidelines. 1795  Rule 6c-11 makes several disclosure amendments, 
many of which help investors compare ETFs falling within the scope of the 
rule.1796 First, it requires ETF sponsors to disclose on their website NAV per 
share, market prices, median bid-ask spreads over the most recent thirty calendar 
days, and premiums and discounts at the end of each prior business day.1797 It 
also requires table and line graphs for days where ETFs trade at a premium or 
 
1794
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Request for Comment on the Effectiveness of Financial 
Disclosures About Entities Other than the Registrant, Securities Act Release No. 9929, 
Exchange Act Release No. 75,985, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,849, 80 Fed. Reg. 
59,083 (Oct. 1, 2015); see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,, Accounting and Disclosure 
Information Improving Principal Risks Disclosure, ADI 2019-08, 
https://www.sec.gov/investment/accounting-and-disclosure-information/principal-risks/adi-
2019-08-improving-principal-risks-disclosure#_ftn1. 
1795
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,, A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC 
Disclosure Documents (1998), available from https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf. 
1796
 Rule 6c-11 does not apply to all ETF structures, but rather is limited in its application to 
ETFs organized as open-end funds. It leaves in place the individual exemptive relief 
framework for several product types including leveraged, inverse, ETFs organized as Unit 
Investment Trusts (UITs), share class ETFs, and non-transparent structures, see Rule 6c-11, 
supra note 1424 at 17-33.  ETFs are also subject to exchange listing requirements see Rule 6c-
11, supra note 1424 at 26; Hu & Morley 2, supra note 1459 at 1156; Some ETF stakeholders 
advocated unsuccessfully for Rule 6c-11 to also include ETF products that use leverage to 
provide a multiple of exposure, or derivatives to provide inverse exposure to a specified index, 
see Comment Letter to SEC of ProShares Advisors LLC on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 
2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4488848-175924.pdf 
(“ProShares Comment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of Angela Brickl, General Counsel, 
Rafferty Asset Management, Inc. on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467064-175845.pdf (“Direxion Comment 
Letter”). 
1797
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 97, 235-236.  
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discount to their NAV, 1798  along with commentary on material factors 
contributing to prolonged dislocations.1799   A table and line graph can help 
illustrate complex issues (like arbitrage instability); although some commenters 
suggested that requiring both was unnecessary, and there was disagreement on 
the preferred format.1800 The SEC justified the inclusion of both as providing 
different information (the line graph measured “degree” of deviation, and the 
table showed “how often” it occurred).1801 There was some contention whether 
ETF premium and discount disclosure added to investor confusion - for example 
whether a discount could be misinterpreted by an investor as a “bargain” rather 
than a source of instability.1802 Also, it is uncertain the extent an ETF sponsor 
can precisely determine the material factors contributing NAV dislocation in its 
commentaries.1803 
 
Rule 6c-11 no longer requires an ETF sponsor to provide intraday 
estimates of its NAV per share (a metric commonly referred to as “intraday 
indicative value” or “IIV”). 1804  Prior exemptive orders required the 
dissemination of IIV, as it was considered useful for investors to determine 
whether an ETF was trading at a premium or a discount.1805 The IIV requirement 
was jettisoned from Rule 6c-11 because the SEC was concerned about its 
accuracy, and how it could be misleading or confusing to investors if an ETF 
was comprised of less liquid assets (like bonds) or foreign securities.1806 At the 
 
1798
 Id. at 100-101, 235. 
1799 See id. at 97; see at 248 (“If the exchange-traded fund’s premium or discount is greater than 
2% for more than seven consecutive trading days, a statement that the exchange-traded fund’s 
premium or discount, as applicable, was greater than 2% and a discussion of the factors that are 
reasonably believed to have materially contributed to the premium or discount, which must be 
maintained on the website for at least one year thereafter.”) 
1800
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Wisdom Tree Asset Management, Inc. on File No. S7-15-
18 (October 1, 2018), at 10, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4466240-175829.pdf (“Wisdom Tree Comment Letter”) (stating that a line graph alone would 
be better for investors); See Comment Letter to SEC of John Hancock Investments on File No. 
S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), at 4, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-
18/s71518-4467046-175800.pdf (“John Hancock Comment Letter”) (advocating for removal of 
the line graph and only providing a table).  
1801
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 101. 
1802
 Id. at 98; See Comment Letter to SEC of State Street Global Advisors on File No. S7-15-
18 (October 1, 2018), at 11, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4466054-175827.pdf (“SSGA Comment Letter I”) 
1803
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 106; See SSGA Comment Letter I, supra note 1802 at 13. 
1804
 Id. at 61. 
1805
 Id. at 61-62. 
1806
 Id. at 62, 64; See SSGA Comment Letter I, supra note 1802 at 7 (positing that the 
publication of the IIV could potentially increase investor confusion); Legg Mason Letter, supra 
note 1730 (identifying that market makers and intermediaries can effect arbitrage without the 
IIV given “widely available daily portfolio holdings”, and that the IIV has “significant 
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time of the adopting release of Rule 6c-11, exchange listing requirements 
mandated IIV dissemination, and there was industry support for the SEC to work 
with the exchanges to remove this requirement. 1807  Fortuitously for ETF 
sponsors, shortly after the adoption of Rule 6c-11, the major U.S. exchanges 
proposed new generic listing standards removing the IIV publication 
requirement for ETFs that can rely on Rule 6c-11, and these rule changes were 
adopted by the SEC.1808 The SEC acknowledged that the IIV didn’t have a 
standardized calculation methodology, and that the metric was not widely used 
by market makers and APs when performing arbitrage (who generally used 
proprietary methods).1809 
 
The choice to eliminate intraday IIV was controversial, as many consider 
IIV to be useful to retail investors.1810 One commenter to Rule 6c-11 expressed 
stark cynicism at its removal, implying that opacity clearly favored the ETF 
industry over investors. 1811  Nasdaq suggested that providing IIV allows an 
 
limitations” and lack precision in regards to international securities and fixed income 
underlying assets); See Comment Letter to SEC of JP Morgan on File No. S7-15-18 (October 
1, 2018), at 6-7, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467032-
175830.pdf (“JP Morgan Comment Letter”). 
1807
 See Invesco Comment Letter, supra note 1425 at 13; SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 
1425 at 20; Wisdom Tree Comment Letter, supra note 1800 at 2, 4-5; SSGA Comment Letter 
I, supra note 1802 at 7; ETF.com Comment Letter, supra note 1545. 
1808
 See Peter J. Shea, Trayne S. Wheeler, Alyssa B. Sherman & Uri S. Segelman, New Listing 
Rules Adopted for ETFs Relying on Rule 6c-11 – Exchanges’ ETF Listing Compliance Burdens 
Reduced, U.S. INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ALERT, K&L GATES (May 5, 2020), 
http://www.klgates.com/new-listing-rules-adopted-for-etfs-relying-on-rule-6c-11--exchanges-
etf-listing-compliance-burdens-reduced-05-05-2020/ (“The SEC approved the proposed rule 
changes for CBOE to adopt Rule 14.11(l), Nasdaq to adopt Rule 5704, and NYSE Arca to 
adopt Rule 5.2-E(j)(8), each governing the listing and trading of shares of relying ETFs.”) 
1809
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 62-63 (“[b]ecause there are no uniform methodology 
requirements, the IIV also can be calculated in different and potentially inconsistent ways.”) 
1810
 See Angel Comment Letter, supra note 1615 at 1; Comment Letter to SEC of Nasdaq, Inc, 
on File No. S7-15-18 (September 28, 2018), at 6, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4451170-175713.pdf (“Nasdaq Comment 
Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of CFA Institute on File No. S7-15-18 (November 15, 2018) 
at 5, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4652219-176478.pdf (“CFA 
Comment Letter);  Comment Letter to SEC of ICE Data Services on File No. S7-15-18 
(October 1, 2018), at 1-3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4463567-175821.pdf (“IDS Comment Letter”) (“IDS believes that the current Intraday 
Indicative Value (“IIV”) process adds transparency to the market, particularly for retail 
investors”); Comment Letter to SEC of Segment Wealth Management LLC, on File No. S7-15-
18 (September 26, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4487260-175837.pdf (“Segment Letter”); Comment Letter to SEC of NYSE on File No. S7-15-
18 (October 10, 2018), at 3-4, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4506043-175977.pdf (“NYSE Comment Letter”). 
1811
 See Segment Letter, supra note 397 (“Reducing intra-day NAV calculations will limit 
investor information flow and will result in less efficient daily pricing. I believe that 99% 
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investor to “screen” for price deviations that signal arbitrage instability.1812 
Others noted that IIV may be the only intraday pricing mechanism that is 
available to retail investors,1813 and the only intraday way to know if an ETF is 
trading a significant premium or discount to NAV.1814  The SEC, in the final 
rule, admitted that none of the largest ETFs by assets provided real-time IIV on 
their websites, and the information wasn’t otherwise available on free public 
financial websites.1815  
 
The SEC Fixed Income Market Structure Advisory Committee 
(FIMSAC) suggested that IIV contained “valuable information” for retail 
investors, and echoed that it’s the only intra-day pricing source for many 
investors, so it should be included with an explanation of its limitations.1816 Also, 
recent empirical studies suggest that the potential for investor herding increases 
if IIV is not available.1817 Investors also benefit from knowing when prices 
deviate from NAV during the trading day since, unlike mutual funds, they cannot 
redeem directly at NAV.1818 As documented by Professors Hu and Morley, the 
possibility of buying an ETF at a premium to NAV (or selling at a discount) 
throughout the day is a viable concern for investors.1819 Also, IIV is valuable 
when a significant gap materializes during the day but is corrected by close, 
which as noted by Professors Hu and Morley happened in 2015 with 
BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500 (IVV).1820  
 
 
accurate information is better than no information at all.  In this case, it’s more like 99.99%. 
We both understand who benefits from reduced information……Please do not let industry 
forces success in reducing great information in pursuit of perfect information.”) 
1812
 See Nasdaq Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 7. 
1813
 See IDS Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 2-3; Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra 
note 1528 at 3; NYSE Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 4. 
1814
 See Angel Comment Letter, supra note 1615 at 3  
1815
 See Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 66. 
1816
 Comment Letter to SEC of Fixed Income Market Structure Advisory Committee on File 
No. S7-15-18 (October 29, 2018) at 5, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-
18/s71518-4587743-176289.pdf (“FIMSAC Comment Letter”) 
1817
 Bhattachaya & O’Hara, supra note 1460 at 15. 
1818
 See Hu & Morley 2, supra note 1459 at 1162, 1174.  
1819
 Id. at 1174. 
1820
 Id. at 1174-1175; Relatedly, one law firm commenter to Rule 6c-11 suggested that 
additional disclosure should be required for “material discount spreads that are obscured by 
using pricing only at the close of the day” see Comment Letter to SEC of Hagens Berman on 
File No. S7-15-18 (October 10, 2018), at 2, 7-8 available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
15-18/s71518-4463571-175822.pdf (“Hagens Berman Comment Letter”). 
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The SEC requires ETF sponsors to report if they are relying on Rule 6c-
11.1821  It also amended Form N-1A in several respects to make cost disclosures 
more transparent, and easier to understand for ETF investors.1822 Form N-1A is 
the registration statement form used by open-ended funds to register under the 
ICA and offer securities in the U.S. 1823  It provides ETF investors with 
information about ETF trading and other costs.1824 ETFs relying on Rule 6c-11 
must now provide additional disclosure around actual trading costs when 
investors buy and sell ETF shares.1825 The SEC did pull back from its original 
proposal of an extensive and prescribed “question and answer” (Q&A) format 
despite some industry support.1826 Instead, it landed on a flexible approach for 
ETF sponsors to use other formats besides Q&A to communicate trading costs 
in Item 6 of Form N-1A.1827  
 
Form N-1A was also amended, for ETF issuers that rely on Rule 6c-11, 
to require a cross referencing of an ETF’s website (which includes timely and 
enhanced disclosures) in its summary prospectus,1828 a streamlined obligation to 
provide “narrative disclosures” in relation to bid-ask spreads to better 
contextualize costs in context,1829 and daily website disclosure of “median bid-
ask spreads calculated over the most recent 30-day period.” 1830  The latter 
requirement was criticized as being potentially misleading (since it’s only one 
aspect of trading costs).1831  Rule 6c-11 also removed certain disclosures from 
 
1821
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 147. 
1822
 See id. at 133-134 (changes include, among others, adding the term “selling” to narrative 
disclosures for fees to reflect the fact that fees may be incurred when they sell an ETF and a 
requirement that investors may be subject to brokerage commissions and other fees; 
streamlining disclosures related to trading costs and bid-ask spreads; and requiring ETF issuer 
that can’t rely on Rule 6c-11 to provide median bid-ask spread information on their website). 
1823
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Form N-1A, https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf. 
1824
 See Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 133. 
1825
 Id. 136-137. 
1826
 See Oppenheimer Funds Comment Letter, supra note 1531 at 4. 
1827
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 11 at 137. 
1828
 Id. 138 (“Rule 6c-11 will require daily website disclosure of several items, including the 
NAV per share, market price, premium or discount, and bid-ask spread information.”) 
1829
 See id. at 139 This move had industry support, see Comment Letter to SEC of the ETF 
Committee of the Asset Management Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association on File No. S7-15-18 (February 22, 2019), at 2, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4967859-178906.pdf (“SIFMA Comment 
Letter II”)  
1830
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 109. 
1831
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Franklin Templeton Investments on File No. S7-15-18 
(October 1, 2018), at 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467035-
175832.pdf (“Franklin Comment Letter”); John Hancock Comment Letter, supra note 1800 at 
2-3. 
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Form N-1A, including duplicative information that is provided in Form N-
CEN.1832 Form N-CEN provides information to the SEC on an annual basis from 
ETF issuers, similar to a census.1833  Form N-8B-2 was also amended to make it 
consistent with revisions to Form N-1A (requiring ETFs organized as UITs to 
provide the same disclosures as ETFs registered under the ICA) despite UITs 
not falling within the ambit of Rule 6c-11.1834  
 
Also for consistency across regulations, and to reduce regulatory 
complexity in ETFs, a series of “technical and conforming amendments” were 
made to Form N-CSR,1835 Form N-PORT,1836 and Regulation S-X.1837 Rule 6c-
11 avoided imposing “supplemental disclosures” if, within limited allowable and 
extraordinary circumstances, an ETF suspended the issuance of creation 
units.1838 An idea to create greater transparency for investors, which was not 
included in Rule 6c-11 however, was the proposal by Jane Street Capital, LLC, 
a leading ETF market maker, to require ETFs to file periodic reports, like on 
Form 8-K, for material non-public information that is relevant to the operation 
of the arbitrage function, like the potential for “creation halts.”1839 
 
 
1832
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 144. 
1833
 See Investment Company Reporting Modernization Adopting Release, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 32314 (Oct. 13, 2016) [81 FR 81870 (Nov. 18, 2016)] 
1834
 See Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 145-146. 
1835
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Form N-CSR, https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-csr.pdf 
(Form N-CSR is a “Certified Shareholder Report of Registered Management Investment 
Companies” and is “used by management investment companies to file reports with the 
Commission” relating to a variety of disclosure items of ETFs organized as registered 
management investment companies.) 
1836
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Form N-Port, https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-port.pdf 
(Form N-PORT is a “Monthly Portfolio Investments Report” and is used by registered 
management investment companies or ETFs organized as UITs to file monthly portfolio 
holdings with the Commission.) 
1837
 See 17 CRF Part 210; Regulation S-X provides form, requirements and content for 
financial statements, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Rules, Regulations and Schedules, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ecfrlinks.shtml. 
1838
 See Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 59; See Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 1528 
at 3; Jane Street Comment Letter, supra note 1469 at 2-3. 
1839
 See Jane Street Comment Letter, supra note 1469 at 2-3. Jane Street notes that this is 
required by some exchanges and advocates for a consistent approach by the SEC; see Listed 
ETP Compliance Guidance, NYSE REGULATION, (January 10, 2018), at 5, available at 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse-
arca/NYSE_Arca_2018_Regulatory_Reminder_Letter.pdf. 
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b. Enhancing Comparative Disclosures and Standardized Calculation 
Methodologies  
 
Easy investor comparisons allow for a well-functioning and efficient 
market, and JDM research suggests that decision making is made “more coherent 
and rational” when information is presented in a comparative format. 1840  
Unfortunately ETF issuers do not have a market incentive to facilitate simple 
ETF comparisons since doing makes it easier for investors to “switch” to 
competitor firms. 1841  Performance comparisons in ETFs are enhanced when 
disclosures are standardized; and Rule 6c-11 mandates standardization in the 
dissemination of daily ETF portfolio holdings, 1842  a move which garnered 
significant industry support.1843  
 
The SEC’s predecessor rule to 6c-11 relied on Article 12 of Regulation 
S-X for information presentation, and this was strongly contested by market 
participants as a source of investor confusion.1844 Rule 6c-11 requires an ETF to 
disclose its portfolio (on its website free of charge) including ticker symbol, 
CUSIP or other identifying information; a description of the ETF’s underlying 
holdings, 1845  quantities of securities held, and percentage weights of the 
portfolio.1846 The SEC rejected, however, the idea of adjusting disclosures in 
alignment with other investment products.1847 It also disallowed its utilization by 
 
1840
 Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 1684 at 406. 
1841
 See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 521, 541 (2009) (illustrating the propensity for switching in the mutual fund 
industry).  
1842
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 74-75. 
1843
 Cary Comment Letter supra note 1545; ETF.com Comment Letter supra note 1545; 
BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 2; BNY Mellon Comment Letter, supra note 
1545 at 1-2; Fidelity Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 3; Comment Letter to SEC of ETF 
Bild Project on File No. S7-15-18 (October 1, 2018), at 4, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467044-175799.pdf (“ETF BILD Letter”) 
1844
 See Franklin Comment Letter, supra note 1831 at 2-3; Fidelity Comment Letter, supra 
note 1545 at 3, 9-10; BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 14; Comment Letter to 
SEC of Vanguard on File No. S7-15-18 (September 28, 2019) at 4, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4457959-175784.pdf (“Vanguard Comment 
Letter”); CSIM Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 9; Wisdom Tree Comment Letter, supra 
note 1800 at 8. 
1845
 The SEC also indicated specific requirements for description of fixed income assets 
including “the security’s name, maturity date, coupon rate, and effective date, where 
applicable, to assist investors in identifying the specific security held.” See Rule 6c-11, supra 
note 1424 at 77. 
1846
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 76-77 
1847
 See id. at 75-76; see Wisdom Tree Comment Letter, supra note 1800 at 7-10 (limiting 
disclosures to “information that is useful to investors”). See also CSIM Comment Letter, supra 
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share class ETFs,1848 despite some industry support for all ETF sponsors being 
brought under a similar approval framework.1849  
 
Rule 6c-11 mandates the standardized publication of ETF portfolio 
holdings, yet reserves a wide array of discretion in the format and “layout for 
displaying the required information.”1850 A structured layout was not required 
under the new rule, 1851  despite having significant industry support for a 
standardized approach. 1852  Given layout discretion, the SEC openly 
acknowledged that “an investor’s ability to efficiently extract information from 
website disclosures for purposes of aggregation, comparison, and analysis across 
multiple ETFs and time periods may be limited.” 1853  Further, third-party 
aggregation services are costly for investors, who must otherwise engage in a 
cumbersome process of reviewing each ETF website.   
 
The SEC conceded that having to visit each website could “decrease the 
information benefits of the new disclosures.”1854 Standardized website layouts 
could incorporate learnings from behavioral studies which show that internet 
consumers often don’t make careful assessments in their online viewing (we 
substitute “depth for speed”).1855 Thus, the JDM principles of prominence and 
disclosure ordering, including varied screen designs for mobile and desktop 
viewing platforms,1856 are important to consider in designing a standardized 
layout and should be further studied.1857 
 
 
note 1545 at 9 (recommending disclosures “similar to what money market funds report on fund 
websites today.”). 
1848
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 121-124. 
1849
 See ETF.com Comment Letter, supra note 1545; BNY Mellon Comment Letter supra note 
1545 at 1; Oppenheimer Funds Comment Letter, supra note 1531 at 6. 
1850
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 187.  
1851
 See id. at 187, 205. 
1852
 See Cary Comment Letter, supra note 1545; Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 
1784 at 1 (“We believe that this information should be provided in a standardized, structured 
format, such as XBRL, so that it can be analyzed and compared across providers. While 
website and prospectus disclosures are helpful, we believe that they are too cumbersome for 
analysis and easy comparison”); Angel Comment Letter, supra note 1615; Eaton Vance 
Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 4; SSGA Comment Letter I, supra note 1802 at 2,9; ETF 
BILD Letter, supra note 1843 at 4. 
1853
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 187. 
1854
 Id.  
1855
 Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights supra note 1683 at 41. 
1856
 Id. at 41-43. 
1857
 See supra Part II(f). 
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Additionally, ETF firms do not have market incentives to study the most 
effective means of website presentation for investors, since they can be easily 
copied by other firms. 1858  One scholar has called this a “collective active 
problem” for investment managers to devise an “optimal layout” on their 
own.1859 The SEC can remedy this problem, while enhancing comparability and 
democratizing access, if website disclosure formats are standardized, and ETF 
key data was filed in a structured and consistent format, and made publicly 
available through a central database or repository in an optimal structure 
determined by the regulator that allowed for ETF side-by-side comparison.1860 
Regrettably, the SEC rejected an EDGAR-style filing requirement in Rule 6c-11 
for portfolio holding information, despite support from prominent industry 
stakeholder Morningstar,1861 as well as FIMSAC,1862 citing increased costs on 
ETF sponsors.1863  
 
Knowing how an ETF attribute compares with similar products is critical 
for investors when making an “informed choice.”1864 Disclosures made available 
through firm websites and prospectus are both “cumbersome” and impede easy 
analysis and comparability.1865 Requiring ETF disclosures to be made available 
in a “centralized repository in a structured format” (like EDGAR) would have 
significant benefits for investors including the ability to retain information if it 
was removed from an ETF sponsor’s website.1866  It would also be “machine 
readable,” and could be tagged for easier automated aggregation and 
comparative analysis by software programs.1867 It would also allow for easier 
investor comparative assessments of matters such as portfolio holdings without 
 
1858
 See Schwartz, supra note 1841 at 541-542. 
1859
 Id. 
1860
 See Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 1784 at 1. 
1861
 Id. 1-2 (“We strongly encourage the Commission to have the information filed in a 
standardized format into a public database, such as EDGAR, through which fund sponsors will 
provide the information about their products.”) 
1862
 See FIMSAC Comment Letter, supra note 1816 at 5 (“We support the idea of requiring 
information on NAV, market price, and range of premium/discount be readily available to 
investors. While posting on each ETF’s website is helpful, a centralized database (potentially 
EDGAR) accessible free of charge would be ideal to access this valuable data.”) 
1863
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 11 at 78 
1864
 See Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 136. 
1865
 See Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 1784 at 1. 
1866
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 206-207; see Reagan Comment Letter, supra note 1545; 
ETF BILD Letter supra note 1843 at 4 (“it makes more sense for there to be a single industry 
source where collecting, housing and disseminating such information occurs.”) 
1867
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 205-207; see FIMSAC Comment Letter, supra note 1816 at 
5; Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 1784 at 1-2; Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra 
note 1528 at 4. 
 
 
 
247 
having to individually navigate potentially hundreds of different websites (which 
use different presentation formats.)1868  
 
As an interim step to a centralized database, the SEC could require ETF 
firms to provide a comparison in their existing disclosures on how certain fund 
elements (like tracking error or securities lending profits) compare to related 
ETFs, similar to comparative proposals in mutual fund disclosure. 1869  A 
centralized source of information, however, that utilizes a regtech solution like 
blockchain, or partners with a fintech innovator, would have significant cost 
savings for small and medium sized ETFs, efficiency payoffs for APs, and 
substantial benefits for retail investors who would no longer have to visit 
individual websites to obtain comparative metrics.1870  
 
Another area where further standardization is warranted is in the 
calculation of NAV (including IIV).  IIV standardization was not required by 
Rule 6c-11,1871 despite support from numerous market participants including 
major exchanges like the NYSE Arca, Nasdaq and Intercontinental Exchange, 
Inc. (ICE).1872 At the time of the adopting release of Rule 6c-11, exchange listing 
rules required ETFs to make IIV available; although this requirement has since 
been jettisoned by the major U.S. exchanges for ETFs relying on Rule 6c-11.1873 
Nevertheless, a standardized calculation methodology would still aid investors 
 
1868
 See ETF BILD Letter, supra note 1843 at 4 (“Currently over 100 advisers to ETFs post on 
their website ETF basket information. While Form N-1A imposes certain requirements on how 
such disclosure is made, ETFs vary on how such information is presented, which sometimes 
making it difficult for website visitors to find such information.”) 
1869
 See Schwartz, supra note 1841 at 570 (proposing such a comparative disclosure 
requirement for mutual fund fees); Christine Sgarlata Chung, The Devil You Know: A Survey 
Examining How Retail Investors Seek Out & Use Financial Information and Investment 
Advice, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 653, 750 (2018) (setting out numerous recommendations 
on how mutual fund disclosure could be improved for easier fee comparisons across different 
funds).  
1870
 See ETF BILD Letter, supra note 1843 at 4. 
1871
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 64-66. 
1872
 See NYSE Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 3; IDS Comment Letter, supra note 1810 
at 2; Nasdaq Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 7; Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 
1528 at 4; Angel Comment Letter, supra note 1615.  
1873
 See Shea et al, supra note 1808. This change was supported by numerous commenters to 
Rule 6c-11, see Comment Letter to SEC of the Subcommittee on Investment Companies and 
Investment Advisors of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of 
Business Law of the American Bar Association on File No. S7-15-18 (October 11, 2018), at 4, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4510948-175993.pdf (“ABA 
Comment Letter”). The CBOE in its comment letter noted that it intended to “file a proposal to 
eliminate the IIV dissemination requirement within its ETF listing requirements when the daily 
portfolio holding disclosure requirement is in place” see CBOE Comment Letter, supra note 
1545 at 3; 
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when comparing products. 1874  To this end FIMSAC has advocated for “a 
consortium of market participants collaborate to develop industry standards for 
a number of data points, including IIV.” 1875  Another area of potential 
standardization that has been suggested in the literature is to use a metric based 
on “value at risk” (VAR).1876 Such a metric could rely on “three parameters” for 
calculation, “the performance differences between such fund index and their 
benchmark, the volatility of tracking error and the liquidity spread.”1877 VAR 
has, however, been significantly criticized for its predictive shortcomings and 
potentially “destabilizing” impact.1878 
 
A further item of required disclosure that lacks calculation uniformity is 
the bid-ask spread.1879 Rule 6c-11 modified the bid-ask disclosure requirement 
to require issuers to use the national best bid and national best offer to facilitate 
a more “uniform” calculation.1880 The data used to calculate bid-ask can vary 
and this can impair investor comparatives. 1881  The SEC initially proposed 
amendments relating to Form N-1A that would have required ETF sponsors to 
provide examples of how bid-ask spreads affect investor returns for both long 
and short term investments, including an “interactive calculator” on the firm’s 
website for investors to hypothesize various investing scenarios.1882  Support for 
this amendment was varied and some commentators suggested it could 
overemphasize certain costs (while obscuring others) and mislead investors.1883 
 
1874
 See NYSE Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 3-4; Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra 
note 1528 at 3. 
1875
 FIMSAC Comment Letter, supra note 1816 at 5. 
1876
 See M. Hassine & T. Roncalli, Measuring Performance of Exchange-Traded Funds, 4(3) 
THE JOURNAL OF INDEX INVESTING, 57, 57 (2013). 
1877
 See Dorocáková, supra note 1493 at 157. 
1878
 See Erin Lockwood, Predicting the unpredictable: Value-at-risk, performativity, and the 
politics of financial uncertainty, 22(4) REV. OF INT. POL. ECON. 719 (2015). 
1879
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Independent Directors Council on File No. S7-15-18 
(September 27, 2018), at 3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4446624-175725.pdf (“IDC Letter”) (“Because there is not a uniform method for assessing 
bid-ask spreads, the bid-ask spread  information would not facilitate comparisons between 
different investment options, as the Commission intends for this disclosure”); John Hancock 
Comment Letter, supra note 1800 at 2 (“Without uniform data across the industry, the utility of 
the Bid-Ask Spread Data as a tool to compare similar ETFs would be severely limited.”); 
Dechert Comment Letter, supra note 1502 at 5 (“there is no uniform standard methodology for 
calculating bid-ask spreads.”) 
1880
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 110-112 
1881
 See SIFMA Comment Letter I, supra note 1425 at 19; CSIM Comment Letter, supra note 
1545 at 11. 
1882
 Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 113.  
1883
 See Vanguard Comment Letter, supra note 1844 at 7; BlackRock Comment Letter, supra 
note 38 at 17; SIFMA Comment Letter II, supra note 1829 at 2-3; Oppenheimer Funds 
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Another commenter suggested a discussion of examples would be useful.1884  
Ultimately the bid-ask spread examples and interactive calculator was jettisoned 
by the SEC in its final rule.1885  
 
c. Strategic Formatting, Contextual Delivery and Digital Enhancement of 
ETF Disclosures 
 
When disclosure became a cornerstone of U.S. financial market 
regulation, the “format” of how information was presented was not a primary 
concern.1886 This has changed over time, and scholars and regulators are now 
interested in how investment disclosures can be strengthened through 
behaviorally-enhanced presentation formats.1887  Scholarship also recognizes the 
“limits” of disclosure, even for sophisticated investors.1888 Yet more can be done 
on ETF disclosure formats to ease investor comprehension, allow for more 
efficient product comparisons, and highlight opaque risks. Securities regulators 
should undertake further investigations on ETF disclosure ordering and 
contextualization, as well as the use of digital enhancements like visuals.  
 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in 
a 2019 investigation of how behavioral principles can make disclosures more 
effective, noted that disclosures should be formed with an objective “to direct 
users’ attention to the most important information included in a disclosure, and 
to design disclosures such that the most important disclosures are also the most 
engaging.”1889 A simple review of key documents in the ETF informational 
ecosystem (prospectus and SAI) reveal dense text-laden formats lacking for 
 
Comment Letter, supra note 1531 at 4; Fidelity Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 5; CSIM 
Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 10-11. 
1884
 FIMSAC Comment Letter, supra note 1816 at 6. 
1885
 See Rule 6c-11 supra note 1424 at 114. 
1886
 See Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure To The Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based 
Policy, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 50 (2015). 
1887
 See Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
325, 326-328, 370-372 (2011) (the author suggests the use of “spatial” adjustments including 
better framing and strategic placement of risk factors, categorization, ranking and underlying of 
certain risks (according to relative impact and likelihood), and using standardized, “menu-like” 
formats for risk factor disclosure. According to the author the act of disclosure then becomes, 
concurrently, an act of “risk management” for firms rather than of “litigation avoidance”); see 
IOSCO Report, supra note 1683 at 11-12.  
1888
 See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
599, 623 (2013). 
1889
 IOSCO Report, supra note 1683 at 11-12 
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intention direction.1890  Further, as noted by Professors James Cox and John 
Payne, “context” is valuable in mutual fund disclosures so that the information 
that is provided to investors is more easily “processible” when choosing between 
competing funds. 1891  This is equally applicable to ETFs.  Contextual 
improvements can be found in Rule 6c-11;1892 however, one aspect of Rule 6c-
11 where the SEC decided against a contextual add-in was in jettisoning the idea 
of having ETF sponsors provide hypotheticals in an ETF’s prospectus on how 
bid-ask spreads impact returns for both long and short term traders.1893 This 
omission was justified by the SEC because it would be costly for issuers and it 
might “obscure” other factors associated with ETF transaction costs like market 
conditions and order size.1894  
 
Disclosures can also be digitally enhanced to improve investment 
decision making. A recent recommendation by the OSC in relation to annual fee 
disclosures in investment funds suggested that a “pop-up” box, that when 
“moused over” provides a short explanation for technical concepts, could be 
used to help reduce “cognitive load” on investors when navigating 
disclosures.1895 Another digital enhancement recommendation of the OSC was 
to use “content-related icons” for key areas of disclosure, which are visually 
stimulating and attract readers attention,1896 as well as “compelling visuals or 
narratives” including flow diagrams, to explain certain difficult concepts and the 
various “actors” associated with an investment product.1897 Relatedly, the SEC 
may consider BlackRock’s proposal to construct and maintain a “single 
interactive calculator tool” that would use “uniform data” to allow for 
comparative trading costs across different ETFs.1898 As noted above, the SEC 
withdrew its original proposal for ETF sponsors to host trading cost calculators 
on their individual websites (pursuant to a proposed amendment to Item 3 of 
Form N-1A); 1899  however, a single, standardized, centrally controlled and 
hosted, calculator as proposed by BlackRock would aid investor comparative 
assessments.1900  
 
1890
 See case study identified in supra note 1715. 
1891
 See Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 911. 
1892
 See infra Part III(a). 
1893
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 204. 
1894
 Id. at 204. 
1895
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 13. 
1896
 Id. at 15. 
1897
 Id. at 16 
1898
 See BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 18.  
1899
 Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 114. 
1900
 See BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 18. 
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d. Marketing Practices That Create Clarity and Distinguish Other Fund 
Structures 
 
As ETFs become more complex, marketing rules may need to be refined 
to supplement disclosure adjustments.1901  Rule 6c-11 didn’t impose marketing 
rules on ETF issuers, despite measures required by prior exemptive orders.1902 
Previously, ETF sponsors had to distinguish ETFs from mutual funds in their 
sales literature (for example, by identifying that retail investors can’t redeem 
ETF shares directly with an ETF sponsor, and also detailing how ETFs are 
purchased on secondary markets).1903 Not all industry participants agree that 
investors understand ETF’s subtle (and explicit) distinctions from mutual funds 
sufficiently to disregard this disclosure.1904 It would seem prudent to at least 
require ETF sponsors to qualify their marketing that the pricing, purchase and 
sale mechanics of ETFs work differently than mutual funds,1905 and that ETFs 
have unique risks because of their operational structure.1906 It is also imperative 
that complex exchange traded products (ETPs) that use derivatives to obtain 
leverage or inverse exposures, including those that have unique mechanics like 
daily rebalancing,1907 or have embedded redemption rights for issuers like those 
found in exchange traded notes (ETNs), 1908 be identified by investment advisers.  
 
Another needed reform is a formal taxonomy to distinguish ETPs (like 
ETNs), commodity pools and inverse or leveraged ETPs, from ETF structures 
that can rely on Rule 6c-11.1909 .  The SEC chose not to include a naming 
 
1901
 See Anita K. Krug, Investors’ Paradox, 43 J. CORP. L. 245, 245 (2018) (contending that 
“regulatory solutions” for mutual funds that resemble sophisticated and complex investment 
strategies, otherwise deployed by hedge and private equity funds, should center on “the process 
by which mutual fund shares are marketed and sold to investors” since disclosure adjustments 
are largely “ineffective”) 
1902
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 115. 
1903
 Id.  
1904
 See Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 8 (“In our experience, a large 
percentage of investors still do not understand the fundamental distinctions between ETFs and 
mutual funds relating to buying and selling.”) 
1905
 See CFA Comment Letter, supra note 1810 at 5-6. 
1906
 See id. at 3 
1907
 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 26. 
1908
 See Otani & Pellejero, supra note 1556 (discussing the significant risks to investors of 
exchange traded notes (ETNs) when an issuing bank chooses to redeem and “take them off the 
market if their value falls below a certain level” and how this scenario has manifest in the 
coronavirus pandemic resulting in new litigation.) 
1909
 See discussion on this point in Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 30, 198, 210. 
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convention in Rule 6c-11,1910 despite significant industry support for such a 
taxonomy. 1911   Professors Hu and Morley suggest that the most viable 
nomenclature for ETFs would be “independent of the assets the fund invests in” 
but capture all funds that use the arbitrage mechanism.1912 They note, however, 
that naming entails some “measured dynamism” since a rigidly applied rule may 
not work in the future for new financial product innovations.1913  A naming 
convention would serve immediate value in distinguishing leveraged and inverse 
ETPs and ETNs from ETFs.1914 This is timely, since ill-advised ETN exposures 
wreaked havoc on some retail investor portfolios in the coronavirus pandemic – 
giving rise to new litigation.1915 Also, ETN credit risk isn’t always reflected in 
secondary market trading prices. 1916  A formalized taxonomy for ETPs 
(distinguishing ETFs) will require more industry consultation,1917 and potential 
frameworks have been advanced by both FIMSAC1918 and BlackRock.1919 Also, 
given the popularity of “sustainable” and “socially responsible” investing, 
efforts should be made to both simplify, and form conventions around, a standard 
taxonomy for these products.1920 
 
 
1910
 Id. at 118.  
1911
 See BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 25-27; Invesco Comment Letter, 
supra note 1425 at 19; CBOE Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 6; FIMSAC Comment 
Letter supra note 1816 at 1-4; see Comment Letter to SEC of Professor Henry T.C. Hu and 
John D. Morley on File No. S7-15-18 (August 27, 2018), at 2, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4267989-173128.pdf (“Hu and Morley 
Comment Letter”); Virtu Comment Letter, supra note 1545 at 2. 
1912
 Hu & Morely 2, supra note 1459 at 1177. 
1913
 Id. at 1182. 
1914
 See Bhattachaya & O’Hara, supra note 1460 at 8-9. (“ETNs are issued by financial 
institutions and are unsecured debt obligations linked to the return of a market index. Whereas 
ETFs own the underlying securities, ETNs are more like return swaps tied to a particular 
index.”) 
1915
 See Otani & Pellejero, supra note 1556 
1916
 See B. Cserna, A. Levy, and Z. Weiner. Counterparty Risk in Exchange-Traded Notes 
(ETNs) 23(1) JOURNAL OF FIXED INCOME 76 (2013). 
1917
 See Comment Letter to SEC of State Street Global Advisors on File No. S7-15-18 
(February 4, 2019), at 2-3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-
4875042-177427.pdf (“SSGA Comment Letter II”). 
1918
 See FIMSAC Comment Letter, supra note 1816 at 3-4  
1919
 See BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 1451 at 25-27. 
1920
 See Institute of International Finance, supra note 1643 at 3 (here the IIF provides a 
proposed standardized taxonomy for sustainable investing using the terms “exclusion 
investments,” “inclusion investments,” “impactful investments,” and “philanthropic 
investments.”) 
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e. Ordered and Centralized Simplicity Around the Most Important ETF 
Factors 
 
The efficacy of mandated disclosures, the degree investors understand 
them and use them to increase consumer welfare, and the extent they should be 
reduced or simplified is a matter of standing academic debate.1921 Empirical 
testing of disclosure is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty.1922 In essence, any 
attempt to simplify ETF disclosures is an act of “streamlining the environments” 
where investors synthesize information to make decisions. 1923  To this end, 
Andrew Haldane, in his famous “dog and the frisbee” analogy, has persuasively 
argued that complex scenarios are often best solved with simple solutions.1924 
The message is especially relevant for decision making in ETFs. 
 
Disclosure often traces its roots to Judge Brandeis’ famous declaration 
that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”1925 Yet as noted by Professor 
Troy Paredes, “sunlight can also be blinding.”1926 Streamlining ETF disclosures 
helps to overcome “present bias” and aversions to search efforts to find the most 
suitable investment products.1927 It also reduces the “task size” of the cognitive 
ask of disclosure review, which can lead to better decision making.1928 To this 
end a standardized, structured, centrally hosted, and publicly accessible 
repository (like EDGAR), where ETF issuers report standardized data, and 
investors can effectively compare ETFs side by side is materially needed.1929 
 
1921
 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure 
Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 6 (2015); Lauren Willis, Decision-making and the Limits of 
Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 712, 718 (2006); 
Choi and Pritchard, supra note 1677 at 60-61; Paredes, supra note 1679 at 421-430; Schwartz, 
supra note 1841 at 569-570. 
1922
 See Gillis, supra note 1886 at 32-34. 
1923
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 11. 
1924
 The Dog and the Frisbee, Speech by Mr. Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, 
Financial Stability, Bank of England, and Mr Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of 
England, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th economic policy symposium, 
“The changing policy landscape”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (August 31, 2012) available at 
https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf. 
1925
 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT, 92 (1914). 
1926
 See Paredes, supra note 1679 at 419. 
1927
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 47. 
1928
 See Paredes, supra note 1679 at 441-443. 
1929
 The benefit of a standardized (and centrally controlled) repository across ETF sponsors is 
that it allows for maximum comparative impact for investors, See Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 
2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload, Complexity, and Other Information Failures? 90 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1143, 1174 (2016) (“As with other technologically enhanced disclosure, the challenge 
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Such measure has industry support, and its implementation should be further 
studied.1930 A centralized comparative mechanism would help filter irrelevant 
information, which some studies have shown to be decision making 
distractions.1931 Reductive measures for existing disclosures will also need to be 
further studied, although a challenge with any reductive initiative is that, as 
Professor Erik Gerding has noted, there is very little (if any) empirical proof of 
what disclosure items are “superfluous or impose excessive cognitive taxes on 
investors.”1932  
 
Presentation format has also been found to have a material impact on 
how consumers process information. 1933  A 2015 Wharton Business School 
working paper provides evidence that a “streamlined” and “easier to understand” 
menu format for employees choosing between defined contribution retirement 
investment options lead to better investor risk profiles, lower turnover rates, 
reduced expense ratios, and more aggregate savings for plan participants.1934 
Simplified disclosures have also increased the effectiveness of tax credit and 
employer 401(k) programs. 1935  Simplifying and ordering ETF disclosures 
around the most important factors will eliminate the need for investors to take 
additional steps to use disclosure provided to them.1936  
 
Any attempt to simplify ETF disclosures, or adjust presentation format, 
must wrestle with two vital ETF complexities.  The first is the ETF arbitrage 
mechanism. The case for clear disclosure around AP arbitrage is compelling 
since ETF sponsors may have “asymmetric information” about its fragilities, and 
 
with moving to a web-based, hyperlinked disclosure layout is ensuring that data remains 
comparable. Who controls the layout is also critical. There is a risk that some issuers might use 
complex layouts to frame information in ways that unduly accentuate the positive and 
practically eliminate the negative.”) 
1930
 See Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 1784 at 1-2; FIMSAC Comment Letter, 
supra note 1816 at 5; Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 1528 at 4; Reagan Comment 
Letter, supra note 1545; ETF BILD Letter, supra note 1843 at 4. 
1931
 See Paredes, supra note 1679 at 442 & fn 17. 
1932
 See Gerding, supra note 1929 at 1146. 
1933
 See James R. Bettman & Pradeep Kakkar, Effects of Information Presentation Format on 
Consumer Information Acquisition Strategies, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 233 (1977). 
1934
 See Donald B. Keim & Olivia S. Mitchell, Simplifying Choices in Defined Contribution 
Retirement Plan Design, PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL WORKING PAPER, WHARTON SCHOOL, 
PRC WP2015-07 (June 2015). (The employers in the study streamlined their defined 
contribution investment options by eliminating “almost half” of the available choices of funds, 
and taking measures to “simplify the fund menus, and also to make a more coherent 
categorization or ‘tiering’ of the retained funds,” see pg. 1-2) 
1935
 See Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 1684 at 405. 
1936
 See Cox & Payne, supra note 1637 at 927. 
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APs have potentially “misaligned incentives” to step back from performing this 
function.1937 Professor’s Henry Hu and John Morley suggest, given the criticality 
of arbitrage, disclosure frameworks for ETFs should incorporate a “Management 
Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A) style narrative where an ETF sponsor 
provides “its views on the past performance and trends and uncertainties relating 
to the future outlook for that ETF’s arbitrage mechanism, including as a 
consequence, analysis of AP-specific, portfolio asset liquidity, and other factors 
affecting the mechanism’s effectiveness.” 1938  The Professors posit that the 
qualitative dynamics of current ETF disclosure (the Management’s Discussion 
of Fund Performance) has a “mutual fund mindset” based on NAV performance, 
not arbitrage instabilities.1939  It is also worthwhile to further study the use of 
visuals, computer aided graphics or other interactive components that create a 
“vivid display,”1940 as these are likely to be more compelling to investors in 
illustrating ETF arbitrage rather than simple text overlay.1941 
 
Second, given the tremendous index heterogeneity in the ETF industry, 
as documented by Professor Robertson, further studies should be undertaken to 
determine how to simplify and clarify disclosures around index construction, 
variability and methodology, while providing transparency on affiliate index 
licensing fees, design and influence - beyond a description of what’s purportedly 
being tracked by the ETF. 1942  Morningstar has advocated that index 
methodology be provided in a “standardized format” upon ETF launch, and 
include “rules regarding securities selection and weighting.” 1943  Index 
construction methodology disclosure reform has also been advocated by industry 
stakeholders.1944 Appropriately, as noted by the Index Industry Association, such 
a move will also require further investigation on how to appropriately “balance” 
 
1937
 See Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 1684 at 391 (“We review literature 
examining the effects of laws and regulations that require public disclosure of information. 
These requirements are most sensibly imposed in situations characterized by misaligned 
incentives and asymmetric information between, for example, a buyer and seller or an advisor 
and advisee.”); see at 393 (“such requirements are applied when less informed consumers 
interact with better informed sellers and when the incentives of the consumers and sellers are at 
least arguably misaligned.”) 
1938
 See Hu & Morley 2, supra note 1459 at 1162.  
1939
 Id. at 1175. 
1940
 Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 1684 at 410.  
1941
 See Ontario Securities Commission, Behavioral Insights, supra note 1683 at 15. 
1942
 See Robertson, supra note 1440 at 843-844. 
1943
 See Morningstar Comment Letter, supra note 1784 at 2. 
1944
 See ETF.com Comment Letter, supra note 1545. 
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intellectual property rights of index creators with enhanced investor 
transparency.1945 
 
f. Cash-Like ETFs and Safeguarding Liquidity Transformation 
 
In the lead up to the March 2020 coronavirus pandemic a report by the 
European Systemic Risk Board indicated that ETFs were increasingly being used 
as cash substitutes.1946 Industry reports on the pandemic selloff confirmed this 
observation, as investors utilized ultra-short duration bond ETFs like 
BlackRock’s iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF (SHY) as an alternative to 
holding risky assets.1947 After the Fed announced support for money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs) and commercial paper, investor flows from cash-like 
ETFs (being held as MMMF equivalents) were also reported1948 Prior to the 
2008 crisis, MMMFs were also used as cash substitutes that offered higher 
returns than bank deposits;1949 yet they ended up needing government support 
after investing in toxic commercial paper and experiencing an investor run.1950 
The Fed’s support of short-duration credit ETFs, considering their act of 
“liquidity transformation” in turning bonds into cash substitutes, is eerily 
reminiscent of intervention in the MMMF market.1951 Therefore, an evaluation 
of post-crisis disclosure reforms in MMMFs, as potentially also applicable to 
ETFs, is a worthy undertaking since credit ETFs now benefit from a similar 
 
1945
 See Comment Letter to SEC of Index Industry Association on File No. S7-15-18 (July 3, 
2018), at 3, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-18/s71518-4467034-175831.pdf 
(“IIA Comment Letter”) 
1946
 See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To 
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD (June 2019), 3-4, 28-29, 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983
ea11870.en.pdf. 
1947
 See Katherine Greifeld, Cash-Like ETFs See $3 Billion Exit After Fed Steps Into Market, 
BLOOMBERG (March 30, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/04/03/what-
have-we-learned-so-far-about-etfs-in-the-covid-19-crisis/#comment-668. 
1948
 See Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 1472 at 1-4. 
1949
 See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS, (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2014); 195-96, (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely 
viewed as virtually indistinguishable from bank deposits as similarly safe vehicles for storing 
cash with slightly better interest rates”). 
1950
 See Clements, supra note 3 at 839-841; Martin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe 
Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24(1) J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES. 29, 34-7 (2010). 
1951
 Clements, supra note 1416 at 839-841 
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“implicit guarantee” as MMMFs that the government will support the market in 
a crisis.1952  
 
Most ETFs are organized as “open-ended management investment 
companies”,1953 thus they use the same Form N-1A for information disclosure as 
short duration credit mutual funds, and MMMFs, subject to certain particularized 
requirements for each respect fund structure. 1954  MMMF regulations were 
amended after the 2008 crisis to better “address run risks” and included, among 
other reforms, prudential measures and stress tests, “floating” NAV for sales and 
redemptions, and redemption fees and gates.1955 Even through ETFs trade in the 
secondary market, and are not redeemed by investors in the same way as 
MMMFs, they have shown evidence of facilitating investor herd formation, and 
they could suffer from primary market runs by APs when bond qualities 
deteriorate.1956  The fact that some ETFs are being substituted for cash (like 
MMMFs), and the reality that both markets have experienced a government 
backstop, warrant further comparative analysis. Particularly on the extent that 
cash-like ETFs could benefit from prophylactic measures including stress tests, 
additional disclosures, and primary market creation and redemption 
safeguards.1957 
 
g. Specific Reforms for the ETF Model Portfolio Industry 
 
ETF model portfolios should also look to incorporate standardized 
reporting requirements in addition to the SEC’s adviser advertising rules 
 
1952
 Id. 
1953 See Rule 6c-11, supra note 1424 at 154. 
1954
 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Form N-1A, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf; Some of the particular requirements for ETFs include 
disclosure of the principal market the ETF trades on (see at 1); narrative disclosure around 
brokerage commissions, creation units, secondary market pricing, the arbitrage function and 
premiums and discounts (see at 4, 15). Unique requirements for MMMFs include certain 
omissions relating to portfolio turnover, risks, management, shareholder information and other 
matters (see pgs. 2, 8, 14); particularized risk disclosures (see pg. 9-10); and disclosure of 
“material events” (see pg. 30-31). 
1955
 See Eva Su, Money Market Mutual Funds: A Financial Stability Case Study, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IN Focus (March 24, 2020), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11320. 
1956
 See Bhattachaya & O’Hara, supra note 1460 at 6. 
1957
 For a review of the safeguards in MMMFs after the 2008 crisis, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules, (July 23, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-
143#:~:text=Website%20Disclosure%20%E2%80%93%20Money%20market%20funds,use%2
0of%20affiliate%20sponsor%20support. 
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governing false or misleading statements. 1958  Requiring investors to access 
comparative tools through private market solutions undermines a fundamental 
selling point of ETFs in the first place – low cost “democratized” access to a 
diversified portfolio1959 - since these comparative tools are inaccessible to many 
retail investors.1960 Also, as ETF heavyweights like BlackRock and Fidelity look 
to enter the non-transparent ETF space,1961 the use of these and actively managed 
ETFs in model portfolios will make investor comparisons even more 
difficult.1962  
 
 Securities regulators should look to undertake further industry 
consultations in the emerging ETF model portfolio industry to assess the 
suitability of current regulatory standards, and gauge how effectively (and 
accurately) investors can compare products including standardized performance 
calculations and website disclosure layout formats. Like mutual funds, ETFs 
now comprise a core component of many saver’s retirement portfolios.1963  As 
ETF model portfolios grow in popularity, prior scholarly concerns around 
misleading marketing for actively managed mutual funds becomes relevant, and 
must be closely monitored and safeguarded against.1964 This bears particular 
weight given evidence that investors often purchase funds based on historical 
returns, not fund specific features.1965  
 
1958
 See Loder, supra note 1647. 
1959
 See Barbara Novick, How Index Funds Democratize Investing, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (January 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-index-funds-democratize-
investing-1483914571. 
1960
 Loder, supra note 1647. 
1961
 See Claire Ballentine & Annie Massa, BlackRock Files to License Active Non-Transparent 
ETF Structure, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
06-03/blackrock-moves-ahead-on-plan-for-etf-that-keeps-holdings-secret; Katherine Greifeld, 
Fidelity Throws Heft Into Hidden-Asset ETF Arena With New Funds, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-04/fidelity-throws-heft-into-hidden-
asset-etf-arena-with-new-funds. 
1962
 See Beverly Chandler, Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Change, ETF EXPRESS SPECIAL 
REPORT (May 15, 2020), https://www.etfexpress.com/2020/05/15/285658/assessing-impact-
regulatory-change (“Another challenge comes from the fact that a lot of advisers use ETFs in 
model portfolios as building blocks and Tuffy wonders if they will include active strategies.”) 
1963
 See Sam Bourgi, Understanding the Role of ETFs in Retirement Planning, ETFDB.COM 
(January 22, 2019), https://etfdb.com/etf-education/understanding-role-of-etfs-in-retirement-
planning/. 
1964
 See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: 
Inherently and Materially Misleading, 46 GA. L. REV. 289 (2012) (discussing the problems that 
occur when mutual funds use past performance to market mutual funds, and also discussing 
how advertising in the mutual fund industry is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission 
rather than the SEC).  
1965
 See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles, 2008 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 940-44, 974-1008 (2008); Noel Capon, Gavan J. Fitzsimons & Russ 
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vi. Conclusion  
 
ETFs have many benefits and have become very popular.1966 Yet, ETFs 
may also be contributing to investor herd formation, 1967  impairing the 
information efficiency and price responsiveness of underlying assets,1968 and 
exacerbating volatility and disruptive market events. 1969  This article has 
illuminated another crucially needed element of ETF discussion: it is extremely 
difficult (at times even impossible) for ETF investors to easily compare products 
or their performance, without the aid of costly third party aggregators. The ETF 
industry engages in wide operational, financial, marketing and management 
discretion, and this creates incredible challenges when investors attempt to 
compare products. This predicament is compounded by disclosure effectiveness 
challenges given investor cognitive limitations and behavioral tendencies. 
 
Despite improvements in Rule 6c-11, much more can be done to make 
ETF product comparisons easier for investors. It would greatly aid ETF side-by-
side comparisons if the SEC standardized website formats and layouts, required 
uniform calculation methodologies for key ETF variables (such as NAV and 
IIV), and created a standardized ETF nomenclature or taxonomy system 
including standards for sustainable investing. Also, investor product 
 
Alan Prince, An Individual Level Analysis of the Mutual Fund Investment Decision, 10 J. FIN. 
SERVS. RESEARCH 59, 66 (1996); Ronald T. Wilcox, Bargain Hunting or Star Gazing? 
Investors' Preferences for Stock Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. 645, 648 (2003); Diane Del Guercio 
& Paula A. Tkac, The Determinants of the Flow of Funds of Managed Portfolios: Mutual 
Funds vs. Pension Funds, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 523, 525 (2002); Erik R. Sirri 
& Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1598 (1998); Travis 
Sapp & Ashish Tiwari, Does Stock Return Momentum Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?, 59 
J. FIN. 2605, 2607 (2004). 
1966
 The popularly of ETFs as an index investment is based on the ability to obtain low cost 
diversification in alignment with portfolio choice and market general equilibrium theories.  See 
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7(1) J. FIN 77 (1952); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset 
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19(3) J. FIN 425 (1964); J. 
Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios 
and Capital Budgets, 47(1) REV. OF ECON. AND STATISTICS 13 (1965); There are also a variety 
of recent demand drivers behind the popularity of ETFs, independent from other index funds 
including liquidity, cost and tax advantages of ETFs over mutual funds, access to otherwise 
opaque and hard to purchase asset classes, use of ETFs as cash substitutes by institutional 
investors, ability of firms to quickly duplicate novel structures, securities lending, and take up 
by fintech firms and “robo-advisors” see Clements, supra note 1416 at 17-23. 
1967
 See Bhattachaya & O’Hara, supra note 1460 at 6-7. 
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 This occurs because ETF investors favor the “systematic” factor of risk over asset specific 
“idiosyncratic” factors, see id. at 1-2. 
1969
 Id. at 3. 
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comparisons would be materially improved through a system of structured 
electronic reporting by ETF sponsors of standardized data to a centrally 
controlled public repository. Investors also stand to materially benefit from 
additional studies around strategic disclosure ordering and digital enhancement, 
and further contextual discussion around critical concepts like AP arbitrage and 
index composition methodology.  Also, the ETF “model portfolio” industry is 
an emerging concern which needs to be studied (and standardized) to reduce 
informational opacity and improve comparisons.   
 
Other areas worthy of further investigation in ETFs include whether 
behavioral “nudges” and other mechanisms of “libertarian paternalism” have 
viability for ETF disclosures. 1970  Using behavioral economics in disclosure 
reform may not correct for impulsivity or “self-control problems.”1971 Direct 
intervention in the ETF market would rely on a welfare economics justification 
of “consumer fallibility” - thus regulatory “intervention” would aid investor 
decision-making, ensure a competitive ETF marketplace, and avoid adverse 
selection of unsuitable products.1972 This would need to balance the benefit of 
financial product innovation while mitigating system-wide risks.1973 It must also 
take into account the cognitive biases that affect regulators when designing and 
enacting such measures.1974 Finally, the growing influence of BlackRock on U.S. 
and global governments, 1975  and the global financial system through its 
integrated “Aladdin” risk management and modelling “financial operating 
system,” 1976  is worthy of much deeper investigation. 1977   This is especially 
warranted given widespread failure of “risk management systems” and models 
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1972
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1973
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1977
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to effectively predict or guard against prior crises, operational failures, or 
disruptive market events.1978  
 
  
 
1978
 See J.H. Biggs, Wall Street’s Management of Risk: Why It Failed, in M. Pinedo & I. 
Walter (eds) GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, 167 (2015). 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation intersects with a growing body of literature on 
economic “financialization” – a term commonly used to describe the financial 
market’s increasing size, variability, complexity, profitability, the continual 
transformation of the real economy to electronically identifiable (and instantly 
tradeable) financial devices, and the orientation (by individuals, firms, media 
and society at large) towards financial market activity.1979   The origins and 
definition of financialization are complex, multi-faceted and no single causal 
factor is determinative.1980  
 
One scholar has described financialization as “a pattern of accumulation 
in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production.”1981 This definition would explain institutional 
uptake of market-based products (including the use of ETFs and ETPs in 
portfolios) away from “activity-centered” or production-based capital 
investments.1982  It also helps to explain the much greater levels of trading, 
significantly increased market complexity and interconnectivity, and the 
multitude and diversity of financial products that currently exist.1983   
 
Other scholars suggest that financial market participants exert 
disproportional “influence” over economic policy, and in turn engage in wealth 
transfers (economic rents) in their favor.1984 In addition to BlackRock’s growing 
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1982 Id. see discussion at 176; see Louis-Philippe Rochon, More Regulations Needed To Survive 
Financialization In The West, CBC OPINION (March 22, 2015), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/more-regulations-needed-to-survive-
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influence over government policy, as noted in Chapters Four and Five, additional 
support for this idea can be found in the increased size and complexity of 
financial market operations, buttressed by the fact (as detailed in Chapter Four) 
that corporate decision making is now largely “dominated by and beholden to 
financial markets.” 1985 Further, numerous “financialization enhancing” 
regulatory measures have been enacted over the past fifty years in the U.S. 
including: deregulation, competition restrictions, tax breaks that favor financial 
market incumbents, the erosion of labor market protections, and increased global 
trade and international business and capital mobility.1986  
 
Researchers trace the origins of financialization in the U.S. to numerous 
events starting as early as the nineteenth century1987 onset through demographic 
changes, 1988  globalization, 1989  sector specialization and increased household 
savings,1990 increased financial service firm prominence,1991 and direct social 
and political engineering.1992 The growth of “shadow banking” has also been 
cited,1993 as has greater demand for investment management services,1994 and an 
explosion of “household credit” (including residential mortgages and consumer 
debt).1995  
 
One study suggests that financialization took place in four “phases.”1996 
The first from the turn of the 20th century until after the New Deal; a second 
 
1985 See J. Froud, C. Haslam, S. Johal & K Williams, Shareholder Value and Financialization: 
Consultancy Promises, Management Moves, 29 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 80 (2000).   
1986 See Palley, supra note 1984 at 16-18. 
1987 See Thomas Philippon, Brief: Finance, Productivity, and Distribution, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT (October 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/philippon-october-2016.pdf.; Suzanne 
J. Konzelmann, Marc Fovargue-Davies, & Frank Wilkinson, The Return of 'Financialized' 
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London Stock Exchange, SSRN (May 31, 2016), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2787154;  
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1989 See Konzelmann, Fovargue-Davies, & Wilkinson, supra note 1987. 
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“transitory phase” continuing until the 1940s; a third “golden age of capital 
development” taking place until the mid-1970s; 1997  and a final phase that 
established “financialized capitalism” and mirrored the first phase in terms of 
financial sector dominance, income share, shareholder value orientation, 
frequency of financial innovation, income inequality, and use of leverage.1998  
 
Other cited factors include foreign competition resulting in firms shifting 
investments from “production” activities to “portfolio holdings” for short-term 
profits; 1999  a revolution in “shareholder value” as the dominant ethos of 
corporate governance;2000  the ubiquity of executive pay incentives linked to 
stock market performance;2001 and an increase in institutional and individual 
investment, heightened market volatility and trading volume, investment banks 
becoming publicly traded (rather than using partnership models) and pursuing 
“proprietary trading” over traditional underwriting and advising, while 
developing exotic financial products (often using complex derivatives).2002 
 
 Deregulation has also been cited as a causal factor.2003  To this end, 
numerous early twentieth century deregulatory measures including the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913, the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, and the McFadden Act 
of 1927, collectively worked to expand credit markets for farms, individuals and 
small businesses.2004  Other cited measures in the literature include the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of 
Omaha Service Corporation; 2005  the 1980 enactment of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act; 2006  the passage of the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Acts of 1974 and 1978 and the Garn-
 
1997 Id. at 2.  
1998 Id at 30-31.  
1999 Krippner, supra note 1979 at 182.  
2000 See id. at 201.  
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Consequences, and Policy Implications, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 167 (2013); 
2002 See Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Financialism A (Very) Brief History, 43 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 323, 323327 (2010). 
2003 Id at 323. 
2004 See Jihad Dagher, Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting The Political Economy of Financial 
Crisis, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND WORKING PAPER (January 15, 2018), 16-17, 
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St. Germain Act of 1982.2007  Others studies cite reduced capital controls and 
greater central bank independence;2008 the deregulatory effect of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 - eroding the long held separation of commercial and 
investment banking established in the Glass-Steagall Act and fostering the 
creation of new bank-led financial products.2009  
 
 Financialization has undoubtedly been influenced by the proliferation of 
economic theories like the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”),2010 and the 
Black Scholes option pricing theory,2011 the rise of credit rating agencies and 
systems for small businesses, 2012  and technological advances facilitating 
investment decision making “detached” from considerations of underlying 
business ownership. 2013  Also, market liquidity expansions (and more 
exchanges),2014 and the dismantling of Bretton Woods have been cited in the 
academic literature as contributing.2015  Finally U.S. bipartisan housing “pro-
ownership policies” creating government sponsored entities and aiding the 
proliferation of MBSs and CDOs have been associated with financialization.2016 
Also contributing are developments in information technology and computer 
processing speeds, including the use of algorithmic and “high frequency” 
trading;2017 corporate takeover activity (driven in part by anti-trust relaxations in 
the 1980s) with executive pay tied to stock performance.2018  
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Individually there is now more fund and direct share ownership than ever 
before,2019  with higher individual debt levels and more access to credit.2020 
Individuals interfacing with markets may be somewhat attributable to firms 
moving away from “defined benefit plans” (guaranteeing a specific retirement 
income) towards “defined contribution” plans, owned and managed by 
employees.2021  Finance now also has a “daily” role in media placement and 
culture, and around the globe governments look to adopt “finance-friendly 
policies” including accommodating market structures, central bank 
independence, and reduced capital regulations.2022  
 
Financialization has many significant societal and economic 
implications. Some scholars cite it association with the “collapse” of the middle 
class,2023 an increase in speculative trading,2024 the proliferation of leverage and 
debt,2025 the propagation of “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions,2026 a decline 
in productivity growth, 2027  political volatility and class-based cultural 
warfare, 2028  “warped” societal values, 2029  manufacturing outsourcing and 
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2020 See L. Hyman, Debtor Nation: How Consumer Credit Built Postwar America, 9 
ENTERPRISE AND SOCIETY 614, 614-18 (2008). 
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REVIEW 243, 243-260 (2004); see Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual funds 
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11, 11-21 (2008). 
2022 Davis & Kim, supra note 2018 at 204.  
2023 See generally Les Leopold, Big Lie: America Doesn’t Have #1 Richest Middle-Class In 
The World…We’re Ranked 27th, HUFFPOST (June 28, 2013), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/les-leopold/big-lie-america-doesnt-ha_b_3516185.html.  
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income inequality, 2030  lower rates of entrepreneurialism, 2031  and declining 
manufacturing, industrial investment,2032 and productive enterprise.2033 These 
negative sentiments lead one to recall Karl Polanyi’s famous “transformation” 
assessment of markets – that they first are “embedded in social relations”2034 and 
then they evolve to later capture all of society which becomes merely “an 
accessory to the economic system.”2035  Financialization has also been criticized 
as “money for nothing”2036 and associated with a form of unproductive economic 
“rent seeking.”2037   
 
Some even go as far as calling it “unproductive finance” and a cause of 
societal income inequality.2038  Concerns have been cited in the literature that 
excessive financial industry compensation may be “leeching growth from other 
sectors” and enticing students to pursue financial careers over other, more 
productive, ventures. 2039  Lord Adair Turner, former head of the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, 2040  has stated that many modern 
financial market activities are “economically useless”2041  and laments banks 
 
2030 See Davis & Kim, supra note 2018. 
2031 See Stacey Higginbotham, Are Crappy Start-ups Wall Street’s Fault? GIGAOM (March 24, 
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modulating credit for speculative trading away from “productive” enterprises 
(like manufacturing).2042  Financialization may also be related to speculation-
driven asset price bubbles2043 It is possible that financialization may have also 
created a “new business cycle” that unlike previous conceptions (based on wage 
and productivity growth) is now driven by “asset price inflation” and “debt-
financed spending.”2044  Other studies suggest that certain types of financial 
product innovations have increased volatility (through “interaction” effects and 
“flash crashes”) 2045  – a contention supported by numerous findings in this 
dissertation.  A wide array of studies also links financialization to income 
inequality,2046 and as negatively impacting employment.2047  
 
Yet it cannot be denied that modern financial markets have created many 
positive benefits including economic diversification, enhanced financial product 
supply, improved allocation of risk to capable bearers and reduced financing 
costs for businesses;2048 enhanced liquidity, price discovery, credit expansion, 
global interaction, information transmission and utilization;2049 and the potential 
for finance to positively engineer social change and facilitate socially 
responsible investing.2050  The continuing expansion of finance has arguably 
made markets more efficient in many ways.2051 Increased trading can lead to 
stabilizing activity when prices deviate from efficient levels, and it also enhances 
 
2042 See Tom Clark, Between Debt and the Devil by Adair Turner Review – Should The 
Government Start Printing Money? THE GUARDIAN (November 25, 2015), 
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market liquidity 2052  The IMF has associated “financial development” with 
positive byproducts like “growth”, “resilience”, “diversification and 
management of risk” and “resource allocation.”2053   However, the IMF also 
acknowledges that there may be “limits”2054 to the benefits of financialization 
and that “financial deepening” in mature markets can negatively impact 
productivity growth.2055 As such, the IMF suggests that financial development 
and economic growth has a “bell-shaped” relationship, and a similar “non-linear 
relationship” to economic stability.2056  
 
 There are other arguments in favour of financialization.  Finance “allows 
technologies to be paid for before they exist” thus linking entrepreneurship with 
financial market activity. 2057  As a result, the system can serve as a “bridge 
between the expectations of future profits and the ability to realize them by 
assembling needed resources in the present.”2058 It may also foster economic 
growth.2059 Additionally it can facilitate “information transmission, risk sharing, 
and allocation of capital” as well as increase the quality of financial products and 
services.2060  
 
This dissertation contributes to the “financialization” literature by 
providing a history and institutional back story, assessment of demand factors, 
market size, product variety, use overview, and analysis of emerging risks and 
regulatory concerns in ETPs and ETFs. It has shown how a post-GFC explosion 
in the size, complexity and variety of the ETF market has interconnected a 
multitude of financial market participants in a complex operational ecosystem 
driven by discretionary incentives, and that this in turn has given rise to new 
systemic risks and informational inefficiencies.  
 
 
2052 See generally Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1953). 
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Further, it has detailed, in a unique and original way how ETFs, and their 
sponsors, are generating new interconnectivity-based systemic risks; and that 
existing regulatory frameworks in the U.S. are insufficient to adequately curtail 
emerging concerns. It has also illuminated, in a first of its kind investigation that, 
due to a myriad of industry discretionary behaviors and disclosure inefficiencies, 
simple “side-by-side” product comparisons in ETFs are extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to undertake.  
 
Fragilities embedded in the ETF ecosystem were prominently manifest 
in the March 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.  Here parallels between ETFs and 
disruptive financial innovations from the past - portfolio insurance in the October 
1987 “Black Monday” stock market crash, and auction rate securities in the GFC 
– became clear.  The promise of instant liquidity, when such liquidity is 
dependent on the discretionary actions of financial institutions, is illusory at best, 
and destabilizing at worst.  The Federal Reserve’s unprecedented act of buying 
credit ETFs as a stabilization measure during the COVID-19 crisis highlights 
how important, and interconnected, ETFs have become to modern capital 
markets.  Even more ominously, the crisis has illuminated how influential 
BlackRock – the largest of all ETF sponsors – has become.   
 
Contextual to the submission of this dissertation new studies are 
emerging which support the conclusions and assessments from this doctoral 
research: namely the world’s largest asset managers (who are also the world’s 
largest ETF sponsors) are growing systemically important with an 
unprecedented level of economic power and influence, and with the growth of 
these firms, and the ETF market as a whole, there is a corresponding increase in 
market volatility and noise transmission, and a decrease in the informational 
efficiency of securities prices.2061   
 
 The conclusions and assessments from this dissertation regarding ETFs 
and ETPs harken the work of Hyman Minsky and his “money manager 
capitalism hypothesis” (MMCH).2062  Minsky, who rose to public prominence 
 
2061
 See Chris Flood, Top 10 Institutional Investors Fuel Market Volatility, Study Finds, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (August 8, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/00bb26e7-16ac-45b1-b56e-
74f8f0aa7e42?shareType=nongift; see Itzak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi, 
John Sedunov, The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors, NBER WORKING PAPERS 
NO. 22247 (July 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22247. 
2062 See L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial 
Crisis, Working Paper 661, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE (1996); Hyman 
Minsky, Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies,  
Working Paper 155, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE (1996); Hyman P. 
Minsky, Money Manager Capitalism, HYMAN P. MINSKY ARCHIVE. Paper 13 (1989), 
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after the GFC with his endogenous theory of financial instability, which posited 
that over periods of extended economic tranquility banks and other financial 
intermediaries destabilize the financial system by introducing increasingly risky 
products and credit,2063 also cautioned against the destabilizing impact that asset 
managers could levy on the financial system.2064  Minsky warned that financial 
markets would evolve as a function of the profit seeking activities of financial 
firms themselves, not just those businesses undertaking traditional or 
“productive” enterprises, and that over time this would make the financial 
system more fragile, while increasing the size and power of large financial 
intermediaries – particularly asset managers.2065  
 
 While ETPs and ETFs undoubtedly have significant benefits, this 
dissertation has also shown they are creating new risks and regulatory concerns.  
While further investigation into this sector is warranted (and the industry will 
undoubtedly continue to grow, resulting in more academic and regulatory 
studies) this dissertation suggests three core recommendations. 
 
First, considering their growing economic influence (and market 
concentration), complex lawyers of interconnectivity, creation of new unique 
risks, and government backstop (and in the case of BlackRock even sway) greater 
regulatory scrutiny and safeguards are warranted for the largest ETF sponsors. 
Second, enhanced controls and standards over credit ETFs, liquidity 
transformation, and the proliferation of “cash-like” ETF products should be 
considered.  Third, investor-focused reforms aiding ETF comparisons (even if 
these reforms are paradigm shifting in terms of disclosure) are needed.  
 
In conclusion, this dissertation highlights a variety of areas where further 
research is warranted, and the author intends on pursuing such investigations 
post-doctorate.  First, there is a clear need for further research on the systemic 
importance of ETFs and the growing power and influence of their sponsors 
(including the world’s largest asset managers such as BlackRock and Vanguard).  
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Such lines of inquiry harmonize with the previously noted MMCH – a theory 
that should be further mined for its wisdom in nascent market developments.  
 
Additional investigations into nascent ETF structures that are emerging 
contextual to this dissertation submission such as the ETF “model portfolio” 
industry, and active, non-transparent, and “smart-beta” product structures are 
warranted.  Also, it is worthwhile to research growing concerns of model, 
concentration, and correlation risk given the emergence of influential risk 
management systems like BlackRock’s Aladdin program. Relatedly, there is a 
need for further investigation into the implications, and necessary regulatory 
adaptations, relating to ETFs as cash substitutes, as well as the extent ETFs serve 
as volatility drivers with distortive market impacts.  
 
The MMCH also has implications for private equity firms who have 
pivoted recently, away from traditional “leveraged buy-outs” to other forms of 
financial intermediation like credit origination and shadow banking.2066 Given 
the fragilities in credit markets exhibited by the coronavirus pandemic (including 
bond pricing opacity, volume, dealer support, and ETF price dislocations), the 
Federal Reserve’s intervention in the market, and the way that credit ETFs, and 
other shadow banking enterprises, both interconnect borrowers with credit 
product investors, and potentially stimulate investor herds, credit moral hazard, 
and originate to distribute incentives, wide investigation of the modern shadow 
banking industry is critical. Such investigation is in alignment with calls for a 
return to the separation of commercial and investment banking, and enhanced 
controls on financial entities that can issue “cash-like” financial products.2067 
 
Research on modularity and other safeguards to mitigate against the 
harmful impacts of financial market collective action problems are also needed. 
Finally, there should be further investigation into investor-focused disclosure 
ordering, and digital enhancements in ETF disclosures, as well as added 
contextual discussion around critical concepts like ETF arbitrage and index 
composition methodology. Disclosure ordering and digital enhancements also 
have considerable value for general securities disclosure across all issuers.  
  
 
2066
 See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315 (2017); see 
Mark Vandevelde & Sujeet Indap, Apollo: how a private equity giant is navigating the crisis, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (April 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6fce9808-84ab-11ea-b555-
37a289098206. 
2067
 See ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR. TAMING THE MEGABANKS (FORTHCOMING 2020, OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS).  
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